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Abstract 
In Indonesia, successful democratisation from military authoritarian rule has pushed 
the military ‘back to the barracks’ and restored the rule of law.  This process of 
moving from authoritarian-military to civil-juridical authority has taken place in 
multiple ways across the political system, however most notably in the rise of the 
police as an institutional actor, the restoration of their authority over domestic and 
national security and law enforcement.   
 
Scholarship shows how criminality and the criminal contingent have been crucial in 
every way to state formation in Indonesia. Throughout history, the security 
institutions have mediated those forms of criminality and the state’s overarching 
relationship with the illicit. One of the ways the relationship between the state and 
criminal practices has manifested itself has been in the mechanisms of illicit 
extraction and accumulation broadly known as “corruption”. Despite the regularizing 
effects of democratisation, the security sector continues to be resourced primarily by a 
vast illicit economy, called the off-budget economy. I show how Polri’s new 
authoritative role in security and law enforcement has opened up the spoils of this 
economy to the police in two important criminal economies; the gift economy of 
indigenous Chinese traders and the illegal gambling economy in Jakarta.  
 
This thesis demonstrates how the transformation from military-coercive to civil-
juridical modalities of power has not improved the quality of Indonesia’s democracy 
or rule of law. Rather, democratisation has caused a restructuring in the political 
economy of security and facilitated the rise of Polri as a perverse political actor within 
! % 
the Indonesian state and society. The intimacy of the Indonesian state with illicit 
practices has been reconfigured anew.  
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Figure 1: Diagram of State & Public Accountability of the National Police. The black arrows denote state 
accountability. The blue arrows denote bodies designed to provide public accountability of the police.  Note 
that Polri are directly under the President and that the newly established KOMPOLNAS has the dual 
function of overseeing the police as well as collecting public complaints about them.  
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Figure 2: Organisational Diagram of Regional Police Station (Polda) 
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Figure 3: Organisational Diagram of District Police Station (Polres) 
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Figure 4: Organisational Diagram of Sectoral Police Station (Polsek) 
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Table 1: Ranks of Polri  
Senior Officers: Perwira Tinggi (PATI)  
Jenderal Polisi Police General Four Gold Stars General 
Komisaris Jenderal 
Polisi  
KOMJEN Pol 
Commissioner 
General of Police 
Three Gold stars Lieutenant General 
Inspectur Jenderal 
Polisi 
IRJEN Pol 
(formerly 
MAYJEN) 
Inspector General of 
Police 
Two Gold Stars Major General 
Brigadir Jenderal 
Polisi 
BRIGJEN Pol 
Brigadier General of 
Police 
One Gold Star Brigadier General 
 
Middle officers: Perwira Menengah (PAMEN)  
 
Komisaris Besar 
Polisi 
KOMBES Pol 
Senior Police 
Commissioner 
Three Gold Melati 
(Melati = Jasmine 
Flower)  
Colonel 
Ajun Komisaris 
Besar Polisi 
AKBP 
Adjunct Senior Police 
Commissioner 
Two Gold Melati Lieutenant Colonel 
Komisaris Polisi 
KOMPOL 
Police Commissioner One Gold Melati Major 
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Junior Officers: Perwira Pertama (PAMA)  
 
Ajun Komisaris 
Polisi - AKP 
Adjunct Police 
Commissioner 
Three Gold Bars Captain 
Inspektur Polisi Satu 
- IPTU 
First Police Inspector Two Gold Bars First Lieutenant 
Inspektur Polisi Dua 
IPDA 
Second Police 
Inspector 
One Gold Bar Second Lieutenant 
 
Senior Enlisted Officers: Bintara 
 
Ajun Inspektur Polisi 
Satu – AIPTU 
Adjunct First Police 
Inspector 
Two Silver Double 
Chevrons (pointing 
up)  
Chief Warrant 
Officer 
Ajun Inspectur Polisi 
Dua - AIPDA 
Adjunct Second 
Police Inspector 
One Silver Double 
Chevrons (pointing 
up - M) 
Warrant Officer 
Brigadir Polisi 
Kepala - BRIPKA 
Senior Police 
Brigadier 
Four Silver Chevrons 
(Pointing up) 
Sergeant Major 
BRIGADIR Polisi Police Brigadier Three Silver  
Chevrons (Up) 
Master Sergeant 
Brigadir Polisi Satu 
BRIPTU 
First Police Brigadier Two  Silver 
Chevrons (Up) 
Sergeant 1st Class 
Brigadir Polisi Dua 
BRIPDA 
Second Police 
Brigadier 
One Silver Chevron 
(Pointing Up) 
Sergeant 2nd Class 
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Junior Enlisted Officers – Tamtama 
 
Ajun Brigadir Polisi  
ABRIP 
Adjunct Police 
Brigadier 
Three Red Chevrons 
(pointing Down) 
Corporal 
Ajun Brigadir Polisi 
Satu  ABRIPTU 
Adjunct First Police 
Brigadier 
Two Red Chevrons 
(pointing Down) 
Corporal 1st Class 
Ajun Brigadir Polisi 
Dua 
ABRIPDA 
Adjunct Second 
Police Brigadier 
One Red Chevron 
(pointing Down) 
Corporal 2nd Class 
Bhayangkara Kepala 
- BHARAKA 
Police Agent Three Red Slanted 
Bars 
Police Agent 
Bhayangkara Satu 
BHARATU 
Police Agent  
1st Class 
Two Red Slanted 
Bars 
Police Agent  
1st Class 
Bhayangkara Dua 
BHARADA 
Police Agent 
2nd Class 
One Red Slanted Bar Police Agent 
2nd Class 
Pegawai Negeri Sipil 
– PNS  
Civil Servant   
 
*Since 1998 Polri have changed rank twice, in July 2000 and again in January 2001. 
Where police officers are named in this thesis, their position and rank are stated in 
accordance with standards of the time.  
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Figure 5: Current Territorial Structure of Coercive Apparatus (2008).  Note that the Kodam and Korem do 
not correspond exactly to the territorial structure of Polri. In 2010, under the leadership of Kapolri Bambang 
Danuri, Polri simplified its territorial system by erasing a layer of lesser police stations between the polda and the 
polres, such as the polwil and polwiltabes (Perpres, 2010). 
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Figure 6: 2003 Map of Police and Military Territorial Presence in Jakarta. The yellow areas represent heavy 
industry while the orange is private, corporate land.  Each division represents a kecamatan [subdistrict] of the city.  
Note that this map is of the province zoned as DKI Jakarta and does not include other new property developments 
discussed in the following chapter such as the Jabotabek region of Tangerang, Bekasi, and Bogor. (Dinas 
Pertahanan & Pemetaan, 2003) 
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Figure 7: Map of Central Jakarta showing field site, the ward of Menteng Dalam in the subdistrict of Tebet. 
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Photograph 1 & 2: On the day of the police anniversary [Hari Bhayangkara], public order (Dalmas) troops 
display their skills. They are watched over by a one star (Brig. Gen) general (behind) and a one-jasmine 
! "# 
flower police commissioner (front) from the police internal affairs division (Propam).  Behind them bereted 
troops from the mobile brigade (Brimob) stand to attention.1   
                                                
1 Photographs by Author. 01.07.08.  
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Introduction 
 
‘The days of coup-making by the military are over in this country. The police, on the other 
hand, will pose quite a few problems’. 
Argentine Police Officer, 19842 
 
 ‘Now days, the police are the pretty girl of politics, to be fought 
over by the political powers’. 
                         Three star Polri general. 
 
‘Uang, uang, uang, semua di sini tentang uang’.  
             ‘Money, money, money, everything here is about money.’  
                                One star Polri general at HQ. 
 
 
Democratisation and the Illicit Financing of the State  
 
This thesis is about the off-budget economies of Indonesia’s security apparatus, how 
these criminal economies are shaped and rearranged by a process of ‘successful’ 
democratisation, and what in turn those effects say about the state’s ongoing 
relationship to illicit practices.  
 
                                                
2 Quoted in Eaton, Kent, 2008, ‘Paradoxes of Police Reform: Federalism, Parties and Civil Society in 
Argentina’s Public Security Crisis’. Latin American Research Review, vol. 43, no. 3, pp. 5-34.  
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We know much about what happens, or at least what should happen, when military-
authoritarian states undergo democratisation. Militaries surrender their prominent 
positions in politics and domestic security to defer to civilian supremacy. The political 
structure of the state and its decision-making processes are opened up and subject to 
liberalising forces. At the same time, states undergo a process of entrenchment 
through the strengthening of the rule of ‘law’ and institution building.  Case studies of 
democratisation generally look at these tangible, ‘sunlit’ (Bridenthal, 2012) elements 
of the state - militaries, elections, local politics, civil society and law – in order to 
evaluate the tenor and quality of the democratisation process.  Certainly this approach 
has a strong following in the study of Indonesia’s recent democratisation. In this 
dissertation, I take a different view and demonstrate that we get a very different kind 
of understanding of the potentials and limits of democratic change by looking at the 
hidden criminal practices central to the state’s existence. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, I narrow my focus to the off-budget economy that sustains the 
Indonesian security sector, principally the National Indonesian Police (Polri). By the 
‘off-budget economy’, I am referring to divergent and hidden sources of cash, gifts 
and other material resources that together illicitly finance the police institution and its 
agents.  
 
Politically embedded studies of the ‘off budget economy’ are not a feature of the 
literature on democratisation.  Indeed, ‘off-budget economy’ is not a term common to 
the political science literature. A comparable, though dissonant, literature on a parallel 
concept, the ‘extra-budgetary economy’, exists in the scholarship on public finance 
and fiscal management. Much of this scholarship is dominated by publications from 
the IMF or the World Bank. Here, extra-budgetary funds (EBF) ‘refer to general 
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government transactions, often with separate banking and institutional arrangements 
that are not included in the annual state (federal) budget law and the budgets of 
subnational levels of government’ (Allen & Radev, 2010).  EBF complement regular 
budgetary funds, but because they are accumulated through institutional 
entrepreneurship, the EBF are managed with different or decreased stringency. They 
are a flexible revenue source, provided by voluntary donation or through enterprise, 
available for contingent purposes and largely unregulated.  For instance, foreign aid is 
a source of EBF. So too are voluntary donations to the United Nations. What is 
remarkable is that since the 1980s EBF increasingly constitute a primary, rather than a 
supplementary, revenue source. If organisations are increasingly funded ‘off the 
regularising track’ of public revenues, this raises questions about whether priorities 
are being made in the public or donor interest (Vaughn et al. 1996).  
 
As well as transactions, states also establish ‘extra-budgetary’ operations, accounts or 
entities that lay outside the purview of public funding (Allen & Radev, 2010).  An 
extra-budgetary unit might raise money through the imposition of levies in order to 
fund services.  The extra-budgetary nature of these entities raises important questions 
about the state’s ability to discipline its various internal components and know its real 
fiscal position. However, this literature underscores that one of the biggest problems 
with extra-budgetary funding is that their flexible and under-regulated nature leaves 
them open to misuse and corruption.  
 
EBF are a prominent feature of the fiscal system of developing and transitional states 
with decentralized or decentralising governments, such as in Russia (Ross, 1987), 
highly fragmented power structures such as Lebanon or dominant militaries such as 
! "# 
Nigeria (Omitoogun & Oduntan, 2006). EBF are a feature of state financing in every 
state in Africa (Levy & Kpundah, 2004, pp. 198).  This is also due to unreliability and 
inefficiencies in the public funds transfer system, leading for instance in 
Mozambique, to entire ministries relying solely on EBF to fund governance (ibid, pp. 
170).   
 
The literature on EBF and fiscal irregularity is most developed in the case of China, 
where the relationships between local and central governments are central to the life 
of the regime.  These reforms – ‘eating from two kitchens’ - have created the 
conditions for the expansion of an extra-budgetary economy so great that it is known 
informally as the ‘second budget’ (Wang, pp. 87, 95).  Indeed, the estimated total sum 
of this budget far exceeds that of public revenues (ibid, also, Pei, 2008, 177-8).   
 
In an important article that brings together the literature on public finance and 
corruption in developmental states, Lu argues that EBF in local Chinese governments 
form the basis for a system of ‘organisational corruption’ (2000).  The levying of 
taxes and fees are one way in which local governments extract EBF. This is in 
keeping with theories of state predation, where the apparatus of extraction studied is 
lawful (Levi, 1981; Tilly, 1986; Thies, 2007; Thies, 2009) though illegitimate.  
However, local governments also use criminal means to accumulate EBF.  They levy 
illicit charges, use regulatory powers unlawfully, fail to report earnings, establish 
secret ‘slush funds’ and companies to monopolise local resources and contracts.  
Closeted from the central fiscal apparatus, extra-budgetary funds feed a vast internal 
economy –‘wining and dining, gifts and bribes’ - for the career advancement of and 
power-hoarding by state officials (2000, 281).  Lu’s analysis shows us the importance 
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of opening up the analysis of state predation to criminal activity by demonstrating 
how methods for the extraction of unregulated state finance traverse licit and illicit 
worlds. In their own analysis of local government budgets in China, Lin and Song use 
the terms ‘off-budget’ and ‘extra-budgetary funds’ interchangeably (2007, pp. 63). 
This is indicative of the way state predation adopts legal and illegal forms which often 
reinforce and bolster each other to maximize illicit extraction.   
 
Lu argues that extra-budgetary financing is a critical tool of what he calls “organised 
corruption”, which he defines as ‘illicit action …by a public agency to achieve 
monetary or material gains for the agency as a whole through the use of its power or 
monopoly’ (ibid, 274).  Lu concludes that organised corruption in China is a 
transitional phenomenon that scores a precise moment in Chinese state formation 
when the developmental state meets a traditional administrative system. His notion of 
corruption as organised or institutionalized critiques conventional definitions of 
corruption – such as ‘the abuse of public office for private gain’ (Nye, 1967) - that 
approach ‘corrupt’ practice as merely an expression of individual deviance. Rather, 
Lu’s idea of ‘organised corruption’ nods to the overall structural context in which 
extra-budgetary funds are accumulated and the fact that the beneficiaries of EBF are 
not just greed-driven state officials but whole branches of local government that rely 
upon the shadow economy to enact practices and performances of governance. By 
locating ‘corruption’ in local government ‘organisation’, Lu protects our idea of the 
state. Local institutions act in predatory and criminal ways, while federal authorities 
are motivated by the same positivist regulatory and legal impulses that we expect of 
states.  
 
! "# 
But there is a clear tension between the failure or inability to eradicate localized 
‘organised corruption’ and reaping the benefits from it. After all it is the federal 
authorities that have reduced their allocations to their provincial tiers, encouraged 
self-financing and taken an ambiguous stance on illicit revenue-raising activity, 
oscillating between a feigned ignorance and a stern ‘crackdown’. ‘Organisational 
corruption’ fails to recognize that the Chinese state has created the specific 
configuration of social, political and economic life under which EBF can flourish, 
undermining ordinary tax revenues and giving life to a vast subterranean economy 
that underpins and finances the workings of the state.  As a theoretical concept, 
‘organisational corruption’ reinforces a positivist distance between state and illicit 
practices. The criminality of the state is an aberrance that stands outside of and in 
opposition to the formal and functional purpose of governance.  Rather, in this thesis, 
I propose that all states extend themselves through illicit practices; indeed, that states 
are criminal by nature.  
 
Critical legal and anthropological scholarship of the state has much to offer the study 
of the criminality of states. As Smart observes, ‘the modern state is not made up of 
law and order alone, but a complex web of the legal and illegal’ (1999). The focus on 
‘the convergence of legal and illegal practice’ (Bridenthal, 2012) exposes the idolatry 
of the State and its disciplining technologies of law and regulation (Nuitjen & Anders, 
2007), and details the perverse and indirect ways in which the fixing of law ‘creates 
the conditions under which criminal economies flourish’ (Heyman & Smart, 1999).  
In this literature law mystifies and masks state predation. Law claims a democratic 
applicability, immutability and replicability and yet ethnography has shown us how 
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law is situated and indeterminate (Ling, 2011, Hoag, 2011). Thus, it is law itself that 
acts the midwife to its own violation (Nuitjen & Anders, 2006).  
 
Ethnography has shown how states, through law, produce and prey upon structures, 
groups and practices that it simultaneously marks as ‘criminal’ (Heyman & Smart, 
1999; Roitman, 2004; Nordstrom, 2010, Coutin, 2005, Penglase 2009, Naylor, 2010). 
This literature has shown how the power to determine illegality is itself productive for 
states; substantiating arguments for its own aggrandizement and militarisation 
(Caldiera, 2000, Tilly, 1985), justifying neoliberal policies (Comaroff & Comaroff, 
2006; Galemba, 2008), supplying cheap, easily disposable streams of labour (Hansen 
& Stepputat, 2005, Coutin, 2005), freeing monies and markets from public scrutiny 
(Roitman, 2004) as well as ‘parsing individual and groups lives into categories’ 
(Penglase, Kane & Parnell, 2009; 109). This generates specific kinds of citizens 
(Caldiera, 2000; Roitman 2004, Hansen & Stepputat, 2005, Comaroff, 2009) and 
‘guilty’ subjectivities (Griffin, 2011). This rich and detailed literature illustrates the 
centrality of law to state predation and consequently, the poverty of the ‘corruption’ 
concept, ‘organised’ or ‘individual’.   
 
However, most scholarship in this vein has fixed its ethnographic gaze on politically 
stable if ‘disorderly’ post-colonies. This critical literature has been much less attentive 
as to how political change has transformed the embedded illicit practices of states. 
Democratisation is particularly interesting to the study of criminal states for two 
reasons. Firstly, democratisation beckons a wholesale reorganisation of the 
distribution of political power.  This is a celebrated aim of democratisation however, 
empirically rich studies have repeatedly thrown up the perverse and unintended 
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effects of power’s dispersion (Ryter, 2009; Hadiz, 2003, Shakow, 2011). In Indonesia, 
for instance, democratisation from military authoritarian rule under President Suharto 
has given rise to the emergence of plethora ‘mini-Suhartos’ (Nordholt & Van 
Klinken, 2007) studded across a decentralising political system. Given that patterns in 
crime have long reflected the complex configurations of political power, it stands to 
reason that democratisation will reorganise the modalities of extraction, modes of 
accumulation and instrumental parties invested in the state’s relationship to the 
criminal world.  Oddly, the reorganisation of state criminality occurs in ways that 
maintains the performance of successful democratisation rather than fatally 
undermining it.  
 
Secondly, one of the central tenets of democratisation is that it promises a 
regularisation of state processes and a regulatory disciplining of populations, by 
reinstating the rule of law. In this way, democratisation marks an important moment 
in state formation, fixing definitively the practices of the state to an objectified, 
articulated body of knowledge we call law.  Theoretically, rule of law assures 
‘political rights, civil liberties, and mechanisms of accountability which in turn affirm 
the political equality of all citizens and constrain potential abuses of state power’ 
(O’Donnell, 2004). Rule of law pledges the effective, responsive functioning of 
government and provides the requisite stability for free markets to flourish. In this 
way, rule of law promises a new political modernity, an alluring prosperity, and a 
leveling of the irregular, corrupt and criminal rumples of the post-authoritarian state. 
However, if we presume that all states at all levels of formation make instrumental 
use of criminal worlds, then democratisation represents a critical moment wherein the 
forms and ideology of illicit extraction contract, expand or are otherwise reorganised.  
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If the forms and degree of state criminality traverses a spectrum, from the overt 
criminality of pariah and authoritarian narco-states (McCoy, 1999) to the 
sophisticated illegality of established democracies reaping profits from laundered 
monies (Sharman, 2011), then democratisation marks the critical mid-way point in the 
reconfiguration of the state’s relationship to criminal practice. Because 
democratisation reorganises political power and regularises the state, democratisation 
heralds new players, new means of extraction, new logics of criminality and new 
scales of illicit accumulation. This thesis examines the changes democratisation has 
brought in the illicit financing of the Indonesian state and argues that exercises to 
strengthen the rule of law have in fact provided a new basis upon which to extract and 
accumulate illicit wealth.   
 
 Genealogy of a Criminal State  
 
Indonesia is an ideal case study to examine the relationship between political change, 
law and illicit practice because the New Order’s own relationship to law veered 
between extremes of fetish and ambiguity3. As scholarship has demonstrated, the 
dimensions of the regime’s criminality were multiple, even national (Siegel, 1998). In 
1965-66 the regime led by General Suharto established itself in a military coup – a 
moment of legal exception that became known as the New Order. Paradoxically, the 
New Order founded itself in a sustained period of rural chaos in which hundreds of 
thousands of suspected Communists were effectively massacred by military officers 
and ordinary civil agents working in tandem.  Despite coming to power on a pledge to 
                                                
3 Siegel, James, 1998, A New Criminal Type in Jakarta: Counter Revolution Today, 
Duke University Press, Durham. Ryter, Loren, 2002, ‘Youth, Gangs and the State in 
Indonesia’, PhD thesis, University of Washington, Washington.  
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restore a negara hukum [state of law] (Lev, 2000), the civil-juridical order of law was 
repeatedly trumped by military coercion in the state’s management and manufacture 
of communist and ‘criminal’ threats. It was this disorientating oscillation between rule 
of law and its calculated fracture that characterised the kind of fraught, contingent 
order that the regime sought to install. 
 
First, communists and then criminals were designated as the great specters of disorder 
and illegality under the regime. And yet the New Order state’s own relationship to 
criminality was direct and literal. The state party, Golkar [Golongan Karya, or the 
Functional Groups party], regularly nurtured and employed criminals and gangsters 
known as preman to disrupt elections, tarnish the opposition and legitimise General 
Suharto’s epic thirty-two year presidency. Similarly ABRI [Angkatan Bersenjata 
Republik Indonesia], the New Order’s primary coercive apparatus that subsumed the 
national police [Polri] under the military, carried out extrajudicial law enforcement 
and defensive tasks through nationalist militia and preman [state-sponsored gangster] 
organisations.  
 
In 1983 when this groomed criminal contingent grew unruly, their tattooed corpses 
mysteriously littered the morning markets, stations and cinemas. The killings, known 
as Petrus, took place with the applause of the middle classes for whom the coercive-
authoritarian nature of the state rightly eclipsed legal process.  Repeated references to 
Petrus in the literature on criminality in Southeast Asia (Barker, 1999; Pemberton, 
1994; Siegel, 1998) agree that the execution of thieves marked a critical moment in 
state formation in which the basis for legitimate state authority was revealed as 
essentially coercive rather than legal, as the regime had repeatedly claimed. The broad 
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swell of support for the mass execution of thieves suggested something too of the 
unique way in which extrajudicial violence under the New Order could dispel the 
boundaries between state and society (Mitchell, 1991; Ryter, 2002). Observes 
Bourchier,  
 
Perhaps the most telling cleavage which the Petrus episode helped to illuminate was not 
between ‘the state’ and ‘civil society’ but between those within the state whose concept 
of authority is ultimately based on the force of arms and those who aspire to a future in 
which law replaces violence as the most effective medium of social control (1990; 201. 
My italics).  
 
What made Petrus more than an instance of utilitarian or instrumentalised state 
criminality was the way in which the practice of the killings and their discursive 
forms revealed an unexpected and intimate envy between the state and the plebian 
criminal classes. Notes Siegel, ‘to the state, the menace was an attraction. It was the 
lethal power that the state wanted for its own…the state itself took on the form of a 
criminal in order to obtain this power’ (1998, pg 9). That the New Order sought to 
periodically mimic the criminal in order to possess something of his power shows the 
regime’s complex, often contradictory, relationship to law and its curious recognition 
that power resides in legal and socio-cultural orders alike.  
 
Compounding its violence, the New Order was also a kleptocratic regime par 
excellence. The president parceled out monopolies to mainly ethnic Chinese 
[Tionghoa] cronies in return for kickbacks to his family and other courted political 
power brokers, such as ABRI. Moreover, by simultaneously overpopulating and then 
under-resourcing the bureaucratic apparatus, President Suharto encouraged the state’s 
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institutions and its agents to build their budgets from the harvest of illegal tithes, 
bribes, industries of vice, foundations and businesses (McLeod, 2008).  By promoting 
the individual entrepreneurial fiscal ethic of state institutions, Suharto weakened the 
capacity of the state to function as a coherent bureaucratic structure. Aside from their 
magnetic loyalty to the executive, the President created a state whose components 
functioned independently as primarily business enterprises.  State institutions were 
networked but lateral ties were strained as institutions competed for the legal and 
regulatory authorities that would yield illicit rents.  
 
Within the internal hierarchy of the state, ABRI’s authority over coercion and its 
proximity to the President meant that the institution’s fiscal claims trounced all others. 
This turned the Indonesian armed forces into one of the most formidable economic 
players in the country (Rinakit, 2005; McCulloch, 2003; HRW, 2006, Crouch 1978, 
Crouch, 2010, pp. 161-69). Akin to many other militaries in Burma, Egypt or Pakistan 
(Siddiqua, 2007), ABRI’s fiscal deprivation lent legitimacy to a vast ‘business 
octopus’ of formal enterprises with significant stakes in the country’s timber, tourism, 
shipping, warehouse, palm oil and fishery industries. A review of military enterprises 
conducted in 2006 found 219 legal enterprises established as co-operatives and 
foundations that provided extra-budgetary funding for local commands (Crouch, 
2010, pp. 168). ABRI also held primary stakes in the black markets of luxury 
vehicles, petrol and firearms (Yunanto, 2002). The military was deeply invested in the 
industries of vice, providing protection and investment funds for the illicit gaming, 
narcotics and sex work industries. This strong illicit element separates off-budget 
economy from a wider literature on state predation and extrabudgetary funding, which 
examines activities that lawful but illegitimate (Levi, 1981; Tilly, 1986; Thies, 2007; 
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Thies, 2009). As in China’s local governments, the off-budget economy of the 
security apparatus levered lawful authority, securitized power and illicit practice to 
maximize extraction.  
 
A second hierarchy within the armed forces ensured the spoils were distributed 
according to an idiom of siblinghood; first to the army, then the navy, then their air-
force and finally, to the ‘littlest child’ [anak bungsu], the police. From this vast 
stratified off-budget economy, bloated by protection rackets, untendered contracts and 
coerced monopolies, monies percolated upwards on a political hierarchy over which 
Suharto presided.  
 
The New Order’s off-budget economy was configured and organised in other 
important ways. Crucially, not all illegalities were the same and the moral 
stratification of illegal practice is suggestive of the remarkable tenacity of law to 
shape the contours of its own transgression. As this thesis will show, the criminal 
practices of the New Order elite were differentiated by their proximity to and capacity 
to mime law. For instance, the President cherry-picked the most legally congruent and 
structurally embedded opportunities for fiscal misconduct for himself and his cronies 
(the awarding of development contracts, charitable foundations and the national lotto) 
and left the most criminally apparent forms of racketeering (such as the ‘dirty work’ 
of providing protection to illegal economies or the collection of rents from a groomed 
criminal class) for his franchisees.  In so doing, Suharto created the discursive subject 
of the oknum, the corrupt or aberrant state official. The oknum is recognisable in 
Western discourse as the proverbial bad apple or the official who abuses public office 
‘for private gain’ (Nye, 1967). The function of the oknum was to place an individual 
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face on state corruption and ‘produce’ the rule of law. As such, the oknum disguised 
and preserved the underlying structure of the state’s intimate relationship to illegality 
(Ryter, 2002).   
 
But the shadow economy was not an incidental mechanism of corruption and 
individual greed. Rather, in the workings of this shadow economy lay the very stuff of 
governance (Ascher, 1999). The New Order’s longevity was partially due to the 
support it received from the international state system that credited the regime for its 
consistent acts of statehood, its centralized development programs and generous 
expansion into the ordinary lives and territory of Indonesians. However, these 
programs were not funded, as widely thought, through the miraculous combination of 
‘Asian values’ and quasi-liberal economic policies.  Rather, institutions forced to seek 
out their own operating budgets drew the funds for their governance projects from the 
wellspring of illicit monies and protection rackets that made up the shadow economy 
of the state (ibid). In this way, the legitimate practices and processes of everyday 
statecraft for which Indonesia was much feted were produced by and dependent upon 
the state’s own criminal deviance. 
 
The 1997 Asian financial crisis lifted the lid on Suharto’s fiscal sultanate, revealing 
the myths of Indonesia’s economic success. When ordinary Indonesians and students 
hit the streets in early 1998 calling for his resignation, they were united by a deep 
sense of anger about the criminality of his rule neatly surmised in popular chant of 
‘KKN’ [korupsi, kolusi dan nepotism] or ‘corruption, collusion and nepotism’. The 
multiple demands of the time have been squeezed into the shorthand of  
‘democratisation’. Protestors called for human rights, for the separation of police from 
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the military and for freedom of speech. There is no doubt that Indonesians wanted 
political power to be dispersed democratically, but the calls for the supremacy of law, 
the regularisation of governmental process and the end of government corruption 
were the most strident of all.  
 
Deserted by a heavily factionalised military, the New Order collapsed with the May 
1998 resignation of Suharto thus initiating Southeast Asia’s single most successful 
transition to democracy. In thirteen short years, Indonesia’s democratisation process 
has met the primary benchmarks for a consolidated democracy. Indonesia has held 
four national elections, resoundingly declared free and fair. Civil and political 
liberties are dignified in law. Indonesia has reorganised and devolved the state’s 
internal balance of power by embarking upon the world’s biggest decentralisation 
process.  
 
Some of the country’s most celebrated democratic triumphs have been in the security 
sector, the reform of which is a key milestone in the democratisation literature 
(Stepan, 1998; Karl, 1990).  ABRI has been dismantled, stripped of its political 
privileges and its business empire. Critically, democratisation has reformed the 
security sector, establishing the police and the military as two separate institutions 
whose forms and functions follow the conventional in/out of traditional state 
organisation4. This means that the power over everyday security, the military’s 
greatest fiscal and political asset, is today handled by the civilian arm of coercion; the 
national police [Polri].   
                                                
4 Notes Bayley on the difference between police and military: ‘an army is publicly constituted to use 
force just as police are, but its jurisdiction is external to the collectivity. An army uses force to defend a 
community from threats outside itself; a police force protects against threats from within (my italics) 
(Bayley, 1975, pp. 329).   
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Restoring police ‘back on the streets’ and militaries ‘back to the barracks’ is an 
uncontested benchmark of democratic consolidation. However, in Indonesia, where 
state authority is a prized economy, the rise of the police has fundamentally disturbed 
the military’s off-budget economy.  After decades of resource deprivation and sibling 
humiliation, the police intend to exact their rightful share of the security economy. 
This thesis shows how illicit mechanisms of extraction that were central to the 
military’s off-budget economy have been intercepted by Polri, reflecting the wider 
reorganisation of the security sector and the retreat of the TNI in the post-
authoritarian era.  Democratisation and ‘security sector reform’ has effectively 
rerouted the streams of illicit wealth to the police. The expansion of the police’s off-
budget economy has been justified within Polri and incentivized by the state by 
underfunding the police, delaying reform of fiscal management practices, and failing 
to implement the mechanisms of public and state oversight over the police that would 
inhibit the growth of such an economy.  
 
By drawing attention to the perverse ways in which the democratic reorganisation of 
the state’s coercive apparatus rearranged the mechanisms of illicit accumulation from 
military to police, I show how democratic regime change, with all its attendant 
proclamations of restoring ‘the rule of law’ and reestablishing of civilian control over 
the military, in fact aggravates the illicit political economy of security within the 
state’s coercive institutions and leaves the underlying structure that provides moral 
and economic incentives to seek illicit financing untouched.  
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The Structure of Polri 
 
Polri is a new institution and old institution, a distinction that reflects the number of 
transformations the Indonesian state has undergone since the birth of the republic in 
1945. Polri was the very first institution recognized by the new Indonesian republic 
and is thus, the state’s oldest body. But by the late 1950s in a period known as the 
Guided Democracy, the police institution was slowly subsumed into ABRI, where the 
police became the final and least important, fourth sibling of the security sector.  
Their separation from ABRI in 1999 makes the national police one of the first 
institutions created in the reformasi era5.    
 
Today, Polri bask in the pride of being an ‘independent’ and ‘autonomous’ institution. 
These two words are an important part of all of their policy statements and ‘master-
plans’ for reform. For the police, institutional independence is a spoil won after three 
decades of being the least respected, least resourced fourth sibling under ABRI. As 
such, Polri guard this independence jealously and invoke the bad old days of New 
Order authoritarianism when it is threatened. Ironically, they see the main threat to 
that autonomy in reformists and democrats who protest that the current system of 
oversight, their direct supervision by the Indonesian president, politicises the police 
[See Figure 1].  The police argue that they are also overseen by parliament, via 
Commission 3, and the newly established police commission (Kompolnas) that is a 
hybrid body that has the conflicting mandates of providing state and public oversight. 
However, because the President is a person not a body, it falls to Polri to manage 
policing (in that they draft the laws, design reforms, and administer the budget) and 
                                                
5 This separation effectively forged the military as well as ABRI was dissolved and the TNI (National 
Indonesian military) was reinstituted to house the army, airforce and navy.  
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implement policing. In this way, Polri have established an effective monopoly on 
policing in the republic.  
 
To manage these two tasks effectively, Polri’s internal bureaucracy is vast. Within 
Polri HQ [Mabes Polri], there is a law department, operations department, panel of 
experts to the Kapolri, procurement and planning department (where the budgeting is 
organised) and centralized departments for all of Polri’s regional level schools (SPN) 
and national level academies (AKPOL and PTIK). Outside of Mabes Polri, Polri’s 
tiers mimic that of government. They have a regional level station [polda] in each 
province, a district station [polres] for each district, a sectoral station for each 
subdistrict and police posts under those. Each tier is overseen by its relevant chief of 
police; the Kapolda [regional police chief] at the regional level, the Kapolres [district 
police chief] at the district and the Kapolsek [sectoral police chief] at the subdistrict. 
Each tier is fitted with a department for criminal investigations, intelligence and patrol 
although the regional and district stations boast far more sophisticated managerial and 
operational systems.  As with Indonesia’s wider democratic decentralisation, the 
district level tier (Polres) has been ‘empowered’ with new authorities and resources. 
All of this vast infrastructure and Polri’s 400 000 strong personnel sits below the 
Kapolri (the national chief of police) and the penultimate cop, the Indonesian 
president.  
 
Figures 2-4 represent the structure of Polri in neat organisational charts.  
One observes quickly that Figures 2-4 bear the same shape, a central trunk with 
branches extending out, as if the institution were arranged like an upside down tree. 
These are ultimately representations of authority: power flows downward and out 
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from a key decision making unit or station. In Jakarta, figures 2-4 are important 
artifacts affixed to the desks of the every police analyst and development consultant in 
Jakarta. One document in particular, the internal map of Mabes Polri (not figured 
here) is marked expressly ‘not for copy’. This only increases its currency and trade for 
gifts, debts and favours.  The document is classified because everybody, civilian and 
police, believes that secreted within the tree is a hidden pattern of appointments that 
will shed light on Polri’s opaque internal politics, its illicit fiscal flows and points of 
criminal accumulation.  Experts often point to certain departments, postings or 
stations that command material gain or political influence. In Mabes Polri, the Kapolri 
rallies influence by posting allies to the heads of criminal research and planning and 
development departments.  There is even talk that draws lines off the page, tying 
certain departments and officers to the forces of capital, political parties or the 
executive.  In this model, police are clients tied through relations of debt and 
reciprocity to a resource-rich patron. Strung together and multiplied, dyadic ties 
become tree-like clusters below a patron who distributes resources (Scott, 1972).  
 
However, ethnography reveals alternative ways of knowing the police institution. 
Outwardly, the police are a tree but beneath the surface, they bear all the 
characteristics of the tuber, submerged and hidden, with its multiple knotted arms 
weighed down by bulbous growths and peculiar extensions. The illicit financing of 
the police gives the institution the shape of a rhizome. The structure of the rhizome is 
dictated by principles of autonomy, ‘connection and heterogeneity’ (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 2004a), or as my informants call it, gaul ke mana-mana, or hanging out 
everywhere. The rhizome is formed through the ceaseless impulse of officers to make 
the kinds of internal and external connections that will yield illicit gains, political or 
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material to feed the off-budget economy. The police are fractured by their 
relationships to ethnic Chinese capital, political parties, goons, the criminalized class, 
timber barons, plantation owners, religious leaders, NGOs and other claimants to 
‘community representation’.  In this way, the police organisation is constantly 
agglomerating new, subterranean chains of power and privilege that disturb and jar 
their arboreal arrangements, both formal and patrimonial.  
 
As one would expect, humps and protuberances form around seniors and their 
factions, fraternities and alumni (Barker, 1999). But the rhizome is ‘anti-genealogical’ 
as other connections and growths override traditional lineages of authority.  
Democratisation and the fragmentation of power have lent an entrepreneurial zeal to 
the middle and lower officer ranks. Whereas under the New Order rank organised and 
disciplined practices of illegality – it would be unthinkable for the lower rungs to 
challenge illicit practices ‘backed’ by a General – the kind of rational-legal authority 
aspired to by the rise of the civil-juridical displaces the source of authority outside the 
charismatic or patrimonial attributes of the person.  Perversely, by attaching the 
exercise of authority to office rather than person space has been opened up for junior 
officers to destabilize the money-making schemes and rackets of their senior officers 
and their networks in private and public office. This has given impetus to junior 
officers to form asymmetrical connections with more senior political and economic 
figures, to subvert the fate of rank and seniority in order to cut in to illicit modes of 
accumulation. Deleuze and Guattari observe that the rhizome, unlike the tree, 
‘assumes very diverse forms, from ramified surface extension in all directions to 
concretion into bulbs and tubers… any point of the rhizome can be connected to 
anything other, and must be’ (1983; 11).   
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Because of this, the police rhizome operates in ways unknown to itself and more often 
in contradiction to its divergent parts.  This incoherence - this hyperpoliticisation of 
the force – is an antidote to the formation of political ideology.  Whereas scholarship 
reminds us of the diverse ways that police are distinctly political (Reiner, 2000; 
Jauregui 2010), the literature does not address why that politicisation has not made 
the police more ‘military-like’. Why don’t police initiate coups to save the nation? 
Why don’t they play the role of national guardian? Such questions are important 
given that police have a monopoly on legitimate coercion in a democracy; where they 
have inherited the powerful historical mantle of domestic security from the military; 
where they, more than any other security institution, determine the quality of that 
democracy and who from the polity can participate in it and how; where they sit 
directly below the president and are unencumbered by effective oversight and where 
they have the fiscal might to establish a serious role in the economic sector.  In all of 
these ways, the Polri of contemporary Indonesia could establish themselves as a 
formidable powerbroker of the democratic era. But cultivating the police as tuber, not 
a tree, inhibits professionalisation, cohesion and political intent. It reduces the 
demands of the police to one simple request, that of autonomy, so that the principles 
of connection, fracture and heterogeneity might proceed unhindered. The principle 
political beneficiary of this tuberous structure is not Polri, but the president who 
directly oversees the police.  
 
Connecting Capital and Coercion 
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As expected, points of connection on the rhizome cluster most densely around private 
capital. These connections feed the off-budget economy. In Indonesia, private 
domestic capital is primarily controlled by a minority Chinese ethnicity who comprise 
just 3-4% of the population. In this dissertation, I use the term of their choice -  
Tionghoa -  to refer to ethnic Chinese Indonesians whose presence in the region far 
precedes European colonialism but whose migration to Indonesia peaked in the early 
20th century as industrialising Dutch East Indies demanded cheap, indentured labour 
for its plantations and mines.  Jakarta, then Batavia, was the principle settlement for 
Chinese migrants and their commerce. Throughout their reign, the Dutch encouraged 
Tionghoa entrepreneurship to motor the colonial economy. This policy reached its 
most concentrated point in the late 19th century with the tax farm system that 
established Tionghoa monopolies over critical sectors of the economy while 
withholding their citizenship rights by establishing the Tionghoa as a racial ‘minority’ 
whose fiscal prowess threatened the natives to the archipelago. Subsequent 
indigenous regimes, suspicious of Tionghoa loyalty, continued this approach 
throughout the 20th century and the threat of violence shadowed Tionghoa lives. 
Throughout this period, geopolitical strains provoked local questions as to the true 
nature of Tionghoa identity. These moments of tension were resolved by massacre. 
Tionghoa were attacked under Japanese colonial rule, during China’s shift to 
communism and in the 1965 anti-communist massacres that consolidated New Order 
rule.  
 
This policy of estranged intimacy continued during the New Order. Under President 
Suharto, a select group of Tionghoa conglomerates dominated a centralist, 
authoritarian economy. Tionghoa capitalists received vast untendered contracts in 
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return for substantial stakes for the upper political class in their ventures. Although 
the oligarchy operated primarily at the national level, this basic union of state and 
capital was replicated below at every tier of government. At all levels, ABRI officers, 
particularly the army and the special forces, benefitted from the politico-business 
oligarchy.  Tionghoa entrepreneurship was instrumental to maintaining the military’s 
menagerie of foundations, charities and ventures vested in the Indonesian economy. 
In exchange for access to capital, the Tionghoa, whose security the state willfully and 
persistently undermined, received private security provisions from the most coercive 
and powerful institution within the state.  This fundamental idea of reciprocity and 
mutual gain constituted the basis of the military’s vast off-budget economy under the 
New Order.  
 
Chua argues that the 1997 Asian financial crisis dismantled the politico-business 
oligarchy and policies of economic protectionism for Tionghoa conglomerates. Since 
the crisis, the advance of neoliberal economic policies that comes packaged with 
modern democratisation has uniquely privileged Tionghoa big business.  Economic 
de-regularisation has freed capitalists of their prior dependence on the political class 
and the sheer spread of their assets have placed them in the pole position to succeed in 
a new free market economy (2010).  In this analysis, Tionghoa capitalists are whittled 
down to purely instrumentalist economic actors who wield extraordinary power 
against the state.  
 
But a view from the subterranean depths of the Polri rhizome reveals a divergent truth 
of a persecuted minority who continue to replicate the politico-business oligarchy 
despite the absence of economic utility. Chapter One illustrates how misuse and 
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misallocation of public revenue funds on the ground means that the ‘parman’ 
economy (see below) of Tionghoa gift-giving and patronage, not public revenue, 
continues to be the primary resource of the security sector.  Chapter One demonstrates 
how the oligarchic structure of ABRI, mainly army and special forces officers, and 
Tionghoa capitalists under the New Order has been transformed into an economy of 
‘gifts’ and patronage trafficked to the police. This reorientation of Tionghoa resources 
has followed the democratic reorganisation of the state coercive apparatus. The 
chapter evidences how this is as true for Chua’s Jakarta-based ‘big Chinese 
businessmen’ as it is for the city’s small and medium traders.   
 
The flow of gifts embeds Tionghoa capitalists into the Polri rhizome, connecting 
capitalist and officer in unique relationships. Thus whereas matters of human 
resources are in theory decided by an official, if authoritarian, hierarchy leading up to 
the Kapolri, in fact Tionghoa gift-giving furnishes this minority with significant sway 
over the traffic of postings, positions and academy placements so critical to the 
careers of Polri officers. But again this suggests a shadow parallel hierarchy, when in 
fact, as Chapter Two highlights, the ethics of reciprocity and volunteerism embedded 
in the gift are frequently contravened.  Gifts are coerced. Friendships are violated.  
This suggests an organisation of power far more complex than the simple hierarchies 
of the patron-client relationship. The rhizome plots the relationship between capital 
and coercion on an evenly footed, horizontal plane, which explains why the 
connections are so vulnerable to acts of disloyalty leading to rupture. This does not 
affect the functioning of the police rhizome in any way that is meaningful. The 
rhizome is dictated by the principle of ‘asignifying rupture’ wherein connections 
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broken are restlessly renewed (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a, 10). The rhizome ‘can be 
connected to anything other and in fact must be’ (ibid, 7).  
 
The Structure of the Dissertation 
 
This thesis is in four chapters, organised according to illicit economy in two sections 
entitled ‘The Parman Economy’ and ‘The Parmin Economy’.  In the first two 
sections of Chapter One, ‘The Art of Fictive Accountancy’ and ‘The Anti-
Bureaucratic Bureaucracy’, I interrogate public financing of Polri and how elite level 
pilferage, the stratifications of rank, the internal primacy placed on individual 
entrepreneurship combined with the bureaucratic dysfunctions of Polri’s accounting 
system produce a state of institutional bankruptcy. This wilful bankruptcy, accepted 
by officers as a routine condition of the postcolonial state, gives rise and justification 
to what is known as ‘the off-budget economy’, a vast shadow economy designed to 
finance policing across the archipelago and supplement low staff wages. This 
economy is fed by criminal practices of violent extortion, illicit extraction and rent 
seeking on a hyperbolic scale.  Feeding this economy is the central preoccupation of a 
commissioned officer. Contrary to classic definitions of corruption that place personal 
greed as deviant to public office (Nye, 1967), I show how in systems of endemic 
fiscal irregularity – systems we often refer loosely to as ‘organised corruption’ or 
‘systemic corruption’ - personal practices of illicit accumulation and illegal 
entrepreneurship are integral to institutional financing and everyday securitized 
authority.  
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Within Polri, economies of illicit revenue are generally classified as ‘parman’, 
‘parmin’ and ‘parmas’ indexing their respective ‘business’, ‘criminal’ and 
‘community’ origins. It is important to underscore that these subfields of off-budget 
financing do not unfold out to neat taxonomies of descending genus but are instead 
used as a generalised heuristic classifier, denoting the various scales of police 
understanding of the ‘licitness’ of derived monies. Polri have multiple ways of 
characterising the off budget economy but for the purposes of this thesis, I have 
arranged the sections and chapters by this folk taxonomy.  
 
Section One looks at ‘parman’ or patronage financing by Tionghoa capitalists and 
Section Two at ‘parmin’ or ‘criminal’ financing through Jakarta’s illicit gambling 
economy. In each section, I combine historical and ethnographic sources to paint a 
picture ‘before’ and ‘after’ of the security sector’s dependence on that economy prior 
to and following the fall of the New Order.  
 
In Chapter One, ‘Foundations, Cooperatives and Cukong in ABRI’s Charity 
Economy’ outlines the off-budget economy of ABRI under the New Order. I show 
how generals were structured into formal business arrangements where Tionghoa 
traders were either recruited to manage military owned enterprises or generals were 
enfolded into Tionghoa-run businesses as executive commissioners.  By being 
associated with a locally venerated military officer, Tionghoa traders and big business 
alike became known as cukong [invulnerable puppeteers of the state]. They could 
ward off the repeated threats to enterprise (from other Tionghoa traders, but mainly 
from a predatory rabble of players, brokers, gangsters and security officers) and 
provide a secure environment for fiscal accumulation.  In return, officers received at 
! "# 
least a stipend and a ready resource base and partnership for their various projects and 
procurements. Choice officers were granted a stake in the business. We then return to 
the critical question of how and why the New Order state created the conditions for 
ABRI dependence on criminal practices and illicit economies markets flourish. ‘State 
Budgets and Fiscal Inadequacy’ examines low fiscal allocations and ABRI’s 
subsequent dependence on the off-budget economy as a form of Presidential control.   
 
‘New Tionghoa Civil Society and the Machine of Patronage’ details the collapse of 
ABRI’s charity institutions that constituted such an important part of their off-budget 
economy with the fall of the New Order and the rush by Tionghoa capitalists to 
provide patronage to Polri. The shape of Tionghoa patronage did not initially take the 
form of foundations and direct business involvement that characterised the New 
Order. Rather, the impulse to patronise has taken on the florid forms of democratic, 
civic engagement that chime with democratisation. In this section I examine new 
Tionghoa media and NGOs as a critical site for Tionghoa-Polri relations and predict 
that as this economy develops, it will increasingly take the form of structured business 
relations that we saw under the New Order. The following chapter, ‘Disequilibrium 
and the Gift’, re-examines the power relationships between Tionghoa and security 
agents in light of a Tionghoa settler history of actual and threatened violence in the 
Indonesian archipelago. In contrast to political economy approaches, I argue that fear, 
not power, animates practices of Tionghoa gift giving to the police. In a series of four 
intimate portraits of Tionghoa-police relationships, I show how police coerce gifts, 
deny fidelity and violent reject Tionghoa claims for reciprocity.  In this way, I show 
how the off-budget economy is embedded in and reflects the asymmetrical structure 
of political power in Indonesia.  
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Section Two examines the parts of the off-budget economy that Polri officers 
explicitly cast as ‘criminal’ or ‘parmin’, that is gambling, narcotics, and the 
underworld of the Jakarta nightlife.  The state security apparatus has long provided 
protection to these industries in return for a stable monthly stipend. The first part of 
Chapter Three, ‘An Anthropology of Urban Gaming’ underscores the significance of 
economic play in the maintenance of regimes, colonial and modern, as well as the 
depth and diversity of gaming across socio-economic groups and hence, the absurdity 
of prohibition. In ‘Judi and the Metropolitan City’, I then focus on the organisation 
and Tionghoa ownership of casinos in Jakarta during Governor Sadikin’s term in the 
1960s and show how this industry is intimately tied up in futuristic visions of the 
capital and in turn, to alternative political visions by the military elite for the 
relationship between law and state. In ‘The Criminalisation and Consolidation of the 
New Order state’ and ‘Licit and Illicit Gaming in the Late New Order’ I tie the 
politics of the legalisation and criminalisation of casinos to vulnerability in Suharto’s 
presidency and the stratification of criminal, corrupt practice (legal but criminal, 
illegal but sanctioned, illegal and illegitimate) among the military elite. Finally, ‘Judi 
Jadi Gila’ [Gambling Goes Crazy] examines how democratisation, the fragmentation 
of political power and the rise of the police as a contending player in Jakarta’s 
underground protection economy, liberalised illicit casino ownership.  
 
The fourth chapter of this thesis, ‘Sutanto’s Twin War on Vices’ examines the 2005 
shut down of the illicit gambling economy despite the industry’s mammoth and 
regular contributions to Polri’s off-budget economy.  In ‘Pacts of Licit and Illicit 
Worlds’, I argue that the industry was closed down because it provided the political 
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and security elite with the means to challenge the status quo.  In the latter part of the 
chapter, ‘Turning Law into Lahan’, I explore how the drying up of gambling money 
impacted upon the personal and institutional finances of the police and address the 
question of how officers made up for the shortfall. I contend that rather than expand 
and institutionalise their protection for the narcotics industry, officers tortured minor 
offenders netted in the war on drugs to coerce bribes. In this way, I show how 
paradoxically, law and its exercise criminalises the force further.  
 
Together, the chapters show how states create the conditions under which criminal 
economies flourish and upon which they depend. I show how democratisation can 
fundamentally rearrange those economies and the means of their extraction and 
accumulation. In the case of Indonesia, democratisation gave the police the means and 
moral authority to diversify and inflate the off-budget, cutting into an economic 
terrain that was formerly the preserve of the military, specifically the army.  Critical 
processes of democratisation, such as exercises strengthen the rule of law, merely 
strengthened the means by which Polri could claim illicit rents. In sum, I conclude 
that states, even states where democratisation is considered successful, have deeply 
embedded criminal practices.  
 
Methods for the Study of Tubers 
 
How does one study a thing whose surface form belies a vast hidden presence? Polri 
are at once an institution of the state bound by formal strictures, legal authorities and 
organisational hierarchy and concurrently, a rhizome that lives in the shadow zone, a 
space that has its own ‘characteristics, temporalities and dimensions’ (Coutin, 2005, 
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174). The lives of Polri as a rigid institutional hierarchy and as a rhizome, flattened 
and dispersed, are not mutually exclusive. They exist concurrently and weigh in upon 
each other in strange ways. The practices that occur within each domain have real 
material effects that are crucial to the maintenance of legality (Coutin, 2005, 174).  
Thus the question becomes how to study the fringes of order, where formal and 
informal intersect in curious and perverse ways, ‘with uneven and indeterminate 
consequences’ (Sandvik in Hoag, 2011).  
 
In many ways, this strange point of intersection is best studied by ethnography. 
Ethnography is particularly adept at mapping the ‘multiple layers of power within 
complex bureaucratic structures’ (Kubick, 2009). It is attentive to the ways that 
representations of institutions as rational, ordered machines are a form of ‘magic 
legalism’ (Sandvik in Hoag, 2011) and the banal, ritualised managerial practices and 
linguistic forms that whisk away irregularity and deviance (Mosse, 2005). At the 
same time, the stalwart of ethnography, participant observation is deeply challenged 
by practices our informants wish to hide.  
 
Because practices of crime and corruption occupy spaces that ‘resist the researcher’s 
gaze’ (Gupta, 1995; 38), an ethnography of illicit fiscal activity hinges in part upon 
what Blundo calls, ‘emic descriptions’, or discursive interactions with informants 
(2008, 35). Here, the researcher becomes attentive to the way that criminality and 
deviant activity is performed and packaged in ‘secret idioms, symbols and codes’ 
(Anders and Nuitjen, 2008). In my own work, I noticed the way that Bahasa lurched 
into registers and peculiar grammatical forms – subjects divorced from object, objects 
divorced from verb – all bound up in a stammer of pauses, winks, emphatics that 
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maintained the congeniality of the conversation but deftly concealed the response. I 
came to see my interviews and engagements with informants as discursive scripts in 
which associative meanings were generated through other types of communicative 
and vernacular performances, such as tone, gesture, silence, acronym, the incongruous 
use of honorifics (Pak, beliau for similarly ranked officers), shifts in pronoun, word 
substitution and passive word orderings (ter rather than di, or the use of the root verb).  
 
Researching state criminality presents a further challenge for traditional means of 
documenting ethnography.  Revisiting recordings and field notes, I remember feeling 
shocked to find nothing in the way of ‘information’. The moments of revelation that I 
recalled and were searching for in my notes had no physical evidence. Without 
memory, field notes were ‘dead data’ (Jackson, 1990; 10) and in this way, the field 
note as the primary basis of anthropological evidence, were more like mnemonic 
devices to recall a series of performances that were paradoxically aimed at revelation 
and concealment. Not only did the absence of words have particular consequences for 
my own acts of ‘translation’ as work was written up, at home surrounded by field 
notes, I felt an anxiety to ‘triangulate’ my ‘evidence’ in quantitative and statistical 
forms that would lend credence to the scraps of my participant observation.  
 
Speech being so slippery and observations of transgression so thin on the ground, it is 
little wonder that anthropologists have been drawn into studying state corruption as if 
they were acts of witchcraft (Haller & Shore, 2003, Blundo, 2008; 28). In this way, 
anthropology becomes drawn into studying the talk of corruption as a popular 
mechanism for envisioning the state (Gupta, 1993), as a way of forming an 
autonomous moral community, as a means of understanding the unpredictable ‘magic 
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of the state’ (Hoag, 2011) or to interrogate the ‘criminalising optic’ of own visions of 
exchange and legitimacy (Hasty, 2005; 271). But without a direct discussion of the 
very fact of corruption and state deviance, being lulled into an analysis of its 
discursive forms feels like the kind of theoretical side-stepping that political 
anthropology took when it exchanged wholesale the study of postcolonial politics for 
power (Spencer, 1997).  Departing from the normative fact of state corruption and 
illicit forms of wealth generation, we return to the question of how to observe that 
which has been concealed.  
 
To answer this, I return to my own experiences mapping the rhizomatic life of Polri. 
Conventional anthropological studies of the police situate themselves in a site of plain 
existence; the precinct (Jauregui, 2010, Barker, 1999, Hornberger, 2006). Here, the 
anthropologist’s geographical scope is clearly delineated by the precinct’s realm of 
legal authority under which fall a limited number of potential informants. However, 
much like Haanstad (2010), I found this approach restrictive and an ineffective tool 
for understanding the ‘hidden faces and inaccessible mechanisms of power’ to which 
the precinct was subjected (Blundo, 2008). Only by stepping back and identifying 
multiple field sites and groups of informants could I see the multifarious and 
uncharted ways that the rise of the police was experienced in the subterranean world 
of illicit capital. As Indonesia’s political system sustained the rupture of 
democratisation, fragmenting and multiplying potential sources of power, I found 
myself slowly untangling from a specific geographical site, and following instead ‘the 
people…the metaphor…and the plot’ (Kubick, 2009; 48) through space and time.  
 
Plainly, this called for a mixed methodology. I started with a solid term ‘doing 
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ethnography’ in a subdistrict of South Jakarta among the orang keamanan [men of 
security] who form a topography of securitized power in the Indonesian capital. To 
‘do ethnography’, I tagged alongside a newly formed Betawi gang who had emerged 
as part of the fragmentation of power in the city. I followed their anxieties about 
regional elections, their racketeering, legal strategising and criminal activities as a 
way of understanding the kinds of cultural, coercive and political resources needed to 
operate in the space of non-existence. The location of this period is shown in Figure 
seven. The real benefit of this period was that I came to understand that criminality 
and corruption was not as cloistered practice a practice as it initially appeared. Indeed, 
for a practice that is supposed to be secret, individual and incriminating, in Jakarta the 
display of illicit gain is tremendously overt and purposeful. Because the suggestion of 
illicit wealth generation serves power and its accrual, the oblique signs of and 
invitations to its practice are always on exhibition whether as fetishized commodities, 
the corporeality of the body (Robertson 2006; 8, Bayart, 1999), in language or 
specific forms of practice and associations marked ‘democratic’. Thus my period of 
traditional ‘ethnography’ was an internship in the ways illicit wealth generation was 
enacted, interpreted and invited in the city.  
 
From these small, localized networks, I gradually expanded my range of informants, 
and eventually came to traverse the city with a motley cru of police and military 
officers, private security guards, neighbourhood policing groups, political parties, 
state sponsored gangs, ethnic and religious youth organisations, neighbourhood 
security groups, brokers, fixers and lawyers. In so doing, I was able to establish a 
fragmented participant observation wherein one is conscious that ‘sporadic’ and 
‘occasional’ ‘universe of petty corruption’ that one is permitted to observe only 
! "# 
gesture to a broader structure of illicit practices. In this way, I was always aware that 
‘every observation in situ [was] linked to other spaces that resist the researcher’s 
gaze’ (Blundo, 2007; pg 38).  
 
To access those other spaces, I turned with an unease that persists, to a series of 
ethnographic interviews. Like Ortner, I continue to feel anxious about the authenticity 
of the interview, which lack the texture and grit of a localized, truly participant 
ethnography (Forsey, 2010).  Complicating matters, because I was interested in the 
kinds of criminal formations, structures and economies that intersected with police 
corruption, I collapsed conventional distinctions between ‘ethnographic’ and 
‘political’ interviews (Spradley, 1979; Blundo, 2007). I carried out over 110 semi-
structured interviews with members of the security, political and business elite. This 
included ethnic Chinese businessmen who prop up the police financially, members of 
the parliamentary commissions responsible for oversight of the coercive apparatus, 
policy drafting teams internal to the police and the military and members of the 
newly-minted national police commission. Among that number were a handful of 
police officers of different rank with whom I would regularly meet to check the 
veracity of the claims I heard and understand police perspectives on those claims. 
Formally, as I explained to my interviewees, I was trying to establish a claim of 
‘truth’, that is to ‘assess’ the police’s reform process according to conventional 
political science barometers and to establish the who, what, where and when of the 
illicit dimensions of Polri’s fiscal life.  But during our meetings, senses heightened by 
my term of participant observation with the street gang, I cultivated what Forsely 
calls, the ‘ethnographic imaginary’: where the ethnographer probes the potential, 
unexpected strands of social and cultural life that at first glace seem unconnected to 
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the immediate research question (2010, 566-9).  In between a battery of ‘normative’ 
questioning, I would occasionally ‘rest’ the formal interview - marked by gesture and 
a relaxation in gait  - to follow alternative veins of questioning. Furthermore, I was 
attentive to the ideas of legitimate and illegitimate power, coercion, wealth, 
accumulation, consumption that were embedded in responses as well as the 
performative and discursive dimensions of speech.  
 
I also interviewed over approximately one hundred Jakartans who shared a very 
different interface with the police: Jakarta’s drug users, recidivists, illicit casino 
workers, sex workers, squatter communities, abandoned street children and 
incarcerated population. Without family, identification [KTP], address or full name, 
many of these interviewees occupied a ‘space of non-existence’ (Coutin, 2005). I 
approached these sources under the auspices of a human rights organisation, but as 
anthropologist, the responses that we most interesting to me was in the brackets of 
‘rest’. In the grey zone of the ethnographic interview, interviewees strayed from the 
script of violations to reveal ambiguous and paradoxical relationships with police. Sex 
workers who spoke on tape about beatings, rapes and extortion at the hands of the 
police, giggled in their hands afterwards about securing an officer as a boyfriend for 
protection. Similarly recidivists who displayed on their legs the scars of bullet wounds 
by errant officers, spoke of earlier intimacies with the police in various criminal-
entrepreneurial projects. Their legal non-existence made them more vulnerable to the 
coercive power of the police and hence more likely to seek to ‘net’ officers through 
the carrot of the police’s illicit economy.  
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Crucially, researching police corruption meant stretching the boundaries of fieldwork 
from somewhere ‘out there’ to primary source data generated from and about the 
state. During my fieldwork I built newspaper databases, excel spreadsheets charting 
officer promotion paths correlated to recruitment and alumni groups. I hoarded 
budgets, audits, police assessment reports, trial transcripts, regulations, corporate 
profiles and newspaper archives. I allowed the knowledge I had developed from 
ethnography to navigate and decode these vast and disparate representations of the 
police.  Most critically, ethnography showed me how the rhizome and its multitude of 
connections made itself manifest in public documentation. It wasn’t that the rhizome 
intended to stay hidden, but rather that it came to the surface in unexpected ways. I 
learnt to map its workings, not in national dailies or political analyses, but in 
obituaries, private newsletters, corporate social responsibility reports and charity and 
religious websites.  
 
Like Tarlo, I tried to understand these documents not just as hard, authoritative ‘data’ 
as a political scientist would but as cultural artifacts (Tarlo, 2001). I was particular 
interested in the assumptions and boundaries of knowledge delineated by these 
primary sources and in the ways that their juxtaposition against ethnographic 
‘evidence’ could reveal the limits of documentation. Far from the promise of an 
ordered, even hegemonic truth, when I drew them into dialogue with participant 
observation, interviews and oral histories, the quantitative and normative revelations 
of audits, budgets and organisational assessments revealed themselves as partial and 
fragmented.  It took a year of primary data research understand how empirics could 
animate this documentation (particularly the news archives), showing the hidden 
paths through which illicit wealth generation was advertised, articulated and mapped. 
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This could only happened when the link between data and conclusion became unstuck 
and when findings were rotated or turned inside out. Where primary source data was 
able to establish links between the police and various illicit economies, only 
ethnography, with its sense of the lived experience of transgression, could delineate 
the divergent size and scope of the illicit economies upon which the rhizomic 
structure of the police institution relied.   
 
The final step of my methodology, and the most critical, was to excerpt parts of the 
thesis and circulate it amongst a number of informants, both new and long-standing 
police, for critique and correction. By my informants’ own request, the chapter 
fragments were not translated into Indonesian although often I had the luxury of 
sitting with the informant and talking out each paragraph.  I have come to regard this 
step to be the most important part of any methodology to study illegality. Rather than 
the final step of ‘fieldwork’, time and time again, it has been a critical device to elicit 
new data under revitalised relations of trust.  Parts of this draft have thus been 
discussed intensively with my informants and the analysis and historical accounts 
provided in chapters two, three and four in particular have been subject to a process of 
debate and discussion that borders on co-construction.  This has long been a part of 
the ethnographic method, however Mosse reminds us that in certain politically-
charged contexts, the process has important limits.  I have been mindful that some 
forms of analytic knowledge must necessarily be subject to an ethnographic distance 
that is productive though perhaps not ‘consensual’ in ways that our informants might 
recognise (2006).   Hence the responsibility for this thesis and its errors lies solely 
with me.  
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Section One: The ‘Parman’ Economy 
 
Photograph 3: At the Buddhist Jin De Yuan temple in the predominantly Tionghoa suburb of Glodok, a 
woman prays for protection and prosperity.   
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Chapter I 
The Civilianisation of Patronage: Polri, TNI and Post- 
Authoritarian Shifts in Gift-Giving 
 
 
‘Patron itu subur, itu gengsi…’ 
‘to have a patron makes [a police officer] fertile, makes one prestigious.’ 
Female police colonel, 20076. 
 
     ‘Indonesia wasn’t made in a parliament. It was made in kongsi-kongsi like these.’  
                                                  Tionghoa businessman dining with three star police general, 2008.7  
 
  
 
This chapter begins by examining some of the issues around state budgeting that lead 
the coercive institutions to depend so heavily on practices of gift exchange as tenured 
patronage ‘partisipasi teman’ [participation from friends] ‘parman’ to fund individual 
officers, units and departments, stations and their operations.  As the primary actors in 
private enterprise, parman patrons most coveted by the coercive apparatus are ethnic 
Chinese Indonesians [Tionghoa].  By taking a historical approach to this interior 
current, I examine how practices of gift exchange between Tionghoa capitalists and 
                                                
6 Retired Police General. Interviewed by author (15 November, 2006).   
7 Field notes. (6 February 2008).  
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the coercive apparatus trace a trajectory of coercive-political power from military to 
police as power itself has transformed from authoritarian-coercive to civil-juridical.  
In the final part of this chapter, I illustrate how once-forbidden forms of Tionghoa 
social organising and community expression, such as print media and civil society 
groups, has facilitated the re-routing of the gift economy of the coercive apparatus.  
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Is Jakarta’s Polda Metro Jaya the only police station in the world to be glorified with 
its very own coffee-table book?  Glossed and embossed, text is incidental; it’s the 
images that are the book’s true intent.  Released in 2005, the book celebrates the 2004 
renovations to the Metro Jaya building, and its new ornamental array of vehicles and 
weaponry.  On page ten is the money shot: the new façade of Metro Jaya is a 
modernist, stern mosaic of grey cement and ejaculating foundations, framed by date 
palms.  The glory of Metro Jaya far outstrips that of its ranked superior, MABES 
Polri, a sprawling complex in grimy yellow and brown located just down the road on 
Jalan Trunojoyo.  This tropical security chic is Polda Metro Jaya’s idea of a civil 
security force for a new democratic Indonesia.  But for all of Metro Jaya’s pomp, the 
viewer’s eyes are tugged to the right to the building’s southeast where a squat grey 
skyscraper sits, crowned in golden initials, AG.   
 
This is Artha Graha. Artha Graha is a conglomerate that, since the demise of the New 
Order, has grown to leviathan proportions.  It is Artha Graha that owns the adjacent 
slab of land known as the SCDB development, whose central coordinates make it one 
of the most lucrative pieces of real estate in the capital.  Whilst more frequently 
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associated with a young peranakan [mixed race, Indonesian-Chinese] entrepreneur 
called Tomy Winata, Artha Graha is in fact jointly, though not equally, owned by 
Winata and his older totok8 [patron, Sugianto ‘Aguan’ Kusuma.  Although neither 
originate from Java - Winata is originally from West Kalimantan and Kusuma from 
Palembang - they have forged the conglomerate’s identity by baptising it in Bahasa 
Kawi, a form of classical Javanese.  Artha Graha means ‘house of money.’ 
 
The release of the coffee table book followed months of media speculation as to the 
source of the estimated Rp 660 billion [$US74 million] needed to pay for the 
renovations.  Metro Jaya had started work on new buildings for Densus 88 (the 
recently formed Anti Terrorist Squad) and Brimob. There was to be a glossy 
auditorium, a three-story Al-Kautsar mosque, a five-story car park, new boarding 
houses (asrama) for the commissioned officers and the refurbishment of the official 
residences of the officer class (Koran Tempo, 15 February 2005).  With no funds 
allocated from the 2004-05 APBN9 and no supplementary funds proposed to 
parliament, Indonesians and their legislative representatives began to wonder where 
had Kapolda Metro Jaya Irjen Firman Gani obtained the liquidity to pay for this grand 
gentrification?  
 
                                                
8 A totok is a person of Chinese descent who is perceived by the Tionghoa community to have a strong 
commitment to Chinese or Confusican values in every day life, speak in Chinese dialect and tend to be 
of Confusian or Buddhist religion. A totok is a relational category in that it is juxtaposed with 
peranakan. Peranakan are Chinese-Indonesians who are considered to have mixed blood, have lost 
Chinese language or dialect and have an assimilated ‘Indonesian’ identity. It is also important to note 
that the categories of totok and peranakan exist primarily for Tionghoa themselves as shifting, 
ontological categories of self-understanding and differentiation, not as fixed categories of 
‘Chineseness’.  This is not Suryadinata’s approach. His scholarship has consistently sought to define 
between essentialised totok and peranakan communities (see for instance, Suryadinata 1978, 1997), 
however his most recent scholarship (2008) has acknowledged that these two categories are beginning 
to breakdown in the wake of reduced Chinese migration.  
9 Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Negara is the state budget, proposed annually by the government and 
approved by parliament.  
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Irawasum10 Komjen Binarto helpfully tried to resolve the matter of the mysterious 
funds by conducting a review and concluding that because no state funds were 
involved, no state funds had therefore been corrupted and Kapolda Irjen Firman Gani 
was in the clear (ibid). Kapolri Jenderal Dai Bachtiar argued that some of the money 
had been allocated from the ABT11 (a statement quickly negated by Komisi III), but 
ongoing financial neglect of the police by the state meant that for important 
operational and strategic matters the Kapolda Metro Jaya, Irjen Firman Gani, was 
forced to rely on donations.  Rather than deny or disprove anything, police comments 
to the media instead focused on Polri’s etiquette of philanthropy.  The Kapolri 
insisted that police acceptance of donations was right and proper for patrons who 
were ikhlas [sincere and wholehearted].  However if it transpired that police had 
forced [paksa] the donations, well then, that would be a disgrace [tercela]. 
 
For his own part, the man at the centre of the storm, Kapolda Irjen Firman Gani, 
issued a statement rejecting outright the idea that the renovations he oversaw relied on 
external funding. He then immediately proceeded to add that if the building did use 
donations from patrons [pemberi sumbangan] then those patrons would have signed 
contracts that attested [perjanjian yang menegaskan] to the charitable nature of their 
gifts.  Hence, the police were in no way obligated [tidak ada ikatan apapun] to the 
patrons (Tempo Interaktif, 8 September 2004). In later comments, the Kapolda called 
the patrons, ‘hamba Tuhan yang peduli dengan keamanan’ [servants of God who 
cared about security].  Indeed, what better way to show it than to gift the regional 
police station a sizeable, three-story mosque? Gani indicated that men of such pious 
humility guarded their anonymity rather than sought vulgar attention (Tempo 
                                                
10 The General Oversight Inspectorate.  
11 The Anggaran Belanja Tambahan or the Additional Expenditure Budget.  
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Interaktif, 27 December 2004). Seasoned journalists, police analysts and political 
observers of Jakarta were having no truck with such opaque pronouncements.12   
 
The extensions sit unapologetically on Artha Graha’s SCBD development, with the 
logical conclusion that the land and, by extension its renovations, had been funded by 
Tomy Winata.  The police’s coffee table book, released after the furor and designed to 
celebrate Polda Metro Jaya, is more pointed in its acknowledgements, thanking a 
consortium of Tionghoa-owned real estate and construction businesses owned by 
Soetijpto Nagaria (Summarecon), Tomy Winata (Bank Artha Graha), Sugianto 
‘Aguan’ Kusuma (PT Mandiri Ditpacipta & PT Multi Artha Pratama), Hary 
Tanusoedibjo (otherwise known as Hary Tanoe of Bimantara group) and Suwarno M 
Serad (who works for Budi Hartono’s PT Djarum).13  
 
Neither was this one off incident.  2005 was for Polri both the year of the coffee book 
and the year of the audit.  The state audit agency’s (BPK) 2005 report on Polri only 
raised more awkward questions about the true sources of Metro Jaya’s financing. The 
BPK noted significant variations in Polri’s report to the BPK compared to documents 
compiled by Polri’s own logistical bureaus.  The report singled out the yawning gaps 
in the Polda Metro Jaya balance sheet [neraca], specifically the omission of land 
worth some Rp 12 586.79 billion [US$1.5 million], Rp 63.83 billion [US$7 million] 
in building and infrastructure and a further Rp 38.58 billion [US$4.5 million] in 
                                                
12 Nominee for National Police Commission. Interviewd by author (17 November 2006).  
13 Among the list of those thanked for assisting in the publishing of the coffee table book that 
celebrated Metro Jaya include Francis Moniaga who, the year previously, had been taken in by Metro 
Jaya for questioning regarding a criminal offense, but not charged.  Curiously, some names in the list 
also resembled, but did not match precisely, that of known gambling tycoons important to the police 
force, such as Rudy Chandra (Rudi Rajamas), Aliong and Winarta (eg, Edi ‘Porkas’ Winata). Chapter 
V addresses these figures.   
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undeclared equipment and vehicles.14  As one of only three regional police stations to 
actually submit a financial report to the state auditors,15 the unaccountable wealth of 
Metro Jaya office is just a drop in the ocean of assets under Polri’s control.  The 
report observed that 2700 hectares of Polri land, or 82% of the total land in Polri’s use 
(according to figures compiled by the logistical bureau) was undeclared to the state 
and undocumented by official certificates of ownership (BPK, 2004, p.13).16  From 
the scant resources available to them, the state auditors report estimated that in 2004 
alone, a year in which Polri’s state budget was some Rp 7.9 trillion [US$880 million] 
(see Table 1), Polri had generated undocumented assets from donations, grants 
[hibah] and private equity to the tune of Rp 163.13 billion [US$18 million], or some 
2% of their state funding.  But the sums that the state auditors were capable of 
detecting were in fact only a sliver of a colossal, partially documented and 
individually managed, subterranean institutional economy.17 
 
The Art of Fictive Accountancy   
 
In October 2003, LPEM-UI, a university think tank commissioned by Mabes Polri 
and Partnership for Governance Reform, held a seminar with the top brass of Polri 
announcing the results of their investigation into the financial woes of the institution. 
The survey prosaically revealed what everyone in the room and indeed everyone in 
                                                
14 See BPK. Pg 5.  
15 The report also praised Polda Metro Jaya for being one of the three provincial stations, out of a total 
of thirty-one polda, to routinely compile financial reports and to have submitted them for BPK’s 
inspection. Ibid. Pg 13. 
16 This is an area roughly the same as the borough of Westminster, or inner city London.  
17 Indeed, I would venture that because these figures rely on the auditor’s comparison between the 
sloppy, permissive inventories of wealth compiled by the MABES logistics bureau and those sent to a 
hostile BPK, they are staggeringly understated and only haphazardly accurate.  Not only does the BPK 
have no access to the financial reports of most of the Polda, Polres and Polsek, but they cannot examine 
the accounts of individual officers, many of which act as holding pens for donations later distributed to 
Polri in the form of operational funds or infrastructure.  
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Indonesia knew already: that a ‘serious discrepancy between the funds needed by the 
police and the official funds allocated through government budgets’ existed.  The 
report also confirmed other long-standing, well known problems that plagued Polri’s 
budgetary distribution such as the indecent proportion of funding for Mabes’ 
command system and the overwhelming allocations for salary procurement and 
infrastructure (between 70-90%) at the expense of operational costs to maintain 
security and rule of law.  Buried in the fine print of their presentation lay a map of the 
dysfunctional systems of accountancy that, like the police itself, was heavily stratified 
to ensure the ongoing wealth of the starred officer class and keep the lower ranks 
under-resourced and in desperate competition.  
 
LPEM-UI’s breakdown of the 2002 police budget showed that 25% went to programs 
at the central office at Mabes Polri and 70% to the police’s command structure, the 
polda, polres and polsek that make up the front line of police work.  The vast 
proportion of that sum was and continues to be dedicated to salaries, rather than 
programs and policy implementation.  Moreover, funding disbursements to the polsek 
and polres were made largely at the regional polda level, trickling through the system 
from Mabes to polda and polda to polres/polsek with the allocated sums shrinking 
down to just a fraction of their stated value. The polda was receiving their budgets 
from Mabes with 15% less of what had been allocated, the polres saw pilferage rates 
of around 45% while the polsek estimated that the discrepancy between their actual 
funds and the funds that they received to be around 54%.  These, however, were only 
estimations as the research showed that over 85% of polsek officers and 65% of 
polres officers had not been informed of the true figure for their budgeted funds.  
Ongoing secrecy around budget allotments allowed senior ranking officers with the 
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ear of the Derenbang (the two starred ‘Deputy Kapolri for General Planning and 
Development’ located at Mabes Polri) to request the reordering of funds.  This 
entailed deleting or skimming line items and eating into polsek and polres budgets to 
suit new contingencies and upcoming projects that would arrest the attention of the 
public and their superiors.   
 
Nonetheless, the source of Polri’s financial woes was not in fact that the existing 
system was too permissive in its management of funds.  The system was negligent 
when seniors commanded their sums and stultifyingly bureaucratic when the juniors 
staked their claim of the budget. Although the separation from ABRI also meant an 
unyoking from the ABRI financial flows that had for so long disadvantaged this 
fourth sibling, the substitute system built by Polri in 2000 and 2001 only reenacted the 
same principles of militarised New Order accounting: the privilege of the powerful to 
pilfer at the expense of the lower ranks.  Polri’s system of accounting retained not just 
the standard military methods of notation and documentation, but the same emphasis 
on hierarchy that gave considerable discretion to the Kapolri and the Derenbang to 
authorise and determine the size of fiscal transfers to the command system.   
 
The hierarchical, serpentine system of financing the command ensured that transfers 
were not only filched as they moved through the system, but crucially that they 
moved through at torpid pace.  LPEM-UI’s data estimated that transfers (not just of 
money but also of petrol and electricity subsidies) from Derenbang at Mabes to the 
distributing arm of the Polda took on average 3-5 weeks and then an additional few 
weeks to get to the polres and polsek.  The report found that funding transfers 
proposed at the beginning of the financial year arrived in March or April and those 
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applied for in the last quarter didn’t arrive at all.  These congestions in the flow of 
funds created a surplus in the budget of sometimes up to 20-40% of the allocated 
APBN, leading to a convulsion of ineffective, easily-corruptible crash spending 
programs at the polda and Mabes level in the last half of the financial year.   
 
Such fiscal constipation meant that polsek polres, polda and Mabes, had adopted the 
practice of undertaking activities first and receiving the tardy leftovers of proposed 
financial transfers months after.  This system relied on official and unofficial income 
sources, with officers saying that they often paid for operational activities by drawing 
on the Anggaran Belanjaan Tambahan or the revenues gathered from the police’s 
authority over the licensing of motor vehicles and their drivers.  However, the sums 
provided by police ‘donors’ and the economy of perkara [criminal ‘cases’] are just as 
important to maintaining the institution.  
 
Section II of this thesis addresses the police’s reliance on illicit, criminal revenues, 
called ‘parmin’ [participasi kriminal, or criminal participation] funds, and the 
importance of ‘an economy of law’ to police financing (parmas, partisipasi 
masyarakat or community participation funds).   In this section, our concern is with 
patronage from the business-sector, known within the police by the euphemism 
parman [participasi teman or the participation of friends].  Parman foot the bill for 
police operations, for equipment and infrastructure and for the cost of transportation 
including vehicles and motorbikes.  The report noted that parman also gift hibah 
tanah [land endowments] including buildings and their maintenance or renovation:  
 
The term parman…is sometimes used negatively as a compensatory payment [imbalan uang] 
for the provision of a security service for a person or a company.  As it turns out the role of 
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parmas [participation of the community] and parman is given highest priority for the 
acquisition of supporting funds, from the perspective of both size [of the donations] and 
frequency... The tendency to use the contributions [jasa] of parman is not just at the polsek 
level but also at every level of the command system, starting from polres, polda until Mabes 
Polri. (LPEM-UI, 2003, p. 15) 
 
This economy of patronage is not merely a modest stopgap in a leaky fiscal system. 
Rather, the parman economy uniformly represents the most important spending 
source for Polri at all levels across the territorial command.  To give a sense of the 
scale, officials interviewed at Polda West Papua stated that they believed 65% of their 
budget, and that of the polres, polsek and pospol, came from parman donations (2003, 
appendix 14). When researchers visited the affiliated polres, officials there estimated 
that they needed around Rp 3 trillion [US$335 million] to run the station, while 
APBN allocations only came to Rp 1.3 trillion [US145 million].  The Rp 1.7 trillion 
[US$189 million] shortfall was made up from off-budget source and parman 
donations.  At the polsek level, the situation was dire with parman donations making 
up 96% of the annual budget.  Broken down by station unit, figures were just as 
dramatic. Reskrim eked out between 1- 14% of their budget from the APBN, while 
patrol (samapta) between 10 – 17%.  The discrepancy was covered by parman and 
other off-budget economies.  These figures are a far cry from the fiscal discrepancies 
the BPK has been able uncover using official accounting sources.  
 
Such fantastical sums of money are an interior current hurrying through the police 
institution, directing its decisions, policies and human resource movements.  They are 
neither legal nor recognised by the police institution and as such they are subject to 
the whim of the officer or unit that has successfully courted the funds.  Only 50% of 
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officers interviewed by LPEM said that the donations were noted in a separate 
financial accounting archive, and my own interviews suggested that the parman 
economy straddled both ends on an irregular spectrum of formalisation practices, 
‘depending on the leadership.’18  One reskrim officer detailed an advanced system for 
the distribution and notation of her unit’s off-budget parman economy which rested in 
the authority of the accountant, independent from senior officers.   
 
My unit is like this: I have to give [kasih] to my superior [atasan]. I have to make a routine 
payment [menyetor] every month for the needs of the organisation.  What’s covered [dikover] 
by this budget is just so minimal.  I give this [sum] to the accountant.  He’s the one who filters 
it down and distributes it for budgetary needs [kebutuhan anggaran], for instance to 
administration [department], who don’t have a budget.  
 
She then added, [in Engl], ‘but the money is easy come, easy go.  We don’t have to be 
responsible for it [unlike the APBN].’ Although the officer bemoaned the staggering 
wealth of the senior officer class, she then added, ‘as long as officers don’t take from 
the budget, taking from [the parman economy] is their right [hak mereka].’19  What 
this contradictory and confusing series of statements suggests is that even when off 
budget revenue is disciplined by the same rationalising methods of the APBN, use of 
this body of funds is not perceived with the same moral strictures as the state budget.   
 
The LPEM study found that presence of the parman economy deeply destabilises the 
legitimacy and accountability of Polri’s use of the state budget.  Because the parman 
economy supplants official Polri spending, and because transfers for proposed 
activities arrive after the fact, distributed funds as well as the leftovers from the fiscal 
                                                
18 Criminal Research Officer, Interviewed by author (1 October 2006).  
19 Ibid.  
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year tend to be seen by officers as ‘free’ to be used for other activities, including 
personal needs.  The disjuncture between real police spending and state allocations is 
in fact so great that police spending reports and the funding transfer requests are 
entirely fictionalised.  The bureaucracy of financial applications to the Derenbang and 
reporting of expenditures is undertaken by specific external or internal contractors 
who perform the necessary bureaucratic hurdle jumping to release or account for 
funds.  Contractors are paid a percentage of the money they are able to ‘extract’ or 
‘justify’ from Derenbang at Mabes Polri according to their mastery of the system. 
Again, this behaviour is not exclusive to the revenue-scarce wilderness of the polsek, 
but occurs at every level of the command system, including Mabes Polri itself.  
 
When the researchers finished their presentation to Mabes Polri, a silence swept the 
hall. The scholars worried that they had said too much and that the starred officers 
would react defensively, or worse, deny the results altogether.20  To their great relief, 
officers applauded their work and their final recommendations for performance 
orientated budgeting, greater fiscal flexibility and direct transfers to the polres.  In 
2004, significant changes were made to the police financial system which sought 
explicitly to muzzle Mabes Polri’s discretionary authority over the budget, taking 
away transfer and procurement privileges.  Today, 90% of the police budget is 
controlled and distributed by the Provincial Treasury Offices [Kantor Pelayanan 
Perbendaharaan Negara] directly to the polda and polres, who distribute to the 
polsek.  As Table 1 shows, state allocations to the police have also increased 
dramatically, from 5 trillion in 2001 to over 25 trillion in 2009.  A significant jump in 
                                                
20 The researchers were not entirely upfront about their findings.  There are considerable gaps in the 
reports submitted to Mabes Polri and Partnership for Governance, let alone the published public report 
of their findings.  Researchers were extremely careful to ensure that their findings did not explicitly 
focus on the full scale of fiscal chicanery going on in Polri, including their alliances with the criminal 
world. Researcher LPEM, interviewed by author, (13 June 2006).  
! "# 
police funding occurred in 2005, the year that Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was 
elected president, appointing as National Police Chief his former ABRI school-mate, 
General Sutanto.  
 
The Anti-Bureaucratic Bureaucracy 
 
Table 2: Department of Defence/Polri Budget 2001-2009 (Trillions of Rupiah)21 
Budget  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008  2009 
Polri  5.287,5 5.499,1 6.739,5 7.908,9 12,020 17 22 23 25,7  
MOD22 9.243,8 9.874,8 12.021,9 13.741,9 22 28 32,6 33,7 35 
  
However, despite the surge in funds, police continue to echo the refrain that fiscal 
inadequacies lie at the heart of poor policing and ongoing corruption.  This  
justification has surprising traction with the Indonesian public and government.  
Although it is generally accepted that the national policing institution is fragile and 
under-resourced, it is remarkable that public, parliamentary and academic debate has 
never raised the question as to how Polri know, estimate and quantify the revenue 
shortfall.  To have the capacity to do so, each of Polri’s stations from Mabes to the 
lowliest polsek, would need teams of accountants noting every fiscal deficiency, have 
an astute sense of the cost of legitimate and workable policing programs and have 
conducted fine-toothed resource needs assessments that are sensitive to local and 
regional security needs.  In order to make the comparison between need and shortfall, 
                                                
21 Figures have been compiled from newspaper articles reporting the annual budget. As a result, they 
may be imprecise to the hundreds of thousands.  
22 The Ministry of Defence budget includes departmental costs as well as all funding for the three 
forces of TNI, the army, navy and air force.  
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police policy makers and number crunchers would have to have an intimate sense of 
how a bureaucratic institution runs effectively and efficiency.   
 
The fact is stations and their supervising command structures have very little ability to 
accurately demonstrate to the Department of Finance, beyond salaries, what actual 
operational and institutional needs they have because stations have no benchmark for 
assessing the minimal level of personnel, equipment or facilities needed to deliver 
policing services in their specific areas (ICITAP, 2005, p 11).23  LPEM asked officers 
to list their expenses and estimate an ideal sum that would cover their operating costs. 
Officers from the community relations department, (then Bina Mitra now Bimmas) 
declared that just five additional line items would be needed to better engage with the 
community: snacks and souvenirs for group meetings, snacks for officers leading the 
meetings, a monthly car rental and a per diem for officers on the trip (LPEM-UI, 
2003, Appendix 1). Reskrim faired little better, adding obscure line items for 
‘incentives’ and silaturahmi [friendship] costs for forensics and, remarkably, the 
prosecution.  At the same time, officers neglected to volunteer funding for basic 
human rights standards of policing such as access to medical services for detainees, 
food for detainees and the establishment of custodial registers, none of which are 
currently funded by the state budget.  All of the aspirational budgets created by a 
range of officers, from the patrol troops to the   intelligence, revolved around the 
immediate staples of lunch, snacks and transportation.  
 
The fact is that the police simply do not have the fiscal management systems to make 
the link between spending and institutional capacity.  Under the current management 
                                                
23 Also, Pers.Comm. Department of Finance. 10.10.06.  
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of data, there is no way for them to accurately gauge the efficiency and effectiveness 
of spending or to map broad patterns in the distribution of finances and identify where 
deficiencies lie.  This would not only require sophisticated internal bureaucratic 
machinery to make internal assessments, but also the ability to link such human and 
technical resources with research into local security environments, patterns in crime, 
and community needs.  It requires ilmu in information gathering and database 
management which Polri simply does not have, nor has ever shown an interest in 
establishing (ICITAP, 2005, p.15).24  In February 1999, at the precipice of separation 
from ABRI, a police spokesman announced Polri’s calculation for their first 
autonomous budget in over 30 years. ‘If you want us to be good, we need around 900 
billion [Kalau mau baik…sekitar 900 milar per tahun anggaran],’(Kontan, 22 
February, 1999) then a seemingly astronomical sum for the revenue-starved police 
service.  By 2001, as Table 1 shows, parliament was already passing Polri budgets of 
more than five trillion. 
 
Despite a 500% increase in funding in just 8 years and substantial changes to the 
disbursement system, the problems persist.  In 2006, the US Department of Justice’s 
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) 
commenced a survey of the operating conditions of polres and polsek in the provinces 
of Bali, East Java and South Sulawesi.  Their research found strong continuities with 
                                                
24 The ICITAP program for district and subdistrict police appraisal, conducted between 2005-2007 
attempted to provide polsek and polres with just these very skills, taking administrational and 
supporting officers through evidence-based planning strategies to build the capacity to conduct 
institutional and environmental assessments. The outcome of the project was to help stations establish 
the very basic nuts and bolts of institutional bureaucracy, from auditory and inventory tracking systems 
and standard operating procedures, to job descriptions and internal mechanisms for inter-departmental 
information-sharing. This program ran in three provinces, Bali, East Java and South Sulawesi. Despite 
support from Kapolri Sutanto, the pilot project was never made policy by Mabes Polri’s Director for 
Planning and Development. Indeed, the Derenbang was openly hostile to the project. The Derenbang 
maintained that instead of the focus on individual station and locality assessment, the project should 
instead establish ‘templates’ for the staffing and equipment of police stations according to geography 
and environments eg, beach stations, hinterland stations and so forth. (Pers. Comm. 12.03.07)  
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LPEM’s 2002 findings.  At the district and sub-district level, there was ‘a lack of a 
reliable system [sic] for collecting accurate data from the stations as basis for both 
headquarters and regions to plan and budget; and as an obvious consequence, an 
extremely poor planning and budgeting process based at best on anecdotal 
information and at worst on hunches from desk officers in Jakarta or in the 
regions’(Villaveces, 2010). The ICITAP project found no reliable information on 
budgets, expenditure or criminal records and no information on workload.  This 
meant they were unable to plan current and future spending or policing and security 
priorities in line with the resources available to stations and the needs of the territories 
and communities they served.25  The project concluded that accounting systems were 
patchy, haphazard or absent and led to falsified financial reporting.  The 
decentralisation of procurement authorities to the polda and polres were slowly, 
steadily being clawed back by Mabes with the collusion of the national parliament.26  
Fiscal bottlenecking and budgetary theft remained strong and many officers at the 
polsek level reported signing budget dispersal forms and not receiving the actual 
funds.  Operational budgets remained nil at the polsek and polres levels and officers 
were operating on less than half of their allocated funds.  Two years later in 2008 the 
Indonesian Forum for Transparent Accountancy issued a press statement that merely 
reiterated the point.  State funds were either misallocated or spent wastefully with 
only Rp 211 billion [US$24 million] of the Rp 18 trillion [US$2 billion] allocated to 
the police in 2007 spent on law enforcement activities (Kompas, 15 January 2008).  
 
One Wakapolsek noted,  
                                                
25 Ibid.  
26 Retired police general, interviewed by author (6 April 2007). The general argued that businessman 
cum Golkar parliamentarian Setya Novanto in particular sought to gain from the return of procurement 
privileges to the Derenbang.  
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You know, I’d rather be below a ministry or the governor, that way we might actually get 
some infrastructure and equipment quickly. We don’t feel these new funds at all. The polres is 
eating up all the money. We did get some new cars. But unfortunately, we don’t have the 
funds to fix them or to pay for the petrol. I set up a deal with local businesses where they 
supply us with five litres a day.27   
 
He went on to add that Eka Cipta Widjaja’s ITC malls had donated the land and 
building of police posts in his area.  Parman donations continued to be the primary 
and most reliable source of funding. Most tellingly, LPEM’s final, and arguably most 
important, recommendation was that the parman economy be formalised into 
legitimate, documented, accountable donations to the police. This recommendation 
was completely neglected by subsequent reforms to the police financial system.  
 
In his ethnography of Cilengka precinct in West Java, set in the twilight of the New 
Order, Barker writes of the ‘data room’. This was a designated space filled with maps, 
statistical makeup of the community and other ‘criminogenic’ information about 
Cilengka presumably to aid preventative policing.  When unveiled to visiting 
officials, they immediately burst into praise and proclamations that such an endeavour 
should be replicated across the country.  But in daily life, the data room is wholly 
irrelevant to the Cilengka precinct’s workings.  It is dark and vacant, its knowledge 
frozen and protected from use by strategically placed curtains.   
 
One decade on, the metaphor of the data room to symbolise Polri’s relationship to 
certain rationalising forms of knowledge is still relevant.  Polri has willfully failed to 
                                                
27 Wakapolsek, South Jakarta, interviewed by author (6 April 2007).  
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establish the external and internal surveillance mechanisms to establish the kind of 
rational, ordered institutionalism associated with state governance.  To do so would 
require a management and systematisation of particular forms and kinds of knowledge 
important to state architecture that the police, under the New Order could not, and 
today will not, institutionalise.  What Barker’s data room illustrated was the way that 
alternative logics of knowing [ilmu] persist and work to unpick the fiction of the 
rational, ordered, state institution that the police strives so hard to portray.  And today, 
one decade on, the police continue to subtlety defend these forms of knowledge and 
the practices they engender in ways that undermine the democratising impulse that 
dominates contemporary, post-authoritarian Indonesian politics.  
 
Cukongism : The Gift Economy of Tionghoa  Patronage 
 
Most of Indonesia’s private wealth and commerce is controlled by ethnic Chinese 
Indonesians, who, if the dubious results of the 2000 census are to be believed, make 
up less than 1% of the population.  For reasons outlined in the following chapter of 
this section, I prefer to use the term Tionghoa.  Although a fantastically diverse 
community, the Tionghoa are united by a strong trading presence across the board, 
from small business to Indonesia’s corporate giants.  In Solo, some 80% of local trade 
is said to be Tionghoa owned (Purdey, 2006, p. 126). At the other end of the scale, the 
2010 Forbes list of Indonesia’s ten richest people includes nine Tionghoa capitalists 
who run some of the most powerful conglomerates in the country.  Parman is thus not 
an ethnically blank category of the neutrally rich.  The term is shorthand for a 
historical patronage relationship between the coercive apparatus and Tionghoa capital 
that has its roots in the ethnic stratification of power, known as cukongism.  Pribumi 
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Indonesians understand this relationship as essentially a patron-client exchange, in 
which the Tionghoa patron, the ‘cukong,’ exchanges gifts of capital for political 
privilege and legal immunity.  In contrast, patrons and their donees articulate the 
exchange as one of selfless, voluntary giving cementing a sincere camaraderie based 
on mutual respect and common interest.  Both parties distinctly refer to each other as 
‘teman’ [friends] and insist repeatedly that the money is given and never requested 
[tidak minta].  The following chapter will dissect cukongism and ambivalent power 
relations that patrons are drawn into.  The focus of this chapter is its significance to 
the coercive apparatus and the way that the current of the Tionghoa gift exchange 
economy has been reorganised in line with the reconfiguration of coercive power in 
the post-authoritarian period.  
 
The gift economy of Tionghoa patronage is a band-aid for the institutional 
incompetence, centralised budget-making and personal greed of the AKPOL-educated 
officer elite.  It is a flexible, untrackable current of capital darting through the 
organisation creating indebtedness by supplying property, construction, material 
goods and cash on a scale that significantly undermines state funding. Tionghoa 
capital is also a substructure of the Polri institution in that it substitutes for state 
allocated operational funds that have been siphoned off by upper echelons of the 
police. It underwrites choice drug and gambling busts and anti-terror exercises, 
community policing events and intelligence gathering.  Tionghoa money also 
sponsors institution-building and knowledge exercises such as seminars, legal 
draftings and networking events.  Capital flows can be long term and invested in 
individuals.  It is then re-circulated into other officers, units and departments or 
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stations. It can also be event based with single patrons or a kongsi [group or cartel] of 
businesspeople making large donations based on need.  
 
For the most part, the territorial instinct overrides the institutional premise of rational 
distribution.  Because every unit, station and department of Polri ‘works on its own, 
as if it were its own company’ [kerja sendiri, kaya perusahaan sendiri],28 the 
circulation and distribution of off budget revenue is not compensatory.  Each 
functional unit or station territorialises a resource for which it may have direct 
functional responsibility or over which it may claim authority because it falls within 
the radius of perceived legal or coercive strength and patronage flows follow this 
management of lahan. Thus, samapta [the patrol department] relies heavily on their 
authority over the surveillance of territory, leading to lucrative protection rackets and 
a side economy in ensuring public protesters don’t get too close to their targets.  
Reskrim’s [criminal research] power of extraction is linked to their exclusive power 
to determine and declare a criminal act and the Bimmas department [community 
relations] on the ability to enfold and connect new patrons to the police.  Similarly, 
Lalu Lintas’ [traffic police] control of the motor vehicle registry is a gargantuan 
economy for the institution, bringing in revenues that, until 2004, were not returned to 
the state.29   
 
                                                
28 Police General, interviewed by author (6 November, 2006).  
29 In a classic example of the stratified nature of ABRI financing, under the New Order, ABRI took a 
20% cut of the profits Mabes Polri made on every license and motor vehicle registered with the police. 
Even after 2004, the control of this economy continues to be important to the revenue-making of the 
police. BPK audits for 2005 found that Polri’s traffic directive was charging at least double the amount 
for standard issue driving licenses [SIM/STNK] (around Rp 176,000 [US$19] but sometimes up to Rp 
600,000 [US$66]) and only haphazardly recording the number of licenses issued to the Department of 
Finance (Widoyoko, D. 2003).  BPK also complained that although the money was now being returned 
to the state under non-tax state income [Penerimaan Negara Bukan Pajak], Polri were deliberately 
sitting on annual SIM/STNK revenues so as to pilfer the returns in interest (BPK, 2005). 
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The legal authority of a department or unit over a series of functions related to law, 
traffic or intelligence, also yields illicit funds based on the perceived authorities 
radiating from the original mandate.  For instance, the lalu lintas and samapta 
departments have the authority to levy fines based on traffic violations, an important 
source of funds for the department.  Indeed, Jakartans like to joke that razia [police 
raids] increase exponentially in number and severity of fines in line according to 
proximity to important police and religious events.  However, this authority to fine 
has bulged and mutated into territorial forms allowing the extraction of sums that 
represent neither a bribe nor a fine.   
 
By way of example, take Jakarta’s transport system. The giant, tangled web that 
represents the Jakarta bus system is an important source of revenue for polsek and 
polres.  Bus drivers who traverse a specific wilayah elect a timer who guard the 
boundaries between wilayah, for instance between the subdistrict of Rawasari and 
Salemba.  Each time a driver runs the route, perhaps dozens of times a day, he gives a 
sum of a few thousand to the timer who at the end of the day will divide the funds 
between the patrol and traffic police of the various polsek and polres that lie within 
that area, providing each with around Rp 100,000-200,000 [US$11-22] per day.30 The 
timer does not work for the police. He is elected by the drivers, sometimes based on 
affiliation to various ormas, who inform the police by formal letter [surat edaran] that 
this individual is permitted to negotiate going rates with the police and refer to him in 
case of any conflict between officers and drivers.  What must be emphasized here is 
that the the sum paid for crossing into the territory of a particular traffic police does 
not represent a bribe for clearly the police have no legal authority over the movement 
                                                
30 If the timer is giving the traffic police of the polsek Rp 200,000 [US$22] per day, this is revenue of 
around Rp 73 million [US$8 200] per year, a tidy sum for a small cash-strapped department.  
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of people.  Plying the bus from one subdistrict to another breaks no laws. Instead, the 
sum is rather more akin to a toll that recognises official police juristication over a 
certain wilayah and anticipates their legal authority to fine within that territory based 
on violations to traffic laws.31  The sum gives the bus driver a pass to enter the traffic 
police’s territory and grants the driver immunity against potential traffic violations 
and other attempts at extortion whilst in the territory. The sums that the timer gives to 
police are an example of the ways that legal and territorial authority become 
intertwined and mutually reinforcing. Fiscal extraction comes not from the originary 
capacity to fine, but from a halo of presumed and indeed, illicit authorities that come 
of that first legal entitlement. Thus illicit fiscal flows appear to sketch the path of 
legal authority in ways that are disorientated and complex.  
 
This example shows the capacity of individual police departments to bring in revenue 
which, if rationally circulated and shared, could potentially make up for the drought in 
resources [kering] experienced by other units and departments.  But Polri finances do 
not circulate but rather cul de sac in specific areas to be mopped up by assigned 
officers according to a complex, sometimes internally conflicting scale of seniority, 
rank and individual prowess. Moreover, stations, units, departments, working groups, 
right down to individual commanders and the officers under their authority do not 
leave themselves open to severe social and political sanction by overtly requisitioning 
the wealth of other areas. Not asking for money is to be ikhlas; it shows your sacrifice 
for the institution, stressed one middle-ranking reskrim officer.  A supervisor will 
                                                
31 Field notes (15 March 2007). My informant recounted a situation in which he was pulled up by the 
police for a traffic violation. Although he was guilty of the offense, he immediately asserted, ‘You 
can’t arrest me. I‘ve paid my money to the timer. If you haven’t received your money, then you have to 
work it out with the timer and your people, not me’ and promptly put the bus into gear and drove off.  
This illustrates how the sum draws police and drivers into a relationship of negotiated rights and 
obligations.  
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invite his junior [anak buah] to come to him to resolve monetary issues, but this is 
just theatre. There is no prestasi [prestige] in doing so.32  Rather, a subordinate’s 
silence about the financial situation of the one’s unit is also to impress upon a senior 
that one has one’s own stock of revenue, sources of patronage and enigmatic ways of 
generating income that sees one’s prestasi ripen in the eyes of management. 
‘Fulfilling my duties as an officer without asking for money is what makes me 
remarkable [hebatnya saya] in the eyes of authority,’ added the officer.33  Getting 
noticed by senior officers for one’s fiscal prowess is crucial to future rotations and the 
generation of further monetary possibilities. One female officer said,  
 
If you are not fit operationally [tidak mampu secara operasional; a euphemism for an officer’s 
ability to bring in revenues to the force], you’ll be isolated [kamu tersingkir].  It’s a kind of 
test for promotion. I was offered one [a promotion] but I was worried that I wouldn’t be able 
to pay the kapolsek enough.  I didn’t want to go crazy having to look for money [tidak mau 
dipusingkan dengan nyari uang].  But the men are up for it [Laki2 mau aja].  That’s why the 
police are mainly men. That’s the obstacle for women.  That’s why women can’t hold a 
posting for very long [tidak lama menjabat].  Look at that female officer who became 
Kapolres in Depok.  She didn’t last very long, did she?34 They [women] have good policing 
skills and the community likes them. If they were smart [pandai], they’d show their ability to 
find patrons [cari teman] using their feminine wiles [kelembutan wanita].35  
 
Not only does the structure of social capital within the police create the very 
inefficiencies in fiscal management that further increase the reliance upon the 
                                                
32 Mid ranking police officer, interviewed by author (07 March 2007).  
33 Ibid.  
34 The officer is referring to Adjunt Senior Police Commisioner (AKBP) Ratnawati Hadiwijaya who on 
the 5th of May 2005 was promoted to Kapolres of Depok only to be urgently removed in early August. 
There was some suggestion at the time by Kapolda Firman Gani that she had allowed the detention of a 
suspect and evidence outside of the police station, however, amongst officers in Jakarta it was widely 
believed that she simply wasn’t able to keep her part of the territorial command financially afloat.  
35 Mid ranking police officer, interviewed by author (10 November 2006).  
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patronage economy, but that very economy operates in gendered ways that works to 
shut women out of further advancement in the police.  
 
Indeed, the Tionghoa gift economy is masculinised to its very core.  Some forms of 
patronage are long term, with individual stellar officers sponsored throughout the life 
span of their careers or during certain key moments, such as when the police 
beneficiary holds a certain strategic position.  While rank and position are, what 
Gambetta calls, immediate barometers by which clients can judge the quality of the 
guarantee (Gambetta, 1996), there are other locally informed ways that bear upon 
capital’s decision to back a police officer.  A rising ‘man of prowess’ can be judged 
by the quality of his police patron, the factions to which he is aligned within the 
police or the deference he attracts from junior officers or important civilians.  The 
quality of an officer’s gaul [association/friendship] with preman and the criminal 
element is an also indicator that ‘dia punya massa, dia punya kekuatan’ [he can 
galvanise the masses, he has power],36 thus bolstering the worth of the investment.  In 
order to not embarrass the officer, gift-giving can initially be timid.  Relationships 
emerge through masculine spaces and modes of bonding such as late nights in clubs 
or gambling dens or the gift of female sex workers.  One officer at PTIK proudly 
showed me photos on his phone of a young slumbering, naked girl.  She was a 
Chinese sex worker who had been gifted to him for the night by a ‘teman cina’ 
[Tionghoa friend].  A ‘friendship’ is struck up by the mutual implication of parties in 
the transgression of laws and norms.  Later, gifts inflate.  Patronage comes to infuse 
                                                
36 Mid ranking police officer, interview by author (18 September 2006).  
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every aspect of an officer’s life, providing cars, scholarships for children, homes and 
Harley Davidson motorbikes.37 
 
From Polri’s perspective, long-term patronage of this kind is considered integral to 
keeping starred officers continually focused on the task of policing, rather than having 
to pursue too many other forms of revenue-raising.  For this reason, meeting and 
maintaining a patron is considered by police superiors an integral rite of passage and 
as a rising officer circulates through postings and departments, he is expected to 
establish contacts and patronage networks that will serve the institution in the future. 
Patronage is also assumed for officers in higher education, and for those in certain key 
positions, such as reskrim and senior command positions in the centres of capital of 
Surabaya, Medan or Jakarta, or when going through the higher education institutions 
for the officer corps, PTIK, the new police Masters program KPK and the senior 
management courses at SESPIM.  At PTIK, my informant told me that to his 
knowledge all of his classmates, including himself, had support from a Tionghoa 
patron.38  
 
Access to liquidity, in the form of a Tionghoa donor, also brings greater mobility 
within the police institution.  Tionghoa patrons supply the capital integral to the 
bidding and counter-bidding process required to circulate upwards into more lucrative 
or prestigious positions.  Monthly amplop [envelopes] from the Tionghoa patrons 
                                                
37 However, interviews with police officers suggested that this was not always so. An officer arriving 
into posting of clear interest to capital, such as the head of criminal research in a border area, will on 
the first day find himself gifted with the luxuries of his new position such as a new house or car.   
38 Junior ranking officer, interviewed by author (11 April 2007).  
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supply the funds from which the monthly setoran [salary deduction] payments to the 
departmental or station chief of staff is paid39.   
 
Finally, the debt of patronage engendered by an individual commander’s relationship 
to Tionghoa capital will also be passed on or circulated as ‘gifts’ are ‘re-gifted’ to 
third parties, such as the junior anak buah below the commanding unit officer.  A 
former senior police commissioner with the police explained,  
 
‘You can’t be promoted/rotated [naik] without the Chinese class [golongan cina].  They have 
an incredible influence on postings [posisi]. There are bribes [upeti] he must pay and he’ll also 
give [memberikan] facilities…to become a kapolsek, you must [mesti] have a patron [friend]. 
We don’t have a merit system. This is why we have this system.40  
 
Maintaining and even amassing patrons can help an officer ward off further bids on 
his position from other ambitious officers who use their own patronage revenue to 
shift stationed personnel.  One reskrim officer at Central Jakarta’s lucrative Taman 
Sari polsek told me that his patrons had to fight off three bids for his position during 
the two years of his tenure by upping their fiscal support.  In this way, Tionghoa 
patrons become mired in turf wars against each other through the deployment of their 
respective officers.  
 
Tionghoa patronage is also rendered in kind, through the permissive use of facilities 
and goods in a patron’s possession.  As such for the police, Tionghoa patronage 
rearranges the city spatially; officer ‘beats’ are arranged around a topographical map 
of patron venues where an officer might get a free meal, some uang rokok [cigarette 
                                                
39 This is discussed in more detail in Chapter VI.  
40 Retired Police General, interviewed by author (15 November 2006).  
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money], meet other officers and make contacts with other potentially important 
Tionghoa entrepreneurs.  A researcher of the police finds on-duty and off-duty 
officers pooling in certain bars, hotels, clubs, karaoke joints and malls but also at the 
local level, at select coffee shops and warung, gathering on a particular strip of land 
or below a banner.  Within the police, these gathering points are markers of affiliation 
to be ‘read’ by colleagues and competitors.  Informants who knew nothing of each 
other, separated by legality, profession, class and ethnicity jiggled nervously with the 
fizz of possibility when they talked of Saturday nights down at the notorious 
gambling den Hotel Crown on Jalan Harum Wuruk.  Dinners with generals were 
always at Winata’s Pacific Place or the 4am buffet at the Hotel Hilton where one 
never saw a bill and afternoons were spent at certain golf courses or the Senayan 
shooting range.  And so one comes to see how Tionghoa patronage reshapes the city 
spatially into hubs where gift-giving, male showmanship and further fiscal potential 
intersect.  Thus, patronage is not merely a relationship but a spatial exercise in urban 
geography.  What officers in the West know comfortably as ‘the beat’ is in Indonesia 
not a neutral exercise in patrolling uninterrupted, sovereign terrain but a circuit of 
political and fiscal potential clustered around nodes of capital.41  Under these 
circumstances, is it any wonder that the figures that Barker details in the Cilengka 
data room so meticulously map the precinct’s Tionghoa population? These are the 
sites to be patrolled, awaiting the emergence of fiscal possibility.  
 
Thus, the gift economy of Tionghoa patronage circulates through Polri on two 
necessarily interconnected levels.  On the individual level, Tionghoa liquidity is 
crucial for officers to fund rotations, promotions and higher education. This capital 
                                                
41 I thank Olly Owen for his fruitful comparative insights in our conversations around this topic.  
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also allows officers to amass a loyal following of anak buah by regifting the spoils of 
patronage to juniors and maintaining the favour of superiors by recirculating 
Tionghoa money upwards as monthly setoran.  Patronage money from Tionghoa 
donors builds internal police patronage by indebting junior officers to a senior and 
currying favour with superiors.  Officers also designate Tionghoa funds for the gift 
economy that flows between juniors and visiting or introduced senior and retired 
officers.  It falls to these juniors to provide senior ranked station guests with petrol, 
girls, drugs, nights out on the town, or simply in the form of amplop [envelopes] to 
see them safely on their journey – all paid with Tionghoa funds.  At the same time, 
the gift economy of Tionghoa patronage is a gargantuan shadow economy of Polri, 
seeping through the institution, filling in where allocated budgets have been pilfered 
or skimmed or simply fail to reflect the everyday needs of a station, department or 
unit.   
 
Patronage thus marries perceived individual and institution needs in ways that are 
complex and often asymmetrical but morally defensible to its beneficiaries and the 
institutional structure in which they operate.  Cukongism operates as a double bind 
that render the norms and laws of social systems internally incoherent.  On one hand, 
Tionghoa-police patronage friendships are illicit relationships because they contradict 
laws and popularly articulated social norms on police neutrality in law enforcement 
and public sources of police funding.  However, within the police institution and the 
wider political body, entertaining good relations with Tionghoa patrons is seen as so 
integral to the well being of the institution that the social and professional life of an 
ambitious officer is by design circuited around points of interface with Tionghoa 
business figures.  These points of convergence include the reservation of Wednesday 
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afternoons at the National Police Schools [SPN] solely for visiting ‘community 
members’, politicians and other important, capitalized figures known as ‘pembina’ 
[guardians]42.  Police also compete for specific geographic postings, such as Medan 
and Surabaya or departmental assignments, such as our reskrim officer in the major 
‘entertainment’ district of Taman Sari in Jakarta.43 As such, the parman economy 
creates stark disparities between different geographic areas within the command, 
between territories dense with parman and those without. The LPEM survey found 
that AKPOL-trained [Police Academy] officers circuited a ‘bureaucratic itinery’ of 
areas rich in private capital and that the low prestige SPN [National Police School] 
graduates clustered around stations located in areas of low private enterprise (Blundo, 
2007, p. 47). It was often rumoured within the police that Tomy Winata had a hand in 
the selection of the Police Chief of Metro Jaya [Kapolda] or the National Chief of 
Criminal Investigation [Kabareskrim].  Although such allegations can’t be proven, it 
is instructive that officers strongly believe they have to circulate within institution as a 
way of ‘doing the rounds’ with its patrons, and that this orbit of the territorial 
command forms the bedrock of police strategising for rotation and promotion.   
 
Thus, the gift economy of Tionghoa patronage fulfils thickly intertwined individual 
and institutional interests, though it would be a mistake to suggest that these interests 
are met equally or that institutional interests prevail in situations where they conflict. 
This alignment of institutional and individual interest is precisely where conventional 
definitions of corruption, as the misuse of public office for personal gain, wholly miss 
the point.  Indeed, ‘corruption’ is a deviant, transgressive practice, enveloped in 
                                                
42 Retired Police General, interviewed by author (17 July 2008).  
43 Figure 6 shows the high density of police and military stations in the central entertainment areas of 
Jakarta. Taman Sari boasts two Kodim, two Koramil and a Polsek. The map, of course, cannot show 
the flocks of non-stationed police and military officers circling the area on a given night. See Chapter 
III for more details.  
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secrecy. Polri officers engaged in the pursuit of off-budget reveue are under no 
illusions about the strict legal definition of their practices. But practice trumps law it 
sustains important relations of exchange and transaction within the institution and 
between the institution and the wider apparatus of the state. Simply put, it is a social 
practice rather an individual offence and it is this very fact that makes corruption 
within the police systemic (Znoj, 2007, p. 54).  Chapter VI of this thesis interrogates 
these relations further.  
 
The fact that a torrent of Tionghoa capital is diverted through the state’s coercive 
apparatuses is in itself nothing new to the scholarship of security in Indonesia. The 
relationship between state keamanan and private capital has a historical trajectory that 
outlasts the republic itself, with individual patronage relations only a small subset of a 
wider, structural relationship.  Tionghoa entrepreneurship funded the pribumi 
segments of the colonial beamtenstaat (Sutherland, 1979). The military offensive 
against the Dutch during the revolution was funded by an alliance between Tionghoa 
smugglers, traders and footballs stars with the nascent political and military elite 
(Twang, 1998; Cribb, 1998) and the 1950s saw the rise of one of the most celebrated 
totok-military couplings in the history of the New Order, that of Liem Sioe Liong and 
the young would-be President Suharto himself.  As military businesses transformed, 
fragmented and formalized, becoming increasing complex and diversified after the 
military seizure of former Dutch owned industries in 1957, relations between 
Tionghoa big business and the military elite too became more sophisticated.  Then 
when Suharto rose to power in 1965 on the back of a massacre of genocidal 
proportions, Tionghoa capital affixed itself to the coercive apparatus in such a way as 
to construct what Chua calls ‘a mutually beneficial politico-business oligarchy,’ 
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(2008) concentrated in nodules around positions, units and battalions which possessed 
extraordinary political and coercive potency, such as Kopassus, Kostrad (of which 
Suharto was a commander in 1965), the Siliwangi (West Java) and Diponogoro 
(Central Java) regional command, the Presidential guard and the army in general.   
 
Seen in this light, Tionghoa capitalists sinking such large sums of money into the 
police in the wake of the political transition to democracy suggests that the vast 
economy of Tionghoa capital, like the politics of territory, has also been subject to the 
see-saw switch of the reorganisation of the coercive apparatus.  Tionghoa capital, 
once marked thoroughly green, was realigning itself following the rise of the 
civilianisation of the coercive apparatus.  The following section will explore Sino-
military cooperation during the New Order.  
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Photograph 4: Polda Metro Jaya’s Densus 88 building under construction despite ongoing suspicion that 
land and funds were donated by Tomy Winata’s Artha Graha [AG].  AG’s headquarters dwarf the station 
(Photo by Hendarto, 2005). 
 
The Militarisation of Sino-Capital in the Golden Triangle  
 
Officially, Polda Metro Jaya neighbours Lot#1 of the 42 hectares of prime real estate 
that make up the Sudirman Central Business District (SCBD).  Zoned between three 
of the city’s main arteries Jalan Sudirman, Jalan Rasuna Said and Jalan Gatot Subroto, 
the area is marketed as ‘Jakarta’s Golden Triangle’ despite its uncanny resemblance 
to a cross, or more fittingly, a pirate’s X.  Alongside Metro Jaya’s recent property 
expansion, the Golden Triangle is home to the Jakarta Stock Exchange, the World 
Bank, USAID, Tan Kian’s Ritz Carlton, a series of exclusive serviced apartments 
built by Agung Sedayu (another property group jointly owned by Winata and 
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Kusuma), a golf range, an exclusive auto and electronics mall, the biggest pool hall in 
Southeast Asia and most recently, Pacific Place, which in a city of extreme-lux 
shopping malls, boasts itself, ‘the foremost destination for shopping and lifestyle.’  
SCBD has been constructed ‘to accommodate your requirements of a place to 
experience your success,’ a success safeguarded by the ‘total security complex’ 
offered by management (www.scdb.com).  
 
Seen from Jalan Sudirman, the Artha Graha building, with its flaxen initials winking 
over the city, is staked before this hoard of skyscrapers like a picket in turf.  Artha 
Graha is the mother company to PT Danayasa Arthatama, a holding company that 
owns, develops, manages and secures the luxury that proliferates in the Golden 
Triangle.44  PT Danayasa Arthatama is also in part owned by Sugianto ‘Aguan’ 
Kusuma, owner of conglomerate, Agung Sedayu Group.  In 1990, PT Danayasa 
Arthatama surprised financial observers by acquiring a majority share in a state-
owned company (BUMN) called PT Jakarta International Hotel Development (PT 
JIHD).  With funds from PT JIHD, in 1991, PT Danayasa Arthatama proceeded to 
pay Rp 7.5 trillion [$US836 million] for the SCDB development, then a ‘fantastical 
sum for central Jakarta real estate.’ (Gatra, 17 March, 2003) To clear the site of its 
pesky, tenacious residents and landowners (most of them migrants who settled there 
from the 1950-70s), PT Danayasa Arthatama hired Yoris Raweyai to galvanise his 
Pemuda Pancasila henchmen (Tempo, 31 May, 1999).45  The violence used to 
deterritorialise evidently paid off because by 1999 Human Rights Watch valued the 
property at an estimated US$ 3 billion dollars (Human Rights Watch, 2006, p. 34). 
                                                
44 Below this company are 19 other subsidiaries involved in tourism, luxury housing, retail, property, 
trading and construction. Most of these companies have a stake in the SCBD development.  
45 In this interview, Raweyai admits that he has known Tomy Winata since 1975 when Winata was 
contracted to build the residence for Irian Jaya Kodam. His relationship with Winata and Aguan 
deepened in the 1980s.   
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Previously, neither Winata nor Kusuma had ever managed a property deal that came 
even close to that sum.  Uncannily, in the year of the SCDB purchase, Kusuma’s 
Agung Sedayu group completed its first big construction project: the Harco Mangga 
Dua complex in Central Jakarta.46  
 
On the face of it PT JIHD was a rather ordinary little enterprise.  Its portfolio 
encompassed a few luxury, but now increasingly dated hotels, such as Jakarta’s Hotel 
Borobudur,47 the Hotel Kartika and its sister hotel in South Kuta, the Kartika Plaza 
Bali.  The SCBD development was a new endeavour for PT JIHD and some would 
say the company was punching way above its weight.  However, PT JIHD was in fact 
one of dozens of subsidiaries48 grouped under PT Tri Usaha Bakti (Truba), a holding 
company under the auspices of Yayasan Kartika Eka Paksi (YKEP).  YKEP was and 
continues to be the Indonesian army’s largest and most notorious foundation.  
  
The marriage of army (PT JIHD) and Tionghoa (PT Danayasa Arthatama) interests 
through the Golden Triangle investment was also reinforced by the earlier 
appointment of Siliwangi officer, Letnan General TB Silalahi to Komisaris Utama 
[First Commissioner] of PT Danayasa Arthatama and Bank Artha Graha.49  Silalahi’s 
                                                
46 Chapter III specifically looks at the Harco Mangga Dua complex and its integral role in the illicit 
gambling economy.  
47 For a time, Hotel Borobudur’s in-house night club, Musro, was the place to see and be seen among 
Jakarta’s rising Tionghoa and military elites.  Security staff to the hotel were supplied by the army and 
Kopassus. In recent years, symbolic of the reorganisation of the coercive apparatus, Hotel Borobudur 
has come to be guarded by Brimob and Kopassus.  In early 2010, it was also the site of anti-terrorism 
training by Densus 88.  
48 HRW notes that in 2001, by the time of YKEP’s substantial decline, the foundation had eleven 
subsidiares and 22 joint ventures (pg 34).  In 2000, Kompas reported that YKEP had 43 subsidiaries, 
while Indonesian Corruption Watch’s independent report on military businesses gave a figure of 44 
companies and 22 joint ventures (2006).  
49 One of the first ventures of the Winata-Kusuma-army prism was the take over of Yayasan 
Siliwangi’s Bank Propelat. By 1989, Bank Propelat was Rp 600 billion [US$67 million] in the red 
thanks to corrupt lending practices and bad debts.  Winata-Kusuma took on the bank, renamed it Bank 
Artha Graha and by 1992, they enjoyed a majority share through PT Karya Nusantara Permai and PT 
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appointment was the first in a procession of senior military figures with commissioner 
status in the Artha Graha empire.  The military commissioners were ostensibly 
positioned within Artha Graha to represent YKEP’s stake in the partnership, but the 
true effect of their appointment was to provide a halo of militarised protection around 
Winata and Kusuma’s business dealings. This spectacular theatre of Tionghoa-
military partnership represented an intensification of the Sino-military business 
empire in an era characterised by militarised relationships with ‘oligarchic capitalism’ 
(Chua, 2008). Land that Polda Metro Jaya would receive as gift some 14 years later 
under Indonesia’s new civilian democracy, was in 1991 a shining beacon of the iron 
clad alliance of Jakarta’s Tionghoa tycoons and the army in late New Order 
capitalism.  
 
However, the SCBD alliance also heralded a new configuration of Tionghoa-military 
entrepreneurship which broke with the earlier patterns of military cukongism50 
organised around a revolving but familiar cast of primarily totok figures such as Bob 
Hasan, Liem Sioe Liong (Bogorsari), Mochtar Riady (Lippo Group), Sjamsul 
Nursalim (Gadjah Tunggal Group), Prajogo Pangestu (Barito Pacific Group), Sukanto 
Tanoto (Royal Golden Eagle International), Eka Tjipta Widjaya (Sinar Mas Group), 
Harry Tanoe and Rachman Halim.  As Chua observes, these business elites had 
amassed capital on the back of a highly protectionist, centralised, industrialising state 
                                                                                                                                      
Cerana Artha Putra respectively.  Yayasan Siliwangi had only a 40% stake in Bank Artha Graha. Bank 
Artha Graha is today one of the top commercial banking firms in the country.  
50 Suriyadinata (1997) explains that a cukong (formerly spelt tjukong) is Hokkein for master or boss 
and has long been used to describe aggressive business entrepreneurs, who often represented informal 
leaders for certain parts of the Tionghoa community. Only in the New Order did cukong come to 
represent a set of relations, in which Tionghoa businessmen provided capital and directional support to 
the pribumi political and military elite in exchange for economic, political and security privileges.  At 
the same Suryadinata (1997) notes that as New Order cukong became closer to the state, they 
harboured increasingly less inclination to ‘lead’ the Tionghoa community.  This has not been the case 
for Tomy Winata who has put his money behind a significant number of pribumi, Tionghoa, state and 
civil society activities.  
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economy in which a corps of politicio-bureaucrats saw the alliance with Tionghoa 
capital as the best path to the cooptation of a rival class, the exclusion of pribumi 
entrepreneurs who might demand political privileges, and personal enrichment (Chua, 
2008, p. 50-55). 
 
By 1991, the year of the SCDB purchase, the capital base of the politico-bureaucrats 
had fattened considerably, decreasing their reliance on Tionghoa big business.51  For 
their own part, Tionghoa capitalists were edging into international markets and 
increasing their autonomy from the state.  Liberalisation and selective deregulation 
profited both parties, and reforms to the banking sector saw a host of Tionghoa 
conglomerates open banks as personal cash cows, increasing their access to the 
colossal jab of credit needed to make Jakarta’s most costly property deal.  With 
inflation and interest rates equally paired, 20-25% of all lending fuelled the massive 
property boom that transformed the urban landscape and intensified spatial 
segregation (Studwell, 2007, Chapter 6). Hence, Kusuma and Winata’s break into the 
big league of Tionghoa conglomerates occurred at a time in which Sino-military 
alliances were transitioning into a new phase which would, as Chua illustrates, 
eventually see Tionghoa big business free themselves of their dependency on the 
state.  
 
Before the SCBD purchase, very few had heard of Sugianto Kusuma or Tomy 
Winata. However since 1991 the SCBD purchase has consistently ranked as one of 
the most profitable slabs of real estate in the country and Artha Graha has grown into 
a true megalith, with major stakes in mining, tin, oil, gas, agriculture and finance.  
                                                
51 Ibid. 
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Indeed, Winata’s recent cornering of the emerging hybrid-rice market is a replication 
of the kind of cartel common during the New Order, supplying a constant cash flow 
that is certain to launch Artha Graha into Indonesia’s top ten most wealthy 
conglomerates. As Chapter II describes, Sugianto Kusuma has established himself as 
a property tycoon and is reshaping the face of Indonesia’s urban spaces into lifestyle 
malls and luxury apartments.  In June 2010, Kusuma’s net worth of US$625 million 
saw him ranked number 21 on the Forbes list of wealthiest Indonesians, up from 
number 25 the previous year. This year, Winata is curiously absent from the list.  
 
Foundations, Cooperatives and Cukong  in ABRI’s Charity 
Economy  
 
Yayasan Kartika Eka Paksi (YKEP) was the army’s largest foundation established to 
provide for the welfare of army personnel.  After a series of Sino-military businesses 
ended in scandal, bankruptcy and a prohibition on any further economic activity 
(Widoyoko, 2003, p. 26-30), General Umar Wirahadikusumah, a rising star from the 
Siliwangi command who replaced Suharto in Kostrad in 1967, established YKEP in 
1972. YKEP was not the first foundation of the armed forces. That distinction goes to 
a Polri yayasan, Badan Sosial Pusat Kepolisian Indonesia (later known as Brata 
Bhakti) which was established in 1952.52  
 
Throughout Indonesia’s constitutional democracy in the 1950s and the guided 
democracy of the 60s, independent revenue-raising was an acknowledged part of 
leading a command, battalion or department.  Indeed, with the nationalisation of 
                                                
52 Senior staff Yayasan Brata Bhakti, interview by author (24 April 2008).   
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Dutch industry, the military swaggered into an increasingly important role in the 
economy.  In 1957, as head of Central Java’s Diponegoro military command, Suharto 
had met this objective by establishing yayasan with business interests in primary 
commodities, agricultural produce and shipping in league with Semarang’s large 
population of totok traders, including Bob Hasan.  Elson notes that through these 
activities Suharto’s military and civilian staff were ‘allocated positions which entitled 
them to percentages of profits’ in private business and in state enterprises.’53  From 
the late 1960s onwards, YKEP, and the dozens of foundations established by ABRI 
and civilian government branches, departments and agencies, represented a 
legalisation of the enterprise Suharto had initiated and then been condemned for at 
Diponegoro.  
 
The yayasan/kooperasi system lent a charitable front to the control of some of the 
best contracts in the country. YKEP, like hundreds of other military and police 
foundations established for the welfare of their personnel, had a vast investment 
portfolio that spanned forestry, manufacturing, services, mining, transportation, 
university education and the diamond in the tiara that was the SCDB development. At 
                                                
53 Elson’s writing on this part of Suharto’s life is interesting for its caution.  He is reserved about three 
of the most popular understandings of this period of Suharto’s life; 1) that through Diponegoro’s 
business empire, he formed a life-long alliance with totok trader Liem Sioe Liong 2) that these business 
activities led to his dismissal for corruption by Nasution in late 1959 and 3) that these activities formed 
the basis for the blatant, franchise style corruption that characterised the New Order state.  Liong 
appeared to be a smaller player in Diponegoro’s businesses than foster child of Gatot Subroto, Bob 
Hasan.  Elson argues that Suharto’s own reputation amongst his men was not one of greed or self-
advancement but selfless devotion and fiscal moderation and Nasution’s decision to transfer him 
appeared to be more a matter of internal politicking than serious allegations of personal enrichment. 
(Elson, 2001, p. 60-75). More recently, Jenkins has categorically rejected this line, suggesting that 
Suharto’s ‘fund-raising’ while at the Diponegoro post was blatantly geared towards self-enrichment. In 
league with his primary financial officer, ‘they squeezed and cajoled ethnic Chinese businessmen. 
They imposed illegal levies on the copra trade. They seized the assets of foreign-owned businesses. 
They set up a lucrative smuggling operation, bartering sugar for rice. They sought ‘assistance’ from the 
manufacturers of kretek [clove] cigarettes. They controlled, ‘unofficially’, the distribution of kerosene 
in Central Java’. Suharto was driven by such excessive greed that it agitated military elites in Jakarta, 
leading to his eventual dismissal. The yayasan that Suharto set up while at Diponegoro were 
instrumental to his growing wealth (Jenkins, D, 2010, p. 17-26).  
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its height, YKEP was associated with around Rp 314 billion [US$35 million] worth of 
13 affiliated firms and 26 joint ventures (Rieffel & Dharmasaputra, 2008), the profits 
of which brought in around Rp 30-50 billion [US$300-500,000] per year (Ishak, 
2008). YKEP also specialised in obtaining state contracts to provide shoddy, 
overpriced services to their own captive markets, such as PT Bhakti Wira Husada’s 
provision of pharmaceuticals to the army medical unit (Widoyoko, 2003, p. 59). 
 
Although it was the most expensive, the SCBD initiative was only one of 26 other 
joint ventures with international capital and Suharto-allied-Tionghoa funds. Through 
PT Tri Usaha Bhakti (Truba), a military company established in 1968 and moved 
below YKEP auspices when the ban on military businesses came into place in the 
early 1970s. YKEP developed significant stakes in timber, aviation, transportation, 
metals construction, forestry and plantations.  By 1996, Truba’s assets had grown so 
profitable that it pegged the company as 140th on Indonesia’s biggest conglomerate 
list.  Truba’s 51% share in International Timber Corp was shared with Bob Hasan 
(35%) and Bambang Trihatmodjo (14%).  Hasan and Tommy Suharto also partnered 
with Truba through Sempati Air and Truba’s timber interests in Kalimantan were in 
league with Tionghoa local, Jos Soetomo, through PT Sumber Mas.  
 
As Robison observed in 1986, partnering with Tionghoa capital alleviated the fact that 
on their own military businesses,   
 
remain small, undercapitalised and struggling. Generally they flourish only with entry into 
joint enterprise with Chinese or international capitalists. It’s the latter who provide the capital, 
the management and the broad corporate structures to turn these sets of political resources into 
real profits (Robinson, 2008, p. 256).  
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Robison’s work underscored how the military used its political clout to lever logging 
and mining concessions with very small sums of investment of Rp 2-3 million 
[$US222-335]. Production would lie fallow until the military negotiated joint ventures 
with big Tionghoa business who would supply the project with an artery of capital 
and the expertise to manage it. Robison proposed that in fact, the military’s 
investment in the partnership was the very concession itself.  Military officers 
provided only the security and prestige of partnership in return for a cut of profits. 
Unlike other financially autonomous militaries such as those in Pakistan (Siddiqua, 
2007), Russia (Brommelhorster & Paes, 2003) or Congo (ibid), the unique racialised 
structure of the Indonesian economy relieved Suharto’s generals from the messy work 
of business strategy and management.  This helped maintain a system that would have 
collapsed far earlier than it eventually did had it been entirely self-run.  
 
Little wonder then that the pattern of military (particularly army) businesses 
mimicked the strategies and structures of Indonesia’s numerous Tionghoa 
conglomerates: random diversification around a series of vertically integrated cartels 
that supplied a core cash flow (Studwell, 2007). In the signature style of most 
Tionghoa conglomerates, YKEP raised enough capital to allow them to dominate 
entire production chains.54  This is known as vertical integration and it allowed YKEP 
to determine how much profit and loss showed up on the books, diverting funds so 
that companies appear less wealthy than they actually were or to obscuring profits 
siphoned into military pockets. With ‘too much easy cash and too much easy credit’ 
(ibid, p. 82) the generations of army generals and the patron cukong that partners with 
                                                
54 Retired Police General, interview by author (11 April 2007).   
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YKEP diversified in order to establish more monopolies in other sectors of the 
economy rather than work at building dedicated, competitive companies with 
maximised earnings.  Studwell observes that this is a classic symptom of ‘a license-
based operating environment in which competition is limited by the state and so any 
new business opportunity is to be grabbed at’ (ibid). But I would push this argument 
further. Vertical integration is an extreme modality of territorialisation writ large on 
the national economy.  It is not yen for limitless power that drives the will to 
monopolise through the indiscriminate purchase of companies, arranged and 
rearranged below holding companies in a labyrinth order too dense to be penetrated 
by any one auditor.  Rather I propose that underlying the need to territorialise the 
sector grinds a deep nervousness about the temporal and political limits of their great 
empires.  It is the plunder mentality of an imposter awaiting exposition. Vertical 
integration within a wider pattern of random diversification speaks of the desperate, 
mechanistic strategy of those who live in uncertain patrimonial exchange systems. 
This will be explored further in the following chapter.  
 
The alliance between Tionghoa capital and the off-budget army economy created 
other queer protuberances in the New Order economy.  Since the nationalisation of 
what agrarian state industry under Sukarno’s Guided Democracy and the 
industrialisation of that industry under the New Order,55 the military had played a role 
as advisors, commissioners and managers of state companies and increasingly of 
Suharto-owned companies.  With the expansion of joint enterprises between the 
military and Tionghoa capital, this too entitled army officers to cushy positions on the 
                                                
55 Sungkar notes that although the state economy of the Dutch East Indies had industrial, commercial 
and financial wings, by the time of its 1957 nationalisation its agricultural investment consisted of over 
400 estates. By comparison, under the New Order, of the 200 companies controlled by the state, 23% 
were in industry, 19% in agriculture, 16% in finance and 10% in public works. (Sungar, Yasmin. 2008, 
p 98-99).  
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board for retired or senior officers. As with TB Silalahi’s permanent post as 
commissioner for Winata’s PT Danayasa and Bank Artha Graha, it was increasingly 
unclear whether officers were there to represent military business interests or their 
individual stake-holdings and as the greening of private enterprise intensified, the 
distinction between the two became progressively blurred.  In this way Tionghoa-
military patronage was a two way street. As military businesses clung to their cukong 
so too did Tionghoa business scramble for beking from an appropriately potent 
military officer. This was a classic semiotic display to competitors and potential 
extortionists.  The exchange was this: if Tionghoa capital provided the military with 
the smarts to turn their concessions into a business empire, then the military provided 
Tionghoa with security against the threat of competition. Enveloped in a halo of 
senior Kostrad and Kopassus officers, the power of their beking lay in their ability to 
extend power by association; by conferring the imagined power of their networks, 
legal immunity and coercive muster.  Ethnic Chinese businesspeople spoke to me 
repeatedly of the need, not to align with or court, but specifically to ‘tempel’ [to 
plaster or patch] a military general to their capital as a potent pribumi face to protect 
their investments.   
  
As the largest foundation run by the oldest sibling of the coercive apparatus, YKEP 
established the signature style of the vast web of foundations and cooperatives that 
made up the revenue-raising wings of the army, navy, air-force, police and, too often 
forgotten, their hundreds of individual territorial, geographic and command 
incarnations.  In the year that Wirahadikumah established YKEP, the police, navy and 
airforce established their main vehicles for off-budget fundraising.  Well known 
among them include the Navy’s Yayasan Bhumyamca, which had around 32 
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companies in 2000 and the airforce’s Yayasan Adhi Upaya, whose 10 companies 
were invested in construction, property, construction, airlines and pharmaceuticals 
(HRW, 2006, p. 35-36). Moreover, through PT Angkasa Pura, the airforce was able to 
maintain a major, ongoing stake in the commercial and state airline industry.   
 
As the youngest sibling of ABRI, Mabes Polri’s efforts to intercept state and private 
commerce were channeled mainly through Yayasan Brata Bhakti (YBB). YBB is 
ironically the oldest of all the foundations of the coercive apparatus, which today 
oversees around ten trade, insurance, and forestry companies (see Table 2). Now 
regulated by the Foundation Laws of 2004, capital is no longer raised through 
partnership with the private sector although its activities continue to receive guidance 
(pembinaan) from the Kapolri, Wakapolri and Irwasum.  Officials at YBB resolutely 
argue that the foundation no longer operates as a ‘mask’ [topeng] for Polri’s business 
interests and insist that most of the companies under its auspices are idle or 
unprofitable.56    
  
Like the army, the police also established its cooperatives, such as Inkopol [Induk 
Kooperasi Polri] which runs a transportation and storage warehouse [gudang] 
network favoured for Bulog and state agri-businesss distribution and storage 
contracts. In 2004, the cooperative was credibly accused of illicit sugar and rice 
smuggling.  In the 1990s, Inkopol also partnered profitably to computerise the Traffic 
Directive’s vehicle registration and licensing, firstly through Suharto’s daughter, Siti 
                                                
56 Interview. Yayasan Brata Bhakti. 24.04.08. Comparatively, however, YBB’s self stated income 
appears to be quite buoyant. In a recent comparison of yayasan managed by state departments YBB is 
second only to Bank Indonesia [the central bank] in takings. So great is Yayasan Kesejahteraan 
Karyawan Bank Indonesia’s Rp 5.3 trillion [$US 590 million] yearly income (YKKBI, or the 
Prosperity Foundation of Employees of Bank Indonesia), that the researchers were unable to include it 
on the graph. (Rieffel & Dharmasaputra, 2008, P. 40).  
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Hardiyanti Rukman’s PT Permatasakti Persada and then after 1998 with Golkar 
parliamentarian Setya Novanto’s PT Prima Nugraha Sejahtera Raya.57  In the post-
authoritarian era, Inkopol has won a host of state contracts, such as for ballot printing 
and transportation in West Java’s 2008 regional election, the 2004 election in Central 
Kalimantan and the botched 2006 election in Banten.58  In 2003 with Puskopol [Pusat 
Kooperasi Polisi], Inkopol shared a Depnakertrans contract to return migrant workers 
[TKI] to their homes from Terminal 3, Sukarno Hatta airport. At the regional level, 
Puskopol, along with Primkopol [Primer Kooperasi Polisi] enjoyed juicy contracts in 
coal mining and petrol transportation, which at West Kalimantan’s Senakin mine led 
to accusations of protecting illegal mining in 2005.  Foundations, cooperatives and 
other individually-run enterprises operate at every level of the policing apparatus 
however, very little is known about their activities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
57 In these contracts, Inkopol is not a partner, but acts as a broker, dispersing the money to the 
contractor. The BPK report strongly criticized this practice as Inkopol’s accounting of their 
management of these contracts to the state is in lump sums rather than detailed and inventoried 
budgets.    
58 The 2006 Banten election was marred by accusations of incorrectly printed ballot papers and poor 
distribution of voting cards. On the day of the election, parliamentary members of the DRPD found 
fraudulent ballot papers. Rival parties, such as the PKS, took the case to Polda Banten however, the 
issue was not resolved.   
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Table 3: Subsidiaries of Yayasan Brata Bhakti59   
Yayasan Brata Bhakti  Ownership  Profit 2007  Dividends 2007  
PT. Bara Induk  YBB owns 20% share. 
PT used to have HPH for  
approx 180 000 hectares 
in Serang (Maluku), Riau 
and North Sumatra.  
Accused of illegal 
logging national forests 
in Riau and North 
Sumatra. HPH not 
renewed in 2003.   
N/A Rp 700 million 
[US$79 000] 
PT Tana Trisna  90% share. Industrial 
feeders, cold storage, 
Polri supplies, shrimp, 
timber, chemical 
supplies.  
N/A N/A 
PT Panca Trisna  90% share. General 
trading & supplier to 
Polri 
Rp 1 billion 
[US$112 million] 
Rp 500 million 
[US$56 000] 
PT Braja Tama 
(Karangsetra)  
90% share. HPH in West 
Kalimantan & hotel & 
swimming pool in 
Bandung.  
Rp 1 billion 
[US$112 million] 
Rp 480 million 
[US$56 000]  
PT Braja Tara  90% share. General trade 
and explosive equipment  
Rp 20 million  
[US$2 300]  
N/A 
PT Brata Sarana Bhakti  90% share. Construction.  N/A N/A 
                                                
59 Yayasan Brata Bhakti, interview by author (24 April. 2008). I am indebted to Karaniya Dharm 
Asaputra for his guidance during this interview. My figures have been checked against his in Rieffel & 
Dharmasaputra, 2008, p 40).  
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PT Asuransi Bhakti 
Bayangkara 
51% share. Insurance 
company. Currently, 
Polri’s traffic directorate 
are illegally extract a Rp 
30,000 levy for insurance 
from PT ABB for driver 
license applicants.  
Rp 2.1 billion 
[US$235 million]  
Rp 600 million 
[US$67 000] 
PT. Sapta Pirsa Mandiri 35% share. Loss 
Adjustment and 
Surveying.  
N/A N/A 
PT.Sekom Bayangkara 
(2001)  
 
35% share, a subsidiary 
of Japanese company, 
Secom Ltd Security 
guards, equipment and 
management. Former 
police general and current 
secretary of the police 
‘watchdog’ Kompolnas 
Ronnie Lihawa owns 
25% share. In 2009, the 
company’s estimated 
value was up by 15%. 
Rp 1.25 billion 
[US$140 million] 
Rp 400 million 
[US$45 000] 
Citra Graha Lestari Persada 
(1999)  
55% share. Parking at 
Samsat, Dan Mogot & 
storage.  
Rp 130 million 
[US$15 000]  
Rp 40 million 
[US$4 500] 
Bimantara Building  YBB owns the 3087 
metres of land upon 
which Gedung Bimantara 
stands in Kebun Sirih, 
providing the head 
US$20,000 per year 
donation 
[sumbangan tetap].  
Rp 73 million 
[US$8 200]  
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quarters for Bimantara 
group. Bimantara group 
was owed by Suharto’s 
son, Bambang 
Trihatmodjo but 
Bambang Hary Iswanto 
Tanoesoedibjo (Hary 
Tanoe) purchased a 
majority 40% share. In 
2010, the build operating 
transfer agreement 
between Bimantara group 
and YBB will expire. 
Hary Tanoe was also 
listed as a donor to the 
Metro Jaya coffee book.  
 
 
As Table two shows, Polri’s economy of charities, cooperatives and foundations by 
and large failed to attract the level of liquidity, diversification and joint 
entrepreneurship associated with the pattern established by army yayasan and 
kooperasi.  Most of the contracts Polri yayasan entertained, like transportation for 
Bulog, were just a sliver of a much more lucrative industry muscled out of the state 
economy.  Polri failed to build vertically integrated cartels and to effectively piggy-
back on Tionghoa dominance in the private sector to create conglomerates on the 
same elephantine scale as the army.   
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Moreover the executive boards of Tionghoa conglomerates were entirely devoid of 
the active or retired Polri officers, suggesting that here too, the cream of Polri’s crop 
had been cut out of a significant off-budget economy.  As the youngest sibling in a 
military state, partnering with the national police had minimal talismanic or economic 
value.  What good was a police general on the board when he could be so easily 
trumped by an army general?  What awe could a police general inspire?  The police 
couldn’t claim to wield the magic of extreme coercion like a Kopassus or Kostrad, or 
wily connections of a Diponegoro or Siliwangi army general.  Polri under the New 
Order was a poor man’s fetish.  For security of mind and capital, nothing beat 
aligning one’s business interests with the kind of political, coercive and legal potency 
the army possessed.  The army’s supreme power to deterritorialise counter claims was 
precisely what the Tionghoa warga asing [foreigners] needed to give oomph to their 
own feeble territorial claims.  Hence, Kusuma and Winata’s attraction to YKEP was 
first and foremost premised on the ‘security’ of investment that YKEP could provide, 
conceived not in liquidity or financial stability but in coercive and political might. 
New Order Indonesia chained coercion, political influence and financial gain into a 
reliable sequence.  
 
State Budgets and Fiscal (In)Adequacy  
 
Like Polri’s clutching at the parman economy, the official line for the military’s 
establishment of an economy of ‘philanthropy’ was that foundations and co-
operations allowed the army to assist its personnel and make up the shortfall in 
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revenue from the state.60  Experts routinely estimate that the ABPN only meets 30% 
of the overall needs of the armed forces. As such, lack of state funding was and 
continues to be the first and primary justification for military businesses, criminal 
activities and Tionghoa patronage.  In 1991, the year of the SCDB purchase, the state 
budget for Pertahanan & Keamanan or Hankam [Defence and Security] surpassed the 
one trillion rupiah mark for the first time (APBN, 1992). However, as Table 1 and 2 
show, the Hankam budget as a percentage of GDP had been falling since the first 
development plans [Repelita] of the New Order.  During this period, no other ASEAN 
country registered such slow growth of military expenditure (Crouch, 1988). If ABRI 
was the jewel in the crown of the New Order, then why such diligent neglect?  
 
Table 4: Budgetary Development in the Defence and Security Sector (Trillion Rupiah) (Years 1973-74 (End 
of Five Year Development Plan [Repelita] 1 - 1993-94 (End of Repelita V)61 
Budget 1973-74 1978-79 1983-84 1988-89 1993-4 
Total APBN 1,98 8,08 19,38 38,16 62,33 
Hankam 
Budget 
0,294 0,916 2,164 2,737 4,239 
% of APBN 14.9 11.3 11.2 7.2 6.8 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
60 PT Tri Usaha Bhakti (also known as PT Truba), the holding company for YKEP was in fact 
established in 1968 to channel funds to pensioned officers.  After the founding of YKEP four years 
later, PT Truba divested all of its shares to YKEP (Syahnakri, 2005, pg 97-110).   
61 Reproduced from APBN 1998.  
! ""# 
 
Table 5:  Annual Budgetary Development of Hankam during Repelita VI (Billions of Rupiah)62  
Budget 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-
99 
Total APBN  62,322 69,749 78,024 90,616 101,086 147,210 
Hankam 
Budget  
4,239 5,008 5,996 7,009 7,415 9,648 
% of ABPN  6.8 7.18 7.69 7.74 7.34 6.55 
 
Analysts frequently couple decreases in military expenditure with the fluctuating 
price of oil that caused a recession in mid-1980s New Order.  Indeed, Tables 1 and 2 
show how the trend in decreasing military spending stabilised to 6-7% of GDP in the 
more prosperous 1990s.  For its own part, ABRI argued that the reduction in funding 
was not externally derived, but in fact in line with the overall planning of the Repelita 
programs and increasing need to divert funding to government programming in other 
sectors (Kuntjoro & Simatupang, 1989). Most scholars of ABRI have been content to 
point out the deficiency in military funding as the inevitable outcome of a developing 
economy in which fiscal shortcomings are the norm.  However, this line of thought 
fails to account for ABRI’s submission to ongoing financial disregard.  This is 
particularly so when one considers that by the 1980s, 24% of Suharto’s cabinet 
originated from military and ABRI directly controlled 100 appointed seats in 
parliament and indirectly many more through their dominance in Golkar (Rinakit, 
2005, p. 45). While military influence in government had certainly flagged compared 
                                                
62 Reproduced from APBN, 1998.  
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to the 1980s, their control of parliament, ministerial positions and the Department of 
Defence was more than enough to push through greater fiscal allocation of the ABPN.  
 
Rather, the sudden decline in military spending also correlates with other, uncharted 
reconfigurations in the workings and logics of the New Order state and the unfurling 
of alternative economies available to the swelling military and bureaucratic elite.  
Beginning in the mid 70s, when rumblings began amongst the military elite about his 
presidency, Suharto also nurtured the state’s development of a diverse, consolidated 
criminal economy to allow for the large-scale arboreal accumulation of clients under 
Suharto’s patronage and ward off further political provocation.  McLeod has written 
skillfully of this economy of New Order state corruption as a giant franchise system 
institutionalised through deliberately low budgets and salaries (McLeod, 2008). 
Franchisees, struggling with the revenues of the APBN, were effectively encouraged 
to collect private taxation for a moderate ‘tax’ circulated upwards to the franchiser.  A 
significant part of this economy included the yayasan/ kooperasi economy in which 
all parts of the military and the bureaucracy partook and which frequently circulated 
its ‘tax’ to the Suharto franchise by partnering with conglomerates approved or owned 
by the president himself.   
 
What needs to be stressed is how this vast, complex economy was neither furtive nor 
incidental to the real business of governance and public accountancy, but wholly 
endorsed by New Order state elites and morally legitimised by outstanding fiscal 
incompetence experienced as deficiency. In this way, the relationship of the legal to 
the criminal, formal to informal, official into oknum, state official to private patron, 
became nothing short of umbilical.  Crucially, by eroding these key distinctions of 
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law, Suharto implicated the state and its agents in the vast machine of corruption he 
oversaw, thus securing silence regarding his tenure as president and his financial 
dealings.   
 
New Tionghoa  Civil Society and the Machine of Patronage  
 
Marked in Indonesia’s cities by unprecedented rioting targeting private enterprise, the 
1998 fall of the New Order dealt a staggering blow to the marriage of coercion and 
capital for Jakarta’s Tionghoa population.  Although executive boards continued to 
appoint their talismanic military partners to commissioner positions, the allure of 
playing cukong to military generals diminished in the context of demilitarisation, 
dencentralisation, democratisation and the increasing fiscal transparency of the state. 
The pressure to unravel military business empires was so great in the immediate post-
reformasi period that laws restructuring the yayasan were passed in 2001, well before 
laws reforming the police (2002) and the military (2004).  However, there have since 
been considerable delays in the process of assessing TNI wealth and reclaiming state 
assets.  
  
The Ernst and Young audit of YKEP that accompanied the 2001 yayasan laws 
showed a capital structure in decay reflecting many years of embezzlement by the 
generals. With the twin pressures of the Asian financial crisis and the emergence of a 
decentralized, competitive market, many military businesses collapsed.  In 2000, 
YKEP returned a net loss of Rp 8.21 billion [US$915 million] and total contributions 
to the defence budget from the yayasan-cooperative economy slumped to 1% in 2000 
and 0.7% in 2001 (HRW, 2006, p. 15). 
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Although generals occupied strategic seats on the board of YKEP, they had little real 
operational influence and were in a poor bargaining position in relation to their 
Tionghoa partners.  Indonesian Corruption Watch concluded from the Ernst and 
Young audit that YKEP’s various investments with Winata-Kusuma were ultimately 
unfavourable to the interests of the military.  In many instances, foundations or 
generals were listed as non-cash partners of conglomerates, substantially lessening 
their bargaining power.  Government delays in restructuring the military businesses 
also gave the generals a chance to extract any remaining value from the companies by 
selling them to their Tionghoa partners.  In 2005 Major General Kiki Syahnakri, a 
representative of YKEP who joined the bank as a commissioner in 2000, facilitated 
the sale of TNI’s falling stake in Bank Artha Graha for Rp 151 billion [US$16 
million] without first seeking state permission (Bali Post, 9 September, 2005). Winata 
and Kusuma owned companies also steadily swallowed YKEP’s share in PT JIHD, 
reducing military holdings in the company to small stakes owned by individual 
generals such as Syahnakri and Silalahi.  
 
This structural uncoupling of the military and Tionghoa big business was also 
underscored by disenchantment with the military as a provider of beking.  The 1998 
riots had proved spectacularly that Tionghoa gift giving to the military bore no fruit in 
the community’s time of need and with the political winds turning in favour of more 
civilian forms of power, Tionghoa conglomerates began a concerted shift in the 
politics of patronage to political parties, politicians and police.  Thus, the democratic 
reorganisation of the coercive apparatus initiated a corollary reorganisation of the 
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structure of the economy of Tionghoa patronage. The gift economy went from 
targeting the army and TNI to a preoccupation with Polri.   
 
Although Tionghoa patronage had long supplemented Polri’s official budget, the 
police suddenly became more important to the Tionghoa business community and 
indeed Indonesia’s wider political, intellectual and criminal elite for several reasons.  
Democratisation and its parallel enthusiasm for the rule of law above coercive might 
meant that the police were no longer just law enforcers, but gripped the power to 
distinguish between legality and illegality.  In post-authoritarian Indonesia, the 
expedient of law had become ever more complicated, with confusing accusations of 
illegality flung by parliament, civil society, the anticorruption commission (KPK), 
and business competitors.  As democracy deepened and rule of law increasingly 
became the most important modality of governance, it was increasingly clear to 
political society that police relations needed to be cultivated.   
 
Moreover, as we have seen, the rise of Indonesia’s police state was paralleled by a 
dramatic expansion in the official police budget, bringing with it a host of new 
contracts and tenders to be won by the entrepreneurial few.  In 1999, through PT 
Putra Pratama, Sugianto Kusuma got in with the police early by linking up with then 
deputy head of planning and development, Adang Dorajatun, to sell weaponry to Polri 
at double the retail price.  In the same year, Tommy Suharto and Eka Cipta Widjaya 
together courted the police to obtain an untendered contract to sell Timor sedans to 
the force, which exploded dramatically when Cipta Widjaya’s attempts at double-
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dealing the police to undercut Suharto became spectacularly public63.  Even then, 
Kapolri Roesmanhadi got in on the act by calling in his Tionghoa golf buddies to 
request donations towards the renovation of Mabes Polri (Media Indonesia, 14 
December, 1999). The rise of the police as a figure of authority in keamanan, the 
increasing emphasis on law as a means to resolve political and economic disputes and 
the opening up of the police procurement economy effectively kicked off the great 
Tionghoa stampede for teman polisi [a police friend].   
 
The question of measurement requires careful address.  For how do we measure this 
reconfiguration in the cukong economy?  Estimates of monetary worth fall flat given 
the size and scale of the yayasan economy under the New Order and the deflation, 
though not eradication, of that economy as a legitimate economic activity for the 
coercive apparatus in the democratic era.  As for the individual patronage economy, 
even Hoegeng, Indonesia’s beloved police chief under Sukarno, wrote in his memoir 
of the gift economy of Tionghoa patrons (Yusra & Ramadhan, 1993, p. 210). Most 
Tionghoa business owners had routinely funded the police and the military and 
continued to give monthly donations to both of them even after reformasi.  A 
medium-sized business owner explained, ‘however much you have, you have to give 
[kasih] it to them. And you have to give it to them equally. Why? Because both of 
them carry weapons [karena dua2nya pake senjata].’64  
 
Yet, my interviews with police and military, their civilian orbit of academics, analysts 
and experts, Tionghoa businesspersons, lawyers and activists, preman, gamblers, and 
other undefined men of prowess were intriguing.  Of hundreds of interviewees, every 
                                                
63 Tommy Suharto initiated a law suit against Cipta Widjija, arguing that he had erroneously priced the 
sedans.  
64 Tionghoa businessman., interview by author (6 March 2007).  
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single person who discussed this subject with me, from police and military officers, to 
Tionghoa businesspeople, lawyers and activists, to preman, gamblers other criminal 
elements, categorically stated that the single defining feature of reformasi for 
Tionghoa big business relations with the state was this very switch in emphasis from 
the patronage economy from the military to the police.  On their own, however, the 
interviews were unconvincing.  Individuals could talk of their own allegiances to the 
security apparatus, divided between police and military, but few could show hard 
evidence of a broader switch amongst the elite Tionghoa business community and 
most admitted that for the most part, private enterprise ensures their patronage 
extends to both sides of the coercive apparatus.  Only the small businesses at the local 
level, too cash strapped to keep up dual setoran payments, would have the temerity to 
ally with either police or military.  
 
The recalibration of the Chinese business community from military to police is best 
viewed in relation to the florid cultural forms and social organisations that have long 
sustained the particular form and weight of the organisation of power in Southeast 
Asia.  Efforts by the elite Tionghoa business community to warm relations with Polri 
have tended to piggyback on the new citizenship activities sweeping the overall 
Tionghoa community since the loosening of strictures on the community’s activities 
post-reformasi.  These have included religious organisations, civic NGOs and new 
forms of Tionghoa media.  Much has been made of the post-authoritarian outpouring 
of Tionghoa cultural, political and social expression in recent scholarly literature 
(Heidhuis, 2006). Nagata praises the ‘spontaneous’ flowering of Tionghoa civic 
engagement (2003). Heidhues writes of Tionghoa organisations growing ‘like 
mushrooms after spring rain’ and Tan of new social organisations and political parties 
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that sprang up after 1998 as a means by which ‘ethnic Chinese’ engage in and build a 
new Indonesia (Tan, 2004). 
 
But as the primary sponsors and donors of these organisations and as laupan [boss] 
within the community, elite business interests have the power to use these new forms 
of social volunteerism to court and cultivate connections within, and channel funds to, 
the police institution.   A wealth of organisations were established in the wake of the 
May 1998 riots including Brigadier General (TNI) Teddy Yusuf’s Panguyuban Social 
Marga Tionghoa Indonesia (PSMTI – social organisation of Tionghoa Indonesia) and 
Perhimpunan Indonesia Keturunan Tionghoa (INTI – or Association of Indonesians 
of Tionghoa descent), established by Eddie Lembong.  Although these organisations 
began life with an outreach mandate to warm relations between the Tionghoa 
community and pribumi Indonesians, INTI in particular has become extremely 
political, with totok Indonesians lining up to be involved on the board.  With the early 
death of Tionghoa political parties in 1999 and 2004, other interest groups have 
flourished: friendship organisations or mini-parliaments with Hong Kong or Chinese 
cities, clan [marga] associations, business societies organised around clan or region, 
Tionghoa literature or art groups, charities such as Sugianto Kusuma’s Tzu Chi, and 
religious organisations such as Matakin and Siti Hartati Murdaya’s Walubi. Others 
are distinct curios such as the West Kalimatan Volunteer Fire Brigade, overseen by 
the governor, kapolda, danrem and bupati, who elected an entirely totok board and 21 
totok ‘advisors.’ Or what of the Jambi Hash House Harriers, whose membership is 
entirely comprised of elderly Tionghoa men dressed in expensively casual playsuits, 
led by the local Kapolda?  This membership seems at odds with the international frat-
boy ethos of the Hash House Harriers that couples long distance cross-country 
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running with extreme beer drinking.  Police are not the only social group targeted by 
the new Tionghoa civil society organisations. Activities circulate on a rotation 
between youth groups, political parties, Islamic leaders, regional government and 
regional TNI.  But police events capture the most attention and detailed reporting.   
 
Tionghoa media has experienced a parallel explosion. During the New Order, written 
Chinese characters were prohibited on the grounds that they dissuaded Tionghoa 
national ‘integration’. President Abdurrahman Wahid’s lifting of the ban on the public 
use of Chinese languages was the springboard for a renaissance in Mandarin and 
Bahasa-based Tionghoa media, a flourishing not seen since the turn of the 20th 
century (Suriyadinata, 1997). Ted’s Siong’s International Daily News (Guo Ji Ri Bao) 
is known as the naga (dragon) of the Tionghoa media, having spectacularly defeated 
Universal Daily News, a pro-Taiwan Mandarin rag owned by a consortium of 
Taiwanese and Indonesian businessmen. By allying with the Jawa Pos for 
distribution, International Daily News, an aggressively pro-China, Mandarin 
newspaper, eventually achieved national distribution and captured the totok market 
when Universal Daily News folded in mid-2008.  This pro-China stance is also 
carried through to International Daily News’ peranakan sister publication, National 
News.  With a circulation of around 50,000 per day, the newspaper is not available in 
ordinary retail outlets but must be subscribed to through agents.  I subscribed but in 
the two years I received the paper I was never presented with a bill.  According to 
Lee, a senior editor,65 National News is primarily distributed amongst the employees 
                                                
65 National News is in fact edited by Mochtar Siahaan, a long-time journalist with few credited articles 
or columns. Siahaan, a Batak, was selected by Ted Sioeng to work with Lee (who also edits 
International Daily News) because of the quality of his police connections. For instance, although 
national police chief General Sutanto was reputed as extremely clean and virtually impenetrable to 
business interests, some of my Tionghoa interviewees speculated that Siahaan was the sole gatekeeper 
of access to the national police chief.  Again, this is merely rumour. What was clear was that Lee and 
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of the elite Tionghoa conglomerates who sponsor the paper.  The list of patrons of 
National News reads like a who’s who of Tionghoa elite business: Tomy Winata’s 
Bank Artha Graha, Eka Cipta Widjaya’s Sinarmas, Sugianto Kusuma’s Agung 
Sedayu Group, Prajogo Pangestu’s Barito Pacific and Trihatma Kusuma Haliman’s 
real estate giant Agung Podomoro. The newspaper also receives substantial 
contributions from a host of other regionally based Tionghoa-owned corporations 
such as Maspion (East Java), Olagafood (Medan) and GRC Board (West Java).  The 
Jambi Tionghoa community is also an especially strong financier of the paper.   
 
According to Lee, he and Sioeng designed National News with the specific purpose of 
establishing a forum for the increasing intimacy between police and the Tionghoa 
community.  ‘We wanted to present a non-biased image of the police and give voice 
to the police, who are not normally heard,’ noted Lee.66  The headline is generally 
devoted to goings on within the Yudhoyono government, while the rest of the paper 
covers news in China and the Tionghoa stronghold of Glodok.  The paper also 
dedicates a daily spread of its respectably sized broadsheet to the latest cars, mobile 
phones and Chinese and Indonesian celebrities.   
 
Page five, entitled ‘Police Line’ is a full page devoted to positive stories about police 
operations and policies.  A side column called ‘Police on My Mind’ features attractive 
youth and their positive feelings about the police and the reform process. On page 
two, entitled ‘Man of Today,’ a feature officer of Kapolres rank or above is presented 
which details the officer’s policing principles, professionalism, past achievements and 
                                                                                                                                      
Siahaan were in a deep conflict about the future of National News, with Lee insinuating that Siahaan 
had no experience or capacity as senior editor. Lee, interview by author (9 April 2007). Tionghoa 
Businessman, interview by author, 16 March 2007.  
66 Lee, interview by author (9 April 2007).  
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official telephone lines. Large portraits of officers glow below copy snapped from B-
Grade VHS titles, ‘The Simplicity of a Strategist,’ ‘A Student of John F Kennedy’ 
and ‘Eternally Vigilant in the Fight against Crime.’67  As Figure 7 shows, generally 
the officer’s entire CV is published alongside photos of the officer’s family and 
children and choice comments on the science of policing. 
                                                
67 For instance, see Kapolda Metro Jaya Ir.Jen Adang Firman’s profile on 6 December 6, 2006.  
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Figure 8: The Page 2 Man of Today, Kapolda Metro Jaya, Irjen. Adang Firman. The article is titled ‘The 
Simplicity of a Strategist.’ On the left hand side of the page is the General’s resume and biography and on 
the right, a description of his career pathway. The story below the lead is titled, ‘Making Polda Metro More 
Professional and Moral’ (National News, 6 December, p. 2).   
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But if National News is the window through which peranakan Tionghoa elites see and 
monitor police, then so too does it function in reverse as a spectacular space in which 
Tionghoa elites can be witnessed, registered and identified by both its peranakan 
readership and the Polri stations who are given a free subscription.68  The middle 
pages of the broadsheet are awash with colour photos, picturing recent activities by 
Tionghoa social and religious organisations at the national level in a section 
patriotically entitled ‘Indonesia: I am in Love.’  This spread of altruism and 
wholehearted civic engagement is bordered in red ink in which advertisements for the 
newspaper’s main sponsors are placed.  Articles cover the opening of new Buddhist 
and Mandarin schools, corporate events, the elections within regional marga [clan] 
societies, and recent meetings with important politicians and police and military 
generals. Many Tionghoa social organisations undertake committed charity work, 
such as blood drives, donations of sembako (the nine basic necessities for living) for 
underprivileged kampung using corporate sponsor products (Olagafood is a big 
donor), health check drives, or fund raising for pesantren [traditional Islamic 
schools], inviting local police to witness or present gifts along with their Tionghoa 
corporate sponsors. Other events focus explicitly on police policies such as supporting 
anti-narcotics events or promoting various police policies.  All are accompanied by 
large colour photographs with extended captions in black bold font naming key 
persons of the organisation and their position. Often too, there are events that 
specifically aim to contribute to assisting the police.  
 
In June 2007, Yenni Thamrin, a well-known Tionghoa nationalist, brokered the 
signing of an MOU between the Republic of China police school and PTIK.  Photos 
                                                
68 I saw this newspaper first at Mabes Polri however Lee informed me that the paper was distributed to 
officers in the territorial command as well.  
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show Thamrin in full police uniform leading the delegation through the police 
grounds.  Similarly, when Taiwan Buddhist Tzu Chi went on a charitable mission to 
build the ‘Great Love Village’ in Aceh in December 2006, Sugianto Kusuma is 
photographed deep in conversation with Wakapolda Aceh Brigjen Rismawan.  
Another article, entitled ‘Struck by the impressiveness of the police’, celebrates the 
acceptance of young peranakan from Jambi into Polri.  Lam Han Kiong, the young 
would be officer stands proudly in his uniform calling on Tionghoa to ‘never feel 
doubt about entering all sectors [lini] of life in this country.  There is no longer a 
difference, especially not an ethnic one.  ‘The proof is in the pudding: even I have 
become a police officer’ (National News, 2007, p. 11).   
 
Figure 9: National News’ ‘Indonesia I am in Love’ section reports on patriotic gift-giving by new Tionghoa 
civil society groups.  Here, Sugianto ‘Aguan’ Kusuma’s Tzu Chi Foundation has gifted US$27 million 
including a new housing complex, mosque and school to the village [desa] of Panteriek in Banda Aceh after 
the 2004 tsunami.  He is pictured talking to the Wakapolda of Banda Aceh.  In the fourth photograph from 
the left, parliamentarian and Tionghoa big-businessman Murdaya Poo appears 3rd from the left (National 
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News, 2006, p. 11). Along the newspaper header are advertisements for Kusuma’s Mangga Dua Square, 
Eka Cipta Widjaja’s Sinarmas and Rudi Setiawan’s Embossindo Utama.  
 
This is not reporting so much as a showcase or, as a Tionghoa businessman called it 
[in Engl.], ‘a show of force’ 69.  Leaders of the business community with whom I 
spoke referred to the involvement of elite Chinese business in new social movements 
as a ‘sandiwara’ [theatre] to display the quality and rank of a capitalist’s association 
with the police force.  Participation in Tionghoa civil society is a way to develop a 
public profile [cari imaj] and obtain strategic friendships [cari hubungan] with the 
police.  Social organisations are a conduit for Tionghoa business interests to obtain 
access to the state and Kadin (the Indonesian Business Association), to funnel money 
to obtain contracts or to partner business with investors.  One Tionghoa businessman 
noted, ‘under Suharto, the one thing we could do was give contributions [sumbang].  
The way of the Chinese is still the way of the New Order [gaya Orba]: sumbang.’   
 
Anthropologists such as Comaroff & Comaroff warn us of allowing our theoretical 
lens to be infected by the millennial rapture of the ‘civil’ in our cross-cultural analysis 
of ‘civil society’. A solid body of empirically rooted scholarship has accumulated 
analysing the self-proclaimed gift-giving of Western NGOs through Maussian eyes of 
the self interested gift (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1999).  Civil society’s euphoric 
capture of the political imagination as as a mystical, universal site for producing the 
common good has come at the same time as the state has seen increasing 
deinstitutoinalisation and dispersement (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2006).  The 
anthropology of civil society presents such social organising as a technology of 
mystification, scrambling the wider structures weakening the state within a self-
                                                
69 Tionghoa Businessowner, interview by author (3 March 2007). 
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aggrandising trope of universal good.  But Tionghoa assessments of their own social 
organising suggest something different again: of gift giving as a form of perverse 
political practice and communication from a community that has, for centuries, been 
denied active forms of political expression.  Is this what explains the dominance and 
comfort of sumbang as political practice over more practical forms, the reluctant 
support for the Tionghoa political party versus the scramble for election to the NGO 
board?  
 
Five years after reformasi, more traditional forms of courting the coercive apparatus 
were starting to emerge alongside of the festival of Tionghoa civic-mindedness. 
While the gifting of commissioner positions to retired elements of the military 
remained – TNI General Endriartono Sutarto at Eka Cipta Widjaja’s PT Bank 
Eksekutif International and Let Gen. TNI Soetedjo at Widjaja’s Pulp and Paper and 
army generals Silalahi and Syanakri heading up positions at Winata’s Artha Graha  - 
for the most part, Tionghoa conglomerates shied away from the kind of talismanic 
coercive politics that had characterised their executive boards in the New Order.  
However, by 2006, retired police generals were beginning to appear on the boards of 
known patrons of the police including appointments to Nagaria’s Summarecon, 
Sjamsul Nursalim’s Gajah Tunggal and Hari Tanoe’s Bhakti Investama.70  Similarly, 
at the regional and local level, pensioned police officers are filling the boards of 
medium enterprises.71 Echoing this trend, police, as army generals did under the New 
                                                
70 Since 2006, Snr. Com. Posma Lumban Tobing had held a commissioner position in a range of 
companies under Hary Tanoe’s control.  In that same year, former Kapolri Dibyo Widodo was also  
appointed to President Commissioner of Gadjah Tunggal. In 2009, Irjen Edi Darnadi was appointed at 
Summarecon.  
71 For instance, Irjen (purn) Logan Siahaan is the Independent Commissioner of Jakarta based PT 
Asuransi Wanamekar Handayani and former Kapolri Dibyo Widodo is President Commissioner of 
Jakarta property developer, PT Indonesia Prima Property & PT Panen Lestari Basuki.  
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Order, have also begun to filter into pribumi and state enterprises.72  High-ranking 
generals have taken up positions at Tommy Suharto’s Humpuss and state enterprises 
such as PT Timah (the state tin company operating out of Bangka Belitung) and PT 
Perkebunan Nusantara V (the state agricultural company specialising in fertilizer and 
most recent biodiesel). Whether these represent the tendrils of the kind of financial 
empire building and patronage capitalism on the scale of the New Order army remains 
to be seen. Certainly, at the regional and district level, police businesses continue to 
operate in obscurity with impunity.73  
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The disenchantment with the soldier as a figure of security - as the securer of states, 
places, practices, and capital circulation - has seen a corollary switch in the illicit gift 
economy of Tionghoa patronage. This vertebrae of gifts and capital that sustains the 
state’s institutions has also changed in size and economic scale, from that of a 
structural alliance in the form of joint ventures, to a loose, shifting economy aligned 
around personal relations, departments and positions. That said, echoes of that early 
structural alliance between Tionghoa capital and the coercive apparatus has emerged 
in recent years perhaps signaling the future establishment of more economically-
embedded forms of patronage and gift-giving between Tionghoa big business and 
Polri. The following chapter interrogates the obligations and fidelity of these bonds 
known popularly, and, as we will see, crudely, as cukongism.  
                                                
72 In 2008, Brigadier General Karyono entered PT PNV after a career in Inkopol and Irjen Polisi Drs 
Insmerda Lebang joined the board of commissioners at PT Timah.  After stepping down from head of 
the police in 2008, General Sutanto was appointed by the president to lead Pertamina, a position 
formerly held by distinguished heads of the TNI. In 2009, Irjen. Rubani Pranoto joined PT Petrokimia 
Gresik.  
73 Retired Police General, interview by author (31 April 2008). Police general, interview by author (13 
January 2006).  
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Chapter II 
Disequilibrium and the Gift: Cukongism  Reconsidered 
 
‘For if exchange underlies everything, why it is that what takes place looks like anything but an 
exchange?’ 
Deleuze & Guttari, Anti-Oedipus. 
 
‘Some of it is given voluntarily. However, the other part is forced [terpaksa].’   
Executive Summary, Financial Mapping of Polri, 2002 (LPEM, 2003)  
 
‘..if you have a nice looking office, they are going to get you.’’ 
Young Tionghoa businessman.74 
 
‘Ada hadiah untuk saya, ga?’ [Is there a gift for me or what?] 
One star police general negotiating the release of goods at Tanjung Perak port, Surabaya.75 
 
 
The previous chapter demonstrated the significance of patronage and gifts by 
Tionghoa traders to the police’s off-budget economy.  This second chapter in the 
section will explore the functionality and endurance of that economy by looking at its 
structural and historical underpinnings.  
 
The material presented in Chapter I supports the master narrative of the Chinese big 
business literature which presents Indonesia’s big entrepreneurial cukong appear as 
                                                
74 Young Tionghoa Businessman, interview by author (21 March 2007).   
75 Field notes (12 December 2006).  
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free, strategising agents driven by the desire to aggregate vast amounts of capital or 
political privilege.  In the New Order, utilitarian Tionghoa strategising for economic 
dominance is presented as having given way to a symbiotic politico-bureaucratic 
oligarchy in which Tionghoa big business established a strong capital base in 
exchange for a steady set of returns funneled back to the state. In the post-reformasi 
period, Tionghoa capital has surpassed the political elite. The democratisation, 
decentralisation and deregulation of the economy, the lifting of anti-Tionghoa policies 
and continuation of Indonesia’s predatory form of capitalism has allowed for a 
reshuffle in the cukong relationship in favour of capital (Chua, 2006).  As Chua 
argues, New Order cukongism as the reciprocal exchange of capital for political 
privilege or economic concession contained within it the seeds of Tionghua big 
business’ liberation and eventual discarding of the pribumi elite.  
 
However, the literature on Tionghoa cukong has focused on the upper echelons of the 
economic community, rarely kneeling down to observe the extent to which practices 
of state tribute, patronage and benefaction have been a part of the socio-economic 
lives of Tionghoa traders, landowners and capitalists of the lower classes.  This has 
been made even more remarkable by the fact that, as the previous chapter illustrated, 
is it the ward level polsek – the veritable atom of the police apparatus - that relies 
most heavily on parman funds donated by local, not national, Tionghoa traders and 
landowners. By examining the lives of middle and lower class traders in this chapter, 
I argue that the scholarship of cukongism needs to take a far more nuanced approach 
to Tionghoa-state relations than brute political economy suggests.  Ongoing, familiar 
practices of pribumi extortion and racism and the long history of violence and its 
threat suffered by the Tionghoa community have given rise to a system in which 
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cukongism, presented as convivial gift-giving, is the only perceivable means of 
managing the threat.  Placed within a genealogy of threat that precedes even the 
republic, gift-giving represents the modality of a pariah economic minority with no 
legitimate territorial claim to inscribe themselves on the Indonesian socius (Deleuze 
& Guattari, 2004a). Where territorialisation is the inscription of social relations on a 
space, gift-giving is the initial attempt to establish those very relations.   
 
While at the elite level cukongism helped Tionghoa tycoons forge a symbiotic 
relationship with the pribumi political classes that, as Chua elegantly argues, 
eventually freed ‘Chinese big business’ from its constraints, at the lower classes the 
patronage economy is a closed and suffocating loop.  At the middle to low class level, 
capital restraints have not allowed Tionghoa traders to succeed the pribumi political 
class.  At the same time, the new citizenship rights for Tionghoa in the democratic era 
do not function on the ground in the day to day of state administration.  For the vast 
majority of Tionghoa, old power relations remain undisturbed. As such, the system of 
patronage and gift-giving continues unchanged but for a greater investment in the 
Indonesian police.  
 
Ethnographic evidence shows that, despite the couching of the gift economy in cordial 
terms of generosity, authentic friendship and unsolicited donations [tidak minta], 
police beneficiaries of this interior current of capital repeatedly violate the reciprocity 
ethic. But if the defining characteristic of reciprocity is the semblance of equivalent 
exchange, then Tionghoa patronage of the state is inequitable in that the obligations of 
exchange are only sporadically and arbitrarily met by police donees.  The police’s  
nonchalant shrugging off of the reciprocal obligations of the gift suggests that 
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Tionghoa claims to belong to the Indonesian socius by ‘patronage-as-inscription’ are 
rejected.  The dysfunction of Tionghoa gift giving contrasts with police fidelity in 
pribumi patronage relationships and shows us how the off-budget economy is deeply 
embedded in the wider matrix of social power relations and cultural tropes about 
territoriality and legitimacy. 
 
! 
 
A classic problem for the study of Indonesia’s Tionghoa is definition.  How do we 
define a people with history that came in waves of denied belonging, deliberate 
alienation and forced ‘assimilation’? A people for whom the ascription of identity 
could not be separated from colonial and republican projects of state and nation and 
for whom the exploration of identity was railed on a single binary logic of 
assimilation/ non-assimilation?  The scholarship is largely divided in two: descriptive 
and historical studies of Tionghoa identity formation versus structuralist analyses of 
the state and ‘Indo-Chinese Big Business.’ Together, they paint a community with the 
face of Janus, at once a pariah subject in search of a shifting socio-political identity, 
and scheming, moneyed agent with the political elite at his behest.   
 
In part, the schizoid subject has emerged from serious problems that lie in the 
definitions of Tionghoa.  Race, being in the abstract distastefully primordial and in the 
empirical, intermarried for generations with pribumi, is immediately excluded as a 
marker of being Tionghoa.  Rather, academics such as Skinner, Gungwu and 
Suryadinata advocate a definition of Tionghoa based on democratic self-
identification.  Being Tionghoa is established through practices (Gungwu calls them 
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‘norms’) marked Chinese (and hence presupposing its binary, pribumi) and then read 
as a system of signs: the use of Mandarin, residential and office address, urbanity, 
Chinese surnames, education, or membership of funeral, religious or literature or 
business associations.    
 
Scholar of Chinese capitalists, Chua, weakly criticises the identity scholars as 
essentialising a primal Tionghoa identity (2008, p. 13). But in fact, the opposite is 
true; this is practice theory writ large.  By emphasising Tionghoa practices as 
determinate of ethnic membership, Chinese identity scholars unintentionally imagine 
Tionghoa identity as constructed and performative.  We recall Astuti’s coastal Vezo 
of Madagascar, where folk theories of Vezo identity formation are pitted against their 
sibling binary, the Masikoro of the hinterland.  He is Masikoro when seasick on the 
boat, but to master tricking Spanish mackerel to bite the line is to be ‘very Vezo’ 
(1995).  One becomes Vezo in the intimate, everyday practices of doing and 
association.  
 
So too our scholars’ idea of being pribumi or Tionghoa.  She is Tionghoa when she 
eats steamed pork buns [bakpio], is active in INTI or engages in trade. But when she 
engages in activities coded pribumi, living in south Jakarta, eating nasi uduk, hanging 
out with other pribumi friends, she is being peranakan or displaying the element of 
her pribumi-nationalist ‘Indonesian’ identity.  It is a triumph of Javaneseness.76  A 
pribumi Jakartan does not inhabit Tionghoa identity when in conversation with                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
                                                
76 In his classic text, Solo in the New Order (1986), Siegel also noted that ‘when Chinese are thought to 
follow Javanese customs, it is taken as a sign of the superiority of Javanese ways rather than the 
conversion of Chinese into Javanese identity’. See, Chapter 3.  
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girlfriends she drawls ‘gua’ and pointedly refers to you as lu.77  The pribumi is not 
deterritorialised when she takes her Sunday lunches as dim sum or rents a kos [rented 
room] in the Tionghoa stronghold of Glodok.  Only the practices of the Tionghoa are 
strictly policed, by pribumi and scholar alike, to tally with the regime of signs of 
Indonesian citizenship and community.  
 
Where contemporary scholarship has failed the Tionghoa is its reproduction of the 
defining characteristic of the pariah minority: the very inability to self-ascribe modes 
of representation.  Lacking ethnographic content, there’s no sense as to the meaning-
making of Tionghoa lives.  Moreover, absent from scholarly analysis of Tionghoa is 
the ugliness of race and how racist practices of exclusion force the formation of 
protective allegiances, identities, groups and their attendant ritual practices.  Certainly 
race, as ethnicity, is a construct and not a valid scientific unit but these constructs live 
out vivid lives in the social structure and political imaginations of ordinary 
Indonesians.  Tionghoa are, to pribumi, ‘urban,’ ‘clannish,’ ‘disloyal,’ ‘opportunistic,’ 
‘money driven,’ and ‘corrupt’ as per Coppel’s definition but he too strategically 
avoids acknowledging that these markers begin with one crude characterisation.  Sipit 
[slanty-eyed], hiss my pribumi informants.  Anjing sipit [slanty-eyed dogs], they spit. 
Or the chant, Cina bajingan, mata lu sipit [bastard Chinese, your eyes are slanted].  
Tionghoa are distinguished by pribumi first by their eyes, envisioned as sipit, and 
racially different from pribumi.  
                                                
77 The etymology of both terms – gue/gua and lu is Hokkien Chinese. Skinner notes that amongst the 
mestizo Chinese Baba communities of Malaysia and Singapore, the usage of gue and lu is common.  
Skinner is reluctant to make comments on peranakan creole-Malay given its complexity and the lack 
of sources, however, the usage of gue/gua and lu is very common amongst young Jakartans and old 
Jakartans of the street. In contemporary Indonesian visual culture, gue/lu is a widely understood sign of 
the distinctive, modern, trendy Jakartan youth.  Ironically, lu is just as often spelt ‘loe’, taking on the 
attributes of Dutch-inflected pre-1972 Bahasa Indonesia. I have also seen lu represented in a kind of 
shorthand ‘lw.’ (Skinner, 1996) 
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Burdened by the ugly legacy of physical anthropology, the shudder of head pincers 
and taxonomies of racial development, contemporary social scientists have nothing to 
say on race but for the denial of its scientific use.  Rather, the discipline and many 
others like it have come to use the term ‘ethnicity’ on a vast scale of interpretation, 
from a mere cipher for ‘biological race’ to more fluid, constructivist processes of 
social identity formation.  With race the classifier spurned, what then is the 
anthropologist to do with informants who speak of little else or, rather than utter the 
word, just grin at me making the sign, with a single finger, of the slanted eye? Cina. 
By excluding pribumi constructions of race from definitions of Tionghoa, scholars 
have denied this divergent and often fractious community the acknowledgement that 
it is in fact not the inadvertent practice theory of the identity scholars nor the genetic 
fact of the eye-shaped sipit that has forged Tionghoa community.  Rather this diverse 
and dissimilar community of Tionghoa has to a great extent been corralled together by 
the surveillance eye of the pribumi that identifies its own territorialised racial makeup 
as a kind of politico-economic entitlement and observes Tionghoa racial difference as 
alien and a license to extort and terrorise.   
 
Budiman evidences the inability of self-definition admirably. A snippet from a news 
program shows a weeping man whose wife and two daughters have burned to death in 
a fire started by rioters in May 1998.  He begs the camera in Bahasa, ‘What sin have I 
committed to justify this ordeal? I am not a Chinese anymore, my eyes are not 
slanted, I cannot speak Chinese and I am poor. I even joined the Hansip [the 
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neighbourhood security patrol].’78  The construction of identity, as Appiah notes, 
involves dual processes of self-authorship and external definition because ‘we write in 
a language we did not ourselves make’ (2005, p. 156). Identity thus is in part derived 
from the response to facts outside oneself, things that are beyond one’s own choices.  
 
Who then, are the Tionghoa? My argument suggests that we cannot begin to answer 
this question without first recognising what is Tionghoa? Tionghoa is a distinct state 
of keamanan, or more accurately, the inexorable fragility of it build around an 
imagined racial identity and an economic disposition.  Only then can we begin to 
speak of membership to the community in terms of a very specific, anxious reply to 
the vital lack of keamanan. Members of the Tionghoa are defined by a preemptive 
response: a safe-house built of capital, state-patronage, social networking and 
community organising, the paradoxical will to invisibility, flushed by moments of 
regime spectacularity to display protection.  It is for this reason I insist on the use of 
Tionghoa, rather than the ‘Chinese,’ ‘ethnic Chinese,’ ‘overseas Chinese’ or 
‘Chinese-Indonesian’ terms that speak of regional and international ties.  Tionghoa, 
on the other hand, is understood here as a uniquely Indonesian identity born in part of 
structural and systematic pribumi practices of exclusion, extortion and violence.  As 
such my definition owes a debt to Coppel’s 1983 definition of Tionghoa as both 
internally and externally derived (Coppel, 1983, p. 42). The Tionghoa are a class-
diverse group whose membership is not just a matter of their willing, meaningful, 
nostalgic or explorative engagement with a changing series of practices marked both 
inside and outside as Cina.  This definition recognises that Tionghoa is a category 
born less of the willing expression of identity than of fear, where the hiss of Cina, real 
                                                
78 As in Chapter II, Tionghoa are normally exempt from or unwelcome in neighbourhood security 
organisations (Budiman A. 2005 p. 95-104).  
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or imagined, has driven a people to seek protection in each other and specific socio-
cultural practices of security-making.  
 
Chinese came first as traders circulating the southern rim of the South China sea, then 
in the 16th and 17th centuries as sojourners huddled in the centers of maritime trade, 
(not puny Batavia, but in the metropolises of Tuban or Semarang or Banten79) and 
then finally, during the rise of the industrial age in a great surge of human 
desperation, as coolies snared in the indentured labour that fed the tax farm 
economy.80  High migration flows continued even after the dismantling of the tax 
farm system, pumping contracted labour into the tin mines of Bangka or the tobacco 
fields of Deli until well into the 1930s.   A century of this unique economy of labour 
meant that now tens of thousands of the hundreds of thousands came and stayed, as 
immigrants proper81 and unlike some of their 16th century Chinese predecessors who 
‘assimilated’ completely when upward mobility beckoned, increasingly developed 
                                                
79 Measured in units of ‘fighting men,’ Jakarta in 1608, had a piddling 4000 and by 1618, this had only 
risen to six or seven thousand. This compared to Tuban, which Reid estimates to be populated by 
around 30,000 in 1608, the 250,000 in Semarang which by 1650, or Banten, which by 1680 supported 
some 700,000 men. (Reid, 1980, p. 238)  
80 As Anderson has noted, the Dutch East Indies company is unique in the annals of corporate history 
for so infrequently does one find a company so enamoured by acting like a state ‘quite aside from 
considerations of commercial advantage’ (1983, p. 479).  From the very beginning, the chief revenues 
of the company relied on the levying of fees; on exports, imports, the tithes of the productions of the 
field and the tax upon farms. The Dutch government, when it took over from a bankrupt and 
beleaguered firm in 1800, maintained and expanded the tax farm system.  The system was little more 
than rent seeking (Tilly, 1985); auctioning exploitation rights for resources over which the Dutch had 
no legitimate claim to predominantly Sino-enterprise. This was a remarkable form of colonial 
exploitation in that it demanded limited investment from the Dutch government, for a high rate of 
return. There was however, a snag in the system; with size of one’s wealth measured not in property, 
but in accessible manpower, indigenous labour was intersected by a patronage system that extracted 
rents that capitalists found too taxing on their profits.  In 19th century Java, the only ‘free labour’ was 
foreign (Reid, 1988, p. 129). The tax farm economy relied on labour from the wild provinces of 
Southern China, and, to a limited extent, India. 
81 Chinese labour contracts show that in exchange for a passage to the Dutch East Indies, a coolie was 
obligated to work for three years and, if infringed, one was fined heavily or indebted to further rigorous 
labour beyond the initial agreement (Stoler, 1995).  Trocki is masterful in his portrayal of how opium 
was vital to the maintenance of coolie debt, ensuring that their labour would continue undisturbed by 
illness, desertion, collective protest or savings (2000). As such, the structure of 19th century Chinese 
coolie labour, as opposed to an analogous migration flow from East India was designed to keep them 
there  (Studwell, 2007). One must not, however, exaggerate the figures of this phase of migration. 
Sugihara shows that from year to year, the differential between immigrants and emigrants to the 
Southeast Asia was around 10-000 to 50 000, or no more than 25% (Sugihara, 2005).  
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what Skinner (2008) calls a creole, mestizo identity. The 17th, 18th and 19th centuries 
saw Chinese migrants engage in a mixture of practices Skinner marks as pribumi or 
Chinese, emerging into a community that eventually came to be known as peranakan. 
This was particularly so in the urban centres where colonial sensibilities of keamanan 
limited Chinese mobility.   
 
The Chinese settler class traded in the cities but also lived rurally as agriculturalists, 
married Balinese and pribumi slaves, adopted out their light skinned girls, but kept 
their half-caste sons, patronised Javanese literature in the courts and spoke a complex, 
ever-changing mix of creole Javan Malay-Hokkein.  On the foundation of a so-called 
Chinese legacy and increasing competence in pribumi culture, began the emergence 
of a distinct peranakan group. This group was defined by their limited ability to 
inscribe themselves on the Dutch East Indies locality, its people and territory. 
Peranakan were posited as incomplete natives and yet superior to the arriving 
migrants who, with their pernicious attachment to China, stubbornly Hakka, Canton 
or Teochew tongue and preference for non-Dutch education, were known by all the 
inhabitants as ‘stinking sinkeh’ [newcomer] (Twang, 1998, p. 19-21).  This 
community of new arrivals, later known as totok, too sneered at peranakan’s willing 
embrace of the pribumi contagion and took the tenacity of their own authentically 
Chinese practices and the crisp snap of dialect as a sign of cultural superiority.   
 
Despite their mutual distaste for each other, Chinese migrants new and old remained 
socially estranged.  In Batavia, the colonial preoccupation with keeping the city in a 
state of order saw urban and agrarian space itself rezoned racially. Segregating the 
groups geographically gave rise to separate legal, taxation, administrative and civil 
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society systems.  Chinese communities, totok and peranakan alike, settled north on 
the west banks of the Ciliwung river and around its mouth, leading to Jakarta Bay. 
Colonial encouragement of professional specialisation kept Chinese communities in 
money lending and intermediary trade.  Totok and peranakan credit and economic 
activity directly bankrolled the colony, as it would over one hundred years later in the 
1945 republican revolution and later again, during Suharto’s New Order.  
 
The Nervous System 
 
The freedom to trade, however, did not translate into the freedom to make political 
demands.  In 1740, on the outskirts of Batavia, the Dutch response to rioting by the 
Chinese community over the forcible transmigration of a surplus of Chinese labourers 
in the wake of the sugar mill crisis was close to genocidal. 10,000 lives were lost in 
what has become known as the Tangerang massacre. Shackled Chinese captives 
queued ‘like sheep’ to have their throats cut. Others were murdered by their Dutch 
neighbours for want of a pig.82  ‘In short, the Chinese nation was almost totally 
massacred that day, guilty or innocent, all and sundry,’ observed Ary Huysers 
(Blusse, 1986, p. 95). 
 
Although the colonial era would not oversee a massacre of this scale again, Sidel 
(2006) encourages us away from conventional tropes about anti-Chinese violence. 
Distinct from Purdey (2006), who argues broadly that the attacks follow a pattern of 
                                                
82 Blusse is struck by the quote from a Dutch trader: ‘‘I myself had to join in. I knew that my Chinese 
neighbour had a fat pig, I intended to take it away from him and bring it into my house. When my boss, 
the master carpenter, saw this, he slapped me and told me to kill the Chinese first and then to plunder. I 
therefore took a rice pounder and with it beat to death my neighbour with whom I had so often drunk 
and dined.’  In Blusse, 1986, p. 95.  
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political change in Indonesia, Sidel narrows the focus of anlysis to demonstrate that 
the attacks on Tionghoa property and much less frequently, person, correspond to 
broader cycles of ‘heightened ambiguity, anxiety and anticipation with regard to the 
position of Islam and those forces claiming to represent it in Indonesian society’ 
throughout the 20th century (Sidel, 2006). Moreover, the cites, townships and ‘nodal 
points of mobilisation’ in episodes of ‘anti-Chinese violence’ correlate to major urban 
centres where trade and capital by a growing Muslim merchant class was under threat 
by or restrained by Tionghoa capital.  In urban centres, peranakan and totok were 
subject to anti-Sino riots and attacks from Sarekat Islam in the first decades of the 
20th century.  
 
Japanese troops encouraged pribumi attacks on Chinese during their invasion, and 
then, as occupiers, targeted them as potential dissidents. The Pontianak affair of 
October 1943 saw 854 Tionghoa amongst the 1,500 executions. Neither was 
keamanan assured by totok financing of the independence struggle.83  Nights were the 
most terrifying as the patrolling KNIL [Royal Dutch East Indies Army] troops ended 
their shift, leaving the Tionghoa huddled in a security vacuum.84  Then came the 
roaming gangs of laskar [Islamic militia] to loot and thieve.  Repeated attacks were 
punctuated by large-scale massacres with 600 peranakan Tionghoa murdered in 
Tangerang by Islamic militia and then one year later the discovery of 30 charred 
corpses, legs fused together, in Mergonsono, near Malang (Berdoeri, 2004). Each 
attack saw trade come to a halt and tens of thousands of Tionghoa refugees huddle 
together in great numbers.   
 
                                                
83 See Twang for an excellent analysis of the rise of the totok entrepreneurs such as Liem Sioe Liong 
who forged relations with the nascent ‘people’s army’ to finance the new republic.   
84 Hari Silalahi, interview by author, 11 June 2008.  
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Other strategies in search of security whirred into action.  Around the country 
Tionghoa social organisations were formed to lobby for the end of the attacks, 
‘Indonesian-Chinese’ friendship associations sprung up to declare loyalty to the 
republic, Tionghoa traders funded conferences on how to safeguard their 
communities, Chinese delegations rotated through local governments, and then, 
finally, a last desperate straw: the community’s attempt to take back the provision of 
keamanan by force by establishing Po An Tui, an exclusively Tionghoa armed police 
force.85   
 
Although the organisation was formed to protect Tionghoa life and property, it was 
(and continues to be) met with a near hysterical response from pribumi leadership and 
denial of existence from leaders of the contemporary Tionghoa community.86  For 
what Po An Tui represented to pribumi was a brazen proclamation of territorial 
entitlement, signified by the marking out of Tionghoa geographies by patrol and 
                                                
85 There is very little available information on Poi An Tui and many Tionghoa historians and leaders 
today continue to deny that the organisation was formed at all.  What published data there is appears to 
be fatally entangled in Cold War and New Order rhetoric.  In Tjomboek Berdoeri, Po An Tui is linked 
to the Staatswatch, a Tionghoa policing organisation formed by the Dutch. On the other hand, Silalahi 
argues that Po An Tui was established with the joint permission of Syahrir, a leading figure in the 
revolution, and the Dutch military as a response to the ongoing attacks on the community. However, it 
appears that due to the centralised organisational structure of KNIL versus the rumbling, autonomous 
chaos of the laskar, Po An Tui became better affiliated with the KNIL who would sometimes be 
seconded to its ranks.  This did not go un-protested by the Tionghoa community who were fearful of 
further reprisals but in truth the opening of new Po An Tui branches did appear to trail Dutch territorial 
victories eastwards. Po An Tui was very strong in Medan where newspaper archives suggest that it 
patrolled with the Dutch police, but also opened branches in Jakarta, Tangerang, Bogor, Sukabumi, 
Tegal and Pekalongan. In Yogyakarta, the heart of the republic, the organisation was rejected.  Despite 
this setback, it does appear that in some cities, Po An Tui managed to establish a working relationship 
also with the young Tentara Rakyat Indonesia (Indonesian army), suggesting that the policing 
organisation were practically not ideologically motivated. Staffed by armed Tionghoa youths, the 
organisation operated at night to function similar to today’s siskambling, erecting gates and roadblocks. 
Military and Islamic sources argue that the organisation engaged in heinous acts of torture of pribumi, 
sabotaging the revolution.  Documents published through the years of the New Order accuse Po An Tui 
of being a Kuomintang stooge and an agent in the G-30-S/PKI coup. But if names are a reflection of 
function, a similarly-monikered Nanking organisation, Po An Tui, is translated in the literature as 
‘Peace Preservation Troop.’  This would suggest that its primary, national goal was simply to protect 
the lives and property of highly vulnerable Tionghoa communities.  
86 Ryter provides an account of Po An Tui in Medan, drawing on military sources that condemn the 
organisation for violence, rascism and an anti-nationalist position. See, (Ryter, 2002, p. 50).   
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picket and their defence in the bearing of arms.  Pribumi accused the organisation of 
being Dutch stooges and of undermining the revolution.  Even after its rapid shut 
down in 1949, sixteen years later its name would resurface in connection with the so-
called Communist coup. The 1965-67 massacres that followed, fuelled by the 
murderous plaiting of personal vengeance, local politics and national ideology, 
targeted Tionghoa in particularly and founded the New Order.  Other dramatic 
incidents of anti-Chinese violence, displacement and financial ruin were to follow.  
Dayak attacks on rural Chinese by the Kalimantan/Sarawak border during Sukarno’s 
konfrontasi sent a wave of thousands of refugees across the area (where, incidentally 
Tomy Winata would have been a mere 9 years old).  Property attacks on the Tionghoa 
in 1974 chimed with the Malari riots, again in 1980 Solo, and again in 1984 in the 
wake of military-Muslim violence at Tanjung Priok.  Property and churches were the 
focus of anti-Chinese riots across Java in the twilight years of the New Order and the 
months leading to Suharto’s downfall, and then, culminating spectacularly, in the 
May 1998 riots that continue to reverberate within Jakarta’s Tionghoa community. 
Recalls Budi, the entrepreneurial son of totok parents, 
 
When the riots (the early clashes between security forces and the students) happened, I was a 
student at Tarumanagara.87  We joined the fight [perjuangan]. We thought; we are citizens 
too, we are equal. A few weeks later came May 1998. We thought this is our punishment. We 
thought, well, this is what we get for trying to be equal. Now the only important thing to me is 
my business.88  
 
                                                
87 University Tarumanagara is known amongst the Tionghoa as a totok university, comparable to its 
sibling, Trisakti, which is a university for peranakan Tionghoa but also Jakarta’s ‘rich kids’.  
Tarumanagara attempts to met the needs of wealthy totok parents who can’t quite afford to educate 
their children overseas. An exorbitant entrance fee maintains the exclusivity. However, the sprouting of 
Tionghoa education facilities is not just about class.  Tionghoa students find it difficult to access 
pribumi and state education facilities because of unspoken racial quotas.   
88 Budi Harjono, interview by author (8 July 2008).  
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Tionghoa attempts as a community to inscribe themselves on the territory of 
Indonesia through intermarriage, rural residence, willing cooptation into the projects 
of colonial powers, outright political activism, coercive organisation and entrance into 
the state bureaucracy were subverted by colonial and post colonial policies which 
shunted them into an economic domain to finance the state.  As entrepreneurs, 
keamanan was guaranteed only for the few individual tycoons who collaborated and 
financed the careers of the rising political stars of the republic.  These tauke [big 
bosses], lauded within some segments of the community as the pioneers of a more 
secure Tionghoa future, were also increasingly the source of the community’s 
vulnerability as spectacular cukong practices of patronage and gift giving provoked 
the ire of pribumi.  Hence, the history of Tionghoa ‘belonging’ in Indonesia has been 
‘a deliberately constructed vicious circle. By emphasising the Chinese as a functional 
group consigned to trade, Chinese exclusivity was fostered, which in turn cultivated 
anti-Chinese sentiments among the local people and manifested itself as ethnic 
segregation’ (Chua, 2008, p. 32).  
 
The aggregate of centuries of episodic violence and its sudden absence, structural 
obstruction to the social and political benefits of citizenship, and the maintenance of 
wealth without security, has brought about for the Tionghoa a persistent state that 
Taussig would call ‘The Nervous System…illusions of order congealed by fear’ 
(1992, p. 12).  The Tionghoa Nervous System is a deep, underlying anxiety masked in 
the relentless pursuit of capital, denial of structural threat, clinging to and wooing of 
talismans of the security apparatus, and the aggressive policing of the community 
from within.  Both stalwarts of the literature - the studies of Tionghoa identity and 
those of Chinese big business - ‘merely absorb and conceal the violence 
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in…universities, workplaces, streets, shopping malls, and even families where like 
business, it’s terror as usual’ (ibid). For the structurally disempowered and the racially 
marked, violence is not the series of intermittent episodes that histories of ‘anti-
Chinese’ violence present.  Violence does not occupy nodes strung along linear time, 
but rather by Tionghoa interpretation, violence in Indonesia is a loop that threatens to 
recreate itself over and over again.89  
 
Little wonder the practices of contemporary Tionghoa betray a fixation with 
keamanan. This is particularly evident in Tionghoa movement and spatial claims. The 
vast numbers of Indonesia’s rural and semi-rural Tionghoa (once the majority of the 
Tionghoa population) have and continue to urbanise at a rapid rate,90 accommodated 
in large gated communities built by Tionghoa conglomerates who also construct the 
titanic malls that are represented within the community as an important pivot of 
keamanan.  Tionghoa property tycoons such as Eka Citpa Widjaja (Sinar Mas group), 
Tomy Winata (Artha Graha), Sugianto ‘Aguan’ Kusuma (Agung Sedayu), Ciputra 
and Jan Darmadi (Darmadi Group) discussed in Chapter II are so frequently talked 
about as rising or fading laupan [big bosses] because when a community’s circulation 
in the city is so heavily circumscribed, the opening of new perimeters of mobility – 
malls, hotels, housing estates, ‘lifestyle centres’ - in which to mingle is a major spatial 
reordering, even a liberation. For this reason, Tionghoa property tycoons are more 
important to the community than the multiple other forms of commercial activity in 
                                                
89 Once is reminded of writer El Saadawi’s description of her own circumcision, aged six. ‘I lay in a 
pool of blood. After a few days, the bleeding stopped and the daya peered between my thighs and said, 
‘all is well. The wound has healed, thanks be to God’…but the pain was like an abscess deep in my 
flesh…I did not know what other parts in my body there were that might need to be cut off in the same 
way. So I lay in bed, my eyes wide open in the dark. I had no idea what fate had in store for me.’ My 
italics. To the victim, the act of violence presupposes a repeat (El Saadawi, N, 2007, p. 63).   
90 Political decentralisation has meant that financial opportunities at the regional and district level have 
dramatically increased and Tionghoa communities have risen to meet that need. Nonetheless, one finds 
frequently that Tionghoa entrepreneurs make their money in the regions, but maintain property in the 
cities, often going there to retire. 
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which Tionghoa dominate. Within Jakarta’s diverse and intensely socially-policed 
Tionghoa community, the spatial restrictions that they experience find their echo in a 
kind of introverted, bunker mentality.  My interviews and everyday chatter recorded 
in my field notes recount a chorus of criticism, particularly from young Tionghoa 
‘activists’ such as those affiliated with JATIM [Jaringan Tionghoa Muda] about the 
perils of Tionghoa commercialism manifest in ‘budaya ruko’ [ruko or shophouse 
culture] or ‘budaya mal’ [mall culture]. Observed one young Tionghoa intellectual, 
‘the Chinese think that they are supreme in commerce because they are born with it. 
They don’t understand that they are oppressed and there is nowhere else for them to 
go.’91   
 
To secure the keamanan of space and property, Tionghoa rely on strategic 
partnerships of which debt and patronage are an integral part.  My informant, Diana, 
grew up in Solo where her father and his family owned the string of gold shops 
targeted in Siegel’s description of the November 1980 riots.  During the New Order, 
her father kept on the payroll a two star general from the airforce and members of the 
army’s elite force Kopassus, allowing one guard to accompany him in full view.   
They lived in a big house on the main street surrounded by Chinese neighbours, 
which like the gold shops they worked in, were purpose built with large papan 
[wooden blinds or screens] to shutter the windows and fortress the home. Behind their 
house, were the resident of the kampung who were kept on side through the provision 
of employment and the constant lending of micro-credit, for weddings, funerals, 
surgeries and the like - small sums of a few million rupiah that more often than not 
would not be paid back.  
                                                
91 Tionghoa activist, interview by author (12 March 2007).  
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Instability in business was subdued in three ways; a) by plying the gold trade with 
genial family members, b) by enveloping other large Tionghoa traders who had 
Kopassus beking into the mutually dependent organisations known as kongsi, and c) 
by deploying Kopassus to ‘menakutkan’ [frighten] other Tionghoa competition 
allowing the kongsi to proceed undisturbed.  Thus when, in November 1980, the 
rumble of the riots came, Diana recalls,  
 
I remember in 1980, I was told to go home quickly by mami. Then the shop was closed 
quickly, and we attached triplex to each window. For hours afterwards, stones were thrown at 
our home.  It seems like Kopassus tipped off my parents, so we were aman...We gave 
employment [kasih kerjaan] to the whole kampung behind us and at the end it paid off. [When 
the rioters came] they protected us, ini cina baik [these are good Chinese], they said.92   
 
The sponsorship of Kopassus by Diana’s father was returned by the tip off that the 
city was going to experience a riot, giving the family time to secure their property and 
children against threat.  Gift-giving in the form of micro-credit to the potentially 
hostile surrounding neighbourhood meant that when the rioters came, neighbours 
were able to vouch for their kind-hearted, civic behaviour and despite stone-throwing, 
the family was protected from the burning and looting that other homes and gold 
shops were subjected to.   
 
Seen from the Nervous System, patronage and gift exchange is the primary means by 
which politically-disempowered Tionghoa traders spread indebtedness to be returned, 
not merely as the gift of political favouritism or waiver of law, but as the gift of 
                                                
92 Field notes (2 May 2010).  
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keamanan.  Unless there is a direct threat, the keamanan provided is not physical but 
rather, it functions first and foremost on as a protective, preemptive measure to ward 
off harm, much like an amulet or a talisman.  In this way, officers are wielded as 
protective objects that inspire fear and caution and extend the agency of their user.  
Officers are thus, to borrow from Gell, a ‘technology of a kind of militarist 
enchantment’ in their ability to inspire caution and convey warning to pribumi 
looking to extort fellow Tionghoa business competition.  Like Gell’s Kula-canoe, the 
officer is objectified by the Tionghoa patron as a ‘potent psychological weapon.’ The 
power of the Tionghoa patron-police officer relationship resides in its quality of 
spectacularity and its ability to stir the political imagination of the audience into a 
fantasy of presumed power conferred upon the Tionghoa benefactor. Cukong 
relationships are a site where Gell’s enchantment of technology (the wonder and 
magic inspired by how the thing came to exist, or how the relationship came to be) 
and the technology of enchantment (the coercive/legal powers of the officer himself) 
collude (1992).  
 
Nonetheless, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the relationship is internally 
couched in a language of decorum and courtesy.  Police insist they are helping [bantu] 
a friend [teman] who has met undeserved misfortune negotiate the complexities of 
law and the state.93  Police officers at PTIK in receipt of scholarships reject the idea 
that that they are in any way beholden to their donors.94 ‘To call it a cukong is too 
connotative,’ they frowned. ‘As if [seolah2] when you don’t hold the position 
[menjabat], the relationship ends [hubungannya sudah selesai]. A good friend [teman 
                                                
93 Field notes (12 December 2006). 
94 Cocong’s relationship with Polri is discussed in Chapter III.  
! "#$ 
baik] is different, they will still befriend you after you retire.’95  For their own part, 
Tionghoa businessmen flatter and fawn over their blushing police generals, filling 
their glasses and calling out to the table ‘this man, this man will one day be Kapolri! 
If not president, ya ngak Pak [isn’t that right Pak]! Mark my words we should keep an 
eye on this one!’96  Their every statement is cheered, agreed with or overly 
emphasised and great elaborations are made around their consumption, from the loud 
impatient calling of wait staff to take the order, to the addition of dishes and of course 
the secreting of the bill.97  
 
The figure of the cukong, from the New Order’s Liem Sioe Liong and Bob Hasan to 
today’s Tommy Winata, Sugianto Kusuma or Eka Cipta Widjaja, is mimicked and 
replicated at all levels of the Tionghoa trading classes as a means to secure keamanan.  
The ‘Nervous System’ concept helps explain the patterns seen in the last chapter of 
patronage exchanges clustering around the state coercive apparatus, with transactions 
increasing in pomp, worth, and urgency as one works up the ranks and specialised 
units of force within and between the coercive apparatus.  It is not enough to merely 
sponsor a two star general whose rank-cum-authority alone would yield the political 
favours and legal exceptionalism to ensure Tionghoa business priorities prevail.  
Instead, as we have seen, Tionghoa capitalists engage in gift-orientated patronage of 
multiple kinds and targets – from the elite, hyper-coercive forces of Densus 88, 
Paspampres and Kopassus to neighbourhood micro lending and social organisation 
charity drives - as a means to ensure their keamanan.   
 
                                                
95 Field notes (11 April 2007).  
96 Field notes (6 February 2008).  
97 Field notes. (6 February 2008).  
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What these practices suggest is a grave error in the literature on ‘Chinese Big 
Business.’  Scholars such as Chua argue rightly for an analysis of pribumi state and 
Tionghoa business relationships that take class seriously, concluding that in the post-
authoritarian period, the demise of ‘Indonesia’s predatory form of capitalism as well 
as the discontinuation of overtly anti-Chinese polices’ allowed Tionghoa capitalist 
elites to reconfigure their relationships with the pribumi political elite from mutual 
dependence to the emancipation of capital.  Strictly speaking, Tionghoa big business 
no longer needs its amulets from the coercive apparatus. And yet, while Tionghoa 
conglomerates such as Artha Graha no longer maintain a structural relationship with 
military businesses, tycoons like Winata keep the flow of capital to the coercive 
apparatus by other means.  The question arises: why keep the troops on the payroll at 
all if capital is now so fully detached from political power?  Why seek out police so 
aggressively?  
 
The answer I was given over and over by businessmen in the capital was much the 
same that Winata gives Chua, ‘you cannot put all money on one horse, because the 
uncertainty of winning is too high.  Besides this, the president now changes at least 
every 10 years’ (2008, p. 128). Similarly, founder of INTI Eddie Lembong explained 
to me,  
 
For the Chinese, perlindungan [protection] is very important…[The military] are our social 
values, our culture.  [If I got rid of my military connections] I would be seen by the 
community as a bad person.  They would say, oh look at Pak Eddie, he used that man and now 
he just gets rid of him just like that.  Also, we don’t want anything coming back at us.  If I 
hurt his feelings today, who knows what will happen tomorrow.98 
                                                
98 Eddie Lembong, interview by author (5 April 2007).  
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Conventional political science conceives of democratisation as telos - a steady, even 
inevitable, progression towards a stable democratic form of governance.  But even 
here in Southeast Asia’s most successful democratic test case, the Tionghoa subject, 
for whom political change has only ever brought further discrimination, violence and 
financial loss, democracy is a vulgar, recalcitrant political system.  Democracy is 
inherently risky and inconstant: what with its fixed presidential terms, its civilian 
caprice, its goading of political change and baiting of political competition and its 
central, most unpredictable plank - the public election.  Seen through the ‘Nervous 
System,’ democratisation does not decrease illicit patronage relations but multiplies 
and fragments them.  
 
Secondly, Chua’s analysis of relations between capital and the state fixates on the few 
elites that make up Chinese big business, rather than the class diverse group of 
Tionghoa traders and the myriad relationships they must establish and negotiate at all 
rungs of state and coercive bureaucracy.  Tycoon capitalists represent only a very 
small group among the capitalist class and indeed, even during the New Order, 
Suharto maintained limits on their fiscal, social and political capital (Sidel, 1998, p. 
163). In contemporary, democratic Indonesia, there is still a divide between a handful 
of the fiscally-endowed who have limited mobility and the rest of the Tionghoa 
business classes with their strictly curbed mobility.  Most lower, middle and upper 
middle class traders I knew continued to struggle to obtain identity cards, business 
licenses and certificates for land, hiring indigenous preman as brokers to negotiate 
with local police and government for fear that their own faces would substantially 
delay proceedings or further increase the illegal tithes to which they are submitted.  
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Despite significant changes to the citizenship status of the Tionghoa through 
successive post-authoritarian governments from Habibie to SBY, the bulk of the 
Tionghoa community continue to live extremely circumscribed lives of limited 
mobility and territorial claim.  Budi drove me around Bekasi, pointing out familiar, 
safe sites,  
 
I only isi ban (fill my tyres with air) here in front of my house.  Everywhere else people look 
at me and tell me that the price is Rp 150,000 [US$16].  But here I know the real price.99  
 
Others comfort themselves in simple acts of heroism,  
 
The hardest thing is to be an outcast of both groups. The ones stuck in between, who can’t 
assimilate but who don’t want to be totok.100  They are the ones that confront the bigotry of 
the pribumi every day.  I still catch the Busway even though every time I get on, I hear 
someone say, look there’s a cina glodok scuttling out of his kampung [spoken in 
Bahasa/English].101  
 
Chua argues that Tionghoa big business has been emancipated from their former 
pribumi associates.  But at the upper middle, middle and lower levels of the Tionghoa 
community, a genuine absence of keamanan continues to define the ebb and flow of 
everyday life in the capital. Tionghoa big business, seeing themselves as the leaders 
[laupan, tauke] of this community cannot help but know this.  
 
                                                
99 Budi Harjono, interview by author (9 July 2010).  
100 The use of the word totok here emphasise my argument that to be Tionghoa is a set of practices, not 
an ethnic identity. In my informant’s sentence, totok is the opposite of the verb assimilate. Totok is here 
also defined in terms of mobility.  Being totok is being unwilling and unable to catch the newly 
constructed commuter busway, which slices through the city from the Tionghoa dominated areas in the 
north to the pribumi south.  
101 Young Tionghoa Activist, interview by author (12 March 2007).  
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By omitting the centuries of threat, structural discrimination and coercive impotence 
of the Tionghoa community that make up the ‘Nervous System,’ scholars such as 
Chua and Studwell reduce the pursuit and securing of patronage by Tionghoa big 
business solely to utilitarian goals of profit maximisation. In fact, the objective of 
cukongism is historically intermeshed with the underlying, anxious need for 
keamanan.   What all of this suggests is a system by which the gift of patronage and 
the counter-gift of keamanan is not merely an instrumentalist economy of exchange 
but rather, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest, a means of inscription and belonging. 
Allies in desire, one for capital, the other for keamanan, the Tionghoa and the police 
seek each other out (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b, p. 202). Tionghoa mark officers of 
the coercive apparatus not merely for the direct, instrumental security they will 
receive, but rather for the powerful social spectacularity of the mark, the association it 
gives them and the social message, ‘wah, ini orangnya ga main2. Ada jendral’ [Hey, 
this guy is no small fry, lit, is not playing around. He has a general on his side]102.  On 
the part of police, the investment of the Chinese cukong is a recognition of the 
officer’s power to coerce, both in line with law and above and beyond it.  To possess 
a cukong is a statement of faith.  And so gift giving appears as a collaboration in ‘a 
socius of inscription, where the essential thing is to mark and be marked’ (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 2004b, p. 154). 
 
The Principles of the Gift  
 
There are three main qualities of the gift:   
                                                
102 Tionghoa Businessman, interview by author (6 April 2007).  
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1) the gift economy is the signature of asymmetrical relationships and the exchange of 
incommensurable goods and services,  
2) the gift economy displaces and obscures the vulgarity of debt and the obligations of 
its return with a language of disinterested, civic charity, and  
3) the receipt of the gift obliges repayment.   
In his work on the Maori, Mauss argued that the gift contains the spiritual essence of 
its owner, known as ‘the spirit of the gift’ (2002). No recipient could keep such an 
intimate nugget without the moral and legal compulsion of return. In contrast to 
commodities, Mauss sees gifts as inalienable within functionalist economics - a 
seamless looping together of the obligation to give and the obligation to return.   
 
Sahlins, who examines the gift economy as a form of primeval trade, contradicted this 
view by arguing that forms of reciprocity shuffled along a continuum from the 
altruism of Malinoswki’s pure gift to ‘self-interested seizure, appropriation by 
chicanery or force’ (1972, 119). This led him to surmise that there are three main 
forms of exchange;  
a) balanced reciprocity of the kind described by Mauss,  
b) generalised reciprocity that occurrs within kin groups in which accepted forms of 
stratification and rank cause the reciprocity of the exchange to keel towards one actor 
or group, and finally,  
c) negative reciprocity where parties jostle and scheme to maximise their share. 
Sahlins argued that these three forms of exchange could be directly correlated to 
kinship distance wherein the politics of ‘chicane’ occupied ‘the most peripheral 
distance’ (ibid, 198).  
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The gift and patronage relations have been a long-standing feature of anthropological 
discussion, but most recently they surface in attempts to map out an anthropology of 
corruption.  Scholars have structured their retort to the normative moralising of 
international anti-corruption institutions and their banners demanding that the ‘cancer’ 
of corruption be rooted out, by relativising ‘corruption’ as a particular form of 
meaning-making at the local level (Harrison, 2006; Anders & Nuijten, 2007). For 
instance, Yang argues that gift-giving for guanxi [social connections] is a counter 
response to dominant, redistributive modes of state power (1989). Here, gift-giving is 
as much a cultural as it is material performance, part of the wider practices of social-
interconnectedness that do not tally with ‘western’ norms of state-like behaviour.  
Anthropology’s determination to focus on local level interactions and meaningful 
social encounters as a pointed counter to ‘the disciplining agendas of northern 
powers’ (Harrison, 2006) has left some parts of this literature completely oblivious, 
indeed, willfully uninformed as to the power of capital and the sheer size and import 
of shadow economies.  Worst of all this literature is the keeper of impaired records on 
the ruinous impact that corrupt systems and illegal state practices can have on the 
lives of ordinary people.  The anthropology of corruption struggles to confront the 
unethical and exploitative behaviour of our informants.  
 
With this in mind, let us take another look at the practice of gift exchange and 
patronage between Tionghoa businessmen and the Indonesian police.  On the face of 
it, Tionghoa patronage of the police displays some of the textbook features of the gift. 
Tionghoa benefactors, though materially rich, are security-poor and the gift economy 
exchanges their wealth for highly coveted keamanan.  But let us examine these 
premises of the gift more closely for I wish to argue that the tenets of gift exchange 
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are here wholly dysfunctional and negate the political economic approach of the 
‘Chinese big business’ literature. I do this in the following section by presenting 
ethnographic and interview data to dissect the gift economy of patronage between 
Tionghoa capitalists and police.  
 
Anatomy of Tionghoa  Patronage: Origins 
 
Wahyu is a 49 year old peranakan businessman who lives on the Duta Mas property 
estate in West Jakarta.  He is not rich, but his father owns a few properties in central 
Jakarta which Wahyu manages.  He speaks in a ramble of English and Indonesian, 
springing from subject to subject in no clear order.  His facts are not construed, he 
evidences them with medical reports and receipts, but his narrative is oddly ordered. 
His story only comes together with patient repeat listenings.  I met Wahyu at one of 
Jakarta’s legal aid bureaus where his case-worker looked exhausted and happy to 
share the burden.  I asked Wahyu if he was a member of INTI or PSMTI and he 
barked immediately that he had no truck with ‘those kinds of organisations that 
provide legality’.103  He does not play patron to the security apparatus not just because 
money is tight.  As his rambling and restless mind attests, he is too socially queer to 
strategise and woo an officer.  He has also set an antagonistic distance between 
himself and the protective realm of the Tionghoa community. As such, Wahyu is a 
rare breed - an unprotected Tionghoa capitalist in the city.   
 
                                                
103 Chapter I interrogated INTI and PSMTII as part of the new wave of post-authoritarian Tionghoa 
civil society and found the organisation to be channeling money to the police apparatus in return for 
protection for its members.  
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Wahyu owns a property in Roxy, a suburb in inner West Jakarta. Like his home in 
Duta Mas, Roxy is an estate developed and managed by PT Duta Pertiwi, a subsidiary 
of Eka Cipta Wijaja’s megalith, the Sinar Mas group.  Roxy bears all the hallmarks of 
Tionghoa enterprise. Its streets and complexes are lined with workaday ruko 
[shophouse] selling electronics, mainly mobile phones. Wahyu owns a house here, 
renting it out on yearly leases.  In 2007, two young pribumi women held the lease. He 
called them ‘wanita bilyar’ [lit; women who work at billiard parlors] meaning Wahyu 
thinks they are sex workers.   
 
After the Islamic fasting month of 2007, Wahyu discovered that the young women 
had pulang kampung [returned to their place of origin outside Jakarta]. They had done 
so with the profit reaped from illegitimately selling his property to the head of the 
Roxy police post [Kapospol].  Wahyu reported the matter to the property [tanah dan 
harta] crimes section of Polda Metro Jaya in January 2008, but they refused to accept 
his complaint based on zoning restrictions and forwarded it instead to Polres Central 
Jakarta.  He returned many times to the Polres, to provide copies of his land 
ownership certificate [hak milik] but apart from this basic administration, nothing 
happened. 
 
Three months later in April 2008, Wahyu returned to Roxy to see that the Kapospol 
had renovated the front of the property, readying it to become a mobile phone shop.  
He became so angry that he rushed in and tore at the new structure. Immediately the 
Kapospol and his two other deputies arrested him for destruction of police property. 
They spoke into their walkie-talkies and had a police car come and take him away.  At 
Polres Central Jakarta, Wahyu waited for hours while he was made a suspect. When 
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he received a call from his neighbours telling him that the cops were rebuilding the 
property again, he rushed to the internal affairs division at the station and filed a 
formal complaint against the officers. He also saw the chief of the Polres and 
demanded he investigate the officers.  He was charged with destruction to property 
and released. A few days later, Wahyu attended a promotion party from a mobile 
phone provider where he met a few cops who gave him a name of a female officer to 
file his complaint for him at the Polda.  The following day he did this, telling the 
internal affairs officer everything.   
 
The day after, on the 1st of May, Wahyu was called into the Polres regarding the 
charge against him for destruction of police property.  While in the waiting room, an 
employee of the Kapospol called Heri turned up and started a fight with him. 
‘Mulutmu lapor ke mana2. Sekarang giliran kita’ [Your mouth reports us everywhere. 
Now it’s our turn] he said. They brawled in full view of everyone but only Wahyu 
was locked up. You have hurt Heri very badly, they told him.  In the cell he was 
beaten and kicked by officers and his ears battered.104 They poured water over his 
clothes and stripped him naked, handcuffed and left him standing without food or 
water from 2pm until 7 the next morning.  The following day, Wahyu was defiant. He  
announced to the head of the station that if he didn’t control his staff and return his 
property, Wahyu would report him to the National Police Headquarters. The Kapolres 
                                                
104 In testimonies of torture that I have collected since 2002 from military abuses in East Timor in the 
early 1980s to the massacres of 1965 to the torture of political activists in the late 1990s and finally, the 
torture of criminal suspects in the post-authoritarian period, ears have featured prominently as a target 
of abuse.  They have been lopped off and souveniered or shot at or next to. Wahyu described a 
technique common to criminal suspects in Indonesia, ‘cuffing’ the ears. Worldwide, this technique is 
known as the telefono. First documented during the British counterinsurgency campaign in Kenya in 
1955, the telefono is now employed primarily by police interrogators across the developed and 
developing world.  By slapping the ears, the aim is to damage the inner membranes of the ears or break 
the eardrums ‘producing giddiness, panic and permanent aural damage’ (Rejali, 2007, p. 339-40).  
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became angry. ‘You talk too much,’ he yelled and Wahyu was taken to another cell 
and beaten up.  
 
On the 4th of May, Wahyu demanded to go to hospital.  He wanted his wounds 
recorded by a medical official so that he could prove the torture later in a court of law.  
But he was taken to the official police hospital where he was put in a cell with six 
other bodies.  One of the occupants had died and the others were in need of medical 
attention but they all lay there, unattended.  Sometimes a medic arrived and insisted 
that Wahyu attend to them.  Wahyu himself was denied medical care. While he was in 
prison, anonymous police officers rang various members of his family - his uncle, his 
aunt, his brother, ‘setiap saudara yang kaya’ [each of my family members who are 
rich] - explaining that Wahyu was in the police hospital as a detainee facing charges 
of assault. The officer explained that for about Rp 10 million [US$1116], Wahyu 
could be freed from all charges.  They ignored his offer.  
 
On his 16th day in hospital, Wahyu was visited by a police psychiatrist who required 
him to fill in a psychological test with 500 questions.  The doctor calculated his 
results and declared him mentally ill.  Immediately after this medical diagnosis, the 
violence, extortion and abuse ceased. He was released as a tahanan kota [prisoner of 
the city] and in the following months he heard nothing more about his case.  His wife 
visited the Kapospol who was running the business out of the Roxy property and they 
cut a deal whereby she shared in a limited amount of the profits of his business.105  
                                                
105 Wahyu. Interview by author (7 July 2008).  
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Wahyu told me that his wife and the police had a ‘reconciliation’ [in English], 
although he separated his own wishes from his wife’s actions.106  
 
Wahyu’s experiences are instructive on many levels. While he legitimately owns 
property in the capital, the legal tenure of his land ownership in the form of the 
certificates he showed Polda did not transfer into the legitimate, defensible right of 
territoriality in the eyes of pribumi ‘billard women’ and the police.  Despite his 
repeated attempts to appeal to law, his land was taken and territorialised anew by the 
Kapuspol’s renovations.  The financial investment of the head of the police post into 
the property is an act of demarcation, a way of marking new territorial ownership, 
much like the flag or the sign.  Land left fallow disentitles territorial claims but the 
bustle of activity is grounding for proprietorship (Li, 1998). Through home 
renovation, the Kapuspol staked his picket into Wahyu’s territory.   
 
Little wonder that the renovations incensed Wahyu, leading to a single-minded attack 
targeted exclusively at the refurbishments that shrink his claim to territory.  His 
                                                
106 This chapter argues that a specific, localised relationship has emerged between the coercive 
apparatus and the ethnic Chinese business community, born of political, social and economic flows 
over hundreds of years. Nonetheless, if elements of Wahyu’s story sound remarkable, even 
unbelievable, the reader can be reassured that the modality of madness to coerce employed here by 
Polri is common to the police abuse of whistleblowers worldwide.  For instance, in 2009, Precinct 81, 
Brooklyn, New York, whistleblower Adrian Schoolcraft was committed to a psychiatric hospital by his 
deputy chief after he tried to report police corruption and misconduct using 17 months worth of taped 
recordings. When his father, also a police officer, tried to locate him, the police, police internal affairs 
and FBI did not know or could not say his whereabouts. Schoolcraft was effectively disappeared by the 
police into the state mental health system. In his narrative of the mounting tensions at the precinct, 
Schoolcraft recounts that rumours were circulating that the chief of the station was going to force him 
out on psychiatric grounds. He also worries, as in the case of Wahyu, that his seniors will ‘provoke’ 
him into something that would lead to his shooting. Leaks from Schoolcraft’s meetings with the police 
doctor, police psychiatrist and police internal affairs tipped off the precinct and district chief that he 
was going to report them. Schoolcraft was eventually confined against his will and without informing 
his kin in a mental hospital for six days. He was in effect, ‘disappeared’ by the medical system. In their 
narrative, the NYPD argued that Schoolcraft was acting erratically, swearing at supervisors, barricaded 
himself in his home and was a danger to himself. The tapes showed this to be untrue. To this date, 
Schoolcraft’s case against the NY police department is ongoing. (The Right to Remain Silent: This 
American Life. 2010, radio program, National Public Radio, 13 Sept).  
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appeals to the law are remarkable given that they are made to the very agent that 
targets him for extortion.  Wahyu’s attempt to challenge the police legally mark the 
beginning of a period in which his relationship with the police shifted from petition to 
violence: the categorical theft of his land supported by the police establishment, his 
imprisonment and torture, the extortion of his family members, the complicity of the 
medical establishment, and his final condemnation of madness which throw any 
further legal claims into awry.  The police have revealed their hand and the full extent 
of their power over Wahyu’s property, family, life, freedom and sense of objective 
reality.  Wahyu’s wife capitulated and the violence of the police was tamed by a 
relationship of patronage to the Kapuspol whereby his use of the land went 
unchallenged in exchange for a small percentage of the profit of his business. This 
transforms Wahyu’s wife into a fully-fledged cukong.  
 
But who is the cukong here?  What is beking when it is so violently derived? Wahyu’s 
narrative raises questions about the origins of contemporary patronage relationships 
between middle class Tionghoa capitalists and the state coercive apparatus, 
undermining the logic of voluntarism or self-proclaimed missions of civic duty that 
underpins gift-exchange and patronage relationships.  It also calls into question the 
meta-narratives of ‘Chinese big business’ that propose an equilibrium between the 
Tionghoa capitalist whose ruthless pursuit of money hitchhikes aboard pribumi 
desires for political power.  In these models of patronage and gift giving, the interests 
of both parties are met, thus rooting patronage in a self-sustaining equilibrium. What 
Wahyu’s case suggests is in fact that the contemporary patronage relationships 
between pribumi and Tionghoa can also be born of ongoing violence, both structural 
and real. Wahyu’s choice to abstain from patronage relationships with the coercive 
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apparatus invites theft, violence and extortion that ends only when a patronage deal is 
struck.  
 
The following is an exchange I had with a Betawi gangster who discussed with me the 
origins of his ‘teman2 Cina’ [Chinese friends].  How did you become such a big 
preman in the first place Jambul?, I asked.  Jambul leans over, grinning like the 
Cheshire cat and says slowly,  
 
Well, I liked drinking.  And you know, when I start drinking, I start thinking about money. 
Terutama dari Cina [Especially Chinese money]. So, I’d get a big rock and throw it. Hancur 
[destroyed]. The next day, they’d fix it. So I go in and break it again. And so again, they fix it. 
And eventually rather than get a tukang [labourer] in every day – that’s Rp 50,000 [US$5.5] 
just for the labour alone – they call me in. ‘Pak Jambul,’ they said, “we’ve got a problem with 
our keamanan [security].  Amanin deh [Protect us, would you]”.  Ha ha ha… 
 
I would turn off the electricity to their houses and offices.  I would lock them in there for 
hours.  They couldn’t breathe. And so that was my technique [modus].  It grew from there. I 
wasn’t trying to find trouble [cari masalah]. I was trying to find money. I always picked on 
the Chinese. I wrecked stuff and then they asked me to fix it. I collected their debts [nyagih]. 
We’d target a totok langsung [directly]. We’d grab his cash as if were maling [thieves]. That 
was the model. I had about 10-12 boys, six guarding the Cina and the others thieving from 
them… [At first] I was paid Rp 500,000 [US$55] per month. They just gave it to me. They 
already knew [mereka sudah tahu].107 Ngak ada yang minta [No-one demanded money from 
them].  Between the years 1982-1990, I’d be making five to six million per month.  
 
                                                
107 Absent of the object, this sentence, mereka sudah tahu, can be read in two ways, both of which 
ultimate settle on the same meaning.  Jambul is suggesting that either they already ‘knew’ the price 
they should pay, or they already knew that the exchange, their security for his employment, should take 
place.  Either way, the Tionghoa businesspeople ‘already knew’ how to temper the rent-seeking 
situation. Compare this to Gupta’s informants, who complain that they lack the cultural savvy to 
negotiate bribes and one begins to see how the skilled management of extortion is a developed trait of 
Indonesia’s Tionghoa presumably because of their historical vulnerability to it. (Gupta, 1995).  
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I’d see a new bengkel [auto mechanic]. I’d say to the anak-anak [from anak buah, his ‘boys’], 
go bring their sign [spanduk] down. And oh sialan [damn it]! Out would come a Kopassus!  I 
would get an earful [dimaki-maki]. ‘Who are you looking for here!?’ Cina itu dekingan 
Kopassus. Kopassus semua [Those Chinese were the financiers of Kopassus. They financed 
the whole lot]. If you ask me, they’re better off with us preman. At least we stick around but 
with the aparat [state coercive apparatus], they’re always off looking for more 
opportunities.108  
 
Like the preman, the police coerce a patronage relationship with Tionghoa capital, 
turning the courtesy and volunteerism of the gift economy on its head.  The 
conventional literature of the gift economy is in other ways reversed: it is not the 
beneficiary of the gift who is weak, captured by capital and implicated by the moral 
economy into repayment.  Rather, it is our donor. Explains a one star retired general:  
 
The very function of the police is to establish a relationship with forms of enterprise [jenis 
usaha] that have something that needs to be secured, a hotel, a factory.  The police look for 
problems; a foreigner who didn’t report himself, you patronise a prostitute, you don’t report 
your earnings. If you don’t have the police protecting you, you’ll be interrogated [diperiksa] 
daily.  From this relationship, the police plant their interests [menanam kepentingan] and the 
Chinese hope that at one point the police will feel obliged to return the favour [saling bantu].  
This is what the police call “community participation” [partisipasi masyarakat]. But, 
“participation” emerges from the police authority to investigate [dari kewenangan polisi untuk 
memeriksa timbul partisipasi]109.  
 
Anatomy of Tionghoa  Patronage 2: Reciprocity Denied 
 
                                                
108 Field notes (12 February 2007) 
109 Retired Police General, interview by author (7 November 2006).  
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The reciprocity ethic is a key element of the patronage relationship. The obligation of 
the returned gift is what closes the loop of gift-exchange and binds benefactor and 
beneficiary in greater symmetry. Hence, the practice of reciprocity is in fact an 
acknowledgement of likeness. Its denial is a rejection of group membership. This 
means that reciprocity and its inverse (negative reciprocity a la Sahlins) delineate the 
boundaries of community. Seen from this perspective, Lim Sioe Liong’s relationship 
with President Suharto begins to look remarkably egalitarian.  The granting of 
monopolies on cloves, wheat and flour were exchanged for setoran payments and the 
opening of joint business opportunities to support the initial capitalisation of the 
President’s family members.  Liong’s lucrative clove monopoly was shared with 
Suharto’s half brother Probosutedjo and Suharto’s eldest daughter Siti Hardiyanti 
Rukmana and her younger brother Sigit Harjojudanto forged their respective business 
empires on the profits made from their 30% ownership of Liong’s BCA.110   
 
Unlike big business, for middle class Tionghoa capitalists, the principle of exchange 
is negotiated and uncertain.  Despite the obligations of the gift, the provision of 
protection and privilege remains contingent on the will of the officer-beneficiary on 
the ground. We see this in the following narrative from a young Tionghoa 
businessman called Budi Hardjono.  
 
In June 2006, a gaggle of journalists were invited to join a police raid in West Java 
which, Polri promised, would likely uncover the hiding place of notorious, fugitive 
terrorist, Noordin Muhammad Top.  The trip yielded not Top but Marsin, a Sundanese 
                                                
110 Although one might recall Suharto’s ‘thinly veiled extortion’ in the wake of the 1990 opening of the 
Jakarta Stock Exchange, where the president proposed that the 100 firms who had placed their shares 
on the market offer 25% of their shares to Indonesian kooperasi as a way of atoning for their vast 
wealth accumulation.  Eventually, the 31 primarily Tionghoa businessmen who were later called to 
Suharto’s ranch gave 1% of their worth to kooperasi. (Heidhuis, 2006).  
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labourer who confessed to killing his former employer Ali Harto Winata, a totok 
Chinese who ran a company specialising in construction materials in Bekasi.  A dozen 
journalists from the biggest news agencies in the country, bored by the fruitless 
excursion to Cirebon, ran instead with the Marsin story.   
 
Certainly, the murder of Winata and the subsequent revelation of his killer was 
newsworthy in its own right.  Four years earlier, in November 2002, the criminal 
detective unit of Polres Bekasi arrested Winata’s own eldest son Budi Harjono for his 
murder. Bekasi police officers invited journalists to their reconstruction of the murder 
and paraded Budi before a national audience as a monster for whom even filial bonds 
meant nothing.  After six months in detention, a court acquitted Budi Harjono in 2003 
due to a string of procedural errors on the part of the reskrim officers. Regardless, 
police maintained his guilt and pointed to his signed confession as evidence.  Media 
coverage of the arrest of Marsin the real killer drew pointed attention to Budi’s salah 
tangkap [mistaken arrest], initiating a disciplinary review for the investigating officers 
at Polda Metro Jaya.   
 
Today, Budi’s family live calculated and compact lives.  Their home in Bekasi shares 
the same site as the family trade and although already in their late 20s, Sri Eni’s two 
sons, Budi and the younger Tommy, live at home to manage the business.  A4 framed 
photos of Winata and his wife Sri stare out over the moldering tiles and the broken 
furniture of the old pastel lounge room.  The only evident wealth lies in the stacks of 
wood and metal piping that tower over the front yard and Budi’s car, a slick black 
machine with bucket seats.  They attend an evangelical church where the membership 
is largely Tionghoa but they do not hold membership of any other social organisation.   
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Budi was arrested 5 days after his father’s murder. At that stage, Budi, Sri and 
Tommy had been unofficially detained in separate rooms in Polres Bekasi for days.   
 
At first they acted like my friend. They said, ‘why don’t you tell us [cerita] your story?’ But 
when I did, they beat me and said, ‘you’re lying.’  When I asked for a lawyer, they brought 
out a baseball bat and swung it, missing my head by just a few centimeters.  My mother (who 
had been beaten badly by Marsin in the attack and required surgery) kept telling them that 
Marsin did it, but they already had a skenario [scenario] worked out for me. They beat me the 
first day, the second day, the third day. They fired a gun right next to my brother’s ears. They 
tried to force me through brutality to confess but it didn’t work. I said to them one day, 
‘Where is your proof? There is evidence, Pak. Why don’t you look at that? You have a block 
of wood. There are fingerprints on it.’ I said, ‘you can’t do this, this is not in line with the law’ 
and they said, ‘this is my law’ [ini hukum saya]. Then, they found a way to get at me. 
Mugiono, the interrogating officer, told me I had to sign a police investigation report or my 
mother would not be released from detention for her surgery.  He said, ‘your mama is gonna 
die.’  I thought, my father is dead, must my mother die too? So, I agreed to sign the police 
investigation report.  It was already filled in with my confession. I thought, this is the greatest 
drama [sandiwara] in the world.   
 
 
Budi’s mother, brother and pembantu [housemaid] signed statements under duress 
that Budi was the perpetrator of his father’s murder.  
 
Why wasn’t Marsin arrested from the beginning? …As far as I see it, at the start, the issue was 
money [soal uang].  Marsin didn’t have any money.  His family didn’t have any money. If I 
was made a tersangka [suspect], they thought we’d shell out [keluarkan] money so that the 
case didn’t go to trial…Sugeng, the kasadserse [chief of staff of criminal detectives] 
approached my uncle and said that he wanted to go on the haj [naik haji] but had no money. 
! "## 
We said, arrest Marsin and if you want compensation, then we’ll work it out [kalau Bapak 
mau imbalan, itu urusan belakangan].  But then the case became about their promotion. The 
minute I confessed, they were all promoted [naik jabatan].  After I was formally made a 
suspect [tersangka], they never asked for money again. 111 
 
In 2006, four years later, the media coverage of Budi’s case snowballed in the weeks 
after the flopped terrorist expedition and Marsin’s arrest.  Aside from numerous 
magazine and newspaper interviews and even a Wikipedia entry, Budi was invited to 
speak on a TV talk show on a panel with notorious Glodok gangster, peranakan 
Anton Medan.112  On air, Medan crassly announced that ‘Budi is a Chinese, so [jadi] 
he’s rich, that’s why he was freed [makanya dia bebas].’   
 
Herein lay the subtext of the recent media storm around Budi Harjono.  Public interest 
in his case did not in fact lie with the procedural errors of his case. Torture, false 
arrests and forced confessions were a dime a dozen and who thought the police were 
clean anyway? Public interest in the case was generated because of Budi’s race: as the 
son of a totok Chinese, what was he doing getting so far into trouble with the law in 
the first place? Wasn’t he making his regular payments to the security services? 
Where were his patronage networks, his kenalan [people he knows], his koneksi 
[connections]? With all that money and power, aren’t the Chinese invulnerable to the 
law?  
 
                                                
111 See Chapter IV for more on fiscal extraction and cases, which I refer to as the economy of law.  
112 Nationally, Anton Medan is renowned as a Jakarta gambling tycoon cum preman cum Islamic 
preacher.  His role in Jakarta’s illicit casino industry is explored in Chapter III.  
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I posed these very questions tentatively to Budi, in the darkness of his car.  He went 
silent and when he answered, his voice broke. ‘Mereka tutup mata’ [lit. They shut 
their eyes].  When he finally spoke again he said,  
 
There are three ways that the Chinese find strength [cari kekuatan] in this country.  Church, 
social organisations, and contracts with the aparat through setoran.  INTI doesn’t do anything 
anyway, mana perlindunanya?! [what protection!?]. These days, I just stick with the church. I 
think that’s why now the Chinese have turned to religion. To find keamanan.   
 
Budi did not elaborate on his family’s former police beneficiaries – we do not know 
their rank, department or station.   
 
In late 2006, Kapolri Sutanto ordered head of Metro Jaya police, Irjen Pol Adang 
Firman to subject Mugiono, Budi’s interrogating officer, Sugeng, the chief of staff, 
and other arresting officers to an internal disciplinary trial.  However, Firman resisted 
and the officers went unpunished.  Why would Firman risk his relationship with the 
national chief of police with such a blatant act of insubordination? The officers could 
have been protected, either by other senior police or by patrons of their own, pribumi 
or Tionghoa, escorting them through the ranks of Polri.  If that was the case, its 
possible that Budi’s police beneficiaries did not have the authority to overturn his 
arrest and detention, but usually, this is only evident after a prolonged negotiation and 
repeated requests for funds.   
 
Rather, ‘to close one’s eyes’ to the distress of one’s patron is a snub of a different sort 
altogether.  It is an apriori decision to overturn the reciprocal obligations of the gift 
economy.  It is a denial of indebtedness and, it is also its inverse, a statement of 
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autonomy in the face of the moral net cast by the patron’s repeated, regular 
presentation of the gift.  If ‘partnership is not merely the privilege but the duty of 
reciprocity’ (Sahlins, 1974) then the shrugging off of the ethic of repayment is a 
denial of the initial fact of partnership.  Without the necessary final step of 
recompense, all the courtesy, decorum and backslapping that signifies the Tionghoa-
police gift economy is nothing but a mask for Sahlins’ concept of negative 
reciprocity: ‘the attempt to get something for nothing with impunity’ (1974, p. 309). 
And like Deleuze and Guattari, Sahlins recognises that if reciprocity is an 
acknowledgement of kinship, coresidence and belonging to the community, then its 
denial is the unsociable extreme.  Herein lies the crux of the fragility of the Tionghoa-
police gift economy: in refusing the obligation of reciprocity, the police negate 
Tionghoa claims of likeness, common citizenship and community.  And so even here 
in cukongism, the supposed ultimate domain of Tionghoa power and influence, 
Tionghoa are vulnerable and subject to betrayal. Indonesia’s few choice Tionghoa 
tycoons maybe emanicipated from the political elite, but for the vast majority of 
Tionghoa entrepreneurs, capital’s power to patronise and indebt is outbid by the 
power of race to delegitimise and deterritoralise.  
 
Seen from this light – the fragility of exchange as opposed to its mechanic 
inevitability – the history of Tionghoa relations with the police and military coercive 
apparatus reveals itself anew.  The repeat incidences of violence that have cost the 
Tionghoa community their lives and livelihoods over the years since the founding of 
the republic appear now not merely as an outbreak of racial-economic tension, but as 
a series of chronic betrayals.  Each riot, threat and act of destruction of Tionghoa 
property is a rejection of the years of courtship and false camaraderie culminating in 
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that final grotesque, orchestrated act of perfidy: the anti-Chinese riots of 1998.  
Starting in the first months of 1998, as the financial crisis was beginning to crunch, 
thousands of Chinese homes and ruko were looted and burnt down.  The riots first 
fanned out across Indonesia. They started from its Christian majority, Eastern islands, 
and steadily narrowed and moved inward, hitting the capital in May.  The riots lasted 
35 hours and were identified in 50 different locations in the city, mainly clustered in 
its commercial heart.  
 
But why didn’t you leave Glodok before the riots? I ask my peranakan friend.  He 
shrugs, ‘we didn’t think it would affect us because beforehand Pangdam Sjafrie 
[Maj.Gen. TNI Sjafrie Syamsoedin] promised us that we would all be aman.  He said 
that there would be no violence in Jakarta.’ Instead, ‘when I went out in Glodok on 
the 15th of May, there was no keamanan at all.  And when the rioters came, they went 
directly for the electronics and companies, they wanted TVs and mobile phones and 
electronic goods.  In the crowd, I saw many faces I knew.’113   
 
Jakarta’s central Chinatown of Glodok was set alight and burnt to the ground 
(although my informants recalled that the investments of the political elite, such as 
Glodok and Mangga Dua’s gambling dens and nightclubs were ringed by Marines).  
Other Tionghoa communities in Kelapa Gading and Permata Hijau were able to 
secure the services of the Marines to guard their residential estates for the princely 
sum of Rp 500 million [US$56 000].114  But many did not, and terrified by the 
possibilities, had their military beneficiaries chauffeur them in luxury cars to 
Sukarno-Hatta airport.  For this privilege beneficiaries remembered, sometimes 
                                                
113 Field notes (11 April 2007).  
114 Tionghoa businessman, interview by author (20 March 2007).  
! "#$ 
laughing, that they demanded the sum of the vehicle itself.  An ethnic Tionghoa 
businessman observed, ‘1998 taught us that the protection of TNI wasn’t everything 
[beking TNI bukan segalanya] so now we don’t show off our photos with the generals 
so much anymore.’115 1998 was an epoch in the history of the gift economy of 
Tionghoa-aparat, exposing partnership for perfidy.  Ten years later, Tionghoa have 
increased their support for the police but for no more stability than when they funded 
the military.  The very fact this flawed, traitorous patronage economy continues is an 
indication of the community’s ongoing sense of vulnerability. Tionghoa debt 
produces neither keamanan nor belonging and democratisation.  Moreover, for all 
promises of newly restored citizenship, Indonesia’s political democratisation has not 
made the Tionghoa more aman but in fact, ever more anxious of the rapid changes in 
government and threat of violence that each change brings. Notes a Tionghoa activist, 
‘ultimately, they know that as long as we continue to feel tidak aman, they will make 
money out of us.’116  
 
Fidelity and the Limits of Knowledge  
 
Insp. Gen. Pol (Purn) Bibit Rianto current Deputy Head of the Anti Corruption 
Commission (KPK) was the star attraction of a small, intimate meeting of journalists 
in a plush office in central Jakarta.  Having the power to investigate corruption in all 
institutions at all ranks, KPK is considered by most people to be the unblemished, 
messiah of good governance and, by state officials, the most fearsome body in 
contemporary Indonesian politics.  Before we gathered, my Tionghoa journalist friend 
joked that Rianto is not like a proper police officer, in that he comes off as lugu 
                                                
115 Field notes (16 March 2007). 
116 Field notes (12 March 2007).  
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[guileless and friendly].  Certainly, this is the impression that Rianto gave as he shyly 
came into the room, shaking hands.  It was not Rianto who was nervous however, but 
his awe-struck audience, comprised of around ten pribumi, one or two Tionghoa and 
me.  
 
Rianto took his seat at the head of the table and told a story to break the ice:  As a 
young, bumbling copper, shoes never shined, shirt always crumpled, Rianto was 
always in trouble for slovenliness at the apel [morning roll call compulsory for 
military and public service staff].  One day the Kapolres, inspecting the troops, stops 
before his polished young anak buah, eyes narrowing. ‘That’s a nice shirt Bibit.’  
Rianto grinned back, ‘bajunya dibeli cina’ [This shirt was bought by a Chinese]. The 
audience laughed. Rianto added in the voice of the commander, ‘What are you 
becoming a Marine [Emang kamu jadi Mariner]?’  Rianto paused and the crowd 
laughed again.  Rianto then added the punch-line. ‘S2 saya juga dibeli oleh teman 
saya di Glodok’ [My masters was also paid by a friend in Glodok] and began to 
giggle.  Again the people around the table tittered.117   
 
Rianto meant his tale to describe a rite of passage, of his transformation from an inept, 
unworldly copper to a polished proper officer.  In doing so, he was trying to play 
down his own megastar status on the national political scene and build affinity with 
this audience of sweaty-palmed young journalists. The transformative ingredient in 
Rianto’s narrative is the ‘teman Glodok’ [friend from the predominantly Chinese area 
of Glodok], a euphemism for Tionghoa patron whose funding progressively extends 
his professionalism and advances his career, as they often did for the Marines during 
                                                
117 Field notes (3 May 2008).  
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the New Order.  My interest is not so much in the tale itself, as its very telling and the 
laughter it ignited.  Being illegal and socially distasteful, why did Rianto feel free to 
admit the fact of his Tionghoa patron to a room of strangers? And why did the 
audience respond with humor?  
 
One and a half years later, in October 2010, Insp. Gen. Pol (purn) Bibit Rianto, and 
Chandra M Hamzah, both deputy Chairman of the KPK, were first made suspects and 
then arrested by Polri’s national chief of criminal investigation, Com. Gen. Susno 
Duadji.  The charge was alleged abuse of power while investigating a corruption case 
involving peranakan Tionghoa businessman, Anggoro Widjojo.  As Director of PT 
Masaro Radiokom, Anggoro was alleged to have bribed officials within the Forestry 
Department to win the US$12 million contract for a radio communication system 
procurement project.  Police accused KPK officials Rianto and Hamzah of taking 
bribes to drop the Anggoro case and allowing him to seek refuge in Singapore.  
However, the arrests of the deputy chairmen took place against a backdrop of 
increasing police envy of the anti-corruption commission’s investigative powers.  The 
KPK protested that its deputies were being framed and that they had wiretapped 
recordings Anggoro Widjojo’s brother, Anggodo Widjojo wheeling and dealing with 
officials from the prosecution and the police to have the deputies arrested.  The KPK 
also released transcripts of these conversations to the public, but without the 
recognition of voice, the words sat unconvincingly on the page.   
 
However, public defence of the KPK was swift and generated an energy that seasoned 
observers such as Wimar Witoelar compared with reformasi and the 1998 collapse of 
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the New Order.118  When the head of the police’s criminal investigation unit, Com. 
Gen. Susno Duadji sneered at the KPK’s objections and likened them to a cicak 
[gecko] trying to take on a buaya [crocodile, an often used euphemism for the police], 
he inadvertently furnished the case with mascots which transformed scattered protests 
into a full blown anti-corruption movement.  Gecko and crocodile fought it out on 
posters, cartoons, street murals, t-shirts, hip hop lyrics, banner, email attachments, 
facebook groups and blogs.  Hundreds of groups were formed online with daily 
postings of colossal volumes of news articles, satire and images, while on Jakarta’s 
streets, activists camped in front of the KPK to show their support.  
Photograph 4: In Jakarta, an artist paints a mural of a crocodile’s mouth tied shut by a gecko (Kompas, 16 
September).  
 
                                                
118 Pers. Comm. 04.11.09.  
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Photograph 5: Members of the ‘Student Opposition Movement’ protest in Jakarta on 2 November 2009 
(Jurnal Grafisosial, 3 September, 2009).  
 
The sheer volume and speed of images generated and circulated and recirculated 
around the gecko and crocodile metaphor in many ways made strategic sense.  As 
representations, they did not defame nor directly identify culprits within the state and 
so avoided overt messaging that may have aroused the defamatory ire of the police 
and the attorney general’s office.  However, a stock of images emerged aggressively 
and pointedly targeting Tionghoa brother of the fugitive, Anggodo, who the public 
suspected of playing cukong to the police in order to have the KPK arrested.  
Anggodo was depicted in police uniform brandishing the hallowed four stars of the 
national police chief, often with the captions ‘Kapolri swasta’ [the private sector 
police chief] or ‘the real Kapolri.’119  These generated images of Anggodo illustrated 
                                                
119 I only heard this term used in connection with one other person, Arief Cocong, whose role as a 
Jakarta gambling tycoon is explored in the following section.  
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long-circulated rumours of Tionghoa patronage and dictatorship of the inner workings 
of the national police.  
 
Photograph 6: Activists boo a doctored image of 
Anggodo Wijojo in police uniform at the 
November 8, 2010 protest at the Welcome to 
Jakarta roundabout, central Jakarta.  Activists 
yelled, ‘Who is this?’ ‘Korruptorrrrrr!’ 
screamed back the crowd. The banner was 
thrown into the crowd and stamped on 
(detiknews, 8 November, 2009).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the 7th of November 2009, the day the constitutional court ordered the tapes be 
broadcast live in court, Jakarta stood still.  Even in Gambir station, haunt of Central 
Jakarta’s street food hawkers, taxi drivers, homeless kids, pickpockets and preman, a 
crowd gathered around a street seller’s television set to watch the airing of the tapes.  
The tapes of the wiretapped conversations implicated among others, the deputy 
attorney general and the police chief of criminal investigations in a conspiracy to 
create a false charge of bribery against the two KPK deputies in a bid to have them 
drop the case against Anggoro. The main voice throughout the four hours was that of 
Anggodo Widjojo, brother of the fugitive, who is heard speaking with and talking 
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about members of the police elite to arrange for his brother’s freedom and the arrest 
of the deputies.  This appeared to prove the rumours that the accused Tionghoa 
businessmen had undue influence over the police and had bribed officers for the arrest 
of the KPK deputies.  Rianto and Hamzah were released later that day and Anggodo 
was arrested and charged with attempted bribery and obstruction of justice.  Chief of 
Criminal Investigation Com. Gen. Susno Duadji, whose voice was heard on the tapes 
and who Anggodo referred in code to as Truno 3120, was rotated from his position but 
ultimately not charged.  The KPK took over Anggodo’s case and in May 2010, 
Anggodo went to trial121.  The whole incident only confirmed the cukong master 
narrative.  
 
In the months proceeding his public downfall, Com. Gen. Susno Duadji, the reviled 
criminal detective responsible for the arrest of Rianto and Hamzah, began to reveal 
other skewed cases in the national police’s portfolio in a bid to secure his own 
freedom.  In a great garble of names and finger pointing, the name of a Javanese 
diplomat cum BIN operative cum military supplier emerged called Sjahril Djohan, a 
‘case-broker’ [markus], who works with the police to manage the cases of bureaucrats 
who had gotten in sticky situations regarding procurement contracts, money 
laundering, tax and other financial crimes against the state.  Djohan is a pribumi 
Indonesian who, like the Widjojo brothers, has undue influence over the police.  
 
Djohan’s relationship with the police was clustered around his ‘friendship’ with a 
small group of generals who served between 2001-2004 in Metro Jaya police station.  
                                                
120 The code comes from the street name of Polri Headquarters in Kebayoran Baru, South Jakarrta, 
Jalan Trunojoyo.  
121 Rianto and Hamzah were released but by November 2010, they continued to face charges of bribery 
pressed by Polri.  
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Makbul Padmanegara served as chief, Bambang Danuri as his deputy and Nanang 
Sukarna as chief of criminal investigations (Asiaviews, 3 June 2010). When the case 
broke in 2010, Danuri was already National Police Chief and Sukarna his spokesman, 
and Makbul had served his term as Vice Chief of Police beginning in 2007.  
Beginning in 2006, Djohan served formally at the national police quarters as ‘expert 
staff’ for the Directorate of Anti-Narcotics under then Chief of Criminal 
Investigations Makbul Padmanagara and his successor Bambang Danuri and had the 
authority to issue secret memos and directives (ibid). Crucially, when Djohan’s 
relationship with former Vice Chief of Police came to light, Makbul acknowledged 
the fact of their friendship and noted that Djohan shared a ‘sibling’ relationship with 
other generals, including his original accuser Duadji.  In the weeks that followed, a 
string of public figures lined up to defend Djohan, including former head of the 
Directorate of Narcotics, Brigjen Indradi Thanos, Marzuki Djarusman, former 
Attorney General under the Abdurrahman Wahid administration and hot-shot lawyer, 
Hotman Sitompul stepped up to represent Djohan declaring, ‘he has done a lot to help 
this country, using his various skills’ (ibid). Despite the defence of ‘friendship’ that 
the police and political elite put up in Djohan’s favour, in May 2010, he was charged 
with bribery.    
 
Djohan is not an individual case. This section has examined Tionghoa patronage, but 
Polri also has its pribumi patrons.  Political party power-brokers, senior bureaucrats, 
and parliamentarians hold sway over certain positions and departments within the 
police.  One example is Golkar legislator Setya Novanto.  Novanto holds long-
standing police procurement contracts including the provision of jarkom/ arkom 
[computerised licensing systems and military equipment] to Polri through his 
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companies such as PT Citra Permatasakti Persada. He has also successfully 
manoveured onto successive parliamentary commissions dedicated to the oversight of 
police, law and the national budget since 1998.122  Within the police, Novanto’s 
patronage is legendary,123 and when his name has been associated with the 
misappropriation of state funds as it was in the Bank Bali case in 1999, and various 
rice import scams in February 2005, July 2006 and again in February 2010, 
allegations of wrong-doing have been quickly smothered. The treatment of the 
police’s pribumi, as compared to its Tionghoa brokers, could not be more different.  
 
This comparison of pribumi and Tionghoa patrons tells us much about the racial 
stratification of patronage.  The gift economy of Tionghoa patronage is a secret that is 
simultaneously public knowledge.  We see this in the first instance in Rianto’s telling 
of the story of his own rise to power and the immediate ascription a police general’s 
uniform to the figure of Anggodo. But we have seen too the dysfunction and 
chicanery in Tionghoa gift giving to the police.  Middle and upper class Tionghoa are 
forced into patronage relationships with the security apparatus by deliberate and 
repeated threats to their security, but once engaged the reciprocity of that relationship 
is subject to the preference of the police beneficiaries.  These two key features of the 
relationship – its public familiarity and its negative reciprocity – are in fact 
interlinked. Police can speak so freely of their Tionghoa patrons precisely because 
their fidelity to them is so precarious.  In the eyes of the police, the haphazard, 
                                                
122 Setya Novanto served in the Golkar faction of Parliamentary Commission I from 1999-2001 when 
the commission managed issues such as foreign affairs, defence, policing and intelligence.  From 2001-
2004, he was on Parliamentary Commission II, dealing with law and policing.  In 2004, the functions 
of parliamentary commission II were taken on by parliamentary commission III where Novanto sat 
until 2008.  From 2004-2008 he also headed the commission’s budgetary committee, deciding upon the 
police budget. While in this position, he teamed up with MABES head of logistics and planning 
Brigjen Tjuk Sukiadi to contest the Kapolri’s decision to decentralize procurement authorities within 
Polri. Retired Police General, interview by author (11 April 2007).  
123 Field notes (11 April 2007).  
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arbitrary nature of their reciprocity decreases the moral wrongdoing of allowing 
oneself as a member of the state to be so freely captured by capital.  
 
Thus, speech and the freedom with which it circulates tells us something of fidelity 
and of the quality of patron-client relationships.  In the two years of my fieldwork, not 
one officer spoke freely about the economy of pribumi patronage funneling through 
the institution, while only a little prodding would bring forth conspiratorial stories of 
Tionghoa cukong who attempt to lever influence over the institution by issuing 
payoffs.  Moreover, at the moment of threat, when all of Jakarta was howling for the 
head of Anggodo Widjojo, police put up no defence. At the very same time, the police 
moved rapidly to issue statements of camaraderie with the pribumi patron, Djohan 
when public opinion threatened his reputation.   
 
These two cases of fidelity and speech and fidelity show us something of the moral 
economy of patronage that fuels the police institution. Corruption is in theory a taboo, 
haloed by an unspoken secrecy.  But as Nuijtens and Anders remind us corruption is 
bound up in ‘ambivalent dialectics of concealment and publicity and the hidden 
continuities between the illegal and the legal, and the moral and the immoral’ 
(Anderrs & Nuijten, 2007, p. 27). Within the heart of Polri’s patronage economy, 
there are patrons who may be exposed through the certain, delineated speech acts and 
those who are not. The illicit bribes, tithes and gift-based cukongism that can be 
spoken of in select instances, even poked fun at as Rianto does, is the corruption that 
does not truly bind at the precise moment in which the return gift of keamanan is 
called for.  These are relations that do not truly exert influence at the most crucial 
moment.  The potential denial of reciprocity and the lurch into brute extortion is what 
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makes the Tionghoa gift economy admissible in the partially concealed, shadow 
realm of things that are known and yet unproven. In comparison, the illicit patronage 
economy of the pribumi political and economic elite elicits neither jokes nor gossip.  
Pribumi patronage is not a social fact acknowledged by crowds of protestors or 
ridiculed in images or phrases. The fact of pribumi patronage is hidden and never 
disclosed and in their moment of need, the reciprocity of keamanan that the pribumi 
patron demands is activated and mobilized. The figure of the cukong versus the 
pribumi ‘friend’ shows us the ways that corrupt practices within the institution of the 
police are embedded in the asymmetrical operation of structural power within 
Indonesia. 
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Section Two: The Parmin Economy.  
 
Photograph 7: In 2007, Jakarta’s bars were filled with hundreds of casino workers awaiting the reopening 
of Jakarta’s illicit gambling industry.  
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Figure 10: Map of Main Casino and Machine Gaming Areas post-1998.  
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Chapter III: The Rise and Fall of Casino Gambling 
 
…and what’s the biggest illegal economy in this country? It’s gambling [perjudian]. It’s bigger than 
any other income…and who is the biggest gambler [bandar judi] in the country? It’s that man who has 
an office behind the Kapolda Metro Jaya, that man who runs Artha Graha.  
Who do you think I am I talking about?  
Middle ranking police officer.124 
         
 
Section One has explored how the hierarchy of the criminal world in New Order 
Indonesia mirrored the political elite in its corresponding governing structures and the 
way that the democratic reorganisation of the coercive apparatus has scrambled 
authoritarian allocations of turf and their spoils.  Section One traced the impact of 
democratisation on the Tionghoa gift economy of patronage.  Section Two will 
examine the impact of democratisation on the reorganisation of the coercive apparatus 
from the perspective of Jakarta’s illicit gaming economy until its demise in 2005 
under Kapolri Sutanto’s ‘war on vice.’  This chapter shows that where the 
reorganisation of power in the bright siang [daylight] of formal politics appeared 
muddled or even reversed in the curious, distorted looking glass of Jakarta’s dunia 
malam [nightlife], the processes of democratisation appeared to be marching forward 
to a dementedly teleological beat. 
 
This section maps the critical off-budget economy of illicit gambling and its 
relationship to political transformations within the state. The chapter examines the 
fluctuations in the legal status of casino gambling in central Jakarta and the way that 
                                                
124 Middle ranking police officer, interview by author (12 December 2006).  
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the persistent illegality of everyday gaming [perjudian] created an untraceable 
parallel economy of mammoth proportions, funneling untrammeled sums of capital to 
the personal, corporate and political projects of Indonesia’s elite, including the 
national police.  The system continued until Kapolri Sutanto, championed by 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, shut down the gambling economy in all its 
forms in mid-2005.   Although the economy of gambling as it is described here no 
longer exists in Jakarta, the forms of gambling outlined in the following pages 
continue today albeit ensnared in a dramatically different relationship with the state. 
Where before the relationship between the police and gambling tycoons was 
structural, organised and evenly disbursed, today what forms of gambling persist are 
protected in secret fitful grabs that can change with the rotation of leadership.  For 
this reason, I have chosen to write this section in the past tense. The war on drugs, the 
final segment of this section, is written in present tense because it is ongoing as are its 
practices of torture and extortion.  
 
As we have seen in Chapter I, Polri’s dependence on various sources of off-budget 
revenue is born of deliberate police mismanagement and corruption of the state 
budget leading to severe resource shortages in the police territorial command.  
Moreover, a conspiracy of cultural structures – the shame around requesting funds 
from one’s senior, the prestige and necessity of cultivating a network of Tionghoa 
patronage for one’s internal career progress, and the motor of personal greed - 
emboldens officers to run their units and departments from various off-budget 
economies known euphemistically as parman [partisipasi teman], parmin [partisipasi 
kriminal] and parmas [partisipasi masyarakat]. The first section of this dissertation 
examined the complexity of the parman economy and the way in which cultural and 
historical structures delineated the form, dimensions and boundaries of those 
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economies.  Similarly, this section examines casino gambling and the illicit narcotics 
trade as two crucial pillars of a vast criminal economy that has historically fed police 
coffers. This source of revenue is broadly known as parmin [partisipasi kriminal, or 
criminal participation].  However, as we will see in the following chapters, for Polri 
officers, that which is ‘criminal,’ like ‘territory’ or ‘patron’ (teman) in our previous 
sections, is defined both subjectively and relatively in ways that contradict simple 
dichotomies of legal and illegal within the formal strictures of ‘law.’  
 
An Anthropology of Urban Gaming  
Similarly, for many ordinary Indonesians particular forms of gambling [perjudian] by 
certain persons, at certain times was not necessarily deviant behaviour but merely one 
further example of the ways in which public mores and that strange, unfathomable 
law of the state departed.  Despite a long history of prohibition, gambling has been a 
constant in the lives of the residents of Java.  Indeed, because gambling is a 
performative social space wherein the self experiments and showcases her negotiation 
with uncertainty, such practices are ubiquitous across time, space, class, gender and 
religion (Malaby, 2002). Witness the service of animal combat to royal Javanese 
power in the pre-colonial and early colonial era or the religiosity of attaching little 
slashes of sharpened iron to bandy legs to gut a fellow cock in seconds (Reid, 1998, p. 
193). Writing in 19th century colonial Java, Cruwford declared the ‘Indian Islanders 
passionately fond of play…a market day in every part of the country where open 
gaming is not absolutely prohibited, men and women, old and young, form 
themselves into groups for the purposes of play’(ibid). Accounts of colonial Java are 
peppered with reports of bidding and betting between children on crickets and 
grasshoppers, between men on the toss of kemiri seeds or the flutter of kites, or of the 
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gatherings of kept Indische women and their love of the kertu [cards] or dice (Tilly, 
1973; Raffles, 1930; Rush, 2007; Barrow, 1806; Knight, 1834).  
A substantial subset of the colonial literature of play specifically addresses gaming 
practiced by the torrent of Chinese coolie-sojourners pouring into the Dutch East 
Indies to labour on the revenue farms that made up the backbone of the colonial 
economy.  Monopoly concessions for mining and agricultural revenue farms were 
parceled out to Chinese capitalists who largely drew upon this wellspring of imported 
Chinese (and Indian) labour for production.  Trocki details the way in which 
concessions for gambling and opium were often owned by a kongsi of the same 
merchant class who were issued state monopolies on important commodities such as 
pepper, rubber and tin mining.  Opium and gambling being the only sources of 
medicament and entertainment for cramped and laboured bodies, the Chinese coolie 
would indulge only to find himself rapidly amassing debts to the company, 
demanding in turn lengthier and more lethal terms of service (2000). In theory at 
least, the gambling dens were only open to the Chinese, the government positioning 
itself as the protector of the indigenous against such foul habits.  As such, Cribb 
agrees that ‘[in East Sumatra] gambling became an important means for planters to 
keep their workforce tied by bonds of indebtedness’(Cribb & Kahin, 2004, p. 152). 
Not only were ‘such arrangements central to the labour control system in these parts 
of Southeast Asia,’(Trocki, 2000) but as Rush observes, it was this very system of 
ethnicised, bonded labour that underwrote the cost of empire building and the 
provision of infrastructure in Java ‘to make the authority of the central government 
thorough and comprehensive  ‘ (2007, p. 2).  
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In contemporary Indonesia, gambling is regulated by Article 303 of the Criminal 
Code, which deems the practice’s greatest crime its affront to common decency 
(kesusilaan) and for this transgression, the law suggests a maximum imprisonment of 
10 years for gamers engaged in practices ‘where the possibility of gain is hinged upon 
fortune.’  Article 303 does not differentiate between gamers and their hosts, between 
‘indigenous’ and ‘modern’ forms of gaming nor the scale of their stakes.  Indeed, 
Article 303 is a surprisingly simplistic law for an archipelago with such a rich and 
diverse history of gambling and a tenacity for play that far outlasts the legal doctrines 
and enforcement practices of the various regimes that have incoherently and 
arbitrarily attempted to prohibit, co-opt, or gain from it. 
 
Despite Article 303, gaming continues to be as pervasive in the lives of Indonesians 
as is it meticulous in its ability to divide and stratify according to ethnicity, sex, 
material power, religion, skin colour and citizenship.  Jakarta is the obliging host to an 
untold number of forms and types of perjudian.  By far the most popular is togel [an 
acronym for toto gelap or illegal lotto] which relies on the correct selection and 
sequencing of numbers and pictures, lending the practise the same terrifically easy, 
vanilla thrill of most other cheap, coupon-based number games such as keeno or lotto 
(Siegel, 1986, fn 322).125  Until the crackdown on ‘vice’ in 2005, togel was a multi-
million dollar industry run by peranakan coordinators and their fleets of indigenous, 
                                                
125 Although Siegel’s ethnography of Solo in the New Order shows us that the fastidious, interior ways 
people select their lotto numbers, as individual, associative speech acts, it is anything but simplistic. 
Javanese establish complex, personal systems with ‘wild associations’ designed to convert numbers 
found into selected lotto entries.  Siegel notes that during his ethnography of gambling, the government 
had banned all forms of gambling except the national lottery, run through national agents.  However, 
the idiosyncratic bets and bids he writes about are all conducted through an illegal network of lotto 
agents. It speaks to the classic anthropological problems of ‘the ethnographic present’ that 
frustratingly, I am unable to locate at precisely what phase in the legality of gambling Siegel writes. 
Siegel, J. 1986. Pg 149-58, 322n2. One is reminded of Spencer’s call to political anthropologists to 
observe more attentively ‘political time’ as located in ‘political space’ (2007, p. 125).  
! "## 
mixed-sex kampung-based vendors throughout the city.  Unlike casino gaming, togel 
was everyman’s game and not prescribed into kongsi.  For Jakarta’s illiterate, 
undereducated and female underclass, togel was a net employer of tens of 
thousands,126 a viable means of social mobility and an integral part of the collective 
play and fantasising of Jakarta’s urban poor.127  Like casino gambling, much of the 
profits of this illicit market have wound their way into the budgets and pockets of 
local level stations in Polri’s territorial command, although the starred officer class 
would not deign to accept funds from such a blue-collar revenue stream.128   
 
As in Geertz’s Bali circa 1958, in post-authoritarian Jakarta, regular affectionate 
throngs of men continue to cluster in their secret, purposeful male spaces to dual their 
cocks in weekly events known as sabung ayam (Geertz, 1978). There have been some 
small adjustments to the practice since Geertz’s ethnography.  Today the cock is too 
much of a financial investment to subject it to the monstrous little blades of a rival.129  
Moreover, rather than bust up the events, one finds that in fact it is a nostalgic coterie 
of kejawen-orientated [Javanese mystical belief] officers and preman who run them.  
Other tabloid forms of gambling in the city include card games such as poker, remy, 
macok, cap sha, ceki, kartu leng, kartu jeblok or qui-qui, and games of the dice, such 
as tasyaw [a kind of roulette in which players pick rolled numbers coloured red or 
                                                
126 In fact, so significant is togel to the economy of the poor that even the ultra-conservative Majelis 
Ulama Indonesia has struggled to take its usual reactionary stance to the practice. For instance, in 2004, 
Secretary of MUI Central Java, Achmad Rofiq stated that ‘the problem of judi is complicated, kan [you 
know].  It’s true that [memang] all religions don’t permit it, but this matter has to be seen in light of the 
reality that the government cannot provide a labour market. The solution to togel is not just matter of 
issuing a ban.’ (DetikNews, 5 August, 2004) 
127 Togel also generates a host of service economies, such as a large market in prediction prophets, also 
known as dukun togel, many of whom operate through the internet.  
128 Kapolres and kapolda were most certainly on the take from the founders of togel networks, but they 
would not stoop to directly receiving monies from individual, working class vendors.  
129 In Jakarta, cock-rearers spend Rp 3-4 million [$US 335-445] on a variety from Bangkok.  
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blue] or dadu kobrok [a picture and dice game in which they are covered by a plate or 
coconut.]130  In the wake of the 2005 crackdown, these games are increasingly 
establishing online presences and large Jakartan followings propelled by the 
proliferation of internet and mobile phone technology in the capital.  
 
 
Photograph 8: Man and his cock.131 
As one scales the city’s socio-economic ladder, so too do the differences in forms of 
perjudian become more than merely ornithological.  Before mid-2005, the upper end 
of Jakarta’s gambling scene was broadly known as casino [kasino] gambling.  For the 
intimate Tionghoa community of central and west Jakarta that service and frequent it, 
                                                
130 Variations on these games are also played across the country, however their names can differ 
substantially.  
131 Photograph by author. 17.08.07.  
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this level of gambling is parsed in two: as casino [kasino] and machine [mesin 
ketangkasan] gambling.132  As the name suggests, machine gambling relies on the use 
of mechanised devices to facilitate games of chance.  What in the Western world 
might affectionately know as ‘pokies’ or slot machines, are in Jakarta divided 
meticulously into bola setan [Satan’s ball wherein players pick winning numbers 
between 1-18], bola ketangkasan [a ball game of skill], mickey mouse [or MM, a 
computerised, seven-card game played individually on a monitor for around Rp 
20,000, US$2.3 a shot,] Happy Royal, keno, and another similar number-selection 
game otherwise known as UFO.  Although mesin ketangkasan was available in 1970s 
Jakarta, these forms of mechanised gambling gained a strong following in the mid to 
late 1980s using machines and software imported, legitimately and illegitimately, 
from Taiwan and more recently, Southern China.  Nonetheless, mechanised economic 
play of this kind is notoriously capricious.  In Jakarta, such is the appetite for gaming 
that new, amusing rearrangements of gambling lagi ngetrend [currently in vogue] can 
be eclipsed within the year by some other transnational permutation offered at another 
venue.  
Casino gambling sat at the very apex of the gaming hierarchy and fiscal clout.  
Casinos were high-capital, exclusive endeavours that offered its patrons the full 
gamut of vice from ketangkasan machines to tables awash with baccarat, roulette, 
blackjack and poker.  Unlike togel, which one finds peddled in the kampung, or the 
cockfight, which shelters in the shadows of the coercive apparatus,133 casino and 
machine gambling dens were set up in the basement of clubs and bars, occupying 
whole floors in malls, apartment complexes and abandoned state-owned buildings.  
                                                
132 This has important methodological implications as figures giving of numbers of illicit ‘casino’ in the 
capital may or may not include machine [ketangkasan] gaming halls.  
133 The two regular cockfights that I attended in Jakarta in 2006-07 were always in some kind of 
physical proximity to potent sites and persons of the coercive apparatus.  
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Any casino worth its salt brandished luxury VIP rooms ornamented with indigenous 
and illicitly-trafficked South Chinese girls.  The tables here boasted starting bets 
running well into the hundreds of millions of rupiah and an invitation into these secret 
rooms was highly coveted, with entry alone often commanding a fee.  But once 
inside, the casino was a liminal, transformative space where time, legality and history 
held still. The casinos were open 18 or sometimes 24 hours a day and with no 
windows, dawn lost its usual powers of regulation.  The executive casinos also prided 
themselves on being 24 or 18 hour ‘one-stop-shops’ in which illicit narcotics, almost 
always amphetamines, and women were on offer.  Although casino managers did not 
usually concern themselves with the complications of direct trafficking, it was their 
job to make both girls and pills readily available.  Their plentiful supply would keep 
players tethered to the place, even if that night the tables were ill-starred [meja 
mati].134  Indeed, so abundant was the provision of both that wandering, gawking 
police and military officers were often tipped in ‘especially pretty women’135 just as 
the casino workers were rewarded in ecstasy tablets, collecting dozens of them a 
night.  Shrugged one floor manager, ‘we were always ‘on’ [on].  We ate them like 
fried peanuts [kacang goreng].’136  
For players, wins were secured in two primary ways.  Most of those who bet came in 
clutching a specific jimat [amulet], usually ‘something difficult to obtain.’137  The 
most prized lucky talisman was a malformed skink or small lizard with two rears and 
two tails [kadal yang berbuntut dua], which would often be smuggled into the casinos 
in handbags or carefully in pockets.  Indeed such was the demand for the double-
                                                
134 Anton Medan, interview by author (23 June 2010). Also Casino worker, interview by author (7 
October 2009). Field notes(27 February 2007).  
135 Anton Medan, interview by author (23 June 2010).  
136 Casino Worker, interview by author (14 October 2009).  
137 Ibid.  
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assed gecko that the illicit casino gaming industry propelled an obscure parallel 
market in which these mutant trophies would sell for millions of rupiah.  Players 
would also seek out meja hoki [winning or lucky tables, hoki is a Tionghoa term] that 
brandished a dealer or banker they believed to harbour good fortune. The lucky 
banker would be talimanised: players would arrive in time for her shift and trail her 
over the course of a career as she circulated through Jakarta’s network of casinos.  For 
a small time dealer in an exclusive casino, to be fetishised in this way was a kind of 
hoki in is own right, generating substantial tips to boost the Rp 6-8 million [US$670-
890] they earned per month (2004 figure, including standard tips).138  In this way, the 
fortunes of casino workers and the players they serviced balanced precariously on the 
outcome of the die leading both to fetishise the logic of the meja hoki and the meja 
mati [dead table].  
Unlike togel or cards which were scattered in the plebian spaces throughout the city, 
casino gambling thumped at its very heart from the neighbourhoods of Glodok, 
Mangga Dua, Sunter and Kelapa Gading, bridging the municipalities of Central and 
inner West and North Jakarta (See Figure 10).  Most casinos fell within the 
administrative sub-district of Taman Sari (See Figure 5).  Though centre-pieced in 
this way, Jakarta’s illegal casino gambling industry was not able to propagate itself 
with egalitarian zeal.  Instead, the casinos and gaming halls tended to huddle closely 
to large resident populations of ethnic Chinese who made up the city’s spatial core 
and who would surround it, protect it and supplement it with an intimate kin of 
labour.  It was not that pribumi were not allowed to work the casino floor, but unlike 
the other forms of gaming in the city, their labour was limited to one of the casino’s 
thousands of cleaners, security officers, food runners or sex workers.  At most, a 
                                                
138 Ibid.  
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pribumi would be allowed to work four or five machines.  Peranakan Chinese often 
started at this low level, hoisted into the business by friends or family, but they could 
rise much quicker than pribumi and if proven trustworthy could find themselves on a 
ladder of escalating, militarised ranks leading to positions of increasing proximity to 
the chips.  An entrepreneurial Tionghoa casino worker might first prowl a number of 
slot machines, graduating to managing more and more machine staff as kepala regu 
[head of the regiment], then onto the position of dealer on the tables.  One of the 
highest positions a casino employee could aim for was that of jangket - the cashiers 
that changed money into chips.  But opportunities for this were rare, dominated as 
they were by peranakan women or totok Tionghoa of direct kin to the management.139   
In this way, discipline and control, the two central concerns of one’s labour force in 
the gaming industry, were mapped onto kinship networks and whiteness of skin.  
Where this failed as a strategy for disciplining nimble fingers, brute violence was 
called in and most casino workers can recall the battering of a colleague until 
unconscious.  So high were the stakes for advancement that life on the casino floor 
was competitive and envious [ngiri].  One small rumour could quickly seed a 
worker’s dismissal.  Given that Jakarta’s gambling proprietors were an intimate 
coterie, elbow deep in the hotel, nightclub, restaurant, sauna and bar industry, 
discharge for stealing or cheating was in effect a blacklist [blacklist] from the 
entertainment sector for life.  
                                                
139 As a broad observation, in Java women are widely regarded as superior managers of money than 
men and as it was explained to me, this is why trusted peranankan women are so readily taken on as 
casino cashiers. Hildred Geertz was one of the first to trumpet the ‘astonishing degree of female 
dominance’ in income management and a 1988 survey of Jakarta women found that more than 70% of 
women (employed and unemployed) managed the household finances.  Anthropological scholarship on 
gender and financial clout in Java has sought to refine this statement in line with structural inequalities 
or cultural ideas about desire and control (Brenner, 1998, p. 168-9). I could find no substantive 
ethnographic work on income management and Tionghoa families although of the few Jakarta 
peranakan Tionghoa families I knew, it was typical that money management was in the hands of the 
wife (Wolf, 2000, p.85-104. Also, Papanek, 1988, p. 79; Carsten, 1989).   
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Aficionados of casino gambling were also primarily ethnic Chinese, both Indonesian 
and international.  Some exceptions notwithstanding, casinos tended to operate a 
racialised door policy in which the only pribumi allowed to cross their threshold were 
reliable, aman Christian minorities such as the Batak or Manadonese who wouldn’t 
blab, call in the Islamic militias, or lever their political connections to forfeit payment. 
However, maintaining the racial purity of the casino was also justified by 
management and employees in that pribumi were resistant to the frenzy of gambling 
in ways that Tionghoa were not, pawning their mobile phones, motorbikes, cars and 
even homes for a meja hoki.140   
A final difference between casino gambling and its more proletarian forms lay in the 
structure of its management.  With such staggering amounts of capital generated, 
Indonesia’s history of casino industry ownership has been one of centralised, 
national-level control by a small number of heavily capitalised, politically-connected 
Tionghoa investors organised into kongsi of mutual gain.  Below this monopoly, sat a 
lower rank of trusted, provincial-level Tionghoa preman and fixers who managed the 
dirty, everyday work of running the casinos and who often steadily graduated to 
investors in their own right. This was in stark contrast to the cockfight or mass lotto, 
which tended to reflect district or sub-district level political patterns of small time 
kingpins jostling for territorial control.  In the case of the cockfight, hosts were 
uniformly pribumi and male while togel was run by peranakan men and women with 
pribumi vendors.  This was because, unlike the chip or the cock, the exchange of the 
lotto coupon for money was a face-to-face relationship that required mutual trust.  
Membership of a common territory was crucial to its mass appeal.  
 
                                                
140 Interview.  Casino Worker. 14.10.09.  
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Photograph 9: Bajai drivers steal off in the evenings before dinner to bet cigarettes on paper dominos. 
 
With such diversity of gaming, the slot machine, the dice, the playing card, the cock 
and the coupon are not neutral material artefacts of a singularly foul vice for either 
Indonesians or the police.  Rather, they are intimately associated with various societal 
groups of varying economic and moral heft.  Thus while economic play is ubiquitous, 
understanding gambling in Indonesia is complicated by its kaleidoscopic optic in 
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which the morality of gaming is dependent on the precise angle of the observer.  
Tionghoa of north Jakarta who frequented the casinos and the mesin ketangkasan 
sneer at the cockfights and card games of the city’s pribumi underclass as the 
compulsive acts of undisciplined addicts, who are ‘kurang terdidik secara mental’ 
[mentally unschooled] (Social Department, 2003, p. 92). Lower to middle class urban 
kampung will gladly play host to togel and the peranakan that run it, but find morally 
reprehensible the casinos they associate with wealthy totok whose wealth is ill-gained 
and whose play is protected by elite political patronage.  Housewives and mothers are 
overwhelmingly in favour of continuing the ban on perjudian for fear that the 
monthly household kitty will be lost on some ratty cock and yet vendors of togel 
coupons are also mothers who rely on the illicit revenue to keep their children 
schooled.  Gambling is a form of economic play that unites the inhabitants of the 
capital, but the very diversity of its form allows debates about perjudian to follow the 
socio-economic lines of discrimination and distrust that segregates the lives of its 
residents.  
 
Despite this immense flora of play, this chapter focuses narrowly on the economics of 
casino and machine gambling.  As we will see, this slice of the illegal gaming 
industry was monopolised by an important criminal and political elite that maintained 
intimate relations with and unprecedented influence over the state coercive apparatus.  
As such, this economy is an important lens by which to observe the dynamics and 
politics of the civilianisation of security and the rise of Polri.  The first part of this 
chapter writes a genealogy of casino gambling in New Order Jakarta, focusing 
specifically on Kopkamtib’s reissuing of a prohibition on gaming after fourteen years 
of its legalisation and taxation. This chapter shows the ways that states willfully 
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create the conditions under which criminal economies flourish by charting the 
important role that the legalisation and prohibition of gambling had in creating a 
capital base for elites of the New Order during the 1980s.  I argue that the 1981 re-
administration of the ban on gambling was a way for President Suharto to distribute 
resources and exert control over a growing and increasingly alienated client base 
within the coercive apparatus.  By allowing the casino industry to proliferate, 
President Suharto drew the men of the coercive apparatus into an interior, illegal 
economy upon which they were dependent and fatally tainted.  The second section 
examines the impact of democratisation on this illegal economy and illustrates the 
way that the reorganisation of the coercive apparatus simultaneously rearranged the 
structure of the casino economy by fracturing the structures of patronage and freeing 
up this illicit market to a variety of players where police beking was crucial.  It argues 
that casino gambling constituted a significant dimension of exchange in the 
relationship between Jakarta’s ethnic Chinese community and the state coercive 
apparatus and indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the industry formed a shadow 
economy for the political elite of the entire New Order state.  Thus, as 
democratisation swung the national police into ascendancy on the see-saw of 
territorial authority, the revenue of illicit casino gambling increasingly became a 
stalwart of the off-budget economy of the national police and of its individual elite 
officer class until the industry’s termination proper in mid-2005.  The reader should 
bear in mind that the structure of gambling that I describe here, both in the Suharto 
and the post-authoritarian eras, has been expunged from Indonesia’s economic and 
social landscape.  Why and how that occurred, and what that means for contemporary 
patterns of off-budget police financing, is the subject of Chapter IV.  
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Judi  and the ‘Metropolitan City’   
 
Early New Order fantasies of building a modern Indonesia rested on the premise of 
exploiting the nation’s natural resources.  Much academic attention has focused on the 
expansion of the oil, gold and timber industries and the New Order’s capitalisation on 
outer island resources to feed the growth of the centralised bureaucratic state. 
Certainly, by the early 1980s the central government was the principle beneficiary of 
natural resource exploitation with 40% of the GDP levied from corporate income tax 
on oil (Sivaramakrishnan & Green, 1986, p. 111). However, provincial government 
revenue-making has been the subject of considerably less attention. Because of their 
limited taxation powers, provincial governments made up their budgets by either 
procuring part of the exploited resource or levering their share from the central 
government. But for resource deficient provinces such as Jakarta and Yogyakarta, this 
was not a viable option. With Jakarta’s 1961 baptism to ‘Daerah Khusus’ [special 
region] status, the DKI administration earned a hazy, negotiable bundle of taxation 
powers that, in theory at least, gave the DKI Jakarta administration increased 
economic autonomy compared to the provinces of the outer islands (Sethuraman, 
1976, p. 45).  
 
In the 1960s, Jakarta’s economy was dominated by the tertiary sector with trade and 
services contributing more than half of DKI Jakarta’s annual revenue and banking, 
finance and tourism making up the rest.  These sources of income could not keep up 
with the rate of population growth (which hovered at 4.6% in Jakarta) and 
urbanisation, which was 3.7% per year. The rapid rate of urbanisation was putting a 
severe strain on the city’s ability to provide urban services. A 1969 survey of 
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kampung conditions in Jakarta found that 65% had no private toilet facilities, 80% 
had no electricity and 90% had no piped water. Literally half the city’s residences 
were temporary shelters with earthen floors and thatched roofs where residents paid 
private vendors over five times the going rate for water (Sivaramakrishnan & Green, 
1986, p. 196). In the eyes of Indonesia’s political elite, if Indonesia was ever going to 
be ‘modern,’ this seething squalor clogging up the capital had to be tackled and that 
required money and a hearty dose of military discipline.  
 
The twins of discipline and extraction came in the form of President Soekarno’s 1966 
appointment of Let. Gen. Ali Sadikin to DKI Governor. This was one of the 
President’s final outgoing decisions in what had become a lame duck presidency 
under the Old Order.  As outlined in Chapter II, this practice was known as kekaryaan 
- where cushy civilian posts as governors, mayors and sub-district heads circulated 
amongst the military top brass.  While the practice was common under Soekarno, it 
was during the mid 1970s that kekaryaan reached its zenith.  Although kekaryaan was 
to decline again by in the mid 1980s, Malley states that during the first decade of the 
New Order, the number of army generals holding provincial governorships alone 
increased from 40% to 78% as Suharto abandoned his support base among the 
civilian, provincial elites in favour of a central, militarised state machine (Malley, 
2003, p. 107). Sadikin’s own installation as DKI governor fit neatly within this first 
wave of kekaryaan appointments as President Suharto sought to divide the spoils of 
civilian leadership among potential rivals from within the military.  The general’s first 
act as governor was to rearrange the city’s civilian administration along military lines, 
merging the bureaucracy of the ‘resident’ [the pamong praja] with that of the 
governor to form a neat, hierarchical line directly under himself (Pratiwo & Nas, 
2005). And although Sadikin liked to say that he had given little thought to urban 
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concerns prior to his position as governor, in truth ‘Bang Ali’ [elder brother Ali] had 
sketched the makings of his master plan for the city well before his appointment 
(Ibid).141  In the blueprint he presented to the Jakarta Regional Council entitled, ‘the 
Master Plan of Jakarta 1965-85,’ Sadikin conjured visions of the capital as the 
‘Metropolitan City’ (always in English, always capitalized) (Abeyasekere, 1989, p. 
217) on par with those he had seen in the United States and Holland (Sadikin, 2007). 
The Metropolitan City was one in which city life was developed in accordance with 
teknologi.  Jakarta was to be,  
 
capable of placing itself as the Country’s Capital and as an International City up to proper and 
universal standards, and [being] the vessel of national as well as international aspirations. 
(Silver, 2008, p. 111) 
 
 
The Master Plan detailed new canals, purification plants and electricity networks.  It 
proposed to double the activity of Tanjung Priok port, reclaiming land and extending 
quays. Sadikin dreamed of new airport facilities and an underground metro system, 
new health centres, museums and cultural hubs (Sethuraman, 1976). He planned new 
residential houses in Jakarta’s south and west that could fit neat nuclear families, 
subjecting the problem of ‘urban excess’ to the cleansing, modern logic of ‘urban 
rationality’ (Kusno, 2000, p. 108).   
 
More than all of this, in fact more than anything, ‘Bang Ali’ hankered for roads. The 
Master Plan detailed great highways and intricate, looping networks of fresh, black 
bitumen that would slice through the city, trafficking his modern labour force across 
                                                
141 There is some contention about Sadikin’s role in the drafting of the Master Plan. Although most 
authors writing of this period credit it directly to Sadikin himself, Silver argues that the governor had 
little input into the Master Plan (2008, p. 111) 
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its ever-expanding dimensions.  The road was also a territorialising device, furrowing 
into the bloated tracts of unmapped, unplanned kampung that pushed the city’s 
boundaries further and further beyond their administrative perimeters.  Roads meant 
mobility and with the freedom to move, the crusty, primordial affiliations of ethnicity 
and place born of the city’s residential arrangements would be stripped back, leaving 
only the pebble-smooth core of the national subject.  Only with roads could this 
dream of Jakarta as the great circulatory and monetary hub of the nation be 
realized.142   
 
Indeed from Sadikin’s appointment onwards, DKI Jakarta lavished no less than half 
of its development budget (a whopping one quarter of the total provincial budget) on 
laying the very road surfaces that today are divvyed up into turf by Jakarta’s gangland 
community.143  Within the first three years of Sadikin’s appointment, Jakarta’s streets 
increased by over 300km, or 20% of their total surface area (Sethuraman, 1976, p. 
1976). Before he was deposed by President Suharto in 1977, Sadikin would oversee 
the construction of 1,312 kilometers of road, 45 bridges, 7 bus terminals, 390 bus 
shelters, 15 overhead bridges and the purchase of over 1000 buses (Biography of Ali 
Sadikin, 1971). Sadikin’s close relationship with then upcoming property and 
construction entrepreneur, Ciputra (Tjing Haw Tjie) meant that many of his 
                                                
142 The importance of roads, traffic, transportation and circulation to the New Order has been remarked 
upon by a series of scholars of Indonesia, from Pemberton to Siegel, Shirashi to Sidel. Scholars of 
criminality such as Barker and Ryter also write of the importance of mobility, and the power to 
traverse, to mystical, criminal power. Roads and transportation were also the bread and butter capital 
base upon which Suharto’s children built their considerable business empires. The key idea in all of 
these works here is significance of territorial flows and the claim of extraction to the maintenance of 
Javanese power.  For a summary of some of this literature, see Sidel’s 1998 discussion of traffic, 
political, fiscal and straight up mechanical, in the New Order.  
143 See Section 1.  
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companies won the tenders for this reconstruction of Jakarta as the Metropolitan City 
(Ramadhan, 1986; p, 295; Silver, 2008; Suryadinata, 1995, p. 204).144 
 
To pay for this grand transformation of the cityscape at Ciputra’s prices, the Sadikin 
administration took World Bank advice by capitalising on the city’s cheap, surplus 
labour and attempting to expand on its nascent manufacturing base (Abeyesekere, 
1989, p. 217). On the advice of the foreign consultants, taxation also came under 
particular scrutiny as an underutilised revenue stream. But, although Sadikin would 
later protest that he was simply protecting ‘the little people,’ the truth was that 
taxation required an extractive capacity that the provincial government simply could 
not muster (Emmerson, 1972, p. 26). To tax public use of goods and services, the 
administration needed to sharpen its surveillance eye, to map and identify its citizens, 
their consumption and behavioural patterns and organise that into rational, accessible 
forms of ilmu that could extract and profit.  DKI Jakarta might now operate along 
military lines, but it was still far from operating like a disciplined governmental 
machine. The city then, as today, could barely control the waves of migrants that 
descended upon it, let alone map and tax their habits of consumption. What Sadikin 
needed was to open up new, bounded fields of taxable income and for that, he 
followed the example of his contemporaries in Thailand, Malaysia and Brazil by 
legalising the practice of gambling.145  
 
                                                
144 Ciputra has a giant property empire. Soemitro writes that Ciputra owned 30% of the shares in PT 
Pembangunan Jaya, owned by DKI Jakarta, which gave him a veritable monopoly on Jakarta 
development projects. Ciputra also had a host of military generals providing him with beking such as 
Maj.Gen. Soedjono Hoemardani along with Sadikin who later served as the president commissioner of 
PT Pembangunan Jaya.  
145 Less known is that Sadikin also initiated the economy of the hajj, which today stands as another 
great, murky revenue spinner for the state.   
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Just as the colonial state before it, the new republic turned to the management of vice. 
What with its lights, glitter and high-rollers, casino gambling fit perfectly with his 
utopian image of a capitalist modernity forged of glass, concrete and steel that was 
Sadikin’s signature vision for the capital.  Legalising the trade would not only fit the 
hyperbolic aesthetic of post-Soekarno authoritarian modernity, but taxing it heavily 
would mean that the gloss worthy of an International City could further be polished 
with the profit.  Moreover, as Sadikin details in his memoir, it was not as if he was 
inventing an industry, but rather making an existing one manifest before the extractive 
capacity of the state (Sadikin, 1995, p. 49). Since the birth of the republic, Jakarta’s 
industry of casino gambling had been grounded in illicit beking relationships between 
Tionghoa businessmen and rogue military figures (Ibid). These ‘bad apples’ were 
known by the state as oknum whose illegal actions were individual and discrete rather 
than institutionalised and systematic.  
 
Judi proliferated in the primarily Tionghoa quarters in central and west Jakarta, an 
irregularity that flew in the face of Sadikin’s pledges to restore rule of law and 
discipline to the capital (Kusno, 2000, p. 108). For fellow retiring ABRI officers such 
as Nasution, Sudirman, Kawilarang and National Police Chief Hoegeng, ‘officers of a 
Calvinist bent who regretted the passing of the old values’ (who would later join 
Sadikin in Fosko and the Petition of 50) this kind of military corruption tugged at the 
image of the modernist, legal Indonesia that they had strived to establish (Jenkins, 
1984, p. 247). Scholars such as Kusno criticise Sadikin for his demand to discipline 
‘urban excess,’ transforming those poverty-stricken, kampung-dwelling Indonesians 
into modern, national subjects below the state.  But the governmentality angle of 
postmodern scholarship neglects the fact that the state itself was far from a rational 
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machine.  Sadikin’s legalisation of gambling applied the logic of rationalising and 
disciplining ‘excess’ to the Indonesian state itself.  By sanctioning the dice, Sadikin, 
now a civilian free of the patrimony of the Suharto’s military, effectively snatched 
from the military elite a lucrative industry that had long lay beyond the formal 
extractive capacities of the state.  In so doing, he brought a solid dose of so-called 
‘urban rationality’ to the state itself.  
 
In mid 1967, Sadikin exercised his authority as Governor to exact a tax on gambling 
licenses as per UU No. 11, 1957, which legislated that kepala daerah (regional heads) 
had the power to grant gaming licenses strictly to Tionghoa dealers, based on the 
argument that it was integral to ‘Chinese’ culture.  Although it seems unlikely given 
the centralised nature of the New Order, in his 1992 autobiography Sadikin is 
adamant that he did not request the permission of President Suharto or the DPRD, not 
wanting to ‘burden’ [memberatkan] either of them (Ramadhan, 1992, p. 64-5). 
 
Sadikin’s model of legalised gambling openly recreated the Dutch colonial system of 
tax farming by putting the casinos out to tender and paying a percentage of profits to 
the DKI government (Forum, 1995). The licenses were to be bestowed on the premise 
that only ethnic Chinese could take part in the practice of gaming.  Sadikin writes that 
of the seven proposals he received, the decision was made to grant the gambling 
concessions to two entrepreneurial Tionghoa businessmen, ‘Apyang’ and ‘Yo 
Putshong.’ Sadikin insists he knew neither previously (Ramadhan, 1992, p. 66).  
 
Sadikin’s choice of these two entrepreneurs was curious to say the least. The 
gambling concessions were shaping up to be some of the most lucrative contracts in 
the country and yet despite the vast pool of Sadikin’s pet moguls and Tionghoa 
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regime cronies living in the capital, the contracts went to two financial nobodies. 
Apyang was a young, cash-strapped Tionghoa entrepreneur, known as Atang Latief, 
or Lauw Tjin Ho, who lodged [numpang] with his wife in a run-down [lumuh] rental 
on Gang Baru, neighboured by scavengers and other second-hand vendors (Gatra, 
2006). Who ‘Yo Putshong’ might be, is not known. In the literature on gambling this 
name only ever appears once: in Sadikin’s own autobiography. What is clear from 
historical record is that the casino tenders were also won by a Betawi Tionghoa called 
Apyang Jinggo, otherwise known as Dadi Darmadi, father of Yan Darmadi (Foek 
Yoo Yan), who would also go on to become one of the great Tionghoa cronies of the 
Suharto regime. At the time, Yan Darmadi was also another financial persona non 
grata who dabbled in illicit gaming in the Mangga Besar area with a consortium of 
investors known as ‘Kelompok Kota.’   
 
Yet together, Latief and Yan Darmadi would establish some of the greatest nightspots 
in Jakarta’s history.  Jakarta’s dunia malam glistened with the lights of exotic new 
names that beckoned like the new, polished steel that shone in the siang.  There was 
Ancol’s Hai Lai and Copacabana at the Horizon Hotel, Djakarta Theatre (NIAC) on 
Jalan Thamrin, Petak IX (PIX) in Glodok and Lotto Fair at Proyek Senen.  Sadikin 
also granted licenses to other forms of gaming. The DKI administration ran a lottery, 
opened up machine gambling [ketangkasan] at the Jakarta Fair and granted licenses 
for horse racing at Pulo Mas and dog racing at Senayan (Sadikin, 1997, p. 130). 
Today most of these entertainment venues continue to shadow the skyline with the 
other concrete realisations of Sadikin’s ‘Metropolitian City’ – Taman Marzuki Ismail, 
Blok M, the Hilton, Chandra Kartika and the Istiqlal Mosque.  The house of cards was 
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as integral a part of Jakarta’s modern future as the houses of culture, theatre, retail 
consumption and God. 
 
How exactly the licenses for gaming venues were parceled out between the pair is 
unclear.  Newspaper reports confuse ownership of each of the casinos, attributing 
them separately to either Latief or Darmadi.  Through a number of published 
interviews, I can establish that Darmadi certainly had his hands in Copacabana and 
Petak IX, while Latief started out his career as casino tycoon at Djakarta Theatre 
(NIAC).  However, as years passed, the responsibility for NIAC seemed to fall into 
the hands of Damardi.  Some argue that so gossamer thin was Latief’s capital base 
that he was just a front man for Darmadi’s gaming empire.  
 
However, such individualised notions of capital and its workings fail to account for 
the specific forms of kinship and exchange that has long characterised Indonesia’s 
uneasy, risk-adverse, Tionghoa business community.  What appears most plausible is 
that Darmadi and Latief both started out as the front men for one or two anonymous 
kongsi of Tionghoa investors and as their respective capital grew, they themselves 
became primary investors in the industry. If the kongsi was ever plural, by the 1981 
end of the legalised gambling era, it had merged into one. Rather than compete, the 
investors appeared to take on significant stakes in each other’s venues.  When Jan 
Darmadi returned from a NY business school in 1971 to take over the reins of his 
father’s gambling empire, he complained that he had become the public face of 
legalised gambling, rather than the multitude of investors who he represented.  
Although the DKI government gave the license for NIAC to Latief, on the books 
Darmadi owned 80% of the shares in NIAC and PIX.  He in turn argued that his share 
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was in reality only 49-51% while other investors under his name took up the 
remaining portion (Tempo, 1981). He also argued that his own share in Ancol’s 
Copacabana was only 25%.   
 
However the ownership was divvyed up, from this capital base in Jakarta the duo 
exported their variety of casino development to other urban centres throughout the 
country.  Surabaya, with its large ethnic Chinese and business community, was an 
important centre for gaming and Darmadi alone supplemented up to a quarter of the 
city’s annual budget from his casino revenues (Mahrus, 1995). 
 
In DKI Jakarta, Sadikin’s reforms to the extractive tax apparatus and attempts to 
remake the city as a manufacturing Mecca for international investors were 
restructuring the economy.  But meeting the city’s enormous appetite for construction 
and public infrastructure meant that gambling became, as in Surabaya, a crucial 
mainstay of the economy. There were canals to build, sanitation and drainage to 
secure, highways to lay, public transport systems to run, a billowing army of khaki-
clad technocrats to pay and campaigns to be implemented to ‘Jakartanise Jakartans’ 
and the surge of domestic immigrants arriving with the stars of a Metropolitan City in 
their eyes (Abeysekere, 1989, p. 220). Property tax, that trusty plinth of other Asian 
metropole economies, made up a mere 4% of DKI’s annual revenues 
(Sivaramakrishnan & Green, 1986, p. 200). The city hobbled along on the income 
earned from taxes on motor vehicle transfers and registrations and development and 
tourism taxes.  The gambling revenue, coupled with regular infusions from the central 
government, meant that the city’s low tax rates, poor enforcement and inadequate 
cadastral surveys, could be overcome.  In 1968, one year after its legalisation, 29% of 
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the provincial budget came from gambling revenues (Cribb & Kahin, 2004, p. 380). 
Profit from the city lottery, around Rp 60 million [US$6700] in 1967, was miniscule 
compared to the enormous clout of Glodok (Emmerson, 1972, p. 26). By 1970, the 
casinos were bringing in Rp 2 billion, [nearly US$ 5 million], to provincial 
government coffers, inciting other provincial governments in East and West Java and 
North Sumatra to open up their dunia malam to the great money-spinner of judi 
(Sadikin, 1995, p. 50).  
 
With such massive fiscal flows pouring into DKI Jakarta coffers, it was only a matter 
of time before the central government muscled in on the act.  In 1974, with the issuing 
of Law No. 7, the authority of the governor to extract taxable revenue from all forms 
of gambling was retracted. As the following table shows, from 1974-81, DKI profits 
from the casinos increasingly became the property of the central government 
(Sivaramakrishman & Green, 1986, 200).  
 
Table 6: Revenue Sources DKI Jakarta, 1974-1981 (in millions of rupiah, 1981 prices).   
Source- 
own 
revenue 
1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 
 
Growth 
rate 
Taxes 40,305 43,075 45,180 44,713 51,665 51,509 65,790 8.5 
Gambling 19,632 18,411 18,366 17,621 15,509 11,460 9,017  -12.2 
Charges 9,107 11,171 10,943 12,853 13,519 12,492 15,583 9.4 
Ipeda 
(property 
tax) 
4,555 4,515 4,463 4,402 5,359 5,122 5,425 3.0 
Enterprises 646 764 862 1,023 1,957 1,556 2,051 21.2 
Other 7,599 10,314 11,390 12,047 10,872 12,016 13,750 10.4 
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Subtotal 81,844 87,250 91,204 92,659 98,881 94,154 11,616 5.3 
Other 
Revenue 
Grants 
 
 
27,608 
 
 
38,309 
 
 
46,682 
 
 
50,672 
 
 
50,038 
 
 
49,128 
 
 
57,135 
 
 
12.9 
Loans 1,928 4,984 9,727 11,321 9,439 7,465 8,489 28.0 
Total 111,380 130,543 147,613 154,652 158,358 150,747 77,240 8.1 
 
 
If the loss of revenue wasn’t enough, the DKI government also found itself 
increasingly subject to criticism from Islamic and youth groups [specifically, a tetchy 
anti-gambling organisation that called itself Generasi Muda] who objected to the 
city’s dependence on haram [forbidden by Islam] sources of money.  Sadikin had 
anticipated such arguments and countered that his legalisation of the illicit casino 
gambling industry was about transforming the natural, cultural tendency of Jakarta’s 
ethnic Chinese community into much needed revenue for the city, and its pribumi 
population. ‘I needed lots of money to build schools, clinics and roads…Yes, I know 
judi is haram, but we needed to think of the little people’ (Tempo, 2005). Like 
colonial approaches to criminality and disease before it, gambling was constructed as 
a contagion that through territorial and fiscal practices, could be localised so as not to 
infect.  The state’s authorisation of gambling was zoned in the ‘Golden Triangle’ that 
stretched for one kilometer across Petak IX, Pancoran and Asemka146 where residents 
felt the pull of the dice as ‘part of the culture.’  The government even made sure to 
support games of a strictly Chinese nature, such as Hwa Hwee which depicted 
historical personalities from 12th century China and to publish clues only in the 
                                                
146 Although with Hailai and Copacabana in Ancol and Jakarta Theatre perched at the head of Jalan 
Thamrin, its clear that the geographical flank of the lokalisasi policy was a lot more flexible than on 
paper.  
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Tionghoa press (Emmerson, 1972). To further quell concerns, Sadikin promised to 
establish a criteria to classify pribumi who showed signs of the disease [kecanduan, or 
addiction].  Like the tattooed criminal contagion of the early 1980s, Sadikin promised 
that Jakarta’s frothing, dice-mad pribumi would be placed on official lists that would 
disallow their entrance [masuk daftar].  Nonetheless, within months of its 
authorisation, Islamic scholar   Alwi Shihab recalls that unlicensed slot-machines 
jangled in the corners of every hotel and shabby panti pijit [massage parlour] across 
the city (2002, p. 128). Despite the localisation policy, pribumi found Hwa Hwee 
equally amusing and for the five months it was allowed it ‘transformed the city into a 
huge night gaming room of thousands upon thousands of players’ (Emmerson, 1972, 
p. 26). Shihab too writes of the pribumi as possessed [keranjingan] by the Hwa Hwee 
opiate and, the ultimate insult, of the scurry to consult the occult powers [gaib] that 
would help them win. The administration eventually withdrew its support for Hwa 
Hwee but the damage to the policy had been done as practices of gambling had crept 
well outside of the so-called ‘Golden Triangle’ between PIX, Pancoran and Asemka.  
Lokalisasi had failed on two counts; both to contain the contagion and also to keep all 
gaming revenue within the purview of the administration.  This in turn gave leverage 
to growing complaints from religious and youth organisations that gambling be shut 
down.    
 
In May 1973, head of Kopkambib, General Soemitro banned gambling and popular 
lotteries outside the urban capitals of Jakarta, Medan and Surabaya.  Although 
Kopkamtib, the New Order’s Operational Command for the Restoration of Security 
and Order, was officially established to purge the Communist contagion and other 
forms of political opposition, Suharto’s machine of control took peculiar interest in 
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Jakarta’s gambling industry and initiated ‘special security [keamanan] action’ for the 
casinos.  Given that the head of Kopkamtib was second only to President Suharto in 
the governmental hierarchy, who was to tell him that the economy of gambling was 
out of his brief?  
 
In 1973, this all-powerful body for keamanan prohibited jackpot throughout the 
country and took over the issuing of lotto licenses.  For the coterie of retired military 
generals who made up the provincial elite, the 1974 passing of legislation that 
centralised the taxation of gambling coupled with the 1975 Presidential Decree on the 
prohibition of gambling was a stark reminder of who was really in charge.  With 
gaming now regulated by the centre, Head of Kopkamtib Soemitro and the Minister 
for the Interior began discussions as to the fate of the casinos, bringing together the 
historical policy of ‘localisation’ with the New Order’s centralising impulse. ‘Our 
plan’ observed General Soemitro, ‘was to close down all the gambling places by 1975 
and then to move them to an island provided by us’ (Ramadhan, 1996, p. 322-3). 
However, the policy of an island casino never came to pass since by 1977, rivalry 
between Ali Sadikin and President Suharto saw the term of gambling’s most powerful 
spokesman come to an abrupt end.  In April 1981 Kopkamtib, then led by Admiral 
Sudomo, closed down the gambling circuit in the Indonesian capital and Surabaya. 
This decision initiated a massive labour dispute between ethnic Tionghoa 
entrepreneurs and the thousands of casino workers under their employ in both 
provinces.147 
                                                
147 Caught between the see-saw legality of the Indonesian gaming industry, the casinos’ vast number of 
labourers (karyawan),  are a crucial element of their historiography.  The issue of representation was 
significant to the cause of the workers.  Initially, workers in Jakarta formed the P3HK to represent 
them at their first mediation [musyarawarah] in March 1981.  However, on allegations that the 
organisation was acting like a ‘calo’ [broker], Serikat Buruh Parawisata [the Union of Tourism 
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The Criminalisation and Consolidation of the New Order State  
 
The 1981 reinstitution of the ban on gambling was justified by the state on urgent 
humanitarian grounds: the vice of gambling drugged the little people [wong cilik], 
pushing them into poverty, infecting their youth and leading them away from the path 
of Islam (ibid). However, historians of Jakarta such as Abeyesekere and Ryter largely 
agree that flipping the switch of legality on gaming practices in the capital was less 
about placating religious groups than restoring an important off-budget institutional 
economy to a jittery and cash-strapped military (Abeyesekere, 1989, p. 220; Ryter, 
2002, p. 169). Certainly, Sadikin’s own bitter statements made at the time confirm 
this view of events.  In 1973, beleaguered by reporters to respond to Kopkamtib’s ban 
on gambling he declared,  
 
Gambling in the city of Jakarta is official [resmi] as per legislation [undang-undang]. Thus, 
it’s legal [legal].  Better that it is legal than it goes on out of sight [sembunyi-sembunyi]. If it 
goes underground [gelap-gelapan], who do you think profits? Come on, answer! Who benefits 
[untung] if it goes underground? I heard people mutter their responses and they were dead 
right. It was those who back up the gambling, those rouge elements [oknum] of the military 
who are well connected to the authorities (Ramadhan, 1992, p. 67)148.  
                                                                                                                                      
times their monthly salary which was rejected on the ground that it would start a precedent that would 
frighten other investors.  Despite the failure to come to an agreement, Jan Darmadi sat in Hall B 
Senayan on 4 April 1981 doling out envelopes with a blue coupon to recoup Rp 2 million  [US$222] to 
employees of Jakarta Theatre and Petak IX (in Surabaya, the severance pay amounted to Rp 3 million 
[US$335]).  Most stated that they would not cash the coupon in with Bank BNI. Workers of Hailai and 
Copacabana Ancol continued their dispute pleading, ‘We are disciplined [disiplin].  We are not making 
trouble. But the severance pay is only twice our monthly salary. It’s not even enough to rent a home. 
(See, ‘Pesangon Judi Lanjutkan’ & ‘Pelajaran Buat Saya’. 1981. Tempo 06/XI. 11 April. 
http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/email/1981/04/11/KT/mbm.19810411.KT49253.id.html. 
Accessed 8.11.09).  Less easily mapped are the thousands of sex workers, pimps, escorts, dancers, drug 
dealers, food and cigarette vendors, taxi drivers, landlords, kos [cheap boarding house] owners and 
catering companies that provide support services to the casinos and their staff.  The changing nature of 
the legality of casino gambling, from legal to illegal and across the spectrum of greys that constitute 
official tolerance for the industry, effects an phenomenal and immeasurable rip in the economy of the 
poor and lower class.   
148 I have drawn my translation of this fragment in part from Ryter, 2002, p.185. 
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However, in their analyses neither Ryter nor Abeyesekere situate the disallowing of 
gambling within the political context of the day.  Those last final years of gambling’s 
thirteen year grace period overlapped, not coincidently, with a period of 
unprecedented internal upheaval for President Suharto regarding the political role 
befitting ABRI and the duration of Suharto’s tenure as President.  Generational 
change combined with surging recruitment rates within ABRI were beginning to 
change the dynamics of power within the regime.  By the mid 1970s, Suharto found 
himself in a confrontation with a cabal of powerful retirees and former revolutionaries 
who still commanded considerable power and yet were not in the president’s inner 
circle where resources, privilege and power were circulated.  Stranded in a political 
limbo, they were known loosely as the Sakit Hati [Hurt Feelings] brigade (Jenkins, 
1986).  
 
Suharto’s problems did not end there.  Kopkamtib head, General Soemitro, locked in 
a rivalry with Ali Murtopo, reportedly had his eyes on the presidency and in 1974 was 
replaced as Kopkamtib head by none other than President Suharto himself.  It wasn’t 
until 1978 that deputy Admiral Sudomo took over the reins of the security 
powerbroker.  From 1976 onwards, the circulation of rotations and promotions among 
the upcoming military brass began to lag as Suharto and his band of old guard 
supporters delayed deciding who could be trusted, creating a band of disaffected 
officers whose mobility within the state was curtailed (The Editors, 1977). As Jenkins 
details, young officers from the military schools began to meet privately to discuss the 
principle of ABRI’s dwifungsi, culminating in the Seskoad paper that argued 
decisively that the armed forces were to have no other political doctrine bar upholding 
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the 1945 Constitution (Jenkins, 1986, p. 62-66). Jenkins concludes, ‘in this document, 
one hears closely the voice of the officers of a principled cast of mind, a group 
committed above all to the notion that ABRI’s behaviour should be posited on certain 
moral values, a group concerned by the apparent backsliding and decline in standards 
that had taken place under the New Order leadership ‘ (Ibid, p. 66).  
 
Meanwhile, from 1977-8, a group of powerful but politically isolated retired military 
generals known as the Brasildi group gathered to discuss the military’s storming of 
schools and universities in the 1978 election campaign and the future of ABRI’s role 
in politics. Within Polri, young officers such as Farouk Muhammad began to wonder 
if the police weren’t better off separated from the military and the drafts of the 
criminal code increasingly took a stand against military intervention in matters of 
criminal investigation.149 Not coincidently, discussion of the integrity of law took 
place in a period of rising criticism of the president over the business dealings of his 
family and ostentatious displays of wealth.  Many of these criticisms had their roots in 
a stratum of military and police leadership who had suddenly found their 
investigations into institutional corruption or other criminal acts by state officials cut 
short or buried.  As Kapolri, Hoegeng had been forced by President Suharto to 
surrender the Sumarijem rape investigation to the central investigative bureau of 
Kopkamtib known as Teperpu in the ultimate subordination of law to the New 
Order’s coercive institutions (Santoso, 2009, p. 97).150  Hoegeng’s police career was 
eventually ended for uncovering a car smuggling racket between Tionghoa broker 
Robby Tjahjadi [Sie Tjie It] and Suharto’s wife, Madame Tien (also known as 
                                                
149 Insp. Gen. Farouk Muhammad, interview by author (27 September 2006).  
150 At the time, Hoegeng asked, ‘Why Terperpu? Doesn’t the body normally just deal with cases of a 
political dimension, like PKI? Did Suharto see the Sumarijem case as more than just a criminal event?’  
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Madam Tien Percent) (Jenkins, 1986, p. 244).151 In Palembang and Aceh, Maj. Gen. 
Ishak Djuarsa had been ‘shocked into disbelief’ by the illegal activities of member of 
the Suharto family (Jenkins, 1986, p. 245). Emboldened by the outburst of public 
condemnation of state corruption, ABRI generals, who themselves were often 
embedded in relations of collusion and fiscal gain, began to call for greater humility 
and restraint from the executive.  
 
In 1978, a new military discussion forum known as Fosko formed out of the ashes of 
Brasildi under Yayasan Kartika Eka Pakti.152  Fosko called for ‘corrections’ to be 
made to the implementation of the duel functions of the military.  After being forcibly 
retired from the governorship, General Ali Sadikin aligned himself with Fosko.  In 
1978, with Nasution and a number of other ABRI generals including police General 
Imam Hoegeng, he joined a group of civilian bureaucrats and intellectuals in setting 
up the Institute of Constitutional Awareness.  The aims and views of the two bodies 
overlapped to the point that by 1980, Jenkins concludes that ‘there was a broad and 
somewhat unique alliance between a number of retired senior officers and ‘retired 
politicians’ with linkages to the student movement’ (Jenkins, 1986, p. 248).  
 
This movement of statesmen, war heroes, parliamentarians, literati and retired 
military generals found its voice in what came to be known as the Petisi 50 or the 
Petition of Fifty released on May 13, 1980. The key ABRI icons of Petisi 50 included 
‘father of the army’ General Nasution, beloved General Ali Sadikin, the 
unimpeachable General Imam Hoegeng and the outspoken General Jasin.  
 
                                                
151 Meanwhile, Suharto and Tjahjadi went onto found the profitable textile business Kanindotex. 
(Santoso, 2009, p. 113).  
152 The business dealings of this foundation are examined in Chapter I of this thesis.  
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The premise of the petition was that the sanctity of Pancasila was being used for 
political purposes and General Suharto’s presidency was increasingly riddled with 
power-hoarding and corrupt practices.  Petitioners called for the upholding of the rule 
of law, tolerance for legitimate political practices such as political opposition and 
curtailment of the military’s political role, and discussed these ideas at weekly 
meetings well into the 1980s.  Revenge however, was swift.   
 
Crucially, it did not take the legal form of an outright ban on the group, but rather a 
slow, devastating fiscal and cultural severing from public and state life.153  In 1981, 
the year Sadikin’s contracts for judi were abandoned because of the nationwide ban 
on gambling, signatories to the petition found themselves forced out from their jobs, 
work permits and business licenses expired without renewal and credit lines to state 
banks dried up.  Sadikin’s children found themselves routed outside of the fiscal 
circuit, unable to obtain lines of credit.154 M Jasin’s construction project for a 
shopping centre in Bandung was suddenly abandoned by local government and his 
personal bank account was mysteriously raided.  Jasin’s dentist daughter found 
herself under pressure to withdraw from Gatot Subroto hospital.  Slamet Bratanata’s 
consultancy firm went bankrupt after companies began giving him a wide berth.  The 
dissenters found themselves subject to travel bans, curtailing their mobility and the 
national press refused to circulate their image or statements.  Unable to move or make 
money without the patronage of Suharto, it was a kind of ‘civil death’ (Aspinall, 
2005, p. 61). Indeed, it was a fitting form of political assassination that distinguished 
the key preoccupations of the New Order: capital, mobility and performance.  
                                                
153 Oddly, in his autobiography, President Suharto accuses the group of breaking the law and insinuates 
that their punishment too was as per the law. (Santoso,  2009, p 139). 
154 Of this time, Sadikin lamented, ‘I was stuck [dicekal]. My children became victims. They couldn’t 
borrow money from the bank, were not given the opportunity to do business. At the same time, others 
were receiving trillions.’ (Santoso, 2009, p. 133).  
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Ryter and Abeysekere fail to connect the see-saw legal politics of gaming with this 
greater dual of visions, between a state of law and a state of neopatrimony, and a 
more general problem facing Suharto as to how to placate the military powerbrokers 
of past and future generations.  In 1981, it fell to Admiral Sudomo, head of the 
Kopkamtib and trusted ear to the President, to thoroughly discredit the petitioners, 
among them the patron of legalised gambling, and isolate them from public life.  In 
the same year, it was also within Sudomo’s brief to sound the death knell for casino 
gaming.  That these two events coincided and fell beneath the same super-body for 
‘orde dan keamanan’ [order and security] was not by chance.  Prohibiting dice and 
alienating reasoned dissent shared the same underlying net of logic.  
 
These seemingly unrelated elements - the disgrace of the petitioners and the 
forbidding of the dice as vice - were in fact part of a wider process whirring at the 
heart of the New Order regime.  Section One of this thesis illustrated how power in 
the New Order was conceived in both its legal and criminal forms.  The state’s 
aggressive 1981 re-posturing took place both in the surface world of everyday public 
politics and in its subterranean counterpart, where the ‘heresy’ that was rooted out 
was that perverse legalisation of an economy that had once been an important part of 
the fiscal recompense of the military elite.  Illicit gaming had two main strengths for 
the coercive apparatus: mammoth profits seemingly generated out of air and a need 
for beking. By re-prohibiting the world of gaming, President Suharto was creating a 
lucrative economy for the upcoming generations of ABRI that might challenge him 
on grounds of his own illegality. In the subterranean world of judi they too could reap 
the benefits of the continuation of the New Order and be drawn into the fold of the 
criminal regime as oknum [rogue, criminalised officers]. Thus, to pinpoint that instant 
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when the regime sought out its image in the criminal looking glass, would be to return 
to 1981 and Admiral Sudomo’s announcement of the prohibition of casino gambling, 
for this was the precise moment that marked the criminalisation, and the 
consolidation, of the New Order Indonesian state.   
 
It is unsurprising thus that Jenkins observes that those who did not join or bowed out 
of Petition 50 were richly rewarded with favours, positions and fiscal opportunities. 
Maj. Gen. Sumitro, one time rival and advocate of Kopkamtib’s dismantlement, was 
awarded logging concessions in Irian Jaya through his company PT Rigunas and a 
juicy contract for ABRI procurement purchases through PT Tjakra Sudarma (Jenkins, 
1986, p. 253). Maj.Gen Ishak Djuarsa, who also sympathised with the movement, 
joined him in business. Soemitro was said to have been tasked with the job of 
approaching the dissidents and coaxing them into silence in exchange for ‘big 
projects’ (Ibid). YKEP, once the home of the revolutionary Fosko, went on to build 
one of the biggest military business empires of the New Order. And for General 
Sudomo, loyal acolyte of the president, suppressor of dissent and brave warrior 
against the evils of casino gambling, what could be more what could be more befitting 
than a big, fat stake in the new national lottery known as SDSB?155  
 
Licit and Illicit Gaming in the Late New Order  
 
SDSB was only the later incarnation of a series of national sports lotteries initiated by 
the state after the 1981 prohibition on gambling.  In 1985, a national football pool 
                                                
155 Such was his profits from the scheme that SDSB was often jokingly said to be short for ‘sudomo 
Datang Semua Beres’ [Sudomo Arrives, Everything Gets Sorted Out] and Sudomo himself as ‘Minister 
of the National Lottery’. (Wilson, 1992, p. 108-9.  Also, Anton Medan, interview by author (23 June 
2010).  
! "#$ 
known as Kupon Berhadiah Porkas Sepak Bola, or Porkas [Forecast] was introduced 
to support the country’s sporting programs. In 1987, the lottery earned the 
government Rp 29 billion [US$3.3 million] (Tempo, 2004). Nonetheless, the lotto met 
severe condemnation from Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah though 
controversially not by the Indonesian Council of Ulama, the MUI (Van Bruinessen, 
n.d).156  In 1988, Porkas was replaced with Kupon Sumbangan Olahraga Berhadiah 
[KSOB], which allowed gamblers to place their bets on the actual scores of the 
matches and not just the no-frills Porkas choice of M-K-S [menang, kalah, seri] or 
win, lose or draw.  Expanding the betting options in KSOB proved to be a profitable 
move, earning Rp 1.2 trillion [US$135 million] that year (Tempo, 2004). The 
following year, the national lotto was reformed again into Sumbangan Dermawan 
Sosial Berhadiah [SDSB] which differed again in that it offered a range of three 
different coupons at a whopping Rp 5000 [US$0.50], Rp 10,000 [US$1.00] and Rp, 
15,000 [US$1.50] each.  Previous incarnations of the lottery had only offered one 
coupon at a relatively affordable Rp 300 [US$0.03] or Rp 600 [US$0.07].  The price 
of the coupons did not appear to dissuade betters and revenues brought in well over 
Rp 1 trillion [US$112 million] per year until the lottery was discontinued in 1993.  
 
The license to administer this changing procession of national lotteries and extensive 
network of agents, distributors and sub-agents lay solely with one foundation 
[yayasan] known as Yayasan Dana Bhakti Kesejahteraan Sosial (YDBHS or the 
Foundation of Loyal Aid [for] Social Prosperity).  YDBHS was established on the 
order of President Suharto and the Department of Social Affairs in 1980.  Although 
the foundation purported to channel billions of rupiah to various charities and social 
causes throughout the country, it was through the forms of legal gambling managed 
                                                
156 Van Bruinessen gives an excellent account of MUI and the Porkas storm.  
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by this foundation that the President came to monopolise the mammoth revenues of 
the legal gaming industry.  Moreover, the foundation found itself increasingly drawn 
into other state development projects.  With a 1990 presidential decree, the foundation 
received contracts to reclaim and redevelop state land from unplanned settlements 
around Jakarta city centre (Inpres, 1990).  
 
Given the juicy processions of concessions and grants, it is unsurprising that some of 
the biggest names in New Order capital clustered beneath the YDBHS’ wings. 
YDBHS was first under direction by the Suharto’s eldest son, Sigit Harjojudanto157 
and then daughter Tutut Hardiyanti Rukmana.158  Also involved were cronies such as 
Henry Pribadi (Napan Group), Suharto’s cousin Sudwikatmono (Subentra Group), 
Admiral Sudomo (who, now as Coordinating Minister for Security and Political 
Affairs, had the pleasure of presenting the weekly prize monies to their lucky 
winners).  There were also Tionghoa big businessmen such as Robbie ‘Ketek’ 
Sumampouw, who enjoyed monopolies on coffee and sandalwood after the invasion 
of Timor Leste and who later also managed Tommy Suharto’s clove industry.159  
From the gambling world, Apyang Latief and Eddie ‘Porkas’ Winata also held stakes 
in the national lotto.  
 
Sadikin legalised gambling in order to fold its revenues into the state through taxes. 
Although the logic of his tender system smacked of fishy dealings and his own 
business interests remained opaque, the fact is that under the governor a mapped 
                                                
157 Sigit built up his massive business empire from revenues amassed through his major stake in Liem 
Sioe Liong’s Bank of Central Asia, managed by the Salim Group. Liong appears in Chapter I of this 
thesis.  
158 Tutut was also the recipient of contracts to build Jakarta’s toll roads and as outlined in Chapter I, 
managed the traffic police’s contract to put motor vehicle licenses on an electronic database.  
159 Napan Group in particular was known for its close business relationship with Bimantara Group 
owned then by Suharto’s son Bambang Trihatmojo.  Bimantara Group and its new owner, Hari Tanoe 
appear in Chapter I of this thesis.  
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tranche of revenue coursed through the DKI tax system to be reallocated into 
recordable, audited public projects.  In stark contrast, the philanthropic structure of 
President Suharto’s new lotto economy meant that its revenues incurred special tax 
exemptions for the foundation and its private partner, PT Artha Dana Kriya 
(Department Keuangan, 1991).160 The proceeds from gambling were also granted 
immunity from public audits (McGlynn & Sulistyo, 2007, p. 225). For the record, 
YDBHS did make small, arbitrary grants of a few million rupiah to favoured 
foundations such as the Cancer Foundation [Yayasan Kanker] or the Foundation for 
the Care of Handicapped Children [Yayasan Untuk Pembinaan Anak Cacat] who 
often sported commissioners [komisaris] from the in-circle of the New Order political 
elite.  Grant-making to these ‘civil society’ organisations was at the sole discretion of 
YDBHS or, the Suharto family.  Moreover, the real sums of money were being 
transferred to foundations within the nest of the Suharto family, such as Tutut’s 
Yayasan Tiara which received Rp 1 billion [US$111 000] in 1993 for the cryptically 
titled Bahana Suara Pelajar [Echo of Student Voices] program, (Tempo, 1993) or 
lent out at high interest rates to in-group entrepreneurs as liquidity for their various 
projects.161   
 
A range of other important social and political institutions also came to rely on 
injections of national lotto revenue including the civil servants’ wives association, 
Dharma Wanita, Nahdlatul Ulama, various faculties of Universitas Indonesia, Partai 
                                                
160 Secondary source research has not revealed who the founders and directors of this company might 
be. By the early 1990s, Tempo too wrote an editorial asking who was behind the company and by what 
process had they come to win the SDSB tender with the foundation? (Tempo, 1993). 
161 In 2005, Eddy Yuwono, Director of PT Sari Kebon Jeruk Permai was imprisoned awaiting trial for 
his failure to pay back a Rp 161 billion [US$17 million] grant made by the foundation in 1998 for his 
purchase of land in Kebon Jeruk for big residential development (Gatra, 2005). In 1993, Tempo also 
reports that Partai Demokrat Indonesia pleaded for YDBKS funds for philanthropic activities around 
their yearly summit. (Tempo, 1993). 
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Demokrat Indonesia [the Democratic Party of Indonesia, PDI] and the state party 
Golkar (Tempo, 1993). Despite this circulation of funds, in 1992 money spent on 
grants came to a mere Rp 40 billion [US$4.5 million] of the company’s fiscal 
reserves, just a fraction of the company’s capital base (Ibid). By late 1993, the waves 
of protests organised throughout the country by an increasingly robust Islamic student 
movement had made their mark and the national lotto was eventually banned in its 
entirety in the same year (Aspinall, 2005, p. 132). The government’s capitulation on 
SDSB should be read both within a lineage of other pro-Islamic concessions that 
occurred in the same decade such as the regulation on Islamic clothing, banking and 
food labeling as well as a rare concession to public opinion, which was increasingly 
disgusted by Suharto’s particularly crude brand of patrimonial statesmanship.  The 
rejection of SDSB, thus, was an early warning sign of things to come.162  
  
Part of the reason for the largesse of the foundation’s earnings was that by introducing 
ever more wily forms of sports lotto, President Suharto effectively nationalised the 
people’s inclination for economic play that had until 1986, been localised and 
contained by extremely profitable but nonetheless, small-scale togel and various card 
and dice games.  By banning all forms of perjudian and legalising the national sports 
lotto, Suharto effectively seized control of the thousands upon thousands of individual 
                                                
162 In fact, despite the ban, legalized gambling as a cash cow for the New Order elite continued albeit in 
alternative form. After the 1981 ban on casino gambling, Atung Latief entered a venture for a casino on 
Australia’s Christmas Island, with Frank Woodmore, a Perth property developer. The casino was a 
joint project with the Australian government designed explicitly to attract high rollers from Indonesia 
now that Indonesia had instituted the ban.  Although the contract was signed in 1987, in 1990, Latief’s 
company operating out of Singapore, Lauw and Sons, sold a controlling interest to Robby Sumampow 
who opened the casino in 1993, the year of the ban on the national lotto. Mismanagement on Christmas 
Island meant that the casino only profited for one year, 1994, and in 1998 closed down after Indonesian 
officials banned the charter flights.  This is unsurprising given that 1998 heralded the year of the judi 
‘explosion’ in Jakarta. Over US$ 2 million in unpaid wages and salaries, severance pay and 
redundancy packages is still owed to the people of Christmas Island (Joint Standing committee on the 
National Capital and External Territories. 2001).  The case has still not gone to trial and the 
government is debating using the decaying casino to house asylum seekers given that conditions in 
their own facilities have become cramped.    
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streams of revenue returned to local kingpins throughout the country and redirected 
the flow directly into his personal pocket.  Suharto’s brand of mass-based gambling 
directly contradicted Sadikin’s neo-colonial approach of lokalisasi where the state 
capitalised on the unquenchable betting habits of pariah minority. This strata of high-
class casino gambling was in principle banned outright but in reality continued 
unabated in the back alleys and entertainment spots of central Jakarta as well in 
Indonesia’s other major urban centres.  If Suharto reserved legal, mass-based 
gambling revenues for himself, his cronies and his family, it was this subterranean 
industry of illicit gambling that was opened up to the generations of ABRI officers 
that swore allegiance to him. In criminal logics of New Order power, the preservation 
of the regime entailed the transformation of officers into oknum.    
 
Back on the streets of Jakarta, in the wake of Kopkamtib’s 1981 ban on casino 
gambling, a colossal realignment of patronage was taking place as casino and mesin-
hall managers and owners attached themselves to a suitably potent military general 
who would grant their enterprise the all-important beking needed to continue to 
operate.  Just as in the world of Tionghoa conglomerates detailed in Chapter III, 
beking in the criminal sphere of illicit gaming was arranged in accordance with ABRI 
hierarchy.  Unlike the rest of the coercive apparatus, police commanders were never 
given the opportunity to install their subordinates as casino security.  This denied 
them an important wellspring of revenue from both the moonlighters and tycoons that 
commissioned them.  However, like the rest of the apparatus, police officers were 
indeed in the receipt of the regular, monthly installments of setoran from the sub-
district level upwards.  However, the stratification of ABRI beking could be clearly 
seen in the police generals’ inability to make, break or protect the gambling tycoons. 
This had financial repercussions in that police generals featured less frequently as 
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shareholders and investors in the various glitzy nightspots cum casinos that lit up 
Jakarta’s dunia malam [nightlife].  As in the corporate world, army generals were 
naturally preferable to any of the arms of the ABRI family, least of all Polri.163  There 
was also a secret ranking within the army that put the Siliwangi, Diponegoro, 
Paspampres [Presidential guards] and military police at the very top of the internal 
apex.  Figure 5 shows the importance that the coercive apparatus placed on the 
gambling revenues.  In the administrative ward of Taman Sari, the very geographic 
nucleus of the illicit gaming industry, there were no less than two military Koramil 
and two Kodim and only one lowly polsek.  Such an intricate security system made 
this small wad of land the most over-defended 4.5 square kilometers in the country.164  
 
With such a convoluted, slippery security system in place, someone had to ensure that 
fiscal flows were peacefully, though not necessarily equitably, dispersed amongst the 
military.  The organisation that took on that role was SKOGAR, Jakarta’s military 
garrison whose authority to prosecute ABRI personnel gave them the unique role of 
coordinating the divvying up of the spoils of turf.  The precious lahan of the casino 
economy was divided horizontally between the sub-district to the provincial layers of 
the Koter command and vertically, between the various branches of ABRI to ensure 
no ugly spats or wars between the men of the coercive apparatus and consequently, 
unwanted media attention.165  To further ensure military control over Jakarta’s dunia 
malam, the Head of the Tourism Service [Kepala Dinas Pariwisata] within the DKI 
                                                
163 In his thesis, Ryter argues that the gambling tycoons preferred to hire gangs rather than military to 
provide protection (2002, p. 170-1). I doubt in fact that this is true as the tycoons would never leave 
themselves so exposed to the potential for a military backlash.  Protection from the gangs was likely 
more obvious as gangs took up the outer positions of the casinos, while military personnel tended to 
guard the rooms inside.  Moreover, the spectacle of security seen from the street does not necessarily 
map in detail the actual pay-offs going to the generals for their protection and the use of the men in 
their command. The real fiscal flows are invisible.  
164 For example, this can be compared with neighbouring ward, Kalideres, which is thirty kilometers 
squared and boasts only one polsek for security.  
165 Casino Worker, interview by author (27 February 2007).   
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administration was traditionally dominated by an ABRI figure or a civilian with a 
military shadow.166  
 
The rise of military beking incited a corollary boom in the provision of private 
protection as Jakarta’s thick nest of military-backed gangs returned to take their place 
in the radiating hierarchy of security that protected the gambling dens.  During the 
1980s and especially in the 1990s, many of the juiciest contracts went to Pemuda 
Pancasila however the gambling economy was such that many a gang boss’ career 
was made from the profits of subcontracting men to the casinos.  In the 1980s and 
1990s, these included the notorious Timorese military informant and king of Tanah 
Abang, Hercules, the Muslim Ambonese Ongen Sangaji, Jhon Kei so named for his 
successful organisation of preman from central Maluku’s Kei islands, Ambonese 
Basri Sangaji, Arit from Surabaya and the gang of Madurese known as Sakera who 
controlled parts of Tanah Abang and around Sarinah.  
 
The rearrangement of power and capital was not just occurring at the level of the 
casinos’ external beking relationships but also internally, as Darmadi and Latief 
graduated their capital base from the now illicit gambling industry to the formal 
economy. With the revenues from judi, Yan Darmadi and brother Edy Darmadi 
established an extensive property empire in the Bekasi and Setiabudi areas of Jakarta 
and Nusa Dua in Bali administered by a network of fifty odd subsidiaries beneath the 
‘Darmadi Group.’  From territory and property, the group diversified into textiles, 
transportation, plastics manufacturing and travel. When in the late 1980s, New Order 
banking policies further deregulated the restrictions on banking competition, Darmadi 
                                                
166 Activist Timor Leste, interview by author (1 May 2007).  
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joined the stampede of Tionghoa big business owners by investing in Panin Bank and 
Bank Susila Bhakti, the former becoming one of the country’s six largest private 
banks. By 1996, Darmadi Group was one of the top thirty conglomerates of the late 
New Order (Chua, 2006, Appendices Table 1). Darmadi continued to maintain his 
stake in the illegal gambling industry until the late 1990s through investments in 
1001, Copacabana and other casinos associated with a kongsi of gambling tsars that 
emerged in the mid 1990s.167  However on the flip-side of the licit business world, the 
sheer size and scope of his expanding financial interests coupled with his increasing 
antipathy towards the increasingly mechanised gaming coming down from Taiwan, 
meant that the Darmadi faded into the background as a mover and shaker in Jakarta’s 
illegal gaming industry.168  
 
Following Darmadi, Atang Latief moved into the property, plastics and food 
industries, but the jewel in his corporate portfolio was Bank Bira, a small to medium 
sized bank that by the 1990s was heavily invested in the murky industry of syndicated 
off-shore debt (Matsumoto, 2007, p. 216 n42). With the 1998 Asian financial crisis, 
the bank collapsed entirely. Latief borrowed Rp 325 billion (US$ 34.7 million) as a 
BLBI [Bank Indonesia Liquidity Support] loan and promptly skipped the country to 
Singapore.  By 2006, he was a broken man, on the run from the Indonesian 
government, reportedly prone to rages and reclusiveness. With a chronic gambling 
addiction, he would disappear for months at a time gambling away the entire family 
fortune.  In the heat and sweat of the card tables, Latief would find himself staking his 
                                                
167 Tionghoa casino worker, interview by author (14 October 2009).  
168 However, gaming appeared to touch the lives of its beneficiaries in unexpected ways.  For Darmadi, 
the glitz and glamour of the casino industry continued to define the family’s most important public 
rituals. In the 1980s, when daughter Rini Darmadi married, Jan Darmadi was said to have flown out 
planeloads of guests from Jakarta to Las Vegas, hiring out every room of Caeser’s casino and 
commissioning Frank Sinatra and Diana Ross as entertainment. Latief too took his holidays in Las 
Vegas, even buying property on Rodeo Drive.  
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homes and land, losing up to US$ 10 million in a single bid. And yet his wife 
lamented, ‘no amount of money would ever be enough. It would disappear on the 
betting table’ (Gatra, 2006). Unsurprisingly, given his life-long addiction to the card 
and the dice, Latief maintained a much higher profile in the gaming industry in the 
post 1981 period, putting his money into a number of new enterprises with the 
burgeoning new elite of the gambling industry, Anton Medan, Hong Lie, Eng San and 
Nyo Beng Seng.  Domestically, asides from his stake in regular casinos, Latief 
invested in gambling dens of the nautical variety.  On weekends, his luxury boats 
such as the Coral Princess (with Eng San) and the Orient Sun (with Sugeng Pranoto) 
would ply the un-policed waters around Jakarta’s Thousand Islands in the Java Sea.  
Indeed, it was this move into the aquatic potentials of casino gaming that carved out 
an important and lasting role for the marines in the casino protection industry.  Latief 
also sought to expand his gambling empire regionally, sharing Australia’s Christmas 
Island venture with the Sumampouws and with Eng San, Nyo Beng Seng and Hong 
Lie in an ill-fated Cambodia deal that would end in 1994 with Beng Seng’s murder.169  
 
So close was the new Tionghoa gambling elite to elements of the ABRI coercive 
apparatus that many among them, like Anton Medan, directly credited their rise to a 
series of individual pacts and deals made with key military and police generals.  
Medan himself attributes his rise to gambling tsar between 1986-91 to his agreement 
                                                
169 Nyo Beng Seng, otherwise known as Suyadi Dharmansyah, was the owner of Irama Tama recording 
company and had business ventures in electronics. He was heavily invested in high class, executive 
gaming at Ancol’s Copacabana but also had ventures in Macau, Perth, Las Vegas and Malaysia’s 
Genting Highlands. In so far as he was an integral player in the world of illegal gambling, Beng Seng 
was known as a clean businessman who kept his books. With Hong Lie, Eng San and Latief, Beng 
Seng invested in a casino in Cambodia but the deal soured when Beng Seng demanded his return. Eng 
San and Hong Lie hired a killer to stab Beng Seng in his second wife’s mansion in the Medan Chiense 
area of Pluit, north Jakarta. Future Kapolda Metro Jaya, then head of criminal research Metro Jaya, Nur 
Faizi, had Eng San arrested and put away for murder but oddly, in 1997, the Jakarta High Court 
overturned the guilty verdict and freed Eng San. Anton Medan, interview by author (23 June 2010). 
23.06.10. See also, Gatra, 1996. 
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to work as a police informant in exchange for the arrest of Hong Lie.170 With Hong 
Lie temporarily imprisoned, Jakarta was a wide open lahan just waiting for harvest by 
someone like Medan who had the capital and military contacts to open a host of 
machine and casino gaming venues throughout the city.   
 
Crucially, nowhere in my secondary research or interviews is ‘Cendana,’ the code 
word for Suharto, his family and network of cronies, mentioned as a patron of 
gaming.  No doubt money in the form of setoran was circulated up to Suharto and his 
in-group, but apart from Tommy Suharto’s brief flirtation with a Singaporean casino 
in the 1990s, the Suharto family steered well clear of any direct involvement in the 
judi economy.  In the eyes of the agents of the state, Cendana money was ‘legal’ in so 
far as it was nefariously levered from a constant, skewed procession of untendered 
state contracts, monopolies and outright theft masked as nationalistic philanthropy. In 
the eyes of the political elite, the lotto industry generated forms of what Roitman calls 
‘sanctioned wealth’ that could be easily circulated or recruited as the capital base for 
other business ventures (Roitman, 2005).  Revenues from the casino economy, 
however mammoth, were sourced from the subterranean world of criminality and 
hence, were a form of deviant, unsanctioned wealth reserved for those lower ranked 
minions from the coercive apparatus who had to scrabble about with Central Jakarta 
preman and whose criminalisation might one day be used against them.  In this way, 
even in the cold mechanical heart of New Order corruption, the acquisition of capital 
did not follow the strictures of a pure economic logic.  As we will see in the second 
chapter to this section, corrupted revenue, like corruption itself, is not a blanket 
category of equal value but rather masks divergent accumulative practices and 
                                                
170 Anton Medan, interview by author (23 June 2010).  
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behaviours (Jauregui, 2007). Money (even illegally gained) was to the internal agents 
of the state ‘a socialised category’ of varying legal, licit and moral weight (Cannell, 
1999, p. 102). As such, what appeared as the brute acquisition of revenue was in fact 
the reproduction of a particular kind of socio-political order internal to the New Order 
state.  
 
By the mid 1990s up until the fall of the New Order, a kongsi of three or four 
Tionghoa laupan controlled the most exclusive and notorious casinos and machine 
gaming venues in the city, many of which continue to loom large in the wayward 
weekend fantasies of even today’s middle-aged clubbing scene.  Among them were 
Pasar Baru’s Classic Hotel, Kunir on Jalan Kunir (later known as Kunir lama, or old 
Kunir), the nightclub Pelangi [rainbow] in Mangga Besar and No. 82 on central 
Jakarta’s Jalan Gadjah Mada (also known as Gadjah Mada 82) and the gaming centre 
known in shorthand as Kelapa Gading, because of its location on Kelapa Gading 
boulevard.  In the final years of the New Order, this small circle would add two new 
additional investors who brandished impeccable military credentials.  In 1995, fresh 
from Jakarta’s most talked about Tionghoa-military property deal, Tomy Winata and 
Sugianto ‘Aguan’ Kusuma took their first foray into Jakarta’s illicit gaming economy 
just as things were about to change forever.171  
 
Judi Jadi Gila:  Democratisation and the Liberalisation of the 
Criminal Economy  
 
                                                
171 This was not Kusuma’s first entrance into central Jakarta nightlife. In 1988, Aguan propped up his 
burgeoning property portfolio with a popular nightclub planted next to the Jakarta Towers known as 
‘stardust’. Anton Medan, interview by author (23 June 2010).  
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If the fall of Suharto initiated a transition to democracy in the world of public politics, 
below ground in the criminal domain, a liberalisation of the market was taking place. 
The civilianisation of security coupled with the unfastening of patron client relations 
from their singular, militarised source meant that the logics of beking were now 
subject to the kind of decentralised, egalitarian mania that, above ground, was 
sweeping the political world.  By the end of 1998, the first signs of the effectiveness 
of democratisation could be read in the feverish mushrooming of gambling venues 
throughout the city.  Grimy new gambling dens sprang up in the traditional areas of 
vice in central Jakarta, that is, along Jalan Gadjah Mada, Jalan Haram Wuruk, Jalan 
Kunir, Jalan Pancoran, in the blocks around ASEMKA and spotted around Mangga 
Dua. But quickly the traditional geographical boundaries of Sadikin’s lokalisasi 
scheme became cramped and cheap casino and machine gaming venues burst forth, 
spreading throughout the city’s eastern, western and northern fronts.  Gambling had, 
in the words of one police general, gone crazy [judi jadi gila].172  
 
Until this point, casino and machine gambling had been concentrated in the hands of a 
small and powerful Tionghoa elite known as ‘the consortium [konsortium],’ but by 
1999 it appears that this group had been split into two kongsi with relatively friendly 
relations, known as the Palembang and Medan groups [used in Bahasa as in the 
corporate sense: grup].  Some put the timing of the split down to a brutal gang war 
outside the Ketapang gaming hall known as the Ketapang incident.173  Certainly, 
                                                
172 Retired police general, interview by author (11 April 2007).  
173 The Ketapang incident was essentially an old-school, territorial faceoff between two rival gangs 
centred around a small mickey-mouse gambling den known as Kasino Royalti Ketapang.  Christian 
Ambonese security guards under Milton Mantuanakota and Ongky Pieters became embroiled in a fight 
with local Betawi Muslims in which a mushollah [small room for Islamic observances] was reportedly 
violated. The battle against the Christian Ambonese quickly escalated, drawing in Muslim Ambonese 
toughs under Ongen Sangaji, Yoris Raweyai’s men from Pemuda Pancasila and the newly formed FPI 
in a two-day frenzy of violence that left fourteen dead (many of whom were in fact Tionghoa casino 
workers who burned to death sheltering inside).  In the aftermath of Ketapang, the government returned 
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Harco Mangga Dua, Jakarta’s biggest and most elite casino, rose to prominence in the 
immediate wake of the riots, changing hands from the Palembang to Medan group.174  
However, the precise details of how and why the Ketapang spat reorganised the 
internal hierarchy of the casinos and their owners remain opaque and for the most 
part, where scholarship that has addressed this event it has been content to repeat 
rumour, knowing little about the actual dynamics of the casino industry at the time 
(Braithwaite, 2010, p. 152, Aditjondro, 2001).  
 
It seems more likely that in these first tender years of democratic transition, as 
Jakarta’s judi industry became ever more bloated with investors, two parts of one 
whole increasingly socialised in different circles, and eventually broke off to become 
independent.  Certainly in terms of organisation and capital, the Medan and 
Palembang group differed substantially. The Medan group had more experience in the 
industry and the capital to be more reckless [berani] with their investments.  Where 
the Medan group invested heavily in high-class casinos, the Palembang group leant 
towards dominance in the market of machine gaming. They even had wildly differing 
systems of labour, salary and discipline on the casino floor.175 But precisely because 
the Medan and Palembang group carved up the high-class casino market so neatly, the 
two groups could enjoy intimate fraternal relations.  The groups shared premises, as 
they did at Harco Mangga Dua, and staff. They pooled resources, used each other’s 
                                                                                                                                      
hundreds of the Muslim and Christian preman back to Ambon, igniting a religious war that raged for 
five years and took thousands of lives. Close to Maj. Gen Suaedy Marasabessy and General Wiranto, 
Ongen Sangaji’s role in provoking the war for a rogue element of the military is widely acknowledged 
in Jakarta, even among his colleagues. Indeed, Sangaji appears to have attracted considerable flak from 
the preman and Ambonese community for inciting such a serious rupture in Indonesian keamanan. For 
this reason, when Sangaji founded an interfaith Malukan preman group, it was widely read on the street 
as an attempt to make amends with the wider Malukan community in Jakarta. One may also be cynical, 
given that the group’s formation occurred just prior to his announcement of running for parliament.  
174 Casino Worker, interview by author (7 October 2009). Also, Casino Worker, interview by author, 
(14 October 2009).  
175 Casino Worker, interview by author (07 October 2009).   
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gaming technicians, machine technology and legal ‘fixers’ [markas] with the police 
and frequently swapped ownership of venues,176 and went into partnership with each 
other. Come Christmas, New Years Eve or Imlek, these two groups of the consortium 
would come together to host a cosy, boozy gathering at Rajamas on Jalan Haram 
Wuruk or K7 on Jalan Kunir, inviting the extended kin from Indonesia’s other great 
judi centres (Surabaya, Batam, Semarang, Medan and Jambi) as well as the fleets of 
Metro Jaya and Mabes generals that protected them.177  
 
For these reasons, untangling precisely who made up the two groups is a vastly 
complicated exercise in forensic criminal genealogy.  At times, the Medan group 
appears to consist of Tomy Winata, Sugianto Kusuma, Medanese Tionghoa Arief 
Cocong and Rudi ‘Rajamas’ Sutanto.  Gambling old-timers, Ajin and brother Awi 
were most definitely of the Palembang group.  Where the rest of the fray lay in this 
ethnic division of proprietorship is anyone’s guess.  
 
An easier exercise is to identify the members of the consortium and their prize 
venues. The consortium included the above six as well as Yoris Raweyai of Pemuda 
Pancasila, Edi ‘Porkas’ Winata, Yasmin (a property developer), Sugeng Pranoto, Hadi 
Rustam (who had the distribution rights for Sony), Iwan Tjahyadikarta (formerly of 
DIPO International Bank), Kwee Haryadi Kumala, Eng San, Johnny Kusuma and 
Arie Sigit. Each of the associates brought a series of skills to the group. Yasmin, Hadi 
Rustam, Winata and Kusuma and brother in law Johnny Kusuma provided capital. 
Ongen Sangaji and Yoris Raweyai did not possess much of an asset base, but their 
respective histories at the centre of Jakarta gang-life earned them the respect of ormas 
                                                
176 Markus is short for broker kasus, a kind of fixer of legal cases with Polri. See Chapter IV.  
177 Anton Medan, interview by author, (23 June 2010).  
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and preman, old and new, thus warding off any challenges from Indonesia’s criminal 
world. Ahjin, Eng San, Sugeng Pranoto, Arie Sigit and Edi ‘Porkas’ Winata were old 
time, New Order figures in Jakarta’s dunia malam.  Arief Cocong and Rudi ‘Rajamas’ 
Sutanto both managed a series of important venues and were often identified as the 
face of illicit gambling in the capital.  Susanto also owned Berita Kota daily which 
provided the consortium with a media mouthpiece and Arief Cocong’s contacts with 
the coercive apparatus were legendary.  Below these men lay an important, shifting 
strata of Tionghoa criminals, gangsters, toughs, managers and their kin who took on 
the everyday running of the various venues and frequently served as the consortium’s 
primary interface with low level cops, officers and preman involved in an individual 
gaming hall’s protection.  Significantly, the consortium also nurtured the capital 
investments of national political figures such as General Wiranto and Governor 
Sutiyoso.178  
 
Clustered in the hands of the consortium were the glitziest and most spectacular 
casinos, gaming halls and nightclubs of city.  With the fall of Suharto, the consortium 
expanded and consolidated its enterprises, opening new entertainment venues and 
placing gaming options in the clubs, hotels and saunas under their control.  On Jalan 
Haram Wuruk, Rudi opened NeoRajaMas, Pelangi and took over control of 
nightclubs Stadium and 1001 (Seribu Satu), placing machines in their backrooms and 
bottom floors.  Along Jalan Kunir, the consortium expanded Kunir lama and Hotel 
Classic and opened up K7, a mammoth new ‘one-stop’ entertainment spot.  Jalan 
Gadjah Mada brandished Gadjah Mada 82 and 85. In the Thousand Islands, luxury 
                                                
178 Casino Worker, interview by author (11 April 2007). Casino Worker, interview by author (7 
October 2009). Field notes (9 February 2007).  
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boats ferried 30-40 elite gamers out to Navy-owned land on Ayer Island for fevered 
weekends of girls and judi.  
 
But the jewel in the consortium’s crown was the monument to luxury gaming housed 
on the fourth floor of Harco Mangga Dua mall. The mall itself had been built by 
Sugianto Kusma’s Agung Sedayu group in the same year as PT JIHD’s joint venture 
with YKEP in that other Golden Triangle on Jalan Sudirman.  Like most of Jakarta’s 
malls, Harco Mangga Dua sheltered a rabble of independent vendors hawking pirated 
DVDs, polyester bedding and cheap Korean appliances under the dull throb of 
fluorescent lighting. Only here at Harco, the fourth floor boasted executive gaming at 
its very finest and most complete [paling lengkap].  To the right of the elevator, the 
floor was dominated by bola ketangkasan, where Mickey Mouse, UFO, Keno, Happy 
Royal and other forms of machine gambling would warble for your attention at Rp 
400,000 [US$45] a shot. Taking a left would direct one to what Jakartans in the 
industry called the kasino proper, where tables offered the traditional card based 
games of roulette, blackjack, baccarat and poker.  Behind the gaming machines lay 
the all-important VIP corner.  
 
Security at Harco was paramount. This was not simply about fear of attack from the 
FPI, FBR or any other preman-Islam permutation set up by General Wiranto and 
former Kapolda Nugroho Djayusman that ran riot in the years after the transition.  In 
the casino business, the punters were willing to forgive a protest outside (as the 
consortium’s 1001, Rajamas and Stadium all experienced) or even an initial, limp 
raid.  Only a second attack revealed to the crowd that a casino’s proprietors did not 
have the political clout or finances to properly secure beking.  The clients would stay 
away for fear that the venue was kurang aman.  Harco’s managers, the last and most 
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prominent of which was Arief Cocong, were far too well-connected to allow Jakarta’s 
most premier casino to be the stage for such loutish forms of politics.   
 
Maintaining an exclusive casino hinged upon an owner’s ability to effect a perfect, 
elegant theatre of keamanan that would reassure the gamers.  At Harco, nothing was 
left to chance. Indeed, the structure was not unlike a traditional Javanese court.  
Around the exemplary centre of floor four, keamanan fanned out in concentric, 
hierarchical circles. At the furthermost post that marked the entrance to the parking 
lot lingered an East Indonesian (mainly Floresian) gang who extracted money for 
parking.  In the middle of the lot, the Bantenese, new on the scene, took over 
entangled with representatives from the notorious Sakera and Arit gangs.  In the lobby 
on floor one, Ambonese guards under Ongen Sangaji kept a careful watch.  At the 
first sign of insecurity they would shut down the lift, sealing in the clientele upstairs.  
By the time a gamer reached the fourth floor, this gaggle of new and old-time preman 
was replaced by military men in sleek black safari suits. These were the low ranking 
marines, military police and officers from the presidential guard [paspampres], paid a 
pittance at anywhere between Rp 20-50,000  [US$2.2-5.5] per day. If that week raids 
by the Islamic militia had particularly spooked the gamers, the Kopassus snipers 
would make an appearance.179  Much to the reassurance of the casino’s patrons, 
shopping malls such as the one that housed Harco were protected by shoot-on-sight 
laws in case of rioting.  To further proof the fortress, casino employees were stationed 
all night out by the parking post where their sole function was to hand out sealed 
envelopes of Rp 10,000 [US$1.1] to the hundreds of dawdling vehicles that ferried 
                                                
179 Not only did SKOGAR continue to organise the layers of military security provided to the casinos 
but within each casino, these multiple layers of moonlighting officers were coordinated by an internal 
body known as ‘Guntur,’ so named after the Jakarta sub-district that houses the headquarters of the 
military police. In the casino, Guntur was the military police who coordinated and monitored the 
leagues of moonlighting officers. Casino Worker, interview by author, (11 April 2007).  
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low-ranking agents of the coercive apparatus to the site.180  Distributors of the uang 
rokok would record the license plate but most nights, the officers would simply swap 
cars and head straight back again for a second or third envelope.  
 
If these security proceedings seemed unnecessarily labyrinthine and costly given the 
wide disbursement of setoran and gift payments amongst the police, the military, the 
Islamic militia, the journalists and the national provincial political elite, then indeed 
they were.  In Java, repeated spectacular ritual displays are integral to the 
performance of territoriality and power.  But there were similarly more prosaic 
reasons for the convoluted nature of the consortium’s security investments, articulated 
ironically in a gambling metaphor by Tomy Winata himself,  
 
‘Up until now, the businessmen don’t want to be seen supporting just one party…It will be the 
end for many businessmen who supported the wrong person.  You cannot put all money on 
just one horse because the uncertainty of winning is too high’ (Chua, 2006, p. 174).  
 
So too within the criminal world, the isolation of one gang of preman could bring 
problems for the whole operation. Indebtedness is key to Winata’s philosophy of 
power.181  By bringing in as many gangs to the fold as possible, relations between the 
different layers of security gentry were courteous, deferent and orderly.  Harco 
Mangga Dua’s elaborate dance of keamanan was orchestrated and synchronised by 
much feared, old time Tionghoa preman such as Teddy Uban and Amiauw, otherwise 
                                                
180 Casino worker, interview by author, (7 October 2009).  
181 This was a recurring theme in every single one of the dozens of my conversations with police, 
preman, NGOs and Tionghoa activists about Winata. Where models of aggressive economic 
competition and capital maximisation might argue the opposite, to Winata, keeping everyone on the 
payroll, regardless of cost, is essential to the preservation of power.  
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known as David Tjioe, who in 2003 also coordinated the attack on Tempo after 
journalists accused Winata of masterminding the Tanah Abang market fires.182  
 
 
Photograph 10: The fourth floor of Harco Mangga Dua, now returned to retail.183 
                                                
182 In 2004, respected news magazine Tempo accused Winata of commissioning a fire at Southeast 
Asia’s largest textile market in Tanah Abang which led to his winning of a local government contract 
for its refurbishment. One week later, the Tempo office was ransacked by preman who beat up 
reporting journalist Ahmad Taufik while Metro Jaya police, then under Makbul Padmanegara, stood 
by. The case led to seven lawsuits filed by Winata against Tempo and editor in chief Bambang 
Harymurti was sentenced to a year behind bars for libel. Soon after, Winata purchased local daily, 
Harian Jakarta and Pilar as well as the station, JakTV and ceased to entertain a prominent public role. 
(Lamoshi, Asia Times, 2004).  
183 Photograph by Author. 21.06.10.  
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Photograph 11: Built by Sugianto Kusuma in 1991, owned by Tomy Winata and run by Arief Cocong, 
Harco Mangga Dua was the crème de la crème of the Jakarta casino scene.  
But if democratisation prompted an expansion in the entrepreneurial ventures of the 
consortium, then it also wore away at their monopoly, exciting a host of new wannabe 
tycoons into the industry.  These individual businessmen of the post-authoritarian era 
became known in central Jakarta as pemain gerilya [guerrilla players] for their 
tenacious, even recalcitrant, claim on what was clearly consortium turf.  Among them 
was Yengky who opened up Gadjah Mada 80 uncomfortably close to the 
consortium’s stalwarts of Gadjah Mada 82 and 85.  Separately, a pribumi known as 
Martin successfully bargained on the fact that Jakarta’s pribumi wouldn’t mind the 
gritty floors and shoddy lighting as long as machines were cheap and the deposit 
[uang muka] was scotched. At ASEMKA and Kaliber II, entire floors of machines 
and card games operated 24 hours a day to whoever wanted in.  Apoh, a Medanese 
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Tionghoa, also reckoned on idea of taking casino and machine gambling to the 
pribumi and peranakan masses, focusing less on cards and more on machines, tasyaw, 
bola setan, and Pai-Q.  Apoh opened up a few major low-class gambling venues at 
Kali Jodoh and Pancoran as well as smaller dens in Sunter Pomodoro, Lippo 
Cikarang, Jatinegara Kelapa Gading Blok A and Green Garden. He stocked his 
venues with cheap Rp 50 000 [US$5.5] prostitutes from West Java and ensured a 
rotating carousel of B-grade artis [celebrities] that would bring in the punters seeking 
a bit of pizzazz to the night’s proceedings.  Slot machines also sprouted on the bottom 
floor of Sarinah, the Hotel Mandarin, Lokarsari’s Hotel Prince and the Hotel Sahid.  
In Dukuh Atas, between 2003-4, even the notorious Timorese militia leader Eurico 
Guteres was said to have installed a few machines.  
 
 
Photograph 12: Kaliber II (sebelas) was one of the many independent casinos appealing to a lower class 
clientele to open in the aftermath of the fall of the New Order.184 
 
                                                
184 Photograph by Author. 21 June 2010.  
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Fuelling the judi boom was the simple fact that investing in machine gambling was 
cheap relative to its bumper gains.  Machines quickly drew in millions of rupiah, only 
cost somewhere between three and four million each and as long as one had access to 
a trustworthy technician they could easily be programmed to a profitable lose rate.185  
For an ambitious hustler with limited capital, it was a win-win situation.  
 
This was as long as the gerilya gamblers could secure concrete, long-term beking 
from the police. Anton Medan observed,   
 
If you opened a casino, the most important thing to weigh up was not how much you won, or 
how much you lost, but how long could you handle paying the bribes [upeti] to the Polsek, 
Polres, Polda, Mabes Polri.186 
 
Although the military continued to play their bit roles on the front line of casino 
protectionism, the reorganisation of the coercive apparatus and the rise of the police 
as a significant player in the security politics of the state had positioned Polri second 
only to the Governor as the most important player in the illegal gaming market. With 
Polri now in charge of keamanan, the gates to the judi market swung wide open as 
senior officers from MABES and Metro Jaya sought to maximise income that had for 
years been limited or denied to them.  Further complicating matters, as Chapter III 
                                                
185 The import of gaming machines appears at least to be partially supported by the Department of 
Sport who had legally been bringing in ketangkasan (skill) machines from at least as early as the 
1990s.  For the consortium, Arief Cocong worked with a subsidiary of the military foundation, 
Yayasan Bina Dana Sosial, called PT Indo Argo to bring in the gaming machines and it seems that at 
least some of these may ended up on the open market being sold to the guerrilla gamblers. It would not 
be implausible to speculate that Cocong’s direct involvement in the machine gaming import industry 
may explain how the consortium were later able to regain dominance over the gambling economy. 
Nonetheless, given the threat that machine gaming presented to the consortium, it is unlikely that 
Cocong and PT Indo Argo were the machines’ sole suppliers (Junaidi, 2002).  
186 Anton Medan interview by author, (23 June 2010). For the record, I have adjusted this sentence to 
the past tense. Medan spoke in the present tense as he argues that some forms of judi are still available 
in the capital. Indeed, they are but as we will see in the following chapter, it is of a vastly different 
form and relationship to the state.  
! "#$ 
outlines, decentralisation was shifting the political scales over to the provincial and 
sub-district levels of governance. This animated the autonomy and ambitions of 
Jakarta’s kapolres and the kapolsek who were no longer content to mop up the scraps 
of setoran payments to their seniors at Metro Jaya and Mabes Polri.   
 
This is not to suggest that the police were the only ones to profit from the illicit 
gaming industry.  Monthly setoran payments were still routine at every level of the 
Jakarta military koter and the DKI administration.  Gambling revenue was also 
percolating through the wider central state, paying for the seminars, operations and 
legal drafting exercises of the various government departments and, crucially, for the 
national and regional election campaigns of political parties and their individual 
candidates. So important was the gambling money as a cash cow for Indonesia’s new 
multiparty electoral system, that party civilian militia such as Megawati’s satgas PDI-
P [Democratic Party of Struggle] sprung up as keamanan for casinos in central Jakarta 
in the early years of the transition (Tajuk, 2009). But above the Islamic preman, 
political powerbrokers, party hacks, military generals and DKI bureaucrats all 
clamouring for kickbacks, the civilianisation of security and the rising importance of 
the rule of law in the new democratic era, had propelled Polri to kingmaker.   
 
In the recollections of the police generals, the punters, the casino employees and the 
Islamic militia members who purported to shut them down, the rise of the guerrilla 
gamblers correlates directly to Kapolda Metro Jaya Nur Faizi’s 1999-2000 term.187 
Despite his best efforts, the Kapolda was an unlikely pick for Kapolri and although 
his name was floated briefly along with that of Nugroho Djayusman for Wakapolri, 
                                                
187 Casino Worker, interview by author (05 April 2007). Retired Police General, interview by author 
(11 April 2007). Former FPI member, interview by author (26 February 2007).  
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by January 2000, Nur Faizi probably knew that his reign over Metro Jaya would be 
the political and fiscal apex of his career. Opening up the gambling industry to 
multiple players could set the general up for life, providing capital for post-pension 
business ventures and any future political campaigning.  Nur Faizi’s aggressive move 
into the casino industry was flanked by deputy Makbul Padmanegara, who would 
later himself become Kapolda Metro Jaya.  
 
So began an era of unprecedented collusion [kolusi] between Polri and Jakarta’s 
gambling tycoons. Polda Metro Jaya took money from whoever wanted to venture 
into the business, inciting a boom in the industry.188  But Nur Faizi and Padmanegara 
could also be tough. Would-be gambling tsars who did not pay enough or did not pay 
with routine consistency were raided and closed down in a great theatre of law 
enforcement, prompting a renegotiation of setoran.  Nur Faizi also had a soft-spot for 
his favourites.  The Kapolda was particularly close to Apoh, which helps explain his 
meteoric rise on the gambling scene and his immunity to attack from either the 
roaming bands of Islamic militia that prowled central Jakarta or the police.189  Nur 
Faizi was also careful to cultivate strong relations with the investors of the 
consortium. When the first president of the democratic era, Abdurrahman Wahid, 
ordered the Kapolda to arrest Tomy Winata on suspicion of illegal gambling on Ayer 
Island, Nur Faizi refused to act.  Just months later in October 2000, the Kapolda and 
no less than thirty-one of his senior Metro Jaya staff were rotated and, in an 
exceptional move, replaced with officers of a higher rank with no prior experience at 
the station (Suara Pembaruan Daily, 2000). This was unusual because most Kapolda, 
including Noegroho Djayusman and Nur Faizi himself, had previously served at 
                                                
188 Retired Police General, interview by author (11 April 2007).  
189 Casino Worker, interview by author (11 April 2007).  
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Metro Jaya in a criminal investigative capacity and earlier held posts as Kapolres of 
central or west Jakarta, where the network of casinos lay thick on the ground.   
 
By appointing Mulyono Sulaiman and a host of alien staff to Metro Jaya, Wahid was 
hoping to sever the bond between the casino operators and the police, a move that 
ultimately did little to change the underlying dynamics of corruption and collusion 
that characterised Metro Jaya’s relationship to judi.  Unlike other illicit economies 
where the potential for extraction relies on the capacity for criminal detection and the 
threat of law enforcement, where gambling was concerned, ‘kami didatangi oleh 
bandar sendiri’ [the gamblers came to us].190  It was easy money, gifted without 
exertion or ultimatum.  Moreover, by tending a new generation of gamblers, Nur Faizi 
had in effect enlarged the pool of off-budget revenue pooling into the institution. 
Cash-strapped and under internal and external political pressure, few kapoldas, 
kapolres and kapolseks had the fortitude to such massive revenues. 
 
By 2000-1, such were the sums coursing through central Jakarta that Governor 
Sutiyoso, himself a strong proponent of legalising the dice, decided to take action. 
Around this time, casino workers report witnessing tours of local parliamentarians 
escorted through Harco Mangga Dua.191  In 2001, supported by Governor Sutiyoso 
and former Governor Ali Sadikin, the provincial parliament commissioned a 
Universitas Indonesia think tank, known as Pusat Penelitan Pranata Pembangunan [P4 
- Research Center for Instituted Development], to work with members of the 
consortium and the main gerilya of the industry to calculate the scale of the economy 
and the potential revenue for the city.  At the same time, the provincial administration 
                                                
190 Middle Ranking Police Officer, interview by author (12 December 2006).  
191 Casino Worker, interview by author (07 October 2009). 
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began accepting proposals for the redevelopment of Jakarta’s Thousand Islands 
district as Indonesia’s own gaming Mecca.  Amongst a host of international bids from 
Macau, Las Vegas, Australia and Holland, TNI foundation Yayasan Bina Dana Sosial 
and Tomy Winata and were fast off the mark to lobby local government for gambling 
contracts, with Winata even hosting President Megawati and husband Taufiq Kiemas’ 
jaunt to the islands (Junaidi & Emmanuelle, 2002). Despite the wealth of elite support 
for the proposal, the rise of political Islam as a discourse, modality of civil and 
criminal mobilisation and vehicle for multiparty politics meant that the national and 
provincial elites treaded gingerly. ‘Just think about it as throwing the gamblers into 
the sea,’ pleaded Governor Sutiyoso (Gatra, 2002).  
 
In late April 2002, UI research centre P4 held a press conference that gave fresh 
impetus to the pro-judi camp. The centre concluded that the thirteen premier [kelas 
kakap] casinos proper in central Jakarta had an individual turnover of between two 
and ten billion rupiah per night, with a total intake of around Rp 130 billion [US$15 
million] per night (Gatra, 2002; Junaidi, 2002).192 Nearly ten thousand workers were 
directly or indirectly involved in the industry, with one casino hiring between 1000-
1500 persons alone. The centre also found that the average executive casino paid 
around Rp 150 million [US$17 000] in upeti [bribes] to police and military personnel 
per night and because of that the coercive forces would likely block any attempt to 
legalise the industry.193 Anton Medan, ever spectacular, pronounced the publicised 
findings of the report too conservative and argued that his sources indicated that 
                                                
192 The study further claimed that around 30 illegal lotteries operated in the city’s five mayoralties, 
bringing in Rp 48 billion  [US$5 million] per week.  
193 Chapter I outlined the ways that off-budget finances enter and circulate amongst the police. Given 
that parmin money was likely filtered through the police as individual, institutional and departmental 
grants and monthly allowances, it seems strange that the centre would come up with a ‘per night’ 
figure. It is my sense that the Rp 150 million [US$16 million] to which the centre refers is only the 
money distributed nightly in envelopes by the Harco Mangga Dua gate. See Gatra, 2002. 
! "#$ 
Harco Mangga Dua was single-handedly making in excess of Rp 1 trillion [US$112 
million] per night, while lower status gambling centres such as those in Sunter and 
Kalijodoh were bringing around 300 billion per night.  Adrian Mahuelete, secretary of 
the Indonesian Entertainment Business Association also presented data that estimated 
that there were actually between 35-50 illegal gambling dens operating in the city, 
with a total daily turnover of Rp 200 billion [US$23 million].194  One business 
proposal handed to the government predicted that legalising the gambling industry 
would contribute Rp 1.5 – 1.8 trillion [$US 168-200 million] to the city’s crudely 
derived Rp 9.3 trillion budget [Rp 1 billion] (Junaidi & Emmanuele, 2002).195  
Whatever the true worth of the illegal gambling industry, the taxable returns to city 
and state coffers stood to be nothing short of titanic.  
 
Ultimately, the combined political and fiscal muscle of the Governor, President 
Megawati and the consortium did not have the leverage to pull the legalisation off. 
Sutiyoso’s relationship with the provincial parliament was fractious and truculent and 
in that self same week as the judi decision, the parties were threatening a vote of no 
confidence. The national Islamic elite that so disliked President Megawati had come 
out squarely against the issue. Facing a September election, Governor Sutiyoso 
announced to the city in July 2002 to ‘forget it’ [lupakan saja] (Jakarta Post, 2002). It 
                                                
194 Although the UI results initially appear more likely than the ramblings of an old preman and the 
speculations of the Indonesian Business Society, there is much to caution us against our immediate 
trust in them. Firstly, the public nature of these reports means that in order to gather data, certain pacts 
and compromises are made between report commissioners, researchers and with interviewees. 
Secondly, often the constricted nature of the research brief commissioned means that information often 
crucial to our understanding of the workings of an illicit economy is left by the wayside for fear of 
inciting offence or vengence.  Moreover, as we saw in the case of the LKEM (Chapter III), researchers 
tend towards self-censorship when information is seen as too sensitive or damaging to certain parties. 
For this reason, one would be foolhardy to categorically reject alternative submissions of casino 
incomes (Gatra, 2002; Junaidi, 2002).  
195 In 2002, the sources of revenue open to the DKI administration had still not sophisticated, although 
Sadikin’s masterplan to rope the city in roads had opened up new forms of revenue.  In that year, 75% 
of the city’s income was derived from vehicle tax.  
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was a feeble end to an issue of such political significance and yet it preserved 
Sutiyoso’s reign for yet another term.  
 
Within the illicit gaming industry it was common during times of political debate, 
local or national elections, mutasi within the political or security elite or the 
renegotiation of setoran, for the various proprietors of the casinos to ‘relax’ the 
machines [stel].  The year 2002 saw the casino’s longest hiatus in years as the tycoons 
closed their doors, kept employees on base salaries and waited out the political storm.  
With their illegality confirmed, the casinos reopened as usual in July, only this time, 
the cards were dealt anew. In 2002, Nur Faizi’s deputy, Makbul Padmanegera, 
successfully strategised to the position of Kapolda Metro Jaya.  From this period until 
the entrance of his successor, Insp. Gen. Firman Gani, the consortium reasserted their 
control over the market.  Many of the gerilya gamblers were shut down by contracting 
either Metro Jaya police officers or FPI to undertake night-time raids of the 
clandestine casinos, destroying or confiscating machines and table equipment in the 
process.196 The use of the Islamic militias to war against select casinos was fitting 
given Wiranto’s involvement in their establishment and his fiscal interests in the 
industry, particularly in the lead up to the 2004 elections.  
 
To some extent, this process of corporate assassination had occurred prior to the 2002 
suspension of the casinos. In 1999, when the consortium had three truckloads of 
Metro Jaya police shut down Yengky’s den on Gadjah Mada, he reportedly stormed 
into Rudi Sutanto’s Stadium nightclub screaming bloody murder. ‘But we are both 
                                                
196 Casino Worker, interview by author (5 April 2007).  Casino Worker, interview by author (7 October 
2009).  
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Medan Chinese!’ [kita sesama Cina Medan!], he reportedly screeched.197  Now the 
cycle of threat and vengeance was heating up.  Industry stalwart, Copacabana was 
raided by police, its Tionghoa management arrested and 130 of its mesin ketangkasan 
destroyed.  A series of small bombs were found in June 2002 in front of nightclubs 
1001 and Eksotik and in the parking lot of Sarinah department store where there were 
known to be a number of machines (The Straits Times, 2002).198  Martin joined forces 
with Ongen Sangaji, Sakera and Arit granting him immunity from the purge.  Apoh’s 
empire of budget gaming dens were cleared given his police connections and the 
prediction that their shabby premises did not poach the consortium’s executive 
clientele.  By 2003-4, new ventures in the sector had to seek permission [ngomong 
dulu] from Arief Cocong or face attack [digrebek].199 The consortium’s control over 
the gambling market was restored. 
 
! 
 
The New Order state was the criminal state par excellence.  By examining the realms 
of legality in which Jakarta’s illicit gaming industry operated, this chapter has 
explored the way in which Suharto and his cronies produced and reproduced 
distinctions between the forms of illegality in which they engaged and other oknum 
modes of criminality in order to maintain power.  In this way the New Order state 
ushered in, to use Roitman’s terms, an ‘ethic of illegality’ which concurrently served 
an instrumentalised political purpose (Roitman, 2006). The gambling economy was a 
means by which Suharto permitted rolling generations of the coercive and political 
                                                
197 Casino Worker, interview by author (11 April 2007). 
198 An equally plausible argument for the tensions in gambling community is offered by Chua, who 
suggests that Taufiq Kiemas orchestrated a number of attacks on Winata’s enterprises after he was 
angered by the sums Winata contributed to his wife, Megawati Sukarnoputri’s election campaign. 
(Chua, 2006, p. 185).  
199 Casino Worker, interview by author (7 October 2009).  
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elite to participate in the prevailing modes of accumulation and reward that 
characterised the New Order developmentalist state, whilst simultaneously reserving 
the network of state concessions and monopolies - the most ‘licit’ and most 
productive - modalities of accumulation for his own family.  
 
Like the sections traversing the economy of gift and territory before it, this section on 
Jakarta’s subterranean dunia malam points to the umbilical relationship between the 
illicit and the licit, between criminal world and the siang of Indonesian state 
governance and law.  Indeed, just as Ryter, Anderson, Siegel and Cribb have 
observed, in Indonesian state formation, criminality has been an auxiliary rather than 
a rival to the regime of law.  The political transition brought about by the fall of the 
New Order initiated two analogous but distinct processes in the illicit economy of 
gambling.  The first was a process of fragmentation away from the military as the 
primary talisman of beking to other civilian, religious and coercive forms.  The 
second was a coalescence of capital around the totem of Polri to correlate with the 
civilianisation of the security apparatus. The failure of the state to legalise gambling 
maintained this siblinghood of licit and illicit.  Crucially too, it preserved capital’s 
leverage over the policing apparatus.  
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Chapter IV: Sutanto’s Twin War on Vices 
 
                     ‘…but we also want to be seen [dianggap] as moral individuals [orang moral]!’  
             Three star police general.200 
 
 
This chapter explores the complex, contextual and changing relationship of morality 
in illicit extraction and exchange by and within the Indonesian state.  As the previous 
chapter outlined, under the New Order, the lucrative judi economy was not divvyed 
up equally between the various elements of the state. Rather President Suharto and 
inner circle seized the most licit elements of that economy, while leaving the illegal, 
but no less lucrative, dimensions of that industry to the lower rungs of the political 
and security elite. After the fall of Suharto, the democratic reorganisation of the 
coercive apparatus facilitated a corresponding rise in the role and financial ‘cut’ of the 
police in Jakarta’s illegal casinos and gaming halls over the military who had 
previously been sought after by the gambling tycoons as the most secure form of 
beking. This chapter charts the peculiar politics of Polri’s 2005 ‘war on gambling’ and 
the severe impact of the termination of the judi revenues on the policing institution, 
showing how considerations of ‘licitness’ and morality intersect with political 
economy and rent seeking within the Indonesian police.  
 
Drawing on anthropological approaches to money, I show how corrupted monies 
from the off-budget parmin and parmas economies are distributed in different and 
                                                
200 Police General, interview by author (19 July 2006). Special thanks go to Lee Wilson and Laurens 
Bakker for their prescient comments on this section.  
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complex ways throughout the institution depending on police perceptions of the 
‘licitness’ of their derivation. I demonstrate how, in accordance with Bloch and 
Parry’s seminal work on transactional orders, unsanctioned, easily-acquired judi 
money is washed of its illicitness by dedicating the revenue to the maintainence of 
kinship relations between ranks. The rotation of judi money from short term to long-
term transactional cycles, decontaminating money for kin unity, shows how ideas of 
morality operate even within corrupt exchanges and serve their perpetuation.  
 
The second section of this chapter continues to trace the perverse line of morality 
within police corruption by grappling with the question of how Polri replaced the 
vertebrae of judi revenue on the ground.  I argue that rather than expand upon the 
institution’s tepid protection of the illicit narcotics industry, Polri’s reskrim officers 
intensified their economy of rent-seeking associated with dispensing their law 
enforcement duties in the parallel war on drugs.  I illustrate how the stabilisation of 
this means of extraction required the use of torture against the lumpen criminal body. 
Using Agamben’s notion of ‘bare life’, I show how practices of state violence are 
highly stratified by class and reserved for the body of the drug user and small time 
dealer.  Within the police, the use of torture on the criminal subclass is a more 
legitimate means of resource extraction than the establishment of an illicit protection 
racket around the traffic of illicit narcotics. In this way, internal patterns of police 
torture and illicit accumulation refract the stratifications of power within wider 
political society in Indonesia.  
 
Finally, this exploration of the dual war on vices and its subsequent effect on patterns 
of police corruption tells us something of the hidden continuites between law and its 
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inverse, transgression. This is not a new theme in the scholarship on law. Derrida and 
Benjamin have long established the paradox of the necessity of coercion in law, 
wherein ‘the legal and the lethal inhabit one another’ (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2006, p. 
31).  But the empirical evidence presented here shows that at the critical time of 
democratisation in which law enforcement and the strengthening of the rule of law is 
experienced as ‘fetish’, the very dimensions of criminality are themselves under 
contestation in ways that show law’s inherent indeterminancy. At the same time, such 
is the mystical authority of law that the language and practices of jurisprudence inflect 
even law’s subversion by its own enforcing officers. Thus, even where law as an 
instrument of power overrides its potential to constrain power, it does so in ways that 
make the negara hukum or state of law appear rational, orderly and lawful.  
 
! 
 
‘Pemberantasan! ’ The End of Casino Gambling 
 
When General Sutanto was nominated to National Police Chief (Kapolri) in July 
2005, replacing a corrupt, largely self-governing and heavily politicised term under 
General Da’i Bachtiar, it surprised few.  After all, General Sutanto was angkatan ‘73, 
a 1973 graduate of the National Military Academy (AKABRI) and, crucially, a 
classmate of newly elected President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.  For Indonesians 
who had long learnt to keep an eye on the transformations within the state coercive 
apparatus, this nomination of an AKABRI schoolmate to National Police Chief was 
logical, if disappointingly predictable.  Indeed, the president’s chummy relationship 
with the Kapolri has structural rather than kinetic origins.  
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In April 1999, President Habibie separated the police and the military by presidential 
decree but placed them both under the control of the Department of Defence.201  One 
year later, Abdurrahman Wahid’s fractured relations with the military and concerns 
about the weakness of the police vis a vis the military led to the drafting of TAP MPR 
VI and VII.202  However, these special decrees did not clearly separate between 
defence [pertahanan] and security [keamanan] functions and in a concession ot the 
police, they moved Polri out from the militarised direction of the Department of 
Defence to under the direct powerful patronage of the president, rather than the 
department of the Interior or the newly recalibrated Department for Law and Human 
Rights.  The TAP MPR attempted to compensate for the lack of civil bureaucratic 
control by bisecting the power of the president with a new body known as Kompolnas 
[the National Police Commission] which was to weigh in on presidential decisions 
about policy direction and the nomination of the Kapolri.   
 
By 2002, regulatory dawdling from the presidential office meant that Kompolnas was 
still years from being established.  Without a civilian bureaucracy to administer police 
affairs, Polri’s legal division took over as they had during the years of ABRI, only this 
time they were not overshadowed by military headquarters pruning back attempts at 
police self-determination.203  The resulting draft was a wish list of authorities free of 
public, bureaucratic or external accountability.  By merging Kompolnas with a public 
                                                
201 Within the police, Insp. Gen Adang Darajatun and his band of assistants such as Brig. Gen. Edhi 
Susilo and Brig. Gen. Syafriyadi were responsible for drafting the new direction of police reform 
which they did in an extended pamphlet widely known within the police as ‘the blue book.’.  
202 Marzuki Darusman, interview by author (1 July 2008). Retired Police General, interview by author, 
11 April 2007). A TAP MPR is a special decree from the People’s Legislative Council, the highest 
legislative body.  
203 Specifically, Insp. Gen. (purn) Logan Siahaan played an instrumental role in drafting the laws.  
Golkar parliamentarian Gunanjar, interview by author, 17 April 2007. Logan Siahaan, interview by 
author (12 June 2008).  
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complaints board, the draft essentially rendered the new commission too feeble for 
bureaucratic and public accountability and the issue of moving the police below any 
other department was completely off the agenda.  Vulgar politicking with a hand-
picked ad hoc parliamentary committee ensured that the draft was largely passed 
without substantial amendment.204  Thus, UU 02/2002 essentially preserved the 
special relationship between the police and the president.  A retired officer known for 
his criticism of Polri observed,  
 
We were all emotional at the time. We could only think to put the police under the president. 
We didn’t think of civilian control. We just wanted to be far from the TNI and far from the 
department. We were scared of political intervention again. We didn’t think that being below 
the president would be being below a political body in itself.205  
 
Hills examines the structures of the police in Ghana, Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe 
to conclude that the police in authoritarian and newly democratising states are merely 
the technical-coercive arm of political elites and their stratagems for power and 
resources (Hills, 2007). African policing, she argues, is ‘an expression of presidential 
preference’ (ibid, p. 420). This is not the power differential of the Indonesian 
example.  Instead, the police-presidential axis operates in a finely balanced symbiosis 
by which the police deliver the security outcomes necessary to maintain the standing 
                                                
204 In the thousands of pages of parliamentary debate that I have examined on the 2002 Police Act 
available at National Parliament, not once did a political party, invited expert or police or military 
officer raise the issue of the politicisation of the police under the president. The sole mention of this 
structure is made by the Fraksi Kebangkitan Bangsa, the political wing of Nahdlatul Ulama, who 
observed that the direct relationship between the police and the president will uncomplicate 
[memberpendek] bureaucracy, increase efficiency and ‘give absolute authority [kewenangan absolut] to 
the police chief to tackle issues of governance’ (Sekretariat Jenderal Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, 2002). 
Security sector reform NGOS were similarly lax in their attentiveness to the 2002 draft, putting their 
energies into military reform. In the words of one highly respected activist, ‘We forgot about the 
police!’ RIDEP, interview by author, 22 September 2006. 
205 Retired Police General, interview by author, 11 April 2007.  
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and legitimacy of the government in exchange for overlooking Polri’s failure to 
implement key democratic reforms and the ongoing abuse of power.   
 
Consequentially, after Da’i Bachtiar’s blatantly political term under President 
Megawati Sukarnoputri,206 few had high hopes for the progression of police reform 
under new Kapolri Sutanto.  There was little public fanfare around President 
Yudhoyono’s inauguration request to his former classmate to tackle the ‘Lima Jenis 
Kejahatan’ (five types of crime) that threatened the integrity of the republic. 
Gambling, drugs, smuggling, logging and other forms of corruption were established 
problems that attracted a stock standard refrain of political rhetoric – pemberantasan! 
[exterminate!] - and yet continued unabated from administration to administration 
since the beginning of the republic. The very idea of rule of law in the Republic was 
often dismissed by people as farcical.  But within a week of his tenure, General 
Sutanto had not only pledged an assault on the offenses that led to a steady leaking of 
state coffers but also the vices he deemed ‘impacted upon the community,’ such as 
narcotics.   
 
The drug trade was an area that the new Kapolri knew something about.  In the first 
200 days of Yudhoyono’s presidency, while Da’i Bachtiar served out the rest of his 
term, Sutanto had been appointed head of the Anti-Narcotics Agency (BNN).  A 
highly strategic position, this particular rotation (mutasi) drew Sutanto in from the 
cold hinterland of police education and back in the running for the upcoming Kapolri 
throne (Irjen Pol Sutanto Jadi…n.d). As head of BNN, Sutanto had brought to the 
                                                
206 Bachtiar is known among the police force for his open support for the president. Come the 2004 
elections, the Wives Association of the Police, a structure that parallels in rank and hierarchy, the 
structure of Polri, were instructed to vote for Megawati Sukarnoputri. Police Analyst, interview by 
author (28 July 2007). Police General, interview by author (12 December 2006). Field notes (20 
November 2006).  
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position a five pronged strategy to reinvigorate the war against drugs, one that 
strategically mixed strong punitive and harm-reduction approaches207.  As Kapolri, he 
took the unusual step of retaining his position as head of BNN to signal his 
commitment to eradicating the illegal use and traffic of narcotics.  
 
Curiously, Kapolri Sutanto also declared the opening of a new front in the battle 
against crime.  Just two weeks after his inauguration, he pledged ‘a war on gambling’ 
and announced he had extracted pledges from the kapolda to shut gambling down 
within seven days (Jenderal Polisi Sutanto Beri Kontrak, 2005). In his public 
pronouncements, Sutanto discussed perjudian in its most unqualified form, giving the 
populace no indication as to precisely which amongst their everyday medley of 
economic play was warred upon.  Either way, it was of little consequence because 
few believed that the Kapolri’s promise to eradicate gambling was genuine, or even 
achievable.  Questions too arose from civil society as to whether the war against 
gambling should in fact be a priority in an archipelago facing such staggering legal 
and security issues (Indonesian Corruption Watch, 2005).  
 
Oddly, the process of pemberantasan barely seemed to happen at all.  There was a 
common echo of support from all 33 of Sutanto’s inherited kapolda,208 the scattered 
                                                
207 Under Sutanto’s leadership as Kapolri and head of BNN, Indonesia opened the largest narcotics 
rehabilitation institution in the world in Lido, Sukabumi. (See, Pusat Rehabilitasi Narkoba…n.d). 
Research conducted in June and July 2008 suggested that this institution and others like it is not 
without the problems that affect the structures of governance in Indonesia.  Rehabilitation institutions 
have been folded into the patterns of corruption, abuse and discrimination that shape the lives of 
Jakarta’s urban poor.  However, in my talks with NGO activists and academics working in the sector, I 
have been reminded that that although there are problems with the harm reduction policies, their very 
integration in the fight against illicit narcotics represents a significant and positive policy shift for the 
Indonesian government.  
208 Surprisingly, Sutanto did not seek to move Bachtiar’s crew of Kapolda until December 2005. At this 
point, he replaced 13 of senior generals with his own men. Sutanto’s strategy during most of his term 
of leadership was to maintain his strength in the territories, where the ‘real’ policing was done. Sutanto 
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arrests of some unknowns and small fry and then nothing.  Within the first eight 
weeks of General Sutanto’s leadership, gambling in all its myriad forms – togel, 
cockfighting, card games, dominos, football betting [bola judi] leading right up to that 
great, glittering lattice of casino high rolling and machine gaming strung up in the 
city’s centre - had completely disappeared from the social landscape of Jakarta.  This 
was similarly so in all of Indonesia’s other major cities.  It was as if the felted green 
tables and buzzing queues of slot machines in the casinos had simply folded in on 
themselves and vanished overnight.  By mid October 2005, Indonesian Police Watch 
released a public announcement ‘saluting’ the ‘prestigious police work’ of General 
Sutanto wherein ‘99% of gambling in Indonesia has been closed down’ (Setahun 
SBY-JK… 2005).   
 
Cynics pointed to the tenacity of small pockets of ‘vice’ scattered throughout the 
capital, reiterating a reliable old narrative of conspiracy and governmental theatre.  
They argued that the war on gambling was a fraud and, with a little tenacity, the 
intrepid gamer could stumble easily across examples of gambling’s casual 
infringement on the rule of law.  Indeed, there is no doubt that the ban was 
pockmarked by the odd weekly cockfight, the rumours of a Saturday night casino in 
an isolated plantation, or the occasional stray togel seller.209  But where previously 
gambling operated largely in the open, ‘yes, illegal, but as if it was legal’ observed 
one of my informants from the casino industry, now it was hidden and marked with a 
murmur of disquiet.210  In the capital the sporadic arrests continued, made up 
                                                                                                                                      
hoped that by stocking the regions with his men, they would provide leverage against his enemies at 
home in Mabes Polri. Sutanto kept his friends close but his enemies even closer.  
209 These forms of gaming were pernicious enough for me to be able to witness them first hand during 
my fieldwork.  
210 Casino Worker, interview by author, 7 October 2009. 
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primarily of togel sellers and card sharks, as evidence that the police war claimed its 
foes. 
 
The effect of the war on gambling in the capital was dramatic and yet, this great, 
grinding shift in the world of criminality passed through the annals of the city 
completely unnoticed.  To date, there is no public record of tens of thousands of the 
urban poor - the men, women and families of my field notes – whose livelihoods 
depended on revenue from the casino industry and whose lives hardened into a series 
of disquieting choices when those funds ran dry.  Such was the consortium’s strength 
that a number of their employees could transfer to other retail labours in its members’ 
hotels, bars, clubs, restaurants, brothels, petrol stations and grocery stores. 
Nonetheless, thousands of workers either directly employed by the consortium or 
living from it remotely via its cleaning, catering, sex, drugs, and jimat service 
industries found themselves suddenly unemployed or underemployed.  This mass of 
labour pooled into new areas, pushing into garbage recycling, prostitution, the 
production of narcotics (specifically amphetamines), kaki lima [food vendors] and for 
those who had connections, low-level white-collar labour.   
 
Tellingly, even two years after the eradication of gambling, Jakarta’s grimy bars, 
clubs and pool dens still held the lives of the industry’s idle labourers in suspension.  
These were the fraternities of middle and inner layer security men, machine operators, 
fixers, the floor managers and money handlers who slept all-day and skulked in late at 
night to smoke cigarettes and play pool.  All were still waged by their former 
employers, though without the added benefit of tips this monthly stipend only 
comfortably supported the young and single.  Few among this brotherhood of gaming 
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believed that the industry could be erased so easily and their talk orbited endlessly 
around a speculated date for the reopening of the casinos.  Men gossiped about seeing 
the slot machines hauled out of storage, about the effect of the 2007 provincial 
elections on permeability of the gambling ban, of the quiet promises of candidates and 
political parties to reignite the industry, about the possibility of gambling’s 
legalisation and about the new ventures that their former bosses were opening.  Most 
of all, they talked of themselves and wider Jakarta, as lapar [hungry].   
 
To look for the truth amongst the indefatigable patter of gossip is to miss its 
significance in historical trajectory of Indonesian gaming and its relationship to the 
state.  The anthropology of gossip shows how such speech straddles the divide of 
public and private, gathering in cavities of social uncertainty.  The circuit through 
which this exploratory discourse flows defines the group.  Indeed Gluckman observed 
that gossip is ‘the hallmark of membership’ (Gluckman, 1963; Lancaster, 1992) that 
in this case, helped to playfully constitute and reconstitute that membership well after 
its grounding structures - labour, place, capital, geography, time, ethnicity and skin 
colour – had been pulled out from underneath it.  Moreover, that communities of ex-
gaming staff continued to meet and define their lives around a rudimentary economy 
of a now absent set of practices is indicative not only of how remarkable and 
unexpected the ban was and how political it was seen to be.  It is also testimony to 
how those working on the vulnerable, changing borders of legality interpreted the 
sites, limits and internal relations of state authority in time of unprecedented 
democratic political change.  A slight shift in political power - a new city mayor or a 
new regional police chief allied to old power - and this layer of casino middle 
management, along with the bosses that continued to pay their salaries, expected to be 
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back in the game.  In the matter of casino gaming, rule of law was mercurial and state 
power was only a temperamental queue of changing personalities.  Until then, even a 
full two years after the eradication of gambling, they watched and waited. 
 
As far as gossip was concerned, only one group brooded more on the ban than its 
labourers and this was the Indonesian national police.  At all ranks of Polri, Sutanto’s 
reasoning for prohibition on gambling was dissected, debated and pored over.  Few 
accepted the idea that it was a vice that needed to be expunged from the social 
landscape and even fewer again argued that the popularity of gambling was haram or 
not in standing with the world’s biggest Islamic country.  Theories were restlessly 
sketched out to explain the ban.  Some argued that President Yudhoyono and through 
him, General Sutanto, was a pawn of the US-dominated, Singaporean gambling 
industry and that domestic prohibition would mean that Indonesia’s high rollers 
would hot foot it across the border for the newly planned Marina Bay casino. 211  
Christian officers, who frequently and justifiably complained about being passed over 
for promotions, naturally pointed the finger at the growing Islamisation of the 
structures of governance.212  Others remembered the heated political debates of 2002 
that pushed for legalised zones where casinos could operate and said that the ban was 
a momentary prohibition to calm the Islamists before the new gambling dens were 
unveiled.213  Some police officers whispered that Sutanto had been tough on gambling 
back in his home province of East Java, and hinted darkly of a family tragedy 
affiliated to the dice.214  
 
                                                
211 Marina Bay is owned by LA Sands, a major gambling multinational. Mid ranking police officer, 
interview by author, 12 December 2006.   
212 Mid ranking police officer, interview by author, (12 December 2006).  
213 Police General, interview by author, (10 December 2006).  
214 Field notes (10 April 2008).  
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However, for most police officers the most compelling piece of evidence explaining 
the sudden ban on gambling lay in Sutanto’s career pathway to Kapolri.  Officers 
pointed to Sutanto’s truncated stint as Kapolda of North Sumatra [Sumut] in 2000 as 
crucial to the psychology of the new prohibition.  In 2000, as Kapolda Sumut, Sutanto 
is reputed to have fallen out with Olo Panggabean, a Christian Toba Batak with 
Chinese ancestry whose name is synonymous with illegal gambling in North 
Sumatra’s provincial capital of Medan.   
 
Born in 1941, Sahara Oloan Panggabean headed the rival gang to Pemuda Pancasila, 
IPK, or Ikatan Pemuda Karya [Youth Workers Association].  IPK was established by 
elements of the military in partnership with Chinese entrepreneurs frustrated with 
Pemuda Pancasila’s monopoly on protecting illegal commerce in Medan.  Ryter notes 
that during the New Order, IPK raised the stakes of the competition by breaking out 
of the protection industry and moving heavily into illegal gambling (Ryter, 2000; 
Ryter, 2009). In Medan, as in Jakarta, the fall of Suharto and the disbandment of 
ABRI reorganised gangland territoriality.  Only here, unlike in the capital, clear lines 
were drawn between the coercive apparatus:  Polri was affiliated with Pemuda 
Pancasila and IPK with the regional military command.  In 1999, then Kapolda Brig. 
Gen Sutiono attempted to close down IPK owned gambling outfits to PP’s benefit, but 
it ended violently.  Shots were fired at Olo Panggabean’s residence, the famed ‘white 
house,’ and in the ensuing battle one Brimob (Mobile Police Brigade) member was 
killed (Ryter, 2009). The following year, Sutanto took up the reigns as Kapolda and 
declared the end of judi.  
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It is impossible to guess whether Kapolda Sutanto’s demand that Panggabean shut 
down his gaming ventures was a function of the police chief’s genuine enthusiasm for 
eradicating gambling, his inherited affiliation to Pemuda Pancasila or the simple 
desire to assert his authority over Medan’s criminal royalty.  Either way, Sutanto’s 
attempt to discuss the end of perjudian face to face was snubbed by Panggabean’s 
dispatch of a minor to represent him at the crucial meeting.  Then, just seven months 
into Sutanto’s term, Panggabean used his leverage with Kapolri Bimantoro to have 
the general rotated to Kapolda of East Java.  That this was a posting of similar stature 
to the Medan position was hardly mollifying for an officer with the obstinacy to 
challenge the likes of Panggabean.   
 
The ejection from Medan blighted Sutanto’s career for years.  In October 2002, the 
very same month of his appointment to national police chief, Da’i Bachtiar rotated 
Sutanto to the dusty tumbleweed of police education.  As head of SELAPA [Sekolah 
Lanjutan Perwira, or Polri’s advanced school for middle ranking officers], Sutanto 
was alienated from the circuits of power and prestige that characterise police career 
mobility.  His appointment to chair of BNN in the twilight of Bachtiar’s term saved 
his career from petering out in the bowels of a national police training school.  Hence, 
when the ban on perjudian came so hot on the heels of Sutanto’s appointment to 
National Police Chief, police officers surmised that Sutanto was using his position to 
exact his revenge.  Mid-meal, one junior ranking officer put down his fork suddenly 
and glared at me,  
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If you see Sutanto during this thing you are doing, I want you to ask him: ‘Is his war against 
judi something he truly wants to do from his heart, or is it really just about dealing with the 
trauma he has from Medan?215  
 
At the time of my ethnography, this was the question asked over and over again in the 
halls of stations across the country.  Why had Kapolri Sutanto, career officer and 
presidential lackey, so rankled the likes of the police, the political elite and the 
criminal elements of Tionghoa big business in order to extinguish a little vice like 
gambling?  
 
 
Parmin versus Parmas: Beyond the Meaning of Money 
 
For a middle ranking, ambitious regional police chief with his sights set on obtaining 
the three stars needed to be in the running for Kapolri, the North Sumatra position is 
one of Polri’s most strategic.  Indeed, a posting as regional police chief in North 
Sumatra, just like its parallel posting in East Java, appears in the career genealogies of 
nearly all of Polri’s National Chiefs.  Kapolri Imam Santoso Hoegeng wrote of his 
1956 appointment to Medan,  
 
North Sumatra is a difficult [berat] region in Indonesia.  It is the testing ground [wilayah 
ujian] for the career of a police officer.  Medan, or North Sumatra is usually seen as a regional 
test case that promises two possibilities.  If you have succeeded, then your career will 
skyrocket [melejit].  But if you fail, yeah, you hit a dead end [ya masuk kotak!].  So there’s an 
uncertain feeling of worry or apprehension if you are assigned there.  Just don’t fail.  This 
                                                
215 Middle ranking police officer, interview by author, (14 December 2006).  
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pattern [pamor] is not only just in the police but also in the military! (Yusra & Ramadhan, 
1993, p. 210). 
 
Medan’s sheer size as one of Indonesia’s largest cities and third largest econonmy is 
certainly part of its importance.  The city’s population is, like Jakarta and Surabaya, 
seen as a challenge to conventional practices of urban policing.  But, as scholars such 
as Ryter and Hadiz have so skilfully outlined, Medan’s significance in the national 
arena lies in its reputation as the heartland of criminal politics (Hadiz, 2003; Ryter, 
2002). Hadiz asserts that ‘arguably, no region matches North Sumatra in terms of the 
sheer political power and influence of the preman (Hadiz, 2003, p. 127). According to 
Hoegeng, an established relationship of collusion and corruption existed between the 
oknum2 ABRI in 1950s North Sumatra.  ‘By bribing state officials, those Chinese 
[sic] freely smuggle and gamble!’ (Yusra & Ramadhan, 1993) Nonetheless, despite 
the depth and tenacity of this off-budget economy, for Hoegeng at least, it remains a 
professional, individual choice whether to intervene.  
  
Nearly fifty years later in contemporary Indonesia, the significance of a posting in 
Medan was similarly explained me by middle ranking and retired officers as a testing 
ground for a budding Kapolri.  The rule still holds: Medan will make or break the 
career of an officer of the coercive apparatus.  But their narratives suggested that 
today Hoegeng’s logic of the professional police officer is now inverted.  Ambitious 
Kapolri jostle for a position from their superiors in North Sumatra because here one 
builds crucial patronage relationships with the business (parman) and criminal 
(parmin) communities.  These connections propel the career of an individual officer 
upwards and keep the policing institution flush with funds through undocumented 
donations that are often criminally derived.  In these contemporary narratives, the 
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distinction that Hoegeng held between Polri officer as oknum and officer as 
professional, collapses.  It is in police institution’s benefit that the officer cultivates a 
privateer quality from his officialdom, not least his own, dissolving the boundary 
between state and illegality, oknum and officer.  As in the parman economy, police 
corruption in contemporary Indonesia operates in ways that frustrate attempts to 
narrow corruption’s definition down to ‘illegal actions for private gain’ (Meier, 
Holbrook, 1992, p. 136). Within the Indonesian national police, the undifferentiated, 
morally laden practice we know as ‘corruption’ is first and foremost a social system 
deeply embedded in institutionalised structures of power and the internal, hierarchical 
relationships that make up those structures (Anders & Nuijten, 2007, p. 15).  
 
Like the parman and parmas economy, the parmin economy is regarded by the police 
as a necessary and regular interior current of revenue that derives, as the name 
suggests, from partisipasi kriminal [lit. criminal participation].  Similar to the parman 
economy, parmin funds are quietly justified by the gross inconsistencies in the 
circulation of state revenue to the police as well as the insatiable greed of the officer 
class, who vertically distribute its profits to obtain prestige postings and maintain 
positions.  However, as we will see, the parmin, parman and parmas economies do not 
function in precisely the same way, draw in similar revenues or travel the same 
internal circuits.  
 
Chapter V outlined how and why gambling revenues came to occupy a unique place 
in the off-budget economies of the police in the post-Suharto era.  In Jakarta, Batam, 
Surabaya, Medan, Manado and Jambi, off-budget revenues from gambling far 
outstripped the monies derived from any other major subset of the parmin economy, 
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including the important trades of illegal logging, illicit narcotics, petrol smuggling or 
gun running.216 There are a number of structural and cultural reasons for the 
importance of gambling as a revenue stream for the police.  First, is the sheer size of 
the gambling economy, which generated hundreds of billions of rupiah per day across 
the archipelago.  Secondly, unlike the illegal logging or fishing industries, the 
productivity of judi did not inflict losses on the state economy and as such could 
operate relatively undetected.  Also, as we have seen, casino gambling was largely 
run by a centralised elite who established intimate relations with national level 
decision-makers, the fiscal consequences of which trickled down through state 
institutions.  Extraction was not up to the entrepreneurial gusto of individual units or 
officers but rather, gambling was a pre-existing, reliable mechanism pumping a stable 
quantum of revenue into the system.  The illicit gambling industry was also an 
important way for budding entrepreneurial officers to be introduced to the technical 
complexities of systems of modern day finance.  Police generals, fearing the chance 
and competition of the modern financial markets, were attracted to the judi economy 
because it offered a way for nervous generals to invest their money with absurdly 
inflated returns.217  Finally, Polri’s inordinate reliance on the gambling economy was 
also because officers from generals down to non-commissioned personnel tended to 
regard the practice of gambling (as opposed to its proceeds) as a relatively minor vice 
of little moral import.  There are many social, political and cultural reasons for this. 
Indeed, systems of surveillance and policing everywhere are only ever a reflection of 
wider social norms.218  This is particularly true for the Indonesian police. Its officers 
                                                
216 Middle Ranking police officer, interview by author, (12 December 2006).  
217 Police General, interview by author, (22 February 2007).  
218 Binde and Curnow argue that in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, the moral ambiguity around 
gambling is linked to its ability to function as a positive generalized form of reciprocity. Gambling 
thus, is an exchange system in which surplus is redistributed or cash ‘socialised’ (Curnow, 2008, p. 
378). Also, Binde, 2005; Curnow, 2008; Mitchell, 1988). 
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are uniquely placed to witness first hand the gulf between legal, licit and moral codes 
in a region where economic play has such a long history and where modern forms of 
mechanised gambling could be so easily confined to a pariah minority.  
 
For all of these reasons, not only did gambling also constitute one of the largest 
revenue streams within the parmin economy, but relative to the gift (parman) and 
community participation (parmas) economies, it was an even and dependable flow of 
funds upon which the policing apparatus could rely.  Take the example of Adjunct 
Police Commissioner [ajun komisaris] Cecep, a former head of criminal research 
(kaditserse) at a Central Jakarta polsek in which gambling was known to be rife.219  
He recounted that in the period just before the war on gambling, he received casino 
and machine revenues [setoran] from five Tionghoa line officers [LO] managing sites 
operating within the district of his authority.  From Kim, Ajin and Asiong, Cecep was 
paid a monthly stipend of Rp 500,000 [US$55].  From Koh San, he collected a further 
Rp 1.5 million per month and from Ahuy, Cecep received Rp 1 million [US$111].   
 
Cecep accepted the differences in sums as a function of the size, stability and legal 
indemnity of a gambling enterprise.  Larger outfits, such as those beneath the 
umbrella of the consortium, gave less in their individual payments to the lower rungs 
of the police because they distributed monies so widely and routinely throughout the 
institution and the quality of their beking was so unshakeable.  Ostensibly, their 
stipend was payment in return for protection.  But in truth, no lowly sectional head 
would have the clout or connections to seriously threaten a consortium-backed 
enterprise.  If, as we have seen in the previous section, elaborately articulated ‘gifts’ 
                                                
219 Details and dates of this source’s appointment are necessarily oblique given the ease with which this 
individual could be identified. Junior ranking officer, interview by author, (7 March 2007).  
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from Tionghoa businesspeople are in reality crudely levered through discrimination 
and extortion, then ironically the monthly consortium-issued protection payments to 
low ranked officers were as close to true ‘gifts’ as the off-budget financial system 
ever got.220  On the other hand, for the gerilya gamblers and other small time 
operators, monthly setoran payments were larger because their zone of protection was 
frequently limited to the administrative district in which they functioned, calling for 
greater displays of prowess and authority from the few officers in their salary.   
 
Each month, Cecep gathered revenue from gaming totalling Rp 5.5 million [US 
$613].  His own salary was a mere Rp 2 million [US $222].  Within his station, 
similar amounts were received by fellow heads [kanit] of intel [intelligence], samapta 
[patrol] and the head of the new narcotics department.  The most deserving of the 
money was the head of the criminal investigation deparment [kaditserse] who held the 
power of prosecution.  It being out of their sphere of authority, the traffic police, 
administrational head and community relations officers cannot in theory requisition 
gaming funds although Cecep said it was possible that they received a small cut. The 
head of the station, his deputy and the head of staff [kasad] obtained gambling payoffs 
potentially three to four times Cecep’s Rp 5.5 million as well as other perks such as 
scholarships for their children, homes, vehicles and access to the pot of one-off 
‘donations’ from the tycoons.  
 
Cecep also outlined the other sources of financing available to him.  Although I asked 
directly a number of times, Cecep insisted that he did not receive money associated 
                                                
220 I would speculate that the regular payments to the police juniors was in fact part of the negotiated 
deal between police generals and gambling tycoons. Police will argue that that providing sources of 
lahan is a moral obligation of seniors but if it is, it is regularly violated.  Making sure juniors got a pay 
off from the gambling economy built up an officer’s prestige and did not require the exertion or 
sacrifice.  
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with the prostitution or narcotics industries that flourished in his neighbourhood.  
However, he did procure a further five – ten million rupiah from what he referred to 
as the industry of kasus [cases].  Within the police, uang kasus is generally 
categorised as an important subsection of the parmas [community participation] 
economy.  Uang kasus [case money] is the sum a criminal investigator will extract 
from a plaintiff requesting police assistance to resolve a criminal or civil act.  
According to the state budget, criminal research officers are issued a sum between Rp 
500 000 [US$ 55] - 2.5 million [US $279] to cover investigation costs depending on 
the case’s ‘size’ [kecil - sedang -  besar].221  However, as Chapter III outlined, 
because these funds are often substantially delayed, pilfered or only issued after the 
fact, officers frequently justify the extraction of uang kasus as covering the shortfall 
of the state.  Explains a young criminal research officer,  
 
We don’t have the budget for cases. We only get about Rp 500,000 per case and we have to 
pay for stationary and paper!  So, we take it from people. When someone comes in with a 
case, they normally pay between two – five million in ‘administrational’ fees.  We don’t ask 
[minta] for the money.  They give it voluntarily [berikan dengan rela]… I mean, you know 
what our budget looks like. We don’t want to be corrupt, but we are forced to ask them to pay.  
It’s a vicious circle [lingkaran setan].  [Masa] do I really have to use my wages that are only 
just enough [pas-pasan] to pay for their cases?! We want to reform, but it’s a vicious circle.222 
 
When a person brings a case to the police, they are generally required to pay this fee.  
The officer above stated that it is between two and five million rupiah but in truth, the 
real sum is calculated in accordance with the size and severity of the case and the 
police’s estimated wealth of the plaintiff.  During my fieldwork, no-one I interviewed 
                                                
221 UNICEF Child Protection Officer , interview by author, (31 July 2008).  
222 Junior ranking criminal research officer, interview by author, (1 October 2006).  
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would speak of the sums they paid to the police to resolve a criminal or civil case.  In 
all likelihood, aggrieved families and plaintiffs feared their ‘uang kasus’ would be 
read as a means of eradicating an enemy or resolving a vendetta by having the 
disputing party arrested, sometimes on false grounds.  Often, this is precisely the case, 
particularly where the potential benefit is the obliteration of a political or business 
rival.  
 
However, for Polri, the kasus economy is a see-saw of fiscal potential.  Police broker 
their powers of arrest and prosecution between plaintiffs and criminal suspects, 
levering payments out of both sides.  From the accused, sums of a stupendous size are 
secured.  A high-level corruption case with national exposure could potentially bring 
in billions of rupiah to criminal research departments in Mabes or at the polda level.  
In one of Indonesia’s biggest banking scandals in the past decade, the family of just 
one of over a dozen suspects in the case privately told me that they had single-
handedly paid out over Rp 3 billion [US $335 million] to Bareskrim (or the central 
criminal research department of Mabes Polri) over the two years the case was 
investigated.223  The money was not paid in one painful outlay, but accrued slowly 
and insidiously.  With each meeting, criminal investigation staff demanded Rp 100-
200 million [US$ 11 000 - $22 000].  Meetings would be called in expensive five star 
hotels around the capital, where officers would invite their friends and family to stay 
the weekend and present the accused with the bill.  The accused was provided with a 
menu of options – flee to Singapore, fall ‘mysteriously’ ill, obtain ‘treatment’ in a 
police hospital or at home, remain in detention in a deluxe room or have a Sunday 
outing.  The options themselves were a pick and mix of possibilities, all of which had 
                                                
223 Confidential Source, interview by author, (21 March 2007).  
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their price.  Sometimes the money was demanded in US dollars and all payments 
were made in cash, never money transfers that could be tracked by the PPATK 
[Centre for Financial Reporting and Analysis].  The sibling of the defendant who 
brokered many of the transactions declared, ‘you know, I used to think the police and 
the prosecutor [jaksa] were ok.  But now I hold a pembantu [housemaid] in greater 
esteem than them…When I go in there, they look at me like I am walking money 
[uang jalan].’224  
    
Despite its worth, at the district and sub-district commands, Cecep maintained that the 
kasus economy is not an inexhaustible font of profit but in fact subject to extremes of 
fluctuation [fluktuatif] and the uncertainties of exchange.  A criminal research officer 
cannot control who might be arrested or commission police action that month, nor can 
he predict their fiscal potential.  Either way, there are still outlays to be reckoned 
with: costs for fuel, officers to muster into action, per diems to calculate, and 
prosecutors and judges to enlist.  Corruption has a key performative element, 
requiring intimate knowledge of tact and etiquette and adherance to certain 
‘discursive scripts’.  For the wily officer, its is up to him to deploy the secret idioms, 
codes and symbols of corruption and transfer these into a personal repetoires of power 
that will ensure his cut is not diminished (Gupta, 1995; Anders & Nuijten, 207, p. 17).  
It is nerve-wracking, risky work for potentially little gain.  Compared to the gambling 
economy, the profits from uang kasus are volatile and dependent on the prowess of an 
officer in haggling and mediation.  Furthermore, unlike the monthly-apportioned 
                                                
224 Ibid.  
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setoran from the gambling tsars, the profits of uang kasus for a criminal research head 
can be eaten into by the Kapolsek and his deputy claiming their rightful spoils.225   
 
The final drawback of the kasus economy is that it has its internal limits since not 
every case is open for extraction.  The kasus economy is invisibly regulated by what 
is internally known as ‘the ten code’ which acts as a check upon the corruption by 
bifurcating the desire (masked as institutional imperative) for revenue accumulation 
with the social considerations of personal prestige (and hence career) and 
intergenerational relations.  
 
We never did more than 10-3.  Meaning out of 10 cases, we never ‘do’ more than 3 cases to 
finance the whole thing. You pick out the cases. This is the case to make you look good to the 
public. This is the case to make your superior look good and these are the cases to get the 
money to do your job and also to live decently according to your rank. And this 10 code is not 
only in the police. It is also in the prosecutor and also in the judge system [sic]. Even amongst 
very corrupt prosecutors or judges, sometimes you get a clean decision. A clean process 
because from the beginning they think, this is for the public, I want to look good.  A lot of 
people feel that corrupt police are corrupt in everything, but no, they pick.  They have this 10 
code and they decide where is their limit.226 [in Engl.]  
 
For all of these reasons, police dependence on the gambling revenues was infinitely 
preferable to other forms of off-budget income generation.  
 
Money occupies multiple meanings and social roles, though unlike the intricacies of 
accumulation, reciprocity and exchange, anthropological scholarship has been much 
                                                
225 Criminal cases need to be signed off by the head of the station.  
226 Confidential Source, interview by author, (30 June 2008).  
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less adept at mapping what Maurer calls, the ‘many sides of the coin’ (2006). In 
officer accounts of the circuitry and redistribution of the police’s off-budget revenue, 
we see a complex, historical and multiplicitous response to the fiscal rewards of the 
parmin, parman and parmas economies suggesting that money is not the 
depersonalised instrument of singular valuation and blanket commodification 
presented by scholars of structuralism (Maurer, 2006). Instead, the differentiated use 
of off-budget revenue indexes both the morality of the transactional system from 
which it derives and the moral cause for which it will be used.  While all of his 
monies are in effect ‘illegally’ obtained, Cecep’s underlying logic of redistribution 
and budgeting of the Rp 10-15 million [US$1100-1680] he receives in non-APBN 
derived funds suggests that different tranches of monies must be circuited through 
different transactional systems in order to take their place in the wider social and 
economic order of the police institution.  
 
Cecep was insistent that the Rp 5.5 million he derived from judi profits had to be 
dedicated to operational and institutional costs.  Uang setan [the devil’s money], he 
recited, dimakan jin [must be used for entertainment].  It was not that the practice of 
judi itself was immoral – police were united in the idea that gambling, like 
prostitution, constituted a victimless crime - but that its proceeds were ‘hot’ [panas] 
and thus could not be ‘saved’ [tidak menabung].  Subekti’s ethnographic account of 
gambling in 1980s Glodok similarly describes the way that the Tionghoa community 
regarded profits from gambling as uang panas [hot money]227 which should be 
immediately consumed in household and daily expenses (Subekti, 1980). The money 
                                                
227 In Lim’s 1981 study of a Malay fishing village in Brunei, cash earned through commercial fishing is 
also described as ‘hot’ (Carsten, 1989. p.136).  
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should never be used as modal [net capital inflow]228 because revenue won at the 
gaming tables was intrinsically perishable: ‘uang yang tidak bisa disimpan, akan 
selalu habis’ [money that could not be saved, would always be expended] (ibid, p. 
120). Thus, while gaming yields could be used to ‘cari duit’ [find/ make money], they 
could not be directly embedded in stable, long lasting fiscal structures that make up a 
recipient’s asset base.  
 
In a landmark text, Parry and Bloch argue that while money might mean something 
different to everyone, its cross-cultural uses within whole transactional systems incur 
significant regularities.  Money earned in short-term, impersonal, acquisitive 
exchanges, wherein the transaction appeared to be individualistic or ill-gotten, is 
‘unsanctioned wealth’. This money is deviant in that it is injustly or inequitably 
acquired.  To transform unsanctioned wealth into a more ‘licit’ form, money is 
recycled into long term transactional orders that work to maintain a specific social or 
cosmic order that transcends the individual (Parry & Bloch, 1989). In her study of a 
Malay village in Langkawi, Carsten illustrates how women mediate the proceeds of 
male exchanges made through commercial fishing: ‘in their passage through the 
house, the central symbol of kin unity, and through the hands of women, [earnings] 
become imbued with the ideals of kinship and thus ‘socialised,’ or ‘cooked’ (Carsten, 
1989, p. 132). Similarly, Brenner argues that in Java’s Solo, kasar [coarse] money can 
be made halus [refined] through women’s domestic practices (Brenner, 1998, p. 168). 
Women, as the lower-status partner within the relationship, decontaminate money and 
convert it into a consumptive good that lends itself to kin unity.  
 
                                                
228 The use of the term modal here is confusing as modal can also mean one’s ‘investment’ which 
suggests that this variety of money can indeed be used to generate more money. I have interpreted 
modal here as capital reserves not capital investments or working capital.  
! "#$ 
Within the Indonesian police, uang judi could not be directly pocketed by the direct 
recipient of the monthly envelope.  To transform the money into a more stable form, 
middle ranking officers recycled their instalments of uang judi into meeting 
operational and departmental needs.  Cecep used his allowance to buy ‘petrol,’ 
‘printing ink’ and for other kesulitan anak buah [problems of my staff] which crop 
up.229  The availability of these funds meant that among his anak buah [juniors] and 
his seniors, Cecep was known as a good leader who was able to run his unit well 
[dengan baik].  By this, it was meant that Cecep could undertake criminal 
investigations, keep the unit functioning and meet a certain, circumscribed number of 
his juniors’ [anak buah] needs.  Cecep also circulated this part of the money (though 
not all) upwards to his seniors as setoran to maintain his posting as kaditserse within 
the vicious, competitive world of transfers [mutasi] and promotions.  In this way, the 
unsanctioned, individual sources of wealth received from gambling revenues were 
subordinated to long-term cycles that ensured the fraternity and hierarchy of the 
junior-senior relationship.  Hot money, thus, is an uncivil, polluted thing of transition 
and liminality, wedged between short and long term transactional orders.  Hot money 
is transformed by its service to maintaining particular, perverted orders of power 
within the police whose very existence, paradoxically, close the loop and demand 
reliance on ill-gotten revenue (Maurer, 2006, p. 24).  
 
Being unreliable, the kasus money was destined for very different purposes 
altogether.  Unlike judi money, which was dedicated to departmental, institutional and 
career outlays not covered by the APBN, Cecep redistributed kasus money laterally 
across police networks.  The money was circulated amongst colleagues in police 
                                                
229 Junior Ranking Officer, interview by author, (7 March 2007).  
! "#$ 
training courses who were temporarily exiled from the normal circuits of revenue 
generation.  It was used to curry favour amongst a fraternity of Polda Metro Jaya 
staff, visiting police dignitaries and other important officers from the regions by 
supplying their consumptive needs such as petrol, hotels, and the all important cash 
envelopes pressed into hot hands upon departure.  This was money invested in the gift 
economy of ‘servicing friends’ [melayani teman]230 and developing a lattice of 
indebted horizontal relationships which are essential to the operational and political 
capacity of an ambitious officer.  Unblemished by a relationship to the criminal 
world, kasus money unlike judi money, was clean and adaptable.  As sanctioned 
wealth, it was even ‘entertainment money’ [uang hiburan].231  
 
In describing Cecep’s system for the ‘cooking’ or laundering of the proceeds of the 
parmin and parmas economies, I do not wish to present this system as a static, 
functional machine in which the potential personal profits of the short term cycle are 
monastically denied.  Cecep cleaned his short-term, ill-gained acquisitions in long-
term transactions that stabilised the political and social order of Polri.  But this system 
is frequently situationally redefined and renegotiated.  Money, being better 
approached as a repertoire or an index than a specific representative meaning, lends 
itself particularly well to paradox, pragmatism and problem solving (ibid, p. 30). 
When pushed, Cecep admitted bashfully that he sometimes used the gambling money 
for his own holidays (which, in the Indonesian example, suggests a redistribution of 
the money amongst his own family) and if he saved its proceeds, he never kept it for 
long periods before its consumption.  Cecep then argued that his savings of the judi 
tranche were not a means of building his own capital base, but pegged for exhaustion 
                                                
230 Junior Ranking Officer, interview by author, (7 March 2007).  
231 Junior Ranking Officer, interview by author, (7 March 2007).  
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on his next bout of schooling at the officer training college [PTIK].  Hence, in a 
roundabout kind of way, the judi money was being invested back in the institution.  
Cecep was clearly embarrassed by this line of questioning and yet had readied 
answers to justify his transgressive saving of perverse, unsanctioned wealth (Roitman, 
2005). Taussig reminds us that these kinds of contraventions do not signal the moral 
irrelevance of the system.  Just as legal orders create their counterpart of violation, 
moral orders invite the ‘tabooed possibility’ in which the sacred is defaced (Anders & 
Nuijten, 2007, p 11). This is not a negation of the Polri’s order of illicit monies, their 
acquisition and consumption, rather ‘transgression…suspends a taboo without 
suppressing it’ (ibid).  
 
Pacts of Licit and Illicit Worlds 
 
The parmin economy is not just about the provision of discrete and segregated 
monthly payoffs to Mabes Polri, Metro Jaya and the subordinate territorial apparatus. 
Like the parman economy, parmin patrons support the institution with sizeable grants 
for infrastructure, operational support, equipment and building construction and 
renovation.  Because of the large scale investments required, parmin contributors also 
have a significant role to play in the police’s internal system of rotations, promotions 
and educational opportunities that lead to rises in rank. 
 
 
Before its demise, the gambling consortium’s role in the operation of this system at 
Mabes Polri and Metro Jaya was considerable.  The primary interface between the 
consortium and the police was a Medan Tionghoa called Arief Cocong, a powerful 
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member of the consortium and owner of Classic Hotel.  As outlined in the previous 
section, Cocong himself was not a heavily capitalised member of the consortium but a 
stalwart in Jakarta’s gambling scene and his alliance with the consortium elevated 
him from nightclub and casino manager to the broker between the gambling tycoons 
and Polri. In our interviews, Cocong was often called ‘Kapolri Swasta,’ or private 
sector National Police Chief by Tionghoa casino workers, Tionghoa corporate heads 
and police officers alike.232  Attendance at the PTIK  [Higher School of Police 
Science] is a prerequisite for rising the ranks to middle level officer, and, according to 
one source, every single junior officer in residence there had obtained their position at 
the school by ‘speaking to Cocong’ [ngomong ke Cocong].233  Funding for their 
position at the school often came from an assortment of parman and parmin donors 
(as well as an officer’s own transgressive squirreling away of ‘illicit’ money) but the 
strategising needed to secure a placing itself was mediated through Cocong.  This was 
similarly so for middle level officers wanting to graduate to the stars of senior 
leadership through SESPIM (Police leadership school).  In accordance with the will of 
the consortium, Cocong also organised officers’ subsequent postings after graduation 
given that his influence among the kapolres and kapolda of the territorial apparatus 
was considerable.  Winata himself was frequently said to have direct influence over 
key positions such as Chief of Metro Jaya, National Chief of Criminal Investigation 
[Kabareskrim] and Wakapolri.   
 
Moreover, the pattern by which capital leveraged its influence over the police was not 
limited to Jakarta alone.  This system was devolving along with Indonesia’s colossal 
                                                
232 Tionghoa business-owner, interview by author (5 April 2007). Junior ranking officer, interview by 
author, (11 April 2007). Casino Worker, interview by author, (7 October 2009). Anton Medan, 
interview by author, (23 June 2010).  
233 Junior ranking officer, interview by author, (11 April 2007).  
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process of political decentralisation. The judi economy had liberalised ownership and 
geography, establishing powerful nodes in the regional centres where decentralisation 
had given way to increasingly concentrated fiscal flows.  As licit and illicit capital 
flows devolved to the regions, Kapolda across the country were setting up similar 
relations of influence with gambling tycoons old and new.  In Batam, under the 
leadership of Kapolda Snr. Com. Anton Bachrul Alam, a gambling cruise ship was 
flouting Indonesian borders by plying international waters to pick up clients in 
Singapore (Suara Karya, 2005). Alam wasn’t even a senior, starred officer.  If the 
gaming tsars could flaunt Indonesia’s very own sovereignty on the beking of a mere 
police commissioner, then there was no end to their grip on the Indonesian police 
(ibid). 
 
Thus, General Sutanto’s war on gambling was not about family trauma, kowtowing to 
foreign corporations, old vendettas or even teaching the gambling tycoons a hard 
lesson in respecting the law.  It was a calculated, sovereign move, designed to 
discipline his fractious and traitorous force, who had for years subverted the 
centralised hierarchy of police national command and competed amongst each other 
for the favours of the consortium.  Bisected and disordered by the pursuit of political 
influence and external capital, Sutanto’s war on gambling was in fact a declaration of 
territorial authority wherein the attentions and allegiances of the vast, sprawling 
police command were forcibly returned to the centre.  The exchange for securing 
greater fiscal control of the police for the state was a far greater proportion of the 
APBN than ever seen in the history of Indonesian state policing.   
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Table Two shows that the biggest leap in Polri funding occurred under Sutanto’s 
tenure.  Polri’s APBN allocation more than doubled in size from Rp 11 trillion [Rp 
1.3 billion] in 2005 to Rp 24.8 trillion [Rp 2.8 billion] in the 2009 financial year.  
Like scattered filings to a magnet, the war on gambling was intended to compel police 
allegiance back to the command by intensifying their financial dependence on the 
police apparatus.  
 
Moreover, the speed with which gambling was shut down suggests that rather than an 
combative assertion of law through detection and arrest, the closure of the casinos 
was a planned, pacted withdrawal by the illicit gaming industry that had come at the 
behest of the very top echelon of governance, the president himself.  The new 
president had his own reasons for wanting the closure of the casinos. After all, the 
judi economy was not just a simple protection industry for the police or the military.  
It was a gargantuan parallel economy of unlaundered cash that snaked billions of 
rupiah through government departments, parliamentary commissions, legislatures, 
cabinets and the finances of opposition parties through ‘gifts’ and ‘donations’.  
Without fiscal control of government, SBY’s presidential authority was undermined.  
 
Not to mention, the continuing traffic of judi funds also left open the potential for the 
funding of rivals.  In his study of Tionghoa big business, Chua observes the fear of 
political party partisanship in a democratic system and a tendency to make overtures 
to all potential centres of power (Chua, 2006). Accordingly, in the 2004 national 
election, the consortium had also scattered their supported amongst the major political 
parties.  Retired Let.Gen T.B Silalahi, a long time business partner of Tomy Winata 
and First Commissioner of Artha Graha, funnelled gambling money to Yudhoyono’s 
! "#$ 
electoral campaign by serving on his tim sukses [campaign team].  Winata also 
pumped significant sums into the campaign of Yudhoyono’s opponent, the then 
incumbent President Megawati Sukarnoputri.234  Ironically, Winata’s own presidential 
preferences were only laid bare on the casino floor: 
 
On the last day before our holidays [liburan], before Harco shut for the campaign season, each 
person [anak] was given Rp 50,000 [US$5.5]. Our managers called it ‘holiday money,’ but the 
gist [intinya] was to vote for [ngoblos] Megawati.  They said to us, if Yudhoyono wins [naik], 
we’ll all be shut down. They had predicted everything already.235  
 
What this suggests is that even before his election to power, Yudhoyono had 
conferred with the consortium, conveying his intention to shut down the judi 
economy.  To do this, he needed the compliance of the gambling tycoons and Polri.  
Only after more than nine months of rule, was the president able to regain control of 
what had been a largely pro PDI-P police leadership by installing General Sutanto as 
Kapolri.  Driven by a mutual desire to rationalize the corruption and narrow its pool 
of beneficiaries, together the president and the National Police chief were able to 
bring about one of the dramatic movements in Indonesian capital since the 1998 
Asian financial crisis.  
 
This colossal shift in the subterranean, criminal economy was effected through a 
hyper-real simulation of law enforcement in which the boats, malls and warehouses 
that housed the casinos were subject to a series of raids only to discover empty rooms 
                                                
234 Chua reports that husband Taufiq Kiemas complained that Winata’s donations to the campaign were 
‘not enough’. One wonders if in fact the source of his irritation was that money he claimed as rightfully 
Megawati’s was in fact divided between the two opposing candidates. (Chua, 2006, 174, 185).  
235 Casino Worker, interview by author, (14 October 2009). Casino Worker, interview by author, (7 
October 2009).  
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scattered with the remains of gambling paraphernalia. ‘At the time of the raid, there 
were no actual gambling activities taking place,’ confirmed Snr. Com. Pol Anton 
Bachrul Alam of the raids on the Leisure World and Omar III cruise ships, suspected 
of shuttling avid gamers between Singapore and Batam. ‘But there were remnants 
[bekas-bekas] of gambling by its passengers. If we see these boats in waters around 
Batam, we will arrest them. We continue to maintain surveillance [pemantauan]’ 
(Suara Karya, 2005). What would be the sovereign theatre of law enforcement 
without the conspicuous rituals of arrest and prosecution? (Hansen & Stepputat, 2005, 
p. 29). Because all rituals require the enacting of violence, the war on gambling had to 
been seen to claim its foes: 
  
Junior Ranking Officer: I was asked [minta] to prepare others [siapkan yang lain].  
Interviewer: Did you do this because they [the gamblers] were your friends [teman] or 
because you were ordered to [diperintah]?  
Junior Ranking Officer: Ordered to.  
Interviewer: Who ordered you to? Your supervisor?  
Junior Ranking Officer: Yes.  
Interviewer: Was that because he was just protecting his friends or… 
Junior Ranking Officer: [interrupts]. He was ordered to by his supervisors [atasannya lagi] 
Interviewer: Did that only occur in your station?  
Junior Ranking Officer: [laughter] I am just a drop in the ocean.236  
 
 
Thus, the mass arrest and imprisonment of a proxy straggle of riff-raff, vendors, low 
ranking casino employees and urban poor marked a crucial shift in the political 
relations between the state and the elite echelons of the criminal economy. In this 
                                                
236 Junior ranking police officer, interview by author, (14 December 2006).  
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way, the enforcement of law on the lumpen criminal body masked changes in the 
structures of power within political society.  
 
 
Given the history, conviviality and interdependence of state-criminal relations, it was 
only fitting that one of the few genuine acts of law enforcement in Indonesia’s history 
of the judi economy occurred through a series of elite pacts and compromises that 
demonstrated the contradictions and ‘limitations of Perfect Law’ (Heyman & 
Campbell, 2007, p. 195). In 2005, a treaty emerged between the domains of the licit 
and the illicit.  For the political prize of shutting down the gargantuan black market of 
casino gaming, the Indonesian state and its police force had to enter into a series of 
Faustian bargains that served the business interests of a heavily-capitalised 
consortium preparing to divest itself of its greatest, most lucrative asset.   
 
Since the closure of the judi economy, Ajin, Awi, Arief Cocong and Rudi Sutanto 
have developed their holdings in the Jakarta entertainment industry branching out into 
new clubs, bars and karaoke joints in central Jakarta.  Apoh moved his assets into 
property and retail such as electronics and grocery stores in central Jakarta.  Sugianto 
Kusuma, as we have seen in Chapter I, transformed Agung Sedayu to one of the 
premier real estate companies in the capital.  Through his chairmanship of the 
Federation of Hakka Associations, Sugeng Pranoto now develops business relations 
between Indonesian Tionghoa and China and has the exclusive ear of the president.  
Former preman such as Ongen Sangaji and Yoris Raweyai have pursued their fiscal 
fortunes through the rough and tumble of popular politics.  Johnny Kusuma heads up 
PT Artha Graha Investama and David Tjioe landed a plum job as managing director 
of Winata’s PT Maritim Timur Jaya, where he twisted the Sea and Fishery 
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department’s arm for trading concessions for Winata’s Tual fish farms.237  At the 
same time, Tjioe used the company to smuggle arms and drugs into the country before 
fleeing to China with several billion rupiah of Winata’s money.238  At Winata’s 
behest, Tjioe is currently wanted by Interpol.  
 
Despite the eradiation of the judi funds, Winata’s power over the police has not 
waned. As Section Two outlined, Winata is a substantial contributor to what police 
identify as the parman economy wherein Tionghoa big business make ‘gifts’ of land, 
infrastructure, equipment.  The parman economy also yields substantial, regular 
stipends between entrepreneurial officers and their benefactors, including Winata. 
Winata’s influence over the police is levered through his ongoing control of the 
system of transfers, shuffles and promotions at all levels of Polri. At PTIK, all 
graduating officers continued to negotiate their transfers, shuffles and promotions 
within the police through Arif Cocong on behalf of Winata, to the extent that even 
two years after the war on gambling, Cocong continued to be known as the Kapolri 
Swasta [private national police chief].239  
 
In 2005, Winata and other Tionghoa big business figures strategised to have their 
man, Makbul Padmanegara appointed as Vice Chief under the Kapolri Sutanto and 
successfully campaigned to place Jusuf Sangkar next to Kapolri Sutanto as a personal 
expert [staf ahli] during his term.240  Sangkar was presented to the public as an expert 
on policing, but in fact he was there as an important interface between the Kapolri and 
                                                
237 In 2006, the Anti-Corruption Commission investigated Tijoe and Winata for allegedly funneling 
money through the Sea and Fisheries Department’s charitable foundation (YDKP) to Minister 
Rokhmin Danuri. During 2002-5, the foundation collected around 15 billion rupiah from taxing the 
budgetary sources of the departments’ regional and central and through this ‘gift’ economy.  
238 Anton Medan, interview by author, (23 June 2010).  
239 Junior ranking officer, interview by author, (11 April 2007).  
240 Confidential Source, interview by author, (3 November 2006).  
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Tionghoa big business. In this way, private capital could personally instruct the 
boundaries and limitations of Sutanto’s reform of the police apparatus. What all of 
this suggests is that Winata’s fiscal control of the police apparatus has been 
streamlined back from a stratified stipend to officers stationed in gaming territories to 
a more discretionary, but no less influential, fund attached to certain police positions, 
postings and projects.  
 
For Tomy Winata himself, his personal recompense for giving up the country’s most 
bankable illicit economy was a significant and growing stake in a licit and 
appropriately banal economy of similar titanic value: rice.  Indonesia comprises the 
world’s third biggest market for rice, second only to that of China and India. 
Indonesia’s annual consumption of rice is twice that of its regional neighbours and in 
2006, the Asia Development Bank christened the country the world’s biggest net 
importer of paddy (Asia Development Bank, 2006). In August 2005, just one month 
after the closure of the casinos, Indonesian Vice-President Jusuf Kalla oversaw the 
signing of an MOU between PT Sumber Alam Sutera (PT SAS), the agro-business 
wing of Artha Graha, and Chinese company Sichuan Guohao Seed Industry, to 
develop new hybrid rice varieties.  Kalla’s presence at the signing was an effective 
about-face on the Yudhoyono government’s previous policies regarding the legality 
of rice varieties developed by PT SAS. As Winata himself explained, Artha Graha’s 
ability to enter the hybrid rice market relied upon the reclassification of hybrid PT 
SAS seeds from ‘illegal’ to ‘legal’241.   
                                                
241 Winata himself explains the changes in the government’s stance on the hybrid rice program. ‘In 
2005, in South East Sulawesi, an issue occurred when there were paddy hybrid seeds planted in 
Konawe that had not gone through proper procedural process. The director general instructed to 
remove all the plants. Thankfully the chief of the local police and the local government were 
encouraged by the National Chief of Police and the Department of Agriculture not to destroy the plants 
as the project was considered a social welfare project. The problem happened till 2006 when the 
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In 2007, 60% of the government programs to increase rice yields were managed by 
Artha Graha (World Investment News, 2009). In November 2009, Jusuf Sangkar, aide 
to Kapolri during the shut-down of the gambling industry, reappeared as President 
Yudhoyono’s personal advisor on food security and energy, attending PT SAS’s 
various harvests in Banten and Lampung, along with the local military command, 
local government and Tomy Winata himself (Bantan Provincial Government, 2010). 
At the harvest, Baran Wirawan, the secretary for the Minister of Agriculture 
announced, ‘the government will continue to develop the hybrid seed program 
because this variety is able to create enormous harvests’ (Republika, 2010). He went 
on to address the hundreds of farmers present warning them that ‘if farmers continue 
to develop independently, prices in the market for hybrid rice will decrease’ and 
encouraging farmers to join the government program and its approved stock of hybrid 
seeds. Events such as these around the country have provided Winata with a plaform 
to transform his popular image as a shady tycoon built on ill-gotten wealth to a 
fervent nationalist, champion of the rights of the poor and advocate for Indonesia’s 
farmers.  
 
One month after Sangkar’s appointment, the government announced its plans to 
create an ‘Integrated Food and Energy Estate’ in Merauke, West Papua, of up to half a 
million hectares.  PT SAS then lodged a proposal for a large slab of land for its hybrid 
rice plantations. The Indonesian government then announced that it expected its own 
                                                                                                                                      
government considered the seeds legal (sic). The total investment for this project was US$ 30 million 
and could feed up to 5,000 people and by this solve a national problem. We became a new player 
admired by international companies. At that time they did not want to import the seed from China as it 
was considered illegal. Together with our project the government launched a program to increase two 
million tons of the national rice production (sic) and our company managed around 60% of the 
program’ (World Investment News, 2009).  
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demand for hybrid seeds to increase by 25% per year until 2014 in order to meet 
domestic and export demand with hybrid rice programs.  
 
Through these programs, the Yudhoyono government has effectively paved the way 
for Winata to become one of Indonesia’s largest suppliers of hybrid rice seeds in one 
of the world’s biggest consumers of rice.  In so doing, Winata has effectively 
swapped his dominance in the biggest industry of the criminal world for a major, 
expanding stake in the most primary commodity of the Indonesian market.  
Paradoxically, the pact of reciprocal exchange between the government and Winata 
rested on his acceptance of the prohibition proper of the gambling industry and the 
reclassification of PT SAS’ hybrid rice seeds from illegal contraband to legal, 
government-sanctioned public good. Here, ‘law is not just the medium by which 
politics is played out’ (Berkowitz, 2006), but state efforts to strengthen the rule of law 
in a period of democratisation has demanded the rearrangement of the very 
relationship between the criminal and the legal. Democratisation and the subsequent 
pressure to become a negara hukum, or a state of law above coercion, redraws the 
perimeters of the criminal and the legal alike.   
 
Turning Law into Lahan : The War on Drugs 2005-2009 
 
With the termination of gambling funds, Polri found itself wedged anxiously between 
its expanding membership and an evaporating pool of illicit revenue.242  In Jakarta, as 
in Indonesia’s other urban centres, the severing of this most reliable and routine 
                                                
242  A recruitment drive to attain membership numbers to rival and best that of TNI has been one of the 
signature policies of the police’s reform package. By January 2008, the number of Polri officials, 
including civilian staff, totaled 370 626 persons.  In early 2005, this number was 284 391, representing 
an increase of some 31%.  
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current of off-budget police financing led to intense financial stress within Polri, 
creating ruptures in the grid of vertical and horizontal relationships that undergird the 
institution.  Officers at every level were foraging for new sources of revenue to make 
up for lost earnings.  I witnessed generals aggressively chasing business opportunities 
or reaching out to businessmen, sourcing new ways of protecting ‘legitimate’ private 
enterprise.243   
 
However, the strains were greatest on the mass of officers clustered at the middle to 
lower ranks, those who made up the frontline of everyday policing.  This was the 
layer of officers closest to the everyday means of extraction, the interface between the 
Indonesian state and its people, and at the same time were the most vulnerable to the 
demands of vertical extraction from the officer class. ‘Kami bingung nyari uang’ [We 
are at a loss for how to get money], implored a commissioned officer.244  2005-2008 
saw a significant spike in media reports about low-ranked police officers shooting 
themselves, their spouses and colleagues.  Although the immediate cause of the 
tragedies could be attributed to the usual trials and tribulations of love, envy and 
alcohol, the subtext of the reports was one of severe financial stress within the police 
institution.   
 
For instance, in March 2007 at Semarang city police station, Brigadir Satu Martinus 
Hance Kristianto, disgruntled at the prospect of being rotated [dimutasi] out of the 
lucrative division of internal affairs [provost], shot at the mounted frames of General 
Sutanto and Central Java Kapolda, Inspektur Jenderal Doddy Sumantyawan on the 
station wall.  In the siege that followed, Kristianto took one senior officer hostage and 
                                                
243 Police General, interview by author, (22 February 2007).   
244 Unidentified Commissoned Officer, interview by author, (23 March 2007).   
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shot dead station deputy head Ajun Komisaris Besar Liliek Purwanto before he was 
himself shot by Brimob (Liputan.com, 2007). Amongst the officer class, the outrage 
was not directed at Kristianto or the system of rents and extraction that demands 
monthly rents for job postings.  Instead officers spoke of blood on Sutanto’s hands 
and of the desperate search for new, stable forms of revenue that could substitute the 
judi economy.245  As following sections of this chapter will show, the war on drugs, 
second in priority as it was to the war on gambling, provided just this very 
opportunity. 
 
Wars on crime are characterised popularly and by the state as instances of ‘Perfect 
Law’ (Heyman & Campbell, 2007, p. 215) in which the sovereign applies a discrete, 
separate canon of law to a narrowly and often perversely defined sub-sector of the 
criminal market.  Scholars of the state, crime and corruption have often shown these 
wars to be perversely theatrical (Haanstad, 2008). They are frequently violent 
performances which like all practices, require a combination of banal reiteration and 
spectacular ritual to form the basic referent of the state – that of sovereignty (Hansen 
& Stepputat, 2005, p. 7). In the face of ‘internally fragmented, unevenly distributed 
and unpredictable configurations of political authority,’ (Ibid, p. 3) wars on crime 
invoke the re-fortification of borders, the delineation and disciplining of the 
degenerate criminal body within, and the reclamation of legitimate violence for the 
state.  Scholarship has shown the mimetic, hollow quality of wars against crime, 
whether because state actors themselves are strategising agents, deeply invested in the 
economy of the very trade they are trying to root out (McCoy, 2007) or due to the 
slippery qualities of law and its discretionary application itself.  As Heyman and 
                                                
245 Fieldnotes (12 April 2007). Unidentified Commissioned Officer, interview by author, (23 Marhc 
2007).  
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Campbell illustrate, the strictures of ‘Perfect Law’ are easily punctured by gendered 
relations of kinship, reciprocity, local intimacies and other tacit acceptances of illegal 
activity by the state (2007). As we have seen, for the eradication of gambling to be 
effective, a theatre of law enforcement had to take place at the expense of the criminal 
body.  However as we will see the war on narcotics, having the relatively genuine 
intent to eradicate, required the transgression of law in other, violent and perverse 
ways. In both cases, the very source of law enforcement and the implementation of 
‘Perfect Law’ invited law’s very infraction.   
 
The previous section presented evidence that demonstrates that the flurry of raids, 
arrests and prosecutions that made up Sutanto’s war against gambling was a largely 
theatrical exercise that masked high-level politicking and manoeuvring that occurred 
at the heart of the executive.  In contrast, because of the unique structure of the illicit 
narcotics industry, I argue that the means of revenue gathering provided by the war on 
drugs provides us with a nuanced and complex illustration of the ways that agents of 
corruption combine material interest and morality to create modes of revenue 
generation that are not legal, but licit (Pardo, 2004). Despite being starved of revenue, 
Indonesian police officers have not established a parallel protection economy for the 
market of illicit narcotics even though the war on drugs must simultaneously put a 
premium on any such service.  Instead, officers choose to develop and intensify 
mechanisms of rent-seeking around the kasus economy. Through the widespread 
arrest, torture, blackmail and prosecution of small-time drug offenders, criminal 
investigations units are able to make up for the shortfall of gambling revenues and 
stabilise a new economy of off-budget finance for the police institution.  
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That abuses of legal procedure and brute violence are deemed preferable to a 
protection economy around narcotics producers and dealers indicates the ways in 
which morality and corruption are drawn into complex relationships that ‘create 
internal distinctions within the field of illegality, beyond the simple dichotomy 
between conformity to and deviance from formal rules’ (ibid, p. 14). Indeed, what the 
torture of small-time narcotics offenders suggests is that practices of police corruption 
refract a wider template of ideas about legitimate and illegitimate targets of abuses of 
power that chime with notions of state sovereignty and power.  As Agamben reminds 
us, the criminal body may be killed, but not sacrificed.  The torture of criminal body, 
that ‘form of life that is beyond the reach of dignity and full humanity and thus not 
even a subject of benevolent power, is the most elementary operation of sovereign 
power’ (Hansen & Stepputat, 2005, p. 17). 
 
As we have seen in Section 1 of this thesis, in Indonesia the torture of the criminal 
body by the kampung is an accepted practice of territorial identification.  The torture 
of certain specific criminal bodies by police similarly accumulates widespread public 
support for ‘the public excuses in the police, what it would excuse in itself’ (Bayley, 
1996, p. 286). Thus, the form that this new mechanism of police corruption is taking 
is not an aberration of social norms but a statement of affirmation for wider 
conceptions about the relationship between the debased, criminal body, legitimate 
citizenship and the logic of sovereign violence.  
 
Sutanto’s anti-narcotics drive was hardly the first of Indonesia’s attempts to 
‘eliminate’ the drug trade.  Even during the Suharto years, the ritual of burning illicit 
booty or showcasing trafficked narcotics hauls on sateen blue tablecloths before the 
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press, was a staple of police work.  This was however, the first time a Kapolri had 
maintained personal responsibility for such an operation and committed so 
comprehensively to a strategy of harm reduction and supply minimalisation through 
unprecedented levels of inter-departmental and international coordination.246  As a 
result, there were some significant successes in the early months of Sutanto’s tenure.  
In November 2005, the newly established narcotics unit within MABES Polri raided 
the third biggest amphetamines factory in the world in Banten amid a series of 
significant Metro Jaya seizures of chemical precursors and product clustered 
primarily around Central, North and West Jakarta and Tangerang.  Most of those 
arrested were (and continue to be) peranakan Tionghoa producers and their pribumi 
dealers and couriers.   
 
This was no theatre: the successes of the drug war are directly measurable on the 
ground.  Throughout the country, drug users continue to complain that the supply of 
marijuana from Aceh and heroin (putaw) from South Asia is becoming increasingly 
stilted (see Table 7).  In the major cities, the drought on putaw is forcing innovative 
solutions.  Indonesia’s pemakai putaw (heroin users) are becoming accustomed to 
counterfeiting or bribing pharmacists and doctors to obtain Subutex prescriptions.  
Ground up, mixed with water and injected, the synthetic substitute opioid gives a 
similar high.247 
 
                                                
246 Twenty six departments were involved in the effort to reduce the drug supply including immigration 
and the department for health.  
247 Thank you to Gabor Somogyi for clarifying this point.  
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Table 7: Seizures of Marijuana, Heroin, Ecstasy and Shabu by the Indonesian Police 2004-2009 (Polri, 
2009)248 
Narcotic 
(in grams) 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
(March) 
Marijuana249 
(millions of 
grams) 
8.5  22.8 11.7 31.8 140.7 9.5 
Heroin250 13,528 19,799 11,902 14,691 29,053 1,224 
Ecstasy (in  
no. pills) 
251,078 255,016 466,907 1,195,305 1,091,204 150,490 
Shabu251  28,406 262,803.  1,241,200 622,356 709,854.  73,519.  
 
 
These achievements notwithstanding, the continuing war on narkoba has achieved 
nowhere near the level of success as the war on gambling.  The supply of synthetic 
drugs in particular seems impervious to the stringent enforcement of law.  Freed from 
the traditional impediments of territory - agricultural farming, high-start up rates, long 
and complicated supply chains, labyrinthine transportation routes and international 
borders - the production of amphetamines is thriving domestically.  The drug trade’s 
tenacity, as compared to the overnight disappearance of judi, is often cited as proof 
that the police provide beking to traffickers of illicit narcotics.  In fact, it means the 
reverse.  The ongoing struggle to halt the circulation of illegal drugs highlights in 
                                                
248 Adapted from Polri, 2009, p. 20-21. Irjen Sutanto replaced Irjen Makbul Padmanegara as head of 
BNN in March 2005. I Made Pastika was appointed head of BNN in December 2005. In June 2008, 
Gories Mere moved from Detachment 88 to replace Pastika.  Bambang Hendarso Danuri took over as 
Kapolri at the end of September, 2008.  
249 Almost all of Indonesia’s marijuana supply is grown in Aceh, transiting through Medan or Jakarta to 
the rest of the archipelago. Ibid. pg 12.  
250 The measuring unit is not given. Heroin comes to Indonesia via the ‘Golden Crescent’ of Karachi, 
Kathmandu/New Delhi/Dubai and Medan/Jakarta or Pekanbaru. Ibid. pg. 10.  
251 This is methamphetamine hydrochloride also known as ice or crack, widely associated in Indonesia 
(as in the West) with youth culture, nightlife and productive work.   
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stark relief just how close the gambling industry was to state structures.  In contrast, 
the economy of illegal narcotics is a ‘rapi’ [neat, ordered] industry, in that it is 
discrete, professionalised and operates free of the crude cultural politics of protection 
that characterises Indonesia’s criminal sub-terrain.252  
 
If as Gupta has shown us, the murky internal workings of the state are often 
discursively constructed by civilians as a powerful, coherent sector of high politicking 
and conspiracy (Gupta, 1995), the state’s internal agents are also given to similar 
processes of reification.  The internal life of Polri is one of concentrated speculation, 
elaborate political strategising, gossamer alliances, and innumerable crosses and 
double crosses.  Curiously, there is frequent disjuncture between the belief in the 
pervasiveness of the institution’s corrupt practices and the actual empirical evidence 
of wrongdoing (Pardo, 2004, p. 9). 
 
At the senior levels of Polri, there was intense discussion that the financial stress 
caused by the realisation of the prohibition on gambling had forced lower-rung 
officers to turn to the trade of trafficking narcotics to generate revenue.253  There was 
no doubt that the absence of stable proceeds from the gambling trade turned lower 
and middle ranking officers to providing protection to drug dealers.  In the wake of 
Sutanto’s war on judi, one officer confessed that, ‘we at the bottom [di bawah] look 
for money through fraternisation [gaul]…now we are closer to the criminals, 
including drug dealers.’254  Moreover, certain types of drug taking are routine within 
the police community.  Pine observes the way that the use of amphetamines has 
become normalised amongst professionalised working cultures most vulnerable to 
                                                
252 Field Notes (24 March 2007)  
253 Field Notes (22 March 2007).  
254 Low ranking police officer, interview by author, (21 March 2007).  
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demands for productivity at a certain, fetishised speed (Pine, 2007). Members of 
Polri, beholden as they are to the prestige economy of a burgeoning transnational 
criminal justice complex, are not immune to these cultural flows.255 The work of 
reskrim and intel officers tends to occupy peculiar hours, working well into the night 
and missing the 7am apel [roll call]. The recreational use of amphetamines such as 
ecstasy [inex] is fairly widespread amongst officers, particularly those in reskrim or 
intelligence who have access to an ongoing stash of narcotics through the evidence 
locker.256  The liberal supply of amphetamines is part and parcel of lubricating the 
horizontal, internal relationships on ‘hiburan’ [entertainment] work outings.  
 
But despite the prolific use of drugs by officers, the police’s involvement in the 
narcotics trade is heavily circumscribed.  Narkoba, sniffed Indonesia’s dealers, users, 
preman and officers, is for the cerecere or the ikan teri (anchovies) of the police 
apparatus.257  These are the coarse and unseemly non-commissioned officers who 
extort rents from even the most plebeian potentials for revenue, like the prostitutes 
who live in shacks along the rail-road or unorganised street urchins.  Again the 
derivation of revenue, even illicit monies, possess complex internal borders of varying 
legitimacy that shape the contours of practices of corruption.  Another senior officer 
told me of a very well-known general, who as Kapolda in eastern Indonesia, had 
                                                
255 In Bangkok, the US Government has established the International Law Enforcement Academy 
(ILEA) which offers highly coveted placements to its criminal investigation courses to CID officers 
around the region. The prestige and potential job advancement that participation in these courses offers 
means that a significant economy for these placements has emerged within Polri. For an uncritical but 
detailed analysis of global police education (Kratcosk & Das 2007). By contrast, Hanstaad calls these 
initiatives evidence of ‘a burgeoning criminal justice industrial complex’ wherein the biometric and 
surveillance technologies of the West are exported to repressive policing systems (Haanstad, 2008, p. 
23).   
256 Field Notes (10 February 2007).  
The problem is so severe that in late 2008, then Chief of Criminal Research and current National Chief 
of Police, General Bambang Hendarso Danuri proposed institutional and policy changes that would 
actually provide immunity to the detective class from the Polri’s disciplinary code under the reasoning 
that officers needed to consume illicit narcotics as part of being ‘under cover’. Bareskrim Officer, 
interview by author, (20 July 2008) 
257 Ibid.  
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pursued money with such dogged relentlessness that he had established relations with 
local drug producers and traffickers.258  Rather than rejoice at the opening up of a new 
source of revenue for the station, this morally distasteful economy made other senior 
officers in the Polda extremely nervous.  The Kapolda was known as gila [mad, or out 
of control] and his perceived greed significantly weakened his authority.   
 
Unlike the illicit gambling industry where the power of the tycoons was mirrored in 
the shifting hierarchies of the national political elite, narkoba has no beking for who 
can take pride in being associated with it? Within the Indonesian police, practices 
directed at the pursuit of illicit capital do not freewheel unbound from social and 
moral norms. Rather, these social and legal norms play out perversely within the 
range of practices of corruption, delineating its safe and ambivalent terrains. The 
anthropology of corruption frequently criticises academic scholarship for conflating 
corruption’s two distinct meanings: unlawful activity and moral deterioration (Anders 
& Nuijten 2007). But for those involved in corruption, the overlap between morality 
and practice is necessary to its perpetuation.  
 
As such, relationships between police and dealers of narcotics appear to be secret, 
individualised, short term and subject to intense fluctuation.  Being socially 
distasteful, they are fragile and, crucially, this limits their ability to yield maximum 
revenues.  This reveals a second field of overlap between morality and 
institutionalised corruption, that the twinning of moral values with certain corrupt acts 
has real material effect.  If institutional mechanisms of illicit wealth creation are to be 
effective, reliable and fiscally prosperous, they need to be embedded in practices that 
                                                
258 Field notes (9 September 2006).  
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are shared and social. The disparity with the off-budget economy of gambling could 
not be more stark.  Where associations with big league gamblers were passed on from 
posting to posting and where funds were distributed regularly, evenly and widely, 
associations with drug dealers are individual, hidden, temporary and maintained by 
lower rung officers.  In the narcotics industry, beking is not watertight.  As 
testimonies from drug users and dealers revealed, once a small to medium time dealer 
was labelled TO, target operasi (operational target) within the drug war, protection 
from an individual officer becomes worthless.259  
 
The fact remains that the war on drugs was and continues to be a serious affair for 
Polri policy makers and hence, the illicit drug industry can never be a long-term, 
financial substitute for the illicit gaming industry.  Under General Sutanto’s tenure, 
the key police secondment to the National Body on Narcotics was filled by solid and 
reasonably ‘clean’ police professionals.260 The immense weight of social disapproval 
for drug taking coupled with the level of buy-in from Polri’s top brass for the war on 
                                                
259 At risk of over-complicating my argument, there is one group of dealers who are clearly protected 
by the police and these are the thin band of former middle level Tionghoa casino employees who 
maintain a foothold in Jakarta’s entertainment industry by working as managers in the clubs and bars of 
the consortium. Because alcohol and entrance fee revenues are on the whole quite low, these 
individuals keep the floor awash with amphetamines turning their hospitality staff into small time 
dealers. The managers are well known to the police and left alone, but the clubs do tend to be 
occasionally raided by reskrim officers. If the managers get ‘too big’ in the amphetamines industry, 
turning into producers rather than facilitators of the trade, they are subject to negotiated arrest and 
prosecution.  Clearly this constitutes a form of protection of the narcotics industry however that very 
protection is grounded in the former beking relationship between Polri and casino gambling. Field 
Notes (20 June 2010).  
260 In March 2005, General Sutanto himself was appointed to Kepala Pelaksana Harian at the BNN by 
then Kapolri Dai Bachtiar, replacing General Makbul Padmanegara.  From the time General Sutanto 
was made Kapolri (July 2005) until December 2005, Sutanto kept the position empty, maintaining 
personal responsibility for the operation against illegal narcotics. In December 2005, he appointed 
General I Made Pastika to the position who held it until June 2008, when he was replaced by General 
Gories Mere. Pastika and Mere, both non-Muslims close to international police donors were known to 
be professional, trustworthy officers loyal to the Kapolri. In his career, Pastika had two particularly 
significant experiences, firstly as Kapolda Papua during the assassination of Theys Eluay where he 
managed to avert major violence between Jakarta and the Eluay’s mourners in Jayapura and secondly 
as Kapolda Bali when the first Bali bomb attack in Kuta in 2003. General Gories Mere’s work in the 
anti-terror squad, Detachment 88, had received similar acclaim and he was frequently referred to as the 
golden boy, ‘anak ‘mas’ of Sutanto. The appointment of these two police heavyweights to the BNN 
signifies the extent to which General Sutanto took the war on drugs as a major priority during his term.   
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drugs means that the establishment of closer relations between Polri and the illicit 
drug industry to replace the gambling industry is a highly risky undertaking for career 
officers.  
 
And so the conundrum for the average Polri officer: the war on vices doubled up in 
this way had stripped police officers (and indeed, the rest of the political, security and 
bureaucratic elite) of their financial security while the internal, moral limits of 
corruption do not allow the simple substitution of one illicit economy for another.  
How could officers safely and securely supplant their income?  What off-budget 
economy in the realm of police authority had the necessary qualities of stability, 
moral respectability and sociability to provide for the force at all levels?   
 
The answer lies in the police’s traditional mainstay, the law itself.  Newly restored to 
the institution, their authority over the domain of law is now invulnerable to attacks 
by other coercive institutions.  Moreover, the overall context of democratisation calls 
for the kind of institutional professionalism and strengthening of rule of law exercises 
that General Sutanto so aggressively pursued with the dual wars on vices.  What the 
war on gambling took away could be replaced through the implementation of law 
itself, at a time of unprecedented legal activity, of wars against Yudhoyono’s ‘lima 
jenis kejahatan,’ wars against corruption, illegal logging, illegal fishing, petrol 
smuggling and of course, the punitive strategy that made up the war against drugs.  
All of these factors collided to one spectacular, unintended consequence; that of 
intensifying the shift of the off-budget police economy from one of crude, illicit 
protectionism to the realm of legality itself.   
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In this way, the severance of systematic and institutionalised ties to Indonesia’s illicit 
sites of gaming changed the face of the off-budget parmin economy of the police to a 
parmas economy, moving illicit police financing from the protection of the physical 
coordinates of territory to a greater reliance on extraction and rent seeking based on 
the authorities of rational governance.  In the eyes of Polri’s membership, this 
represented a move from a straight up ‘criminal’ territorial economy to a more ‘legal’ 
economy in which revenue is generated from the legitimate authorities exercised by 
the institution.261 ‘Sekarang kita jual perkara [now I sell cases],’ an officer 
shrugged.262 
 
Extraction and the Economy of Torture  
 
The war on drugs is largely carried out by reskrim officers organised into individual 
task forces [satgas] either subsumed beneath or working in conjunction with the new 
narcotics unit.  These satgas are often highly autonomous and led by an up and 
coming career officer with the tasks of designing anti-narcotics operations and 
locating funding for operations as well as the livelihood of his men.  Because of the 
autonomy they enjoy, particular satgas are often said by the criminal underworld to 
possess individualised temperaments and operate in signature ‘styles.’   
 
Despite the diversity and the cult of personality around the satgas, some broad 
patterns emerge in the police’s modus operandi of the drug war.  Officers seek to 
pegang [grip, or hold sway over] dealers from their areas, who can be held to ransom 
                                                
261 Police General, interview by author, (22 February 2007).  
262 The use of kita, ‘we’, generally include everyone present, including the addressee. However as the 
officer was speaking directly to me with only preman around him, I translate kita in this context to 
mean, I. Unidentified Commissioned Officer, interview by author, (21 March 2007).  
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against a raft of potential charges.  This is a policy known as ‘satu dilepas, 2 
ditangkap’ [one is let go for two to be caught].  Through gaul [repeated fraternisation 
and acts of gift-giving, such as the sharing of cigarettes and food] and a monthly 
salary (sometimes up to Rp 1 million [US$112]), these low level criminal offenders 
are groomed and mobilised to capture other bigger, dealers.  People entangled in this 
relationship are often pitied by the wider drug community as cepu [pawn], spion [spy] 
or informan [informants].  For the criminal suspect, forced alliances with the national 
police are fragile, ungovernable and ultimately treacherous as they can sometimes 
serve as good fillers when officers fail to meet the monthly arrest targets set up by the 
Kapolri. These targets do not distinguish between charges of use, possession (as 
addicts or couriers, many of the latter being children) or the severity and quantity of 
the narcotics trafficked and it is this deficiency that makes the urban poor and addicts 
so very vulnerable to arrest and demands for extraction.  
 
The kasus economy, as we have seen, is not a new dimension of the off-budget illicit 
economy and if stabilised its potential for revenue are mind-boggling.  The 
strengthening of the Anti-Corruption Commission under the Yudhoyono government 
and the ongoing war on corruption has done much to pin down kasus money as a 
regular and shared source of revenue as Indonesia’s political and business elite 
scramble to the Polda and MABES Polri to cut them an easier deal.  However, at the 
bottom rung of the kasus economy, Sutanto’s war on drugs nets tens of thousands of 
users, couriers and low-level drug dealers whose fiscal clout is limited (See Table 8).  
If this unwanted congregation of social riffraff could be made productive, then the 
gains to the polsek, polres and polda stood to be enormous. The question was how 
! "## 
could an entrepreneurial officer compel payment from a class of people with so little 
to lose?  
 
 
Table 8: Number of Criminal Suspects on Narcotics Charges 2004-2009. The data for 2009 ends in March. 
If arrests continue at that same rate, the number of arrested for 2009 will be 36,796, just above the figures 
for 2007. I have not been able to find any police data which differentiates these numbers based on type of 
charge (Polri, 2009, p. 19). 
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Herein lies the rub for the poor and the vulnerable that make up a significant subset of 
Jakarta’s illicit narcotics industry: tilling the framework of law into fertile lahan 
requires a malevolent twinning of a police force’s legal functions, the authority to the 
lawful use of coercion and the provision of law enforcement.  The use of torture 
during arrest and interrogation is integral to the process by which the enforcement of 
law transfers its financial rewards.  Violence gives extortion its urgent edge.  This is 
how practices of torture in criminal arrest and detention actually increase at the very 
same time that Indonesia is consolidating one of the world’s most successful 
transitions to democracy.  
 
By 2007, just 18 months into General Sutanto’s war on drugs, human rights, legal and 
harm reduction organisations were beginning to notice a disturbing spike in cases of 
police abuse of drug users.  In 2007, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture visited 
Indonesia, touring prisons and interviewing inmates.  In his report, he noted that 
‘detainees interviewed indicated that ill-treatment was used primarily to extract 
confession, or in the cases of drug related crimes, to receive information on drug 
suppliers.  In a number of cases, detainees were offered to be spared in return for the 
payment of a substantial amount of money.’ Although Nowak’s report was released to 
the press, its findings generated very little public interest.263  In 2008, the Jakarta 
Legal Aid institute released a report suggesting that of the 367 detainees surveyed in 
the greater Jakarta region, 81% had been subject to some form of physical, verbal or 
psychological violence (Jakarta Legal Aid, 2008). In a 2007 survey of 1106 drug 
users, Jangkar, the Indonesian harm reduction network, found that over 60% of 
participants had experienced physical abuse from the police and over 36% had 
                                                
263 Nowak’s report preceded Indonesia’s obligatory submission to the UN Committee Against Torture 
in 2008. Although Polri did not respond to Nowak’s report, Polri’s Legal Division headed up by 
Arianto Sutadi did liase and respond to NGOs submitting their reports to the committee.   
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negotiated bribes.264  Again, once announced to the public, the findings failed to 
generate any static. A report issued one year later by Amnesty International echoed 
Jangkar’s results, declaring that suspects interviewed by Amnesty International were 
beaten or subjected to other forms of torture or other ill-treatment unless they could 
pay bribes’ (Amnesty International, 2009, p. 40). In all the reports, testimonies of 
arrests formed a clear pattern of beatings followed by demands for bribes.  The story 
of ‘Irfan,’ featured in the 2009 Amnesty International report was typical of the 
testimonies.  
 
 I was arrested in February 2008, I was done in by a police informant. I had about a gram of 
the stuff on me. When I was arrested, I was beaten, punched, slapped. They said, ‘where’s 
your dealer, you’re a dealer aren’t you?’ They said, ‘don’t worry, we’ll free you as long as 
you tell us the name of someone who uses, who has some money, do you know anyone like 
that?’ I gave them the name of my dealer but still they drove me to the football field in 
Tangerang.  
 
They took out their guns and said, why don’t you run across that field? I knew if I did it, I 
would be shot.  One of the officers closed my eyes and I thought it was actually going to 
happen so I yelled, ‘but Pak, I’m not a thief, Pak, I’m just a drug user. I don’t harm anyone 
else, I just harm myself! Pak, don’t beat me, I’ve got no money, I’m just a user.’ After that, he 
stopped. We got back in the car. When we were in the car they said, do you want to do 
‘86’?265 Pay us Rp 200 million [US$22 000] and we’ll set you free. I don’t have that sort of 
money, so I thought, I’ll just do my time (Ibid, p. 26).  
 
                                                
264 The disparity of some 30% between users alleging violence and bribery is no surprise.  In my own 
interviews, I found that criminal suspects speak far easier of torture, in which power relations are so 
clearly distorted, than bribery, where suspects fear that their moral authority as a victim of the state is 
compromised by the mutually beneficial outcomes that graft provides.  Extracting comprehensive 
stories of corruption from defendants in the criminal justice system requires a serious methodological 
shift, from large scale polling to fine tuned, protracted ethnographic interviewing. 
265 To 86 is the euphemism for paying a bribe to escape charge.  
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Polri torture follows an established repertoire that is unique to the institution. In 
almost every other country in the world, the risk of torture increases with the length of 
detention.266 This is not the case in Indonesia, where torture is almost always front-
loaded to the beginning of the judicial process prior to detainment.  
 
Interviews with criminal suspects revealed a script of violence and extortion: users or 
addicts are captured, often at night, by two or three plain clothed officers during or 
just after the purchase of marijuana, shabu [amphetamines] or putaw [heroin] from 
their routine, trusted dealers.  They are tortured (usually beaten, sometimes with a 
large, heavy object), squeezed into an unmarked vehicle and driven around the city, 
sometimes for hours [dibawah keliling].  In the car, criminal suspects are beaten and 
their hands and feet are burnt with cigarettes before being offered release for an 
initial, very large payment.  For users and small time dealers, payments range 
anywhere from one to 200 million rupiah (US$ 100 – US$ 20,000).  The exact sum 
depends on an idiosyncratic calculation which includes factors such as how officers 
surmise the severity of the crime (measured usually in grams of illegal narcotic or 
willingness of the officer to ‘plant’ larger amounts on the offender) multiplied by 
police perceptions of the capital accessible to offenders and internal factors, such as 
upcoming costs for operations and pressure from supervisors.  Nonetheless, this sum 
could be bargained down as much as a quarter of the initial amount.  Tionghoa users 
consistently feel that bribes for release were higher than for other ethnicities.   
 
Most users are extremely frightened and disorientated during this bargaining process.  
Rejection frequently leads to an escalation in the violence, such as threats to be killed 
                                                
266 I thank Tim Parritt for this point.   
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whilst sustaining beatings and kickings or being driven to certain spiritually potent 
sites  – graveyards, empty fields, ‘hutan’ [forest] – and threatened with a gun.267  
These incidents usually end shamefully, with suspects crying and begging for their 
lives. Irfan in the story above was ordered to run across a field.  He refused, surmising 
that he will shot in the back and his death reported as proper police procedure for 
halting an escaping suspect.  Many other testimonies gathered corroborated Irfan’s 
experience.  Repeat offenders are sometimes shot in the calves or feet or pistols are 
placed on their side on their shins or tops of their feet and fired.268 The violence here 
is urgent because agreements made in the car, on the field or in the graveyard go 
unlogged by other officers and superiors at the station who are expecting their cut.269 
Officers making the arrest can thus choose to split it between themselves or others in 
their satgas, outside of the knowledge of the chief of staff, head of station and his 
deputy. 
 
Torture outside the station, at the site of arrest or in the car, is also designed to draw a 
suspect into a humiliating perfidy.  For the poorest of the poor, the value of bribes are 
often dropped if a suspect can hand over [nyanyi, to sing, or menunjuk, to point out] 
someone with greater fiscal potential.   
 
Ibu Cici was shamed by her own treachery. She cried when her friend was bundled 
into the back seat, thumbs tied together behind his back. ‘Saya daya sama polisi. Bok, 
sorry Bok, habis ngak tahan digebukin’ [I was tricked by police. Bok, I’m sorry Bok, 
                                                
267 Traditionally, to enter these kinds of spaces one would have to ask permission from the ‘spirits,’ 
particularly at the spiritually loaded times in which officers are hauling criminal offenders across their 
threshold. That police routinely barge into such areas uninvited, and indeed make them their own sites 
of police authority, speaks of Polri’s territorialisation of the spiritual world.    
268 Urban squatter, interview by author, (15 July 2008).  
269 Unidentified Commissioned Officer, interview by author, (23 March 2007).  
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its just that I couldn’t handle being beaten up].270   Ferry, a heroin addict, described 
his arrest just six months after the declaration of the war on drugs in a central Jakarta 
marketplace at midnight.  He was beaten with a wooden plank, mainly on the shins 
and legs, and then caged under a rattan chicken coop.    
 
Confess!’ They said, ‘Confess!’ But the buser, who seemed to have a higher job position, 
said, enough of this, just take him to the station.  I was taken to the main road. But we didn’t 
get into a police car. We went in a cab. We were three, and I was in the middle and as the cab 
drove, they bargained with me. ‘Hey can you get us Rp 40 million [US$4500] tonight? If you 
can get the 40, I’ll let you go.’ I said, ‘I don’t have any money, I don’t have anything like 
that.’ He said, ’Ok, you tell us a friend who is also a user, but pick someone with some 
money, someone who can provide us with some cash. Do you know someone like that?’ I 
said, ‘its midnight, how do I find someone like that? I don’t know anyone like that.’  They 
said, ‘Ok.  Fine.’ And then they started to beat me, ‘Then you are going to die,’ he yelled. 
‘You are going to die.271  
 
 
Suspects are drawn into the torture and processes of extraction of the accomplices 
they ratted out.  A female narcotics courier told me that at the start of the war on 
drugs,  
 
They took us to a house in Cempaka Putih.272  It was empty, but it was the place for Team 
5.273  There were lots of cars there, but no-one was wearing a uniform. They took me there, 
but they didn’t hurt me, they just threatened me with a gun. One officer grabbed my shirt and 
said, why don’t you take it off for us? There were ten officers from other units watching me 
and I cried and said, please Pak, don’t do this.  Eventually he stopped.  In another room, the 
                                                
270 Urban squatter, interview by author, (15 July 2008).  
271 Amnesty International. 2009. Pg 19.  
272 A suburb of central Jakarta.  
273 Narcotics unit 5 of Metro Jaya.  
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Nigerian was being tortured and they made me watch.  They electrocuted him, washed him 
down with water, and electrocuted him again. It went on for ages. We were there from 9pm 
till 2am, but I only watched a bit of it. I was crying and screaming. That boy [cowok] was 
tortured over and over again. The police said to me, ‘tell him Sri, tell him that if he just 
confesses, it will all be over. Tell him he just has to give us his account number [rekening].’ 
Turns out he had hundreds of millions of rupiah in there. The police wanted to know the PIN 
number. Because the police are basically just robbers [perampok].274  
 
 
If no deals for release are made and if this process fails to extract the names of richer 
users and dealers, suspects are then taken to the station where they are held separate 
from other detainees in a room habitually used by arresting satgas.  Processes of 
interrogation are known as starting one’s BAP or Berita Acara Pemeriksaan  [police 
investigation report].275  Writing the BAP usually begins within a few hours of arrival 
at the station at 2 or 3am, and often involves different officers from the personnel that 
conduct the arrest.  Interrogation is intimately involved with confession and 
punctuated by different modes of torture.   
 
Suspects claim that they are kicked by booted feet, beaten with pistol butts punched, 
slapped, stripped, hosed down and forced to sit in air-conditioning or their fingers are 
crammed underneath chair legs and sat on and burnt with cigarettes.  Less frequently, 
offenders are electrocuted, tied up and soaked in bak mandi [a ceramic tub for holding 
bathing water] for hours, groped or raped.  During the writing of the BAP and for the 
period that this report is inconclusive, the suspect’s family and extended kin are called 
                                                
274 Sri – Heroin courier, interview by author, (14 July 2008).  
275 The BAP contains the police’s investigation of the subject, including witnesses, documentary and 
physical evidence and questioning, including a suspect’s ‘confession’. The BAP’s primary use is by 
police investigators and prosecutors in court. The BAP is the first and most important lead into the 
criminal justice process for a plaintiff or a defendant because all other procedural steps will flow from 
this singular document. Laying a charge also requires the prior writing of the BAP.  
! "#$ 
by telephone, told of the plight of the suspect and asked for money. Very often, 
suspects do not broker their own freedom but the terms and conditions of their release 
or reduced charge are conducted through these midnight phone calls to kin.276  
 
Back at the station, they beat me again. We did the BAP at midnight. While we did it, they 
yelled at me and hit me. They just wanted money out of me so they put me under pressure. 
They said, ‘come on, don’t you want to 86? If you don’t have the money for it, what about 
reducing the evidence? If you’ve got some money, we can reduce it.’ For Rp 5 million 
[US$558] the 1gm of shabu I had became 0.145. This meant that the article of the penal code 
they would charge me under went from article 62 to 60. Everything was about money, the 
entire BAP could be changed. Everything. (Amnesty International, 2009, p. 40). 
 
The use of torture for the kasus economy is spatially defined. Torture occurs, 
reoccurs, escalates or recedes in the hazy space between ‘arrest’ and ‘detention.’  The 
finite points of legal procedure – arrest, register, interrogation, detention – are 
suspended and deferred so that the torture of the criminal body takes place only when 
the legal status of that body is indeterminate. In stark contrast to police violence 
elsewhere, in Indonesia practices of police torture are clustered only in the 
ambiguous, roily spaces in which the state is keenly absent.  Observe in the 
testimonies of victims; the officers in civilian wear, the ‘unmade worlds’ (Scarry, 
1985) of the unmarked cars, the taxis, the hours of aimless driving in the night, the 
graveyards, forests, abandoned fields and marketplaces and the secret homes around 
Jakarta independently contracted by a satgas commander for the purposes of torture.  
At the police station, the criminal body remains unlogged by the custodial registers 
and is kept segregated from the detainees in sealed waiting rooms, interrogation cells 
                                                
276 Many suspects report if their extended kin were financially better off, they were also contacted by 
the police. Curiously, suspects had not passed on their details.  
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and even the offices of commanding personnel.  Practices of torture are reserved for 
the liminal, transitional zones where the suspects have nothing, ‘no status, insignia, 
secular clothing, rank, kinship position, nothing to demarcate them structurally from 
their fellow[s]’ (Turner, 1967, p. 98). This is a form of liminality that is spatially, not 
temporally defined because these are Jakarta’s permanent, roaming bands of ‘bare 
life’…the in between forms of life, uncoded substances without fixed belongings, 
unprotected’ (Hansen & Stepputat, 2005, p. 275). What is remarkable is the extent to 
which structuring of torture in liminal space mimics the phase of violence subject to 
new police cadets at the academy and indeed, the forms of ‘hazing’ and torture 
experienced by violence workers worldwide (Barker, 1999, p. 178-84).  
 
The corruption of arrest procedures and prosecution only ever occurs here, ‘betwixt 
and between’ identity, status and place, where the realities of the charge can be lent a 
shadowy, blurred quality.  Here the sums are agreed upon (the actual exchange occurs 
tomorrow) and the official account of the offence is cobbled together line by line in 
the police investigation report.  Dealer or user? Producer or courier? 1 gram or 10? 
How many witnesses? It is not until the financial deal has been struck that the subject 
transfers into the next phase of criminal procedure.  With the presentation of the arrest 
warrant [surat penangkapan], the care of the suspect is relinquished to the wardens in 
detention where the violence-extortion nexus takes a different form entirely and 
illicitly gained revenues traverse alternative circuits through the police station.  
 
It is important to acknowledge limits in corrupt or violence systems, for both have a 
tendency to be represented as pathological or cancerous and therefore infinite.  At 
what point does the logic of the kasus economy no longer apply? Whose criminal 
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body may be sacrificed, and never killed? The answer, of course, lies in the 
stratifications and ordered, unjust hierarchies of class. The war on drugs netted 
thousands of the middle and upper class whose fiscal clout and connections 
immunised their bodies from the violence levelled at the lower class.  Michael, a law 
student at an upper class Jakarta university, explains,   
 
I was arrested in … 2008 while I was getting my stuff.  I bought 14 tabs of ecstasy.  I drove 
out of Kampung Ambon, and suddenly I was cut off by another car.  The driver got out and 
was holding a gun at me. He said, ‘Get out of the car Pak.  There’s no need to panic.  Don’t 
move. We’re just doing our job so be cooperative.’ I was surrounded by about 10 plain-
clothed officers but they showed me their ID. When we got to the station it was night, so they 
said, take a rest first and we’ll start tomorrow.  At 10am, they started doing the investigative 
report. There was no violence. I was offered a lawyer by the police, but I said my dad would 
come, because he’s a lawyer. The police knew that. They didn’t ask me for my dealer’s name. 
I was not offered ‘86.’  I was not offered to ‘play the prosecutor.’ They didn’t ask me for 
anyone else’s names. My letter of arrest and detention was sent to my home.277  
 
In democracies, ongoing, systematic and relatively candid patterns of police torture 
cannot be simply ascribed to individual or even institutional traits in which violence is 
normalized by ‘authoritarian pathologies’, ‘police culture’, ‘rotten apples’ or 
‘violence-prone’ individuals (Worden, 1996). These various explanations for police 
brutality presume a strict delineate between civilian and police ‘culture’. This 
boundary has its epistemological orgins in the conceptual drawing of a determined, 
clear line between state and society itself when in fact ethnographic interrogation 
shows how the ‘edges of the state are uncertain; societal elements seem to penetrate it 
on all sides, and the resulting boundary between state and society is difficult to 
                                                
277 Michael, interview by author, (28 July 2008).  
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determine’ (Mitchell, 1991, p. 88). Police violence is not randomly distributed but 
rather ‘pain itself is grounded in culture and history’ (Silverman, 2001, p. 21). Like 
the violence against the Tionghoa, practices of torture are bound up in citizenship and 
sovereignty.  The body of the junkie, like the body of the maling [thief] is the body 
that looks like us (Siegel, 1998) but may be beaten, bruised, whipped, and 
electrocuted because the criminal body stands apart from the political body as its 
inverse. Even patterns of instrumentalist rent-seeking refract the status of the criminal 
as an internal other.   
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Figure 11: Excerpt from Human Rights Training handbook for AKPOL cadets. The title above reads: 
Don’t do this Mr and Ms Police! The title below declares: ‘Attention! The torture of detainees or defendants 
is prohibited!!’ The figure shows a police officer explaining his actions to a criminal suspect he is 
electrocuting on the feet. ‘If I don’t do this to you, you’ll never confess!’ he says. The criminal suspect cries 
for mercy and eventually relents, confessing that he indeed committed the act.  A second officer says, 
seemingly to a mixed audience, ‘Who else would like to have a go?’ and a journalist [pers] flicks up his hand 
and says, ‘I want to! Is hitting allowed?’ Although the cartoon is childish, almost humorous, it suggests that 
society too is deeply invested in sustaining and tolerating practices of torture against criminal suspects.  In 
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2008-9, the Asia Foundation recommenced its program of human rights training for the police at AKPOL 
and it is likely that this book is no longer used in the curriculum (PUSHAM UII, n.d). 
 
! 
 
In 2007, the capital’s central bars and clubs teemed with the idle men of the newly 
terminated gambling industry in mourning.  Across the city, on its very fringes, 
squatted the prisons and correctional facilities where wardens complained of cells 
newly groaning with the bruised and battered bodies of men and women on 
threadbare narcotics charges as couriers and users and low level pushers.  What linked 
these two seemingly divergent phenomenon was a perverse, cataclysmic series of 
changes to the mechanisms of exchange in which the fantasies of a rational and lawful 
order by a president and his police school mate, constrained as they were by the 
politics of capital, met the cultural conceptions of morality, money and licit, 
legitimate exchange of the police institution.  
 
The war on vices twinned the termination of casino gambling with a war on narcotics, 
divesting the police of the central pillar of its parmin economy.  Rather than establish 
a parallel protection economy for the narcotics trade, the moral calculus of Indonesian 
police corruption expanded and developed the kasus economy in ways that replicated 
the community’s exclusion of ‘bare life,’ bodies subjected to biopolitics, but not 
involved in politics’ (Stepputat, 2005, p. 62). Like the decontamination of ‘hot 
money’ [uang panas] through its vertical and horizontal circulation among police kin, 
this chapter has shown that even tortuous acts of illicit accumulation, which are by 
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definition transgressive or deviant, trace perverse lines of morality, legitimacy and 
licitness embedded within political society.  
 
Finally, the findings of this chapter reinforce the conclusions of Section One in 
arguing that the move from coercive-authoritarian to civil-juridical governance has 
stimulated a parallel change in the methods and targets of illicit resource extraction. 
The police have abandoned the protection economies around the gambling and 
narcotics industries, either by the force of the police command or by the force of 
moral norms, and moved toward the exercise of law as a means for criminal 
extraction.  This has meant that processes of illicit accumulation have been further 
enfolded within the state.  
 
Democratisation is frequently associated with rising lawlessness and surges in 
criminality and post-authoritarian Indonesia have been no stranger to that debate. But 
as this chapter has shown, attempts to enforce the rule of law have led to a further 
enfolding of criminal practices within the body of the state, from a brute protection 
industry around criminal acts to an increase in practices where tithes and bribes are 
levered from the laws and authorities of the state. The new criminality of the police 
‘does not so much repudiate the rule of law or the licit operations of the market, as 
appropriate their forms and recommission their substance’ (Comaroff & Comaroff, 
2006, p. 5). In this way, we see how successful democratisation can unfold at the 
same time as the state’s relationship to criminality is hardening behind the mask of 
law.  
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Conclusion  
 
Criminality and illicit practice has been a constituent element in the formation of the 
Indonesian state and despite its regulating promise, democratisation has not eradicated 
this critical delinquent element.  The state’s dependent relationship to illicit practices 
continues though no longer in identifiably ‘criminal’ practices. This thesis shows the 
way that the rise of the police and the dramatic expansion in their off-budget economy 
has paralled the demise of traditional opportunities of illicit extraction and the 
enfolding of new mechanisms of corruption within the forms and practices that come 
bundled with democratisation such as the fragmentation of power, the exercise of law, 
civil society and democratic security sector reform.  
 
At the same time, the findings of this thesis do not chart a simple, static seesaw 
motion between TNI and Polri.  Democratisation may not lead necessary to an 
idealised and lauded democracy, but nor does it merely reassign old players to new 
political pegs.  Multiple pressures pull the form and organisation of state criminality 
into different and sometimes conflicting arrangements. For instance, although this 
dissertation charts the triumph of the police over the military, in fact the 
reconfiguration of the off-budget economy has taken place on top of the contours of 
New Order arrangements of power. The TNI retains its territorial grip and many of 
the spoils of power and patronage that comes with it. Most police officers, along with 
many ordinary Indonesians, believe that democracy is only one more phase in the 
long and convoluted criminal politics of the Indonesian state. For this reason, what 
appears as a “demilitarization” of state force is popularly taken as merely a 
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“reorganisation”, which will inevitably be reorganised anew in favour of the military 
or some other security body. This explains the frenzied nature of Polri’s illicit 
accumulation and the obsence expansion of off-budget economy that feeds it.  
 
Other things suggest that the findings of this dissertation are only a snapshot of a 
relationship in transition. The failure of the police to reciprocate appropriately to their 
Tionghoa patrons. The fiscal pressure created by eradication of the all-important 
casino economy, that central funding source for the entire Indonesian state. The 
fragmentation of power, ushering in a never-ending crowd of fixers, brokers, middle 
men and other ‘mini Suhartos’ intercepting lines of authority to claim their ‘cut’ 
which has increased corruption ‘costs’ exponentially.  All of these things suggest that 
state criminality as it is today is not a functioning system and that the state’s 
relationship to illicit practices is likely to shift again in response to the points of 
friction.   
 
In this thesis, I have drawn attention to invisible connections of cause and 
consequence pulsing below the surface of the city as the country’s experiences the 
multiple, asynchronous and often contradictory processes of democratisation. I have 
linked the demise of Jakarta’s illegal gambling economy to the intensification 
practices of state violence against the urban poor and the rise of the capital’s new 
commodity and property tsars. I have correlated emergent Tionghoa civic practices 
with the increasing frenzy of rites of tribute and benefaction to the unstable, 
democratic state. This correspondence between seemingly disparate phenomenon, 
actors and markets are not born of my informants conclusions but are mine alone to 
be responsible for.   
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Contributions to a body of knowledge do not just fill gaps in scholarship. More often 
their impact is to reveal them or spur questions about possible crevices that lie below 
the surface. This thesis is no different. I wish to issue caution to the reader against 
conflating this hidden face of Jakarta with an inner kernel of ‘truth’ that exposes the 
lie of everyday state order and legality. Instead, we must understand that whatever 
‘facts’ are revealed here have been rudely yanked out and decontextualised from the 
covert practices and networks of power that underpin, subvert, sustain and engage 
with what we conventionally know as the political system. So exposed, they are naked 
and bereft of the alternative constellations of knowledge that sustain, explain and 
contextualise them.  It is our task to recognize the creation of knowledge as precisely 
that - a creation - placed into clear, digestible narratives that serve an explanatory 
purpose. We must discern their revelation as always and necessarily partial and 
question the perimeters and packages in which they are served.  Thus, the key 
problematic of the material presented in this thesis is not its divulging of ‘truth’ or 
otherwise, but its implicit boundaries. How does it come to be that these particular 
subterranean patterns of power are within the range of that which might be known?  
 
To answer that question, we must return to the two primary subjects of this thesis: the 
figure of the Polri officer and the Tionghoa entrepreneur as the gambling tycoon, 
benefactor or property tsar.  This thesis conjoins the figure of coercion and law with 
that of capital and unlike the others, this partnership came first and foremost on the 
suggestion of my informants. But why is it specifically their illegal practices and 
illicit revenue flows that emerge in this work and not those of the myriad other actors 
who ply Indonesia’s political landscape and are embedded in similarly powerful 
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networks and extractive mechanisms? The answer lies in the hidden twinning of the 
Polri officer and the Tionghoa capitalist.  Both represent what Jauregui calls ‘an 
Internal Other’, an inferior but necessary subject within Indonesian political society 
(Jauregui, 2010, p. 14). Police and the Tionghoa perform sullied functions within 
modern Indonesian society. The Tionghoa run the economy and are seen as fatally 
infected by vast accumulations of wealth controlled by their communities. Similarly 
the police’s brutalisation and terrorizing of the lower class comes at the behest of the 
wider community who shrug off such sticky obligations.  The figure of the Tionghoa 
and the police officer have something uniquely uncanny and treacherous to them.   
 
Is it this that made their illicit practices knowable to me? Taxi drivers dropping me off 
at Mabes Polri or Artha Graha would issue dark warnings to be careful.  Informants 
appeared initially reluctant, and yet were still disposed to speak of Tionghoa and 
police and their illicit practices. What all of this suggests is that within the domain of 
the secret, internal stratifications make certain perimeters of knowledge possible and 
others concealed completely. So, this thesis should be read for its gaps – the absence 
of sustained discussion around the criminality of a post-authoritiarian military, the 
silence around indigenous business relationships with the police, the fixation with one 
set of Tionghoa business entrepreneurs at, conceivably, the expense of other rival 
groups.  In this way, the reader must see this thesis as revealing as much as it conceals 
because the research upon which it rests was formed out of the asymmetrical and 
perverse lines of legitimacy and deviance within the society in which data was 
collected. Knowing this should make us rather more attentive to unearthing other 
missing narratives of democratic regime change.  
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Appendix 1: Sites of Reported Polri-TNI Clashes 2001-2010 
 
 PLACE  DISTRICT PROVINCE KODAM 
2001 POLRES MADIUN CITY  MADIUN EAST JAVA V/BRAWIJAYA 
2001 SAMPIT PORT WEST KOTAWARINGIN CENTRAL 
KALIMANTAN 
XII/TANJUNGPURA 
2001 SAMPIT WEST KOTAWARINGIN CENTRAL 
KALIMANTAN 
XII/TANJUNGPURA 
2001 LATA SIRIMAU, AMBON AMBON CITY MALUKU XVI/PATTIMURA 
2001 AMBON AMBON CITY MALUKU XVI/PATTIMURA 
2001 SERUI YAPEN WAROPEN YAPEN WAROPEN PAPUA XVII/TRIKORA 
2001 POLRES ACEH BARAT WEST ACEH  ACEH  ISKANDAR MUDA 
2001 PALU PALU CENTRAL SULAWESI VII/WIRABUANA 
2002 BINJAI LANGKAT NORTH SUMATRA I/BUKIT BARISAN 
2002 BOGOR BOGOR WEST JAVA II/SILIWANGI 
2003 DUMAI  BENGKALISRI RIAU I/BUKIT BARISAN 
2003 POLOPO  LUWU SOUTH SULAWESI VII/WIRABUANA 
2003 MEMPAWAH PONTIANAK WEST KALIMANTAN VI/TANJUNGPURA 
2004 SEUNEUBOK BACE  EAST ACEH  ACEH  ISKANDAR MUDA 
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2004 HARMONI, JAKARTA CENTRAL JAKARTA DKI JAKARTA KODAM JAYA 
2005 WAIHAONG AMBON MALUKU XVI/PATTIMURA 
2005 POLSEK CIBINONG BOGOR WEST JAVA VI/SILIWANGI 
2005 PALU PALU CENTRAL SULAWESI VII/WIRABUANA 
2005 NABIRE NABIRE PAPUA XVII/TRIKORA 
2006 ASRAMA BRIMOB TANTUI AMBON CITY MALUKU XVI/PATTIMURA 
2006 SAMARINDA  SAMARINDA EAST KALIMANTAN XII/TANJUNGPURA (this 
has since been divided) 
2006 MANADO MINAHASA NORTH SULAWESI VII/WIRABUANA 
2006 PUBLIC FIELD, ATAMBUA CITY BELU NUSATENGGARA 
TIMUR 
IX/UDAYANA 
2006 MUSI RAWAS MUSIRAWAS SOUTH SUMATRA II/SRIWIJAYA 
2006 POSO POSO CENTRAL SULAWESI VII/WIRABUANA 
2007 POLRES BANTAENG  BANTAENG WEST SOUTH 
SULAWESI 
VII/WIRABUANA 
2007 PUNCAK JAYA  PUNCAK JAYA  PAPUA XVII/CENDRAWASIH 
2007 POSO POSO CENTRAL SULAWESI VII/WIRABUANA 
2007 MAKASSAR CITY MAKASSAR SOUTH SULAWESI VII/WIRABUANA 
2007 PALLANGGA GOWA SOUTH SULAWESI VII/WIRABUANA 
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2007 POLEWALI  MANDAR POLEWALI MANDAR WEST SUMATRA I/BUKIT BARISAN 
2007 BULELENG BULELENG BALI IX/UDAYANA 
2007 JAILOLO WEST HALMAHERA  NORTH MALUKU XVI/PATTIMURA 
2007 HARMONI, JAKARTA CENTRAL JAKARTA DKI JAKARTA KODAM JAYA 
2008 MANGGAR CITY  EAST BELITUNG  BANGKA BELITUNG II/SRIWIJAYA 
2008 MAKASSAR MAKASSAR SOUTH SULAWESI VII/WIRABUANA 
2008 MASOHI CENTRAL MALUKU MALUKU XVI/PATTIMURA 
2008 SERPONG TANGERANG BANTEN KODAM JAYA 
2008 BULUKUMBA BULUKUMBA SOUTH SULAWESI VII/WIRABUANA 
2008 TOBELO NORTH HALMAHARA  NORTH MALUKU XVI/PATTIMURA 
2009 MAKASSAR MAKASSAR SOUTH SULAWESI XVI/PATTIMURA 
2009 TERNATE HALMAHARA TENGAH NORTH MALUKU XVI/PATTIMURA 
2009 ROKAN HULU ROKAN HULU RIAU I/BUKIT BARISAN 
2009 WAMENA JAYAWIJAYA PAPUA XVII/CENDRAWASIH 
2009 POLSEK PONDOK GEDE BEKASI WEST JAVA KODAM JAYA 
2009 MUSI RAWAS MUSI RAWAS SOUTH SUMATRA II/SRIWIJAYA 
2009 PALEMBANG PALEMBANG SOUTH SUMATRA II/SRIWIJAYA 
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2009 PEKANBARU PEKANBARU RIAU I/BUKIT BARISAN 
2009 POLRES MAMUJU MAMUJU  WEST SULAWESI VII/WIRABUANA 
2009 POLRES TOLIKARA TOLIKARA PAPUA XVII/CENDRAWASIH 
2010 POLRES MAMUJU MAMUJU WEST SULAWESI VII/WIRABUANA 
2010 POLRES MENTAWAI MENTAWAI WEST SUMATRA I/BUKIT BARISAN 
2010 KOTA KALABAHI  ALOR NUSA TENGGARA 
TIMUR 
IX/UDAYANA 
2010 MEDAN  MEDAN  NORTH SUMATRA I/BUKIT BARISAN 
2010 TIMIKA MIMIKA PAPUA  XVII/CENDRAWASIH 
2010 LABUHAN BATU MEDAN  NORTH SUMATRA I/BUKITBARISAN 
2010 PADANG PADANG  WEST SUMATRA I/BUKIT BARISAN 
2010 MUARA ENIM MUARA ENIM SOUTH SULAWESI VII/WIRABUANA 
2010 SERUI  YAPEN PAPUA  UNKNOWN 
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Appendix 2: Glossary 
 
Note for users: This glossary references Stevens and Tellings’ 2004 A Comprehensive 
English-Indonesian Dictionary, published by Ohio University.  Although meanings 
are checked against this source, I have adjusted definitions where appropriate.  Where 
acronyms are more familiar, I have classified them under the acronym and provided 
the expanded version in brackets. Lit denotes a literal translation and (Pol) is used for 
terms exclusive to the police.   
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ABRI -  [Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia] The body that incorporated the 
Armed Forces of Indonesia, including the Navy, Air-force, Army and Police. ABRI 
was dismantled in 1999 when the police force was made independent.  
 
Adik-kakak  - a sibling relationship.  
 
Agung Sedayu – A Jakarta-based property company owned by Sugianto ‘Aguan’ 
Kusuma. 
 
AKABRI – [Akademi Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia] the Armed Forces 
Academy of the Republic of Indonesia.  
 
AKPOL – [Akademi Kepolisian] Polri’s police academy.  
 
Anak buah – golden child, clientalist underlings, juniors under one’s supervision.   
 
Anggaran Belanja Tambahan (ABT) – Additional Expenditure Budget.  
 
Anggaran Pendapatan Belajar Negara (APBN) – National Revenues and Expenditures 
Budget. 
 
Angkatan Darat (AD) – the Indonesian Army.  
 
Angkatan Laut (AL) – the Indonesian Navy.  
 
Angkatan Udara (AU) – the Indonesian Airforce.  
 
Angkatan Bersenjata – the Armed Forces. 
 
Artha Graha – ‘The House of Money’, a conglomerate owned by Tomy Winata and 
Sugianto ‘Aguan’ Kusuma.  
 
Asrama – boarding house.  
 
Babinkamtibmas  - Lit. Security and Social Order Guidance Body or Community 
Policing Officer.  
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Babinsa – [Bintara Pembina Desa]. Lit. Village Guidance Officer stationed at the 
Koramil.  
 
Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan (BPK) -  State Audit Agency.  
 
Bakorstanas – Coordinating body for national security established in 1988 to replace 
Kopkamtib.  
 
BAP [Berita Acara Pemeriksaaan] – the police investigative report that records the 
interrogations of the suspect, witnesses and documentary evidence of the crime. The 
BAP is required to lay a charge.  
 
Beking – patronage, protection, backing.  
 
Betawi – ‘indigenous Jakartan.’  
 
Brimob – [Lit. Mobile Brigade]. .Polri’s centrally commanded, militarised police.  
 
BUMN – State-owned company.  
 
Buser [buru sergap] – Lit. Pursuit and Attack, the arresting unit of Polri’s criminal 
research department.  Buser are field staff who do not interrogate or write case files.  
 
Cendana – the leafy, plush street in Menteng, central Jakarta where the Suharto family 
residence is located. Cendana is frequently used to euphemise the Suharto family’s 
role in illicit dealings.  
 
Cicak Lawan Buaya – gecko vs. crocodile, shorthand for the 2009 showdown 
between the Anti Corruption Commission and Polri in which Polri has been credibly 
accused of being paid by businessmen to set up the deputies of the Commission.  
 
Cina – Chinese, including ethnic Chinese citizens of Indonesia.  
 
Cukong – Hokkien term, used in colloquial Indonesian for a wealthy Chinese 
businessperson who bankrolls the political and military elite.  
 
Cukongism – the practice of exchanging Tionghoa capital for security, economic or 
political concessions.  
 
Curanmor – Motorbike theft and thief. 
 
Daftar Isian Proyek Anggaran (DIPA) – Issuance of Spending Authority. The 
reporting system by which state departments, institutions and units account for state 
funds.  
 
Dandim – District military commander.  
 
Dandramil – Sub-district military commander.  
 
Danrem – Garrison military commander (Korem).  
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Densus 88 – Polri’s counter-terror department that manages threats to national 
security such as counterterrorism, armed crime and insurgency.   
 
DKI [Daerah Khusus Ibu Kota Jakarta Raya] - Greater Jakarta Special Administrative 
Region. The special province of Jakarta divided into the districts of East, West, North, 
South and Central Jakarta.   
 
DPO [Daftar Pencarian Orang] – (Pol.) list of wanted persons.  
 
DPR [Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat] – The People’s Assembly of the Republic of 
Indonesia.  
 
Dukun – a shaman, traditional healer, sorcerer. See also orang pintar. 
 
Duit – colloquially used to describe money, like cash, moolah or dosh.  Originally 
Dutch to denote the copper coin that gradually replaced the picis by 1780.  
 
Dwifungsi – [lit. dual functions] the ideology that justified ABRI’s socio-political role 
in Indonesian governance and daily life.  
 
Forum Kemitraan Polisi dan Masyarakat (FKPM) – Police and Community 
Partnership Forum. 
 
Golkar – The Party of Functional Groups, who with the military, made up one of the 
pillars of the New Order.  
 
Hankam [Pertahanan dan Keamanan] – Defence and Security.  
 
Hansip [Pertahanan Sipil] – Civil Defence.  
 
Hibah tanah – donated land.   
 
Hoki – luck or lucky, a term used primarily by Tionghoa. 
 
Ilmu – knowledge, both scientific and non-rational in form.  
 
Irwasum -  Head of the General Oversight Inspectorate of the National Police.  
 
Jago – rooster, champion martial artist (in West Java), gangster.  
 
Jambret – purse snatcher, pickpocket.  
 
Jawara -  Bully, gangster, local martial arts champion. See also jago and preman.  
 
Judi – Gambling. Also perjudian.  
 
Kamnas [Keamanan Nasional] – The shorthand for the National Security Bill, drafted 
by the Department of Defence in 2007 and since buried.  
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Kampung – a village or residential area for the lower classes.  Though often thought 
of in romantic terms, affixing the … –an to become kampungan describes a boorish 
person or behaviour.  
 
Kantor Pelayanan Perbendaharaan Negara – Provincial Treasury office.  
 
Kapolri – National Chief of Police  
 
Kapolri Swasta  - Lit. ‘informal’ National Police Chief. A turn of phrase to describe a 
kind of cukong relationship specific to the police.  
 
KASAD – Military or police chief of staff. 
 
Kapolda – Regional Police Chief.  
 
Kapolres – District Police Chief.  
 
Kapolri – National Police Chief.  
 
Keamanan – Security. 
 
Kecamatan – Sub-district level governance.  
 
Kekaryaan – A practice of appointing retired and active military generals to civilian 
bureaucratic and leadership posts that reached its zenith in the New Order.  
 
Kelurahan  - Ward level governance. 
 
Ketangkasan – literally, skill. Usually associated with a ball game such as pin ball or, 
in the instance of Indonesia’s illegal gaming industry, a slot machine or keno.  
 
Kodam – District level military command.  
 
Komisaris – Commissioner, usually of a state or private corporation.  
 
Komisi III – National Parliamentary Commission III, responsible the oversight of law 
and policing.  
 
Komnas HAM – National Commission for Human Rights.  
 
Kompolnas – National Police Commission.  
 
Kongsi – Joint venture or business association. Frequently, kongsi is used in place of 
cartel.  
 
Kooperasi – Cooperative.  
 
Kopassus – the Special Force Command of the Indonesian Army that deals with 
specialized national threats such as insurgency and counterterrorism. Known for their 
sniper capacities.   
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Kopkamtib - Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order. 
 
Koramil – Sub-district level military command.  
 
Korem – Garrison level military command.  
 
Kostrad – the Indonesian Army’s Strategic Reserve Command.  
 
Koter [Komando Daerah] – Military Command System. 
 
KPK [Komisi Anti-Korupsi] - Anti Corruption Commission. 
 
Inkopol – Holding Company for the Polri Cooperative.  
 
Intel – Intelligence departments and agents within the police.  
 
Lahan – Fertile, tilled land that brings wealth when harvested.  In urban 
environments, the term is slang for one’s turf.  
 
Laupan – Hokkien term for boss.  
 
Lembaga Permasyarakatan (LP) – State jail. 
 
Linmas [Lindungan Masyarakat] - National Community and Community Protection 
body.  
 
Mabes Polri: the national headquarters of Polri. 
 
Maling  - Thief.  
 
Marga – Clan. 
 
Markas – A kind of ‘broker’ who works exclusively with the police to ‘fix’ legal 
cases.  
 
Metropolitan City – the specific vision for Jakarta under Governor Maj.Gen Ali 
Sadikin that determined the city’s policy and planning initiatives.  
 
MPR [Majelis Perwakilan Rakyat] – People’s Legislative Council.  
 
Mutasi – A term employed by employees of the state to describe the rotation of job 
postings.  
 
Narkoba – Narcotics, usually illegal.  
 
Oknum – A ‘bad apple’ within the state corps, a rogue, individual whose uses his or 
her authority as a public official for personal gain.  
 
Orang pintar – A shaman who heals, ruptures and predicts. See also, dukun. 
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Ormas [Organisasi Masyarakat] – Community organisation, more frequently used as 
a euphemism for Indonesia’s post-authoritarian variety of non-state aligned criminal 
gangs.  
 
P21 – (Pol) The name a complete case file is given when it is accepted by the 
prosecution.  
 
Pamong praja – the indigenous ruling class of the colonial state.  
 
Pancasila – The five principles of National Ideology as proclaimed by President 
Sukarno.  
 
Pangkat – Rank.  
 
Panti Asuhan – Orphanage or child care institution, often providing residential care.  
Parman [partisipasi teman] – (Pol) Euphemism for donors to the police from the 
private sector.  
 
Parmas [partisipasi masyarakarat] – (Pol) Euphemism for donors of the police 
institution from members and institutions in the community.  
 
Parmin [partisipasi kriminal] – (Pol) Euphemism for donors of the police institution 
from criminal networks or individual bosses.  
 
Partai Demokrat – the Democratic Party led by President Susilo Yudhoyono.  
 
Paspampres [Pasukan Keamanan President] – the Presidential Security Guard usually 
made up of elite, career-minded officers from various sections of the military, or as in 
President Abdurrahman Wahid’s time, the police.  
 
PDI-P – the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, led by Megawati Sukarnoputri 
who served as president from 2002-2004.  
 
Pembinaan – Nurturing guidance.  
 
Peranakan – Indonesian born Chinese of mixed Chinese Indonesian parentage.  
 
Perkara – (Pol). Case.  
 
PKI [Partai Komunis Indonesia] – The Indonesian Communist Party. 
 
Perjudian – gambling, also judi.  
 
Pesantren – Islamic school offering a mix of Islamic and ‘modern’ education, usually 
offering board to its students.  
 
Polda Metro Jaya – Jakarta Regional Police Station.  
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Polmas [Polisi Masyarakat] – Community Policing.  
 
Polres – District level police station.  
 
Polsek – Sub-district level police station.  
 
Pos Pol – Police post administered by the polsek.  
 
Preman – Gangster, criminal, state sponsored thug, see also jago and jawara. Also, 
the name for an un-uniformed member of the security apparatus.  
 
Pribumi – ‘indigenous’ native of Indonesia with Malay racial characteristics.  
 
Propam [Divisi Profesi dan Pengamanan] – (Pol) Internal affairs. 
 
Protap – (police) Standard Operating Procedures.  
 
PTIK [Perguruan Tinggi Ilmu Kepolisian] – The Advanced School of Police Science, 
located in Jakarta. A mandatory part of any officer’s education if they are to advance 
in the institution.   
 
Purnawirawan (Purn.) – Retired officer.  
 
Putaw  - Low grade heroin.  
 
Reformasi – Reformation, the title of the movement that instigated democratisation.  
 
Repelita – Five Year Development Plan. 
 
Reserse, also serse. – Criminal Investigation.  
 
Reskrim [Reserse Kriminal] – Department for Criminal Investigation found at every 
level of the police command system.  
 
Ronda – Traditional neighbourhood patrol.  
 
RT [Rukun tetangga] – Neighbourhood Association.   
 
Rumah Sakit – Hospital.  
 
RUU [rancangan undang-undang] – draft national legislation.  
 
RW [Rukun Warga] – Citizen’s Association comprised of RT.   
 
Satgas – police task force, usually associated with specific criminal investigations.  
 
Satpam [Satuan Pengamanan] – private security guard.  
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Sembako – nine basic necessities comprising salt, salted fish, sugar, cooking oil, 
kerosene, laundry soap, rough textiles.  
 
SDSB – [Sumbangan Dermawan Social Berhadiah] The later incarnation of a series 
of national sports lotteries between 1986-1991.  Profits from the lotteries were 
supposed to go to sports and other worthy causes.  
 
SESPIM [Sekolah Staf dan Pimpinan Kepolisian Negara Republik] – Police Leaders 
School.  
 
Setoran – (Pol) a monthly or regular rent extracted by seniors.  
 
SKEP [Surat Keputusan Edaran Polri] – Decree or edict issued by the Kapolri. 
 
Shabu – [also, shabu-shabu or sabu] - Methamphetamine hydrochloride, an addictive 
stimulant.  
 
Siliwangi command – West Java military command.  
 
Siskamling [Sistem Keamanan Lingkungan] – Neighbourhood Security System.  
 
SPN [Sekolah Kepolisian Negara] – National Police School.  
 
Sumbang – to donate. 
 
Taipan – boss (Hokkien).  
 
Tauke – boss.  
 
Terpaksa – forced.  
 
Tionghua – Indonesian citizen of Chinese descent.  
 
TO [Target Operasi] – (Pol) Target of Operation. 
 
Togel [Toto Gelap] – A popular variety of lotto, rather like bingo but involving 
numbers and pictures.   
 
Totok - a person of Chinese descent who is perceived by the Tionghoa community to 
have a strong commitment to Chinese or Confusican values in every day life, speak in 
Chinese dialect and tend to be of Confusian or Buddhist religion.  
 
UU [Undang-Undang] – Law, act.  
 
Visum – medical certificate.  
 
Wilayah – Region, territory, area.  Also, in slang use, turf.  
 
Yayasan – Foundation. During the New Order, charitable enterprises to masked illicit 
businesses run by the state and its elites.  
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The Cast 
 
Adang Darajatun [also, Dorojatun] – Served as Wakapolri.  He is often presented 
as a ‘reformist’ because of his role in drafting the ‘blue book’ in 1999, Polri’s 
blueprint for reform and later, as Wakapolri, his role in supporting community 
policing.  During his career, he has faced credible charges of corruption on several 
occasions and has faced an internal ethics trial.  In 2007, Darajatun ran for governor 
of Jakarta with Islamic party PKS but lost to former Governor Sutiyoso’s choice, 
Fauzi Bowo. Through his wife, Nunun Nurbaiti, the Darajutuns possess a substantial 
business enterprise with interests in defence contracts, telecommunications and palm 
oil. In 2010, Darajatun’s wife fled to Singapore in need of ‘medical treatment’ after 
allegations emerged of her distributing cheques issued by an Artha Graha-owned 
company to lubricate the nomination of Miranda Goeltom to the senior deputy 
governor of the Bank of Indonesia.  
 
Agung Podomoro Group – Run by Trihatma Kusuma Halim, the group specialises 
in Jakarta property development. The group has risen to prominence in the latter years 
of the first decade after reformasi due to big property projects such as Podomoro City 
and Perumahan Sunter Podomoro. It is currently raising money through an IPO.  
 
Artha Graha –  Tomy Winata’s giant, sprawling conglomerate with interests in 
property, tourism, telecommunications, finance, insurance, tin and most recently, 
agro-industry with the launch of a massive hybrid-rice project.  
 
Jenderal Dai Bachtiar – Served as Kapolri from 2001 to 2005 under the Megawati 
administration.  Although he kicked the reform process along slowly, approving a 
series of research projects run by the Partnership for Governance Reform designed to 
reform the police, he also ran a largely corrupt ship and made few attempts to conceal 
his political leanings.  In the 2004 elections, with Megawati versus Yudhoyono, he 
instructed the force to use the votes of their families and wives to vote for PDI-P. 
Under the Yudhoyono administration, he was farmed out as ambassador for Malaysia. 
He and a host of other pensioned officers also run LCKI, a consultancy/ think tank 
designed to capture foreign funding by supporting criminal justice reform.  
 
Aburizal Bakrie – Chairman of the Golkar party and Bakrie and Brothers. Under the 
latter, is the subsidiary Bakrieland, the ‘largest superblock developer in Jakarta,’ 
according to their website.  Bakrieland is renowned for its developments around the 
main artery Jln Rasuna Said, including the popular Taman Rasuna.  Bakrieland also 
develops Jakarta’s toll roads and water in Jakarta’s east.  Bakrie and Brothers have 
invested heavily in energy, mining and bio-fuels. In 2007, the year after the Lapindo 
disaster, Bakrie was listed as Indonesia’s richest man. In 2010, he had dropped to 
number four.  
 
Fauzi Bowo – He served as Governor Sutiyoso’s deputy before running against 
Wakapolri Adang Darajatun for governorship of Jakarta in 2007. He has an 
instrumental role running the pan-Betawi body, Bamus, and is linked to its plethora 
civilian militia.  
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Ciputra – owns Ciputra group which specialises in property, media and retail in the 
capital. After taking a massive hit in the Asian financial crisis, Ciputra’s company has 
begun developing property throughout the country and in Vietnam.   
 
Citra Bhayangkara  - a Polri established community policing group found 
predominantly in Jakarta.  
 
Arief Cocong – Medan Tionghoa Manager of various illegal gambling casinos in 
central and west Jakarta. Often known as the ‘Kapolri swasta’ or the private National 
Police Chief for his reputed contacts within Polri.   
  
The Consortium  - the term used to describe a range of investors and actors in high 
class gambling industry, including Sugeng Pranato, Tomy Winata, Sugianto ‘Aguan’ 
Kusuma, Edi ‘Porkas’ Winata, Arief Cocong, Rudi Sutanto, Yoris Raweyai, Ongen 
Sangaji, Hadi Rustam, Kwee Hariyadi Kumala, Johnny Kusuma, Arie Sigit, Iwan 
Tjahyadikarta (Eng Tiong).  
 
Kapolri Bambang Danuri – Under Kapolri Sutanto, Danuri appeared as a clean, 
reformist officer during his tenure as Kapolda for North Sumatra and as head of 
Bareskrim, where he even commissioned a white paper for reform.  As a result, 
Danuri was outgoing Kapolri Sutanto’s choice for Kapolri but upon being appointed 
in 2008, he has largely run a fractured messy term, dithering over a number of serious 
scandals to rock the police such as the KPK affair and the discovery of inflated bank 
accounts of senior generals.  
 
Dadi Darmadi – (Apyang Jinggo). He served as the front man for a series of 
investors in Jakarta’s gambling scene while it was legalised under Governor Ali 
Sadikin.  
  
Yan Darmadi  - (Foek Yoo Yan) Ran his father’s contracts for Jakarta casinos under 
Governor Ali Sadikin, building a big enough capital base to invest heavily in 
property, hotels and retail in Jakarta and throughout the country through PT Jan 
Darmadi Investindo and PT Jakarta Setiabudi International. Before the crisis, 
Darmadi’s group was one of the top thirty companies in the country.  In 2007, 
Darmadi was listed by Forbes as Indonesia’s 30th richest man.  
 
Kapolri Awoeluddin Djamin – Served between 1978-82 and oversaw important 
changes within the police including legislation for private security companies and the 
code of criminal procedure, KUHAP.  Djamin continues to be seen as Polri’s most 
‘intellectual’ police officer, by dint of having a PhD from the University of Southern 
California and writing prolifically about the force, but he offers very conservative 
visions of reform. His influence within Polri remains strong.  
 
Susno Duadji – Was appointed Kabareskrim [Head of Criminal Investigation] under 
Danuri but became embroiled in the cicak-buaya case of 2008 in which he appeared 
to set up KPK Deputy Chairmen Chandra Hamzah and Bibit Rianto for arrest.  After 
being forced to resign as Kabareskrim due to overwhelming public pressure, Duadji 
began a strategy of seeking public influence by dishing the dirt on other police 
generals based on information gathered during his 2004 secondment to the Financial 
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Reporting and Analysis Centre (PPATK).  Duaji is currently facing criminal charges 
regarding allegations of corruption.  Ranking in 2010 was Com. Gen.  
 
Nugroho Djayusman – Kapolda Metro Jaya from 1998-99.  Close to General 
Wiranto and self-confessed advisor and advocate to many new civil militias in Jakarta 
and Medan, particularly Front Pembela Islam.  
 
Eka Cipta Widjaja – Cipta Widjaja was heavily embedded in the New Order regime 
and the Suharto family owned a significant stake in Sinar Mas. The group is largely 
propped up by a significant stake in pulp and paper which has led to credible claims 
of illegal logging.  Sinar Mas also has an important property flank of the business 
which constructs residential and retail estates in Jakarta through PT Duta Pertiwi.  
 
Nur Faizi – Kapolda Metro Jaya from 1999-2000 before being ousted by 
Abdurrahman Wahid for his failure to arrest Tomy Winata on illegal gambling 
charges. Final rank was Insp. Gen.  
 
FBR [Forum Betawi Rempug] – the Betawi Brotherhood Forum is a Jakarta based 
ormas [mass based organisation] established in 2001 by now deceased K.H. Fadloli 
el-Muhir. The group purports to restore the fruits of development to the ‘Betawi,’ the 
city’s original inhabitants. However, in reality it is a shifting mass of various old time 
and new preman who have aggressively taken over large strips of the capital, 
including parts of profitable central Jakarta.  
 
Kapolda Adang Firman – Appointed to Kapolda Metro Jaya at the time of Kapolri 
Sutanto’s war against gambling and drugs. Despite initial calls that he wasn’t up to 
the job, Firman lasted well over three years as Kapolda.  
 
Forkabi [Forum Komunikasi Anak Betawi] – the Communication Forum of Betawi 
Kids. Often twinned with FBR, Forkabi was established around the same time for 
similar reasons. Like FBR, Forkabi has an ongoing and brutal rivalry with the 
Madurese gangs that ply the city.  However, Forkabi has been far less successful at 
taking over the resource rich areas of the city.   
 
Front Pembela Islam  - A hardline Islamic militia that appeared after the 
disbandment of the Pam Swakarsa.  FPI is known for its violent tactics and 
spectacular attacks, initially on places of sin but increasingly on ethnic and religious 
minorities across the country.  FPI is a complex and contradictory mix of preman 
tactics and religious fundamentalism.  
  
Irjen Firman Gani – Close to Kapolri Da’i Bachtiar, Firman was appointed Kapolda 
Metro Jaya during 2003-2004. With the change of political winds that occurred under 
Sutanto, Gani was rotated to an educational position until he retired. 
 
Golkar – The party of functional groups, the main political vehicle for the New 
Order.  
 
Trihatma Halim – Took Agung Podomoro group over from his father. He is 
currently rated in the top twenty richest of Indonesia.  
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Chandra M Hamzah – Deputy Head of the Anti Corruption Commission.  He was 
arrested by Polri on corruption in 2009 but later freed when tapes showed that the 
head of Criminal Investigation colluded with Anggoro Widjojo to have him arrested. 
In October 2010, the charges of bribery against Hamzah and Rianto were dropped.  
  
Hanura – People’s Conscience Party, founded by General Wiranto in 2006 after his 
defeat in the 2004 national elections. For the 2009 national elections, Wiranto 
amassed a central board consisting mainly of police and military generals 
disappointed that their support of his administration in the second round of the 2004 
presidential elections had not translated into real political positions.    
 
Harco Mangga Dua – Built by Sugianto Kusuma’s PT Agung Sedayu Group in 1991 
for retail purposes. Harco housed Jakarta’s most exclusive casino from 2000-2005.  
 
Kapolri Hoegeng – Much respected national police chief from 1968 to 1971. 
Renowned as a clean cop with high morals, he was eventually alienated by President 
Suharto.  He went onto join Sadikin and Nasution in the Petition of 50. 
 
Hotel Borobudur - Located near Kodam at Lapangan Banteng, the hotel was once 
owned by YKEP’s PT JIHD.  Since the transition to democracy, the Hotel has 
changed hands to Discovery, a subsidiary of Tomy Winata’s Artha Graha.  
 
Humpuss Group – A large shipping company 60% owned by Suharto’s favoured 
son, Tommy Suharto.   
 
ICITAP - International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program funded 
by the US Department for Justice and Department of State.  
 
Inkopol [Induk Kooperasi Kepolisian] – A police cooperative with extensive business 
interests.   
 
INTI – [Perhimpunan Indonesia Tionghoa] Association of Indonesians of Tionghoa 
descent established by Eddie Lembong in the wake of the 1998 riots in February 1999 
to assuage pribumi-Tionghoa relations. Today functions as a nation-wide pressure 
group.   
 
International Organisation for Migration – International NGO working on 
migration issues worldwide. This branch in Indonesia has pushed the boundaries of 
IOM work by establishing a national community policing program with European 
Commission and Royal Netherlands Embassy support.  
 
PT JIHD -  Jakarta International Hotels and Development. In 1991, acquired PT 
Danayasa Arthatama, the owner and main developer of the Sudirman Central 
Business District (SCBD).  This acquisition has changed JIHD's corporate status from 
a single asset/hotel owner to a mixed-use property developers, ranging from hotels to 
commercial offices, shopping centers, residential, and serviced apartments. Owned by 
Tomy Winata and Sugianto Kusuma.  
 
Kosgoro [Kesatuan Organisasi Serbaguna Gotong Royong] – a civil militia/ business 
outfit formed by Golkar in the late 1950s.  
! "#" 
 
Sugianto ‘Aguan’ Kusuma – Palembang Tionghoa based in Jakarta and owner of 
Agung Sedayu group, a major player in property in Jakarta. Kusuma is Tomy 
Winata’s senior and they have partnered in initiatives together since the early 1980s.  
Kusuma is also active in Tzu Chi, a well-regarded Taiwanese charity with branches 
all over the world.  
 
Atang Latief – (Lauw Tjin Ho) A Tionghoa entrepreneur who made his fortune in the 
legalised gambling industry during Sadikin’s term as Governor.  After a series of 
bank investments tied up with the Asian financial crisis, Latief skipped the country 
with a substantial BLBI loan [Restructuring authority].  He returned to Indonesia to 
face charges in 2006 but by 2010, the case was still unresolved and Latief was living 
in Singapore.  
 
Ronnie Liehawa – Former Kombes (Senior Police Commisssioner) in Polri. 
Secretary for the national police commission (Kompolnas), consultant to IOM’s 
community policing program and to Dai Bachtiar’s consultancy, LCKI.  He is a major 
shareholder in PT Secom, a Japanese-Polri partnership towards providing private 
security. Since the terrorist attacks in Jakarta, this company holds many of the major 
hotel security contracts throughout the country.   
 
Liem Sioe Liong (Salim group) – Once considered the richest individual in 
Indonesia, Liem Sioe Liong started his career in business in Kudus, Central Java, by 
providing supplies to the armed forces, particularly while Suharto headed up the 
Diponegoro command.  He expanded into textiles and banking and during the New 
Order and was handed monopolies on cloves and flour which allowed him to expand 
into cement and food production.  In many of these initiatives, Liem Sioe Liong was 
forced to partner with Suharto’s children. Liong has also been associated with other 
Suharto cronies such as Ciputra, Eka Cipta Widjaja, Henry Pribadi and Mochtar 
Riady. Son Anthony Salim now runs Salim group. He was ranked 9th richest 
Indonesian in Forbes 2010.  
 
Lippo Group – Established by New Order cukong Mochtar Riady, and currently run 
by his son James Riady. Lippo Group established a capital base in banking, expanding 
to property estates in the Jabotabek region in the 1980s and 1990s.  Currently, Lippo 
group is investing in education in China.  
 
Mitra Jaya – A group of civilian toughs, businessmen and ward-level leadership 
formed to assist the Koramil in everyday policing.  
 
Soetijpto Nagaria  - In 1975, established Summarecon Agung, a property giant 
responsible for several large residential estates throughout Jakarta and retail buildings 
in and around Central Jakarta. Nagaria was a donor in the Polda Metro Jaya 
renovations.  
 
Setya Novanto – Curried favour with Golkar through Kosgoro and was the recipient 
of a number of contracts supplying Polri before becoming a Golkar parliamentarian 
after the fall of Suharto. In parliament, he has played an active role on the 
commissions dedicated to police oversight and budgeting. Accusations of corruption 
have repeatedly been brought up against him, but never pursued. Setya Novanto is 
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associated with the Nova group, a diversified conglomerate with interests in granite, 
entertainment, and export-import, but also a number of other companies such as PT 
Hexatama Finindo and PT Prima Nugraha Sejahtera Raya.  
 
Nur Faizi  - Kapolda Metro Jaya from 1999-2000. Final ranking at retirement was 
May.Gen.  
 
Ongen Sangaji – Sangaji’s career in Jakarta’s gangster politics has been closely 
linked to his relationships with General Wiranto and kin, retired Let.Gen Suaedy 
Marasabessy. As the leader of one of the most fearsome Muslim Ambonese preman 
groups in the capital, Sangaji had a dominant role in the protection industry of central 
Jakarta night spots and hotels which after 1998, graduated into a stakeholder position 
in gaming halls.  In 2007, Sangaji renounced his life in the Jakarta underworld for a 
life in politics as deputy head of the Jakarta branch of General Wiranto’s Hanura 
party.  Sangaji’s band of preman have also been credibly accused of fanning the 
flames of a civil war that broke out between Muslims and Christians in late 1998.  
 
Makbul Padmanegara – Between 1983-86, Padmanegara served as Kapolsek in 
various stations in central Jakarta, including Taman Sari.  In 2000, he served as 
Wakapolda for Metro Jaya under Kapolda Nur Faizi then going on to take the 
Kapolda position where he was accused of sympathising with Tomy Winata in the 
Tempo affair.  In 2005, Padmanegara was Kabareskrim and then went on as 
Wakapolda under Kapolri Sutanto. In 2010, Padmanegara retired.  
 
Pamswakarsa – A generic term for private security forces but more frequently used 
to refer to the Islamic gangs formed by Wiranto to support the MPR against the 
students in the 1998 Special Session. Many Pamswakarsa troops went on to join other 
Islamic militia in the capital such as FPI and FBR.  
 
Olo Panggabean – Was an early member of Pemuda Pancasila until in 1969, he 
broke off and formed rival group, IPK which ruled North Sumatra’s gambling world 
until Kapolri Sutanto declared an end to the industry in 2005.  Panggabean died in 
2009.  
 
Partnership for Governance Reform – An institution that mediates international 
funding for democratisation and reform in Indonesia through the initiatives of national 
stakeholders. Under Adrianus Meliala, Partnership’s police program was instrumental 
in commissioning a series of important policy papers on the Indonesian police, 
recommending strategies for the reform of recruitment, human resources, education, 
fiscal and community policing systems.  
 
Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghua Indonesia – Established by Eddie Lembong 
and Teddy Yusuf in the wake of the 1998 riots in Jakarta, PSMTI and INTI were 
originally one social organisation founded to provide mutual aid to the Tionghoa.  In 
1999, Lembong accused PSMTI of being too Tionghoa-centered and split from the 
body to establish INTI.  Like INTI, PSMTI is widely regarded as a networking 
organisation that facilitates relations between a middle-aged, male business elite and 
the state.   
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Pemuda Pancasila –A nation-wide organisation of state-sponsored preman that 
achieved notoriety during the New Order. Headed by Yapto Soerjosoemarno and 
deputy, Yoris Raweyai.  
 
Petition of 50 – A document signed in 1980 by disaffected generals, intellectuals and 
parliamentarians raising concern that the spirit of Pancasila was being abused. 
Notable ABRI signatories include Sadikin, Hoegeng and Nasution.  
 
Po An Tui – A national, grassroots policing organisation established by Tionghoa 
youths to protect Tionghoa property and trade during the revolution against the Dutch 
colonial government. The single instance in Indonesian history in which Tionghoa 
have mobilised themselves for their own security.  
 
Puskopol – Police Cooperative with branches at every level of the police territorial 
command.  
 
Yoris Raweyai – Former deputy head of Pemuda Pancasila and key player in the 
executive casino industry. Currently, Raweyai is a Golkar legislator for Irian Jaya and 
head of the newly established Dewan Adat Masyarakat Papua [Traditional Culture 
Council for Papua].   Raweyai’s relationship with Tomy Winata started in the 1980s, 
although this relationship came to light most notably in Winata’s use of Pemuda 
Pancasila to clear land around Sudirman for the SCDB development. Raweyai is of 
Chinese-Irian descent. 
 
Bibit Rianto – Graduate of AKABRI 1970, Rianto embraced a role in the police 
reform movement by writing a series of books on Polri’s reform and taking 
responsibility for the direction of the institution in the wake of the 1999 split from 
ABRI.  Nonetheless, these machinations did not win him any real traction for his bid 
to become Kapolri to replace Roesmanhadi and Rianto retired from the force in 2000. 
In 2007, Rianto was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Anti Corruption Commission 
where he pursued police corruption most notably imprisoning former National Police 
Chief Rusdihardjo for embezzlement and former prosecutor Urip Tri Gunawan for 
receiving bribes. Tensions between the criminal justice system and the KPK ran high, 
climaxing in 2009 when Kabareskrim Susno Duadji ordered the arrest of Rianto and 
his colleague Chandra M Hamzah allegedly for receiving bribes from Tionghoa 
businessman Anggodo Widjojo. Tapes played in the constitutional court proved that 
the police had conspired with the Widjojo to have the deputies arrested. Anggodo 
Widjojo was convicted for bribery and sentenced to five years imprisonment.  
 
Haji Rizieq Shihab – Notorious founder and head of Front Pembela Islam, the 
Islamic Defenders Front.   
 
Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana – Eldest daughter of President Suharto, otherwise known 
as Mbak Tutut. Under the New Order, Rukmana’s empire of companies in 
telecommunications, agribusiness, toll road construction and shipbuilding under the 
Citra Lamtorogung group substantially profited from a raft of government contracts.  
Her company PT Citra Permatasakti Persada also won the tender to computerise the 
police licensing system in the late 1990s. Rukmana’s substantial capital base was built 
through a 30% share of Liem Sioe Liong’s Salim group and her chairmanship of 
Yayasan Dana Bhakti Kesejahteraan Sosial, the foundation that organised the national 
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lottery from 1986-1993.  Rukmana also chaired Golkar in the 1990s and announced 
her desire to run for president in the 2004 elections.  
 
Ali Sadikin – Controversial governor of Jakarta from 1966-77 famous for legalising 
gambling and whose charisma and outspoken nature put him in direct conflict with 
President Suharto.  Sadikin was an important member of a number of ‘discussion’ 
groups in the 1970s and 1980s that criticised the New Order.  
 
Jusuf Sangkar – Purportedly the first civilian to earn a PhD in policing from the 
newly established KIK advanced policing centre at PTIK, Sangkar proceeded to serve 
as special advisor to Kapolri Sutanto during the period of his tenure as Police Chief. 
In the second term of the Yudhoyono presidency, Sangkar reappeared as the 
President’s advisor on food security, propelling forward the administration’s policies 
on hybrid rice.  
 
TB (Tiopan Bernard) Silalahi – Major General in the Indonesian military and 
former secretary general in the New Order bureaucracy. In the military Silalahi was 
close to Edi Sudrajat and General Bagus Sudjana through these ties, became friendly 
with Tomy Winata, dispensing contracts to him from their positions in the military 
and government. Silalahi and Sudrajat, along with a number of other senior generals 
and the Jakarta governor were deeply invested in the SCDB deal. At the time, Silalahi 
was a director for PT JIHD. Silalahi went on to serve as president commissioner for 
Bank Artha Graha. Silalahi was also active in the first term of the SBY government, 
first as one of Yudhoyono’s campaign team and then as a special presidential advisor 
until 2006.    
 
Ted Siong- Of Indian ethnic origin but purportedly brought up by Tionghoa parents, 
the businessman otherwise known as Pak Gatot is known for his holdings in 
Tionghoa-related media and as a pro-China lobbyist for Tionghoa business. Siong 
owns International Daily News and the obscure pro-Polri, pro-SBY rag, National 
News.  
 
Suharto – Military General who ruled Indonesia for 32 years in a period known as 
the New Order.  Although Suharto’s regime was known to be brutal and kleptocratic, 
his death in 2008 initiated a wave of mourning among the political elite.   
 
Tommy Suharto – Reportedly a favoured son of former President Suharto, to the 
public he has long been thought of as a rogue from even his teenage years when on a 
Saturday night he would shut down Jakarta’s main artery, Jalan Thamrin in order to 
race his collection of Italian sports cars. Tommy Suharto served four years of a fifteen 
year sentence for ordering the assassination of Supreme Court Judge, Syafiuddin 
Kartasasmita after he charged him with graft.  Recently, Tommy Suharto has been 
making a strong comeback in the business world, with a luxury property development 
in Bali and through his major shipping company, Humpuss, which happens to 
brandish a retired police officer as commissioner.  
 
Yapto Soerjosoemarno  - Part Dutch, Jewish and Javanese gangster best known for 
his leadership of the biggest preman outfit under the New Order, Pemuda Pancasila. 
In 2001, Yapto formed the Pancasila Patriot Party but won no seats in the 2004 
elections. For the 2009 elections, Yapto contested through the renamed Patriot Party 
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but faired even worse than the last. Yapto continues to head up Pemuda Pancasila but 
is struggling to find a new, post-Suharto identity for the organisation.  
   
Soemitro – Head of Kopkamtib from 1973 to 1974 before being sidelined for his 
alleged ambitions to become president. He played an important role in weakening 
Petition of Fifty by luring members away with offers of state contracts.  
 
Juwono Sudarsono – Widely respected academic from the Institute of Technology 
Bandung and the University of Indonesia who served two terms as Defence minister 
under two different administrations. Under the beleaguered presidency of 
Abdurrahman Wahid, Sudarsono took a frontal approach to military reform and spoke 
frankly about the problems facing the institution, even going so far as to point the 
finger at rogue military factions for the bloody civil wars that flared during the first 
years of democratic transition. Under the Yudhoyono presidency, Sudarsono has 
repeatedly shielded the military from key reforms such as the dismantling of military 
businesses, courts and the territorial apparatus. He is closely aligned to the think tank, 
Propatria as many on the board are old academic colleagues.  
 
Sudomo – Navy Admiral that replaced President Suharto himself as Kopkamtib Head 
from 1978 to 1983. He became famous for his effective dismantling of internal 
military dissent against President Suharto. In the same year, he also re-prohibited 
gambling. Later, as Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, his 
reward as Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs was a share in the 
profits of the national lotto.  
 
Megawati Sukarnoputri – Daughter of beloved president Sukarno and leader of the 
opposition, the Party of Democratic Struggle [PDI-P].  Megawati led the country from 
2001-2004 before losing the election to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.  Her 
term was characterised by deference to both institutions of the coercive apparatus in 
exchange for political support in the wake of Abdurrahman Wahid’s own dramatic 
removal from power. Unsurprisingly, democratic reform of the coercive apparatus 
stalled dramatically.  
 
Robbie ‘Ketek’ Sumampouw – Crony of the Suharto family. Awarded monopolies 
on coffee and sandalwood after the invasion of Timor Leste.  Later Sumampouw 
managed Tommy Suharto’s clove industry. The Sumampouws were also a heavy 
investor in Jakarta’s gambling economy, purportedly owning Hai Lai in Ancol and 
shares in many of the consortium’s premier casinos. 
  
Rudi Sutanto  - Medan Chinese and owner of several celebrated nightclubs and 
gambling dens around central and west Jakarta such as Rajamas, Neorajamas, 
Stadium, Pelangi and 1001. A core member of the kongsi of businessmen involved in 
the gambling industry from the late 90s until 2005.  
 
Kapolri Sutanto – Graduated along with President Yudhoyono in AKABRI’s 1971 
class, Sutanto was the president’s first nomination for Kapolri. Sutanto served from 
2005-2008. The former national chief of police is known for being conservative, 
somewhat aloof and poor with words but nonetheless his term did more for the 
democratic reform of Polri than any police chief prior or since.  Not only did he shut 
down the gambling economy but, with civil society organisations, he commissioned a 
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series of powerful external interventions into the financial, community relations, 
human resources, knowledge management and recruitment systems of the police.  
These policies were ultimately not taken up under the term of his successor. Sutanto 
was also not a raving democrat. His collection of Harley Davidson motorcycles and 
luxury home in Pondok Indah was well known. Quietly, he also maintained relations 
with preman and Tionghoa business communities but these were much pruned back 
compared to other Kapolri before and after him.  
 
Governor Sutiyoso – Former Letnan General in the Indonesian army and appointed 
governor of the capital from 1997 -2007, until his civilian deputy Fauzi Bowo was 
elected. Deeply involved in the gambling industry as well as the Islamic preman/ 
ormas groups that have come to characterise Jakarta’s preman scene.  
 
Kiki Syahnakri -  A Major General in the Indonesian military former vice chief of 
staff and operations assistant during the independence of Timor Leste, Syahnakri led 
the team that audited YKEP. Internationally Syahnakri is wanted as a war criminal for 
his role in inciting pro-Indonesian militias in Timor Leste but domestically, he 
continues to play a vocal role in the direction of the military.  Syahnakri is President 
Commissioner of Bank Artha Graha.   
 
Bambang Hary Iswanto Tanoesoedibjo (Hary Tanoe) – Tionghoa President of 
Bimantara Group and media mogul.  
 
Bambang Trihatmodjo – Third child of Suharto and founder of Bimantara Citra, a 
conglomerate with major media, property, and hotel interests. The conglomerate was 
hit hard by the Asian financial crisis and Hari Tanoe acquired a 30% share.  
 
Abdurrahman Wahid -  Former chairman of Indonesia’s biggest Islamic 
organisation, Nadhlatul Ulama, Wahid effectively outmaneuvered Megawati 
Sukarnoputri to become the first president of the republic after the fall of Suharto. 
Wahid’s presidency was bold at best and downright unpredictable at worst. He 
embarked on aggressive reform of the Indonesian military which would have been 
successful had in other areas his own leadership skills not been so erratic. It was 
under Wahid’s presidency that the TAP MPR IV/VII was issued, splitting the police 
from the military and placing the police under the president. Wahid also politicised 
the police, firing Kapolri Bimantoro on a whim when he realised the General would 
not support his tenure as president.  He attempted to replace the general with his 
deputy, General Chaeruddin but the vast majority of officers did not recognise this as 
legitimate and so both generals served at the same time until Wahid was eventually 
impeached in mid 2001.  Wahid is fondly remembered by the Tionghoa community 
for his reforms to their citizenship and cultural rights. Wahid passed away in 2009.  
 
Walubi – Religious NGO established by Siti Hartati Murdaya as her vehicle for 
charitable and religious publicity and is embedded in a sometimes vicious rivalry with 
Matakin which prefers to emphasise the religious element of Buddhism. Things came 
to a head in 2007 when both institutions planned separate and distinct ways of 
celebrating Imlek. President Yudhoyono negotiated a truce between the institutions by 
attending both of their celebrations.  
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Dibyo Widodo – Kapolri from 1996-8 and former assistant to President Suharto. 
Currently President Commissioner of PT Angkasa Interland.  
 
Agus Widjojo  - Graduate of AKABRI 1970 who served as head of the territorial 
command during the transition to democracy and head of the MPR [People’s 
Legislative Council]. Widjojo advocated for reform of the Koter apparatus although 
he was careful to word his proposals in softer terminology than that of other 
reformists.  Among the generals of the national police, Widjojo is known as the 
midwife of Polri, for his reformist role in separating the police institution from ABRI.  
 
Tomy Winata – Pontianak Tionghoa with a mysterious background who appears to 
have courted military contracts in Kalimantan, Irian Jaya and West Java as early as in 
his teens.  Maintained close links with Kostrad and Kopassus and was often thought 
of as the ‘anak buah’ of military general Edi Sudrajat.  Winata obtained national 
attention when in 1991, Artha Graha acquired a majority stake in PT JIHD, a military 
company, and went on to develop one of central Jakarta’s most lucrative property 
deals of the 1990s.  Since the SCDB deal, Winata has openly patronised general TB 
Silalahi and Kiki Syahnakri who both hold plum jobs as commissioners in his Artha 
Graha conglomerate. Artha Graha has expanded aggressively into banking, 
international finance, tin, coal, fishing, textiles, construction, post-tsunami 
development, and most recently, hybrid rice. Winata is building a profile as one of 
Indonesia’s major philanthropists through his NGO Artha Graha Peduli.  
 
Agus Wirahadikusumah - Major General in the Indonesian army who established 
Yayasan Eka Kartika Paksi.  By 1998, Wirahadikusumah, as Chief of Staff of ABRI 
(KSAD) had become known as a reformist who advocated that the military should 
return to its professional roots and relinquish its political, territorial, economic and 
social roles.  Wirahadikusumah died in, some believe, suspicious circumstances in 
August 2001. He died largely alienated by the political elite because of his ideas on 
military reform.  
 
Wiranto – Served as Head of ABRI and Minister for Defence during the fall of 
Suharto and was widely praised for not seizing power at the time of the transition to 
civilian rule.  Wiranto oversaw and encouraged the separation of the police from the 
military, while at the same time attempting to rebuild a territorial role for the army 
through proposals for the national security council, Ratih (rakyat terlatih or trained 
people) and the expansion of Koter.  In 2004, despite criticism that his actions in 
Timor Leste made him a war criminal, he stood as a contender against Yudhoyono 
and Megawati for president.  He did not, however, make it to second round and thus 
threw his resources and supporters towards Yudhoyono’s nomination in the hope that 
he would be rewarded in the new administration. This did not happen however and in 
2006, the former general formed Hanura, the People’s Conscience Party, which 
effectively gathered together disaffected political elites isolated from the Yudhoyono 
government.  Wiranto challenged the presidency again in the 2009 elections, this time 
as vice to Jusuf Kalla, but only received 12.4% of the vote.  
 
Yayasan Brata Bhakti – Polri’s national foundation where profits are directed to the 
welfare of officers. Although the foundation is supposed to be separate from the 
police institution, its internal structure mirrors that of the police executive, with the 
Kapolri, Wakapolri and Irwasum heading up the ‘advisory’ board.  
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Yayasan Dana Bhakti Kesejahteraan Sosial – A foundation with close ties to eldest 
son Sigit Harjojudanto and daughter Tutut Hardiyanti Rukmana of President Suharto 
that managed the national sports lottery from 1986-1991.  
 
Yayasan Kartika Eka Paksi – The army’s largest and most notorious foundation, 
established in 1972.  The foundation’s primary holding company is known as PT Tri 
Usaha Bhakti which oversaw a huge diversified network of companies that pumped 
back to the military and its officer class. The foundation became notorious for its 
partnership with Artha Graha in the 1990s and became the focus of much civil-society 
attention after the fall of Suharto. Currently PT Tri Usaha has interests in the palm 
soil industry.  
 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono – Former general in the Indonesian army, turned 
cabinet minister under the Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri 
administrations. In 2003, he established Partai Demokrat which, despite only winning 
7.5% of the vote in the 2004 legislative elections, became his political vehicle to win 
the 2004 and 2009 presidential elections.  
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